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ABSTRACT 
 
7KLVWKHVLVDGGUHVVHVWKHOHJDOFKDOOHQJHVDULVLQJLQWKHFRQWH[WRIWKHµIUDJPHQWDWLRQ
RUXQLW\RISXEOLF LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ¶ The question of the so-called fragmentation of public 
international law mainly refers to the phenomenon of diversification and expansion of public 
international law. In recent years, the proliferation of international bodies entrusted with the 
WDVNRI PRQLWRULQJ6WDWHV¶FRPSOLDQFHZLWK WKHLU LQWHUQDWLonal obligations has increased the 
possibility of conflicting interpretations of similar or identical rules of international law.  
In this context, it is claimed that international courts with limited ratione materiae and 
personae jurisdiction fragment international law and threaten its unity. This thesis examines 
the question of the fragmentation of public international law from the perspective of the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). In the view of the present author, the European 
Court has developed the autonomous interpretative principle of taking cognisance of public 
international law norms when interpreting the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR). The ECtHR employs this interpretative principle in a fashion that is distinct from 
other seminal interpretative principles, namely the so-called comparative interpretation, the 
dynamic interpretation and the principle of effectiveness.   
)XUWKHUPRUHWKLVWKHVLVSURYLGHVLQGHSWKDQDO\VLVRIWKH(&W+5¶VOHJDOUHDVRQLQJ,W
reaches conclusions on the type of public international law norms that the ECtHR takes into 
DFFRXQWDQGWKHFRQGLWLRQVDQRUPPXVWVDWLVI\WRTXDOLI\DVµUHOHYDQW¶DQGµDSSOLFDEOHLQWKH
UHODWLRQVEHWZHHQWKHSDUWLHV¶7KLVWKHVLVDOVRSURYLGHVDQRYHUDOODVVHVVPHQWRIWKHGLIIHUent 
XVHV RI SXEOLF LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ QRUPV LQ WKH (&W+5¶V UHDVRQLQJ ZKHQ H[SDQGLQJ RU
restricting the scope of the rights and freedoms of the ECHR. It stresses the importance of the 
(&W+5¶VSUDFWLFHRIUHO\LQJXSRQSXEOLFLQWHUQDWLRQDOODZQRUPVLQRUGHUto (re-)interpret the 
ECHR and overrule its previous case-law. Finally, this thesis explores the boundaries that 
should be set to restrict the impact of other relevant public international law norms on the 
construction of the ECHR. 
The study concludes that, in principle, the ECtHR does not threaten the unity of 
international law, but reads the ECHR harmoniously to public international law. The findings 
of this thesis also furnish evidence that the ECtHR has competence to pronounce on questions 
relating to international law and that, on certain occasions, it develops and enriches the scope 
and content of international law.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
1. The questions addressed  
The present thesis addresses certain of the legal challenges arising in 
WKH FRQWH[W RI WKH µIUDJPHQWDWLRQ RU XQLW\ RI SXEOLF LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ¶ The 
question of the so-called fragmentation of public international law (hereafter 
PIL) has been at the forefront of academic debate and the practice of 
international courts and tribunals over the last decade. The fragmentation of 
PIL mainly refers to the phenomenon of diversification and expansion of PIL. 
In recent years, the proliferation of international bodies entrusted with the task 
RI PRQLWRULQJ 6WDWHV¶ FRPSOLDQFH ZLWK WKHLU LQWHUQDWLRQDO REOLJDWLRQV KDV
increased the possibility of conflicting interpretations of similar or identical 
rules of PIL. The importance of the topic is evidenced by the fact that, in 2006, 
the United Nations International Law Commission (ILC) completed its Study 
RQ WKH µ)UDJPHQWDWLRQ RI ,QWHUQDWLRQDO /DZ 'LIILFXOWLHV $ULVLQJ IUom the 
'LYHUVLILFDWLRQDQG([SDQVLRQRI,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ¶1  
One of the main difficulties of the question of fragmentation of PIL is 
the role of courts with restricted ratione materiae jurisdiction, namely courts 
which are entrusted to interpret and apply a specific body of law, usually a 
treaty or a series of treaties.2 It is argued that such courts often ignore PIL 
when interpreting and applying their constitutive instruments, hence forming 
                                                             
1
 International Law Commission, µ)UDJPHQWDWLRQ RI ,QWHUQDWLRQDO /DZ 'LIILFXOWLHV DULVLQJ
IURPWKHGLYHUVLILFDWLRQDQGH[SDQVLRQRILQWHUQDWLRQDOODZ¶Report of the Study Group of the 
International Law Commission finalised by M. Koskenniemi, (1 May-9 June and 3 July-11 
August 2006) UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682. 
2
 Alternately, international courts with limited ratione materiae jurisdiction may be defined in 
a negative way: they are international courts which are not potentially available to all States 
and/or their subject-matter jurisdiction is not potentially unlimited. See R. Mackenzie, C.P.R. 
Romano, Y. Shany with P. Sands, Manual on International Courts and Tribunals (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2010) 1. 
2 
 
µOLWWOH VHSDUDWH HPSLUHV¶ DQG µVSHFLDO UHJLPHV¶ +HQFH LW LV FOaimed that 
international courts with limited ratione materiae jurisdiction fragment PIL 
and threaten its unity.  
The thesis examines the question of the fragmentation of PIL from the 
perspective of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR or Court). The 
choice to study the example of the ECtHR is based on the fact that the court in 
question has the most extensive jurisprudence of any international court in PIL. 
Furthermore, the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR)3 and its 
Additional Protocols, which update and enhance the scope and substantive 
guarantees of rights and freedoms, form the most well-developed regional 
system for the protection of human rights. Notably, the ECtHR has been 
frequently accused of endangering the unity of PIL. Therefore, it is the best 
candidate for testing whether, and if yes, how, it mitigates the challenges 
arising from the fragmentation of PIL through an examination of its case-law.    
The thesis discusses the interpretation of the ECHR by taking 
cognisance of PIL norms. The ECtHR has already produced a significant 
pertinent practice. Judges sitting at the bench of the Court witness that hardly a 
week goes by without the Court discussing issues related to PIL.4 This practice 
also becomes evident from the text of the judgments themselves. It is common 
                                                             
3
 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (concluded on 4 
November 1950; entered into force on 3 September 1953) ETS No 005. 
4
 As noted by Judges Myjer and Caflisch: ( 0\MHU µ+DUGO\ D :HHN *RHV E\ ZLWKRXW«
Observations on the Increasing Number of General Problems of International Law in the Case 
/DZRIWKH(XURSHDQ&RXUWRI+XPDQ5LJKWV¶LQ,%RHUHILMQ-*ROGVFKPLGWHGVChanging 
Perceptions of Sovereignty and Human Rights (Intersentia, Antwerp-Oxford-Portland, 2008) 
327, 327-328; L. CaIOLVFK µ,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZDQG WKH(XURSHDQ&RXUWRI +XPDQ5LJKWV¶ LQ
Dialogue between Judges (Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 2007) 23, 27. See also Speech of 
H.E. Judge R. Higgins, President of the International Court of Justice, µ7KH,QWHUQDWLRQDO&RXUW 
of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights: Partners for the Protection of Human 
5LJKWV¶Ceremony marking the 50th Anniversary of the European Court of Human Rights, 30 
January 2009, available at http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/38D1E6A5-DE24-42BD-
BC3D-45CCCC8A7F8A/0/30012009PresidentHigginsHearing_eng_.pdf  
3 
 
practice to encounter a separate heading under the Facts of the case entitled 
µUHOHYDQW LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ¶ RU µUHOHYDQW LQWHUQDWLRQDO WUHDWLHV DQG RWKHU
PDWHULDOV¶LQZKLFKWKH&RXUWPDNHVUHIHUHQFHWRDYDULHW\RI3,/QRUPV5 It is 
also of interest that in 2012 the Court launched a new search engine of it case-
law on its website. A new search option was introduced specifically including 
µLQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ DQG RWKHU UHOHYDQW PDWHULDO¶ $Q DGGLWLRQDO UHFHQW
development is the establishment of a small research division in Strasbourg, 
which is entrusted with the task of carrying out studies on comparative and PIL 
questions. The division has already published a report on the use of Council of 
Europe treaties in the case-law of the Court.6 7KH &RXUW¶V SUDFWLFH WR WDNH
cognisance of PIL has already found its way into the new editions of the 
general textbooks discussing the ECHR and the jurisprudence of the Court.7 
Most importantly, in the 2010 Interlaken Declaration by the High Level 
Conference on the Future of the European Court of Human Rights, member 
States explicitly underlined the importance of ensuring that the judges 
appointed to the Court have sufficient knowledge of PIL.8    
It is considered a truism to state that the ECtHR takes cognisance of 
PIL as an aid for the interpretation of the ECHR. Rather, this study provides 
                                                             
5
 M. Eudes, La Pratique Judiciaire de la Cour Européenne GHV'URLWVGHO¶+RPPH (Pedone, 
Paris, 2005) 250. 
6
 Report by the Research Division, The Use of Council of Europe Treaties in the Case-Law of 
the European Court of Human Rights (Council of Europe/European Court of Human Rights, 
2011), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/FE35FFDC-6FFC-458E-A2E4-
5FE51767A4E2/0/RAPPORT_RECHERCHE_CoE_Treaties_EN.pdf. 
7
 For example, cf. the fifth edition of C. Ovey, R. White (eds.), Jacobs and White, The 
European Convention of Human Rights (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010) 18, 580-581 
to the fourth edition (2006).  
8
 High Level Conference on the Future of the European Court of Human Rights, Interlaken 
Declaration, 19 February 2010, point 8 (a), available at  
http://www.eda.admin.ch/etc/medialib/downloads/edazen/topics/europa/euroc.Par.0133.File.tm
p/final_en.pdf; Guidelines of the Committee of Ministers on the Selection of Candidates for the 
Post of Judge at the European Court of Human Rights, CM (2012) 40 Addendum Final, 29 
March 2012, [27]-[28]. 
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detailed discussion of the legal reasoning of the Court and the different uses of 
PIL. An important question is whether the Court follows a specific 
methodology and whether it is possible to discern patterns in its jurisprudence. 
Certain interpretative means and principles have already been suggested, in the 
IUDJPHQWDWLRQRI3,/GLVFXVVLRQDQGLQWKH,/&¶VZRUNLQRUGHUWRDOOHYLDWHWKH
difficulties of fragmentation. This thesis examines whether the Court follows 
the aforementioned principles. If the Court does follow a certain interpretative 
practice in its case-law, it is also crucial to explore how the interpretative 
practice of taking cognisance of PIL norms interrelates with other interpretative 
principles, such as the dynamic interpretation of the ECHR or the principle of 
effectiveness. 
Another question concerns the different ways that PIL norms assist in 
the interpretation of the ECHR. Is the Court employing them in a rhetorical 
fashion? Do PIL norms serve as a supportive consideration of a given 
interpretation or do they have a significant impact on the final construction of 
the ECHR? Further, is the Court using PIL norms to enhancing the effective 
protection of human rights or to restricting the scope of protection under the 
ECHR? In order to emphasise the importance of systematically exploring the 
varying ways in which PIL norms are employed by the Court in its legal 
reasoning, this thesis follows the following structure. The relevant 
jurisprudence is classified and analysed on the basis of how the Court uses PIL 
norms, for example in order to define terms in the text of the ECHR or to 
expand or restrict the scope of rights envisaged in the ECHR.         
If the Court has such an extensive practice of engaging with and taking 
other PIL norms into account, how it treats these external norms should be 
5 
 
VWXGLHG6LQFHWKH&RXUW¶VMXULVGLFWLRQLVUHVWULFWHGWRLQWHUSUHWLQJDQGDSSO\LQJ
the ECHR and the Additional Protocols thereto (Article 32 ECHR), is there a 
boundary to draw with regards to its authority and competence to take 
cognisance of PIL norms for interpreting the ECHR?  
Finally, and most importantly, does the practice of the Court of reading 
the ECHR in light of PIL norms effectively alleviates the alleged threat of 
fragmentation? Does the ECtHR endanger the unity of PIL? Or does it develop 
its case-law and the rights and freedoms under the ECHR consistently with and 
harmoniously to PIL?    
While writing this thesis, two other studies were published concerning, 
in general, the relationship of the ECHR to PIL.9 This is not surprising 
FRQVLGHULQJWKHVLJQLILFDQFHRI WKH&RXUW¶V MXULVSUXGHQFHDQGWKHWRSLFDOLW\RI
the fragmentation of PIL discussion. It comes to reinforce the belief of the 
SUHVHQW DXWKRU WKDW WKH &RXUW¶V SUDFWLFH TXDOLILHV DV D OHJDOO\ VLJQLILFDQW
phenomenon worthy of further study. Nonetheless, there are considerable 
differences between the present thesis and these publications.  
Both studies focus on different research questions to the questions 
discussed in this thesis. As it will be seen, the present author puts forward an 
argument which has not been previously explored in literature. Also, Vanneste 
and Forowicz, in their studies, chose to focus on particular topics (Vanneste on 
general international law and Forowicz on specific themes, such as child rights, 
UHIXJHHV¶ ULJKWV ZKHUHDV WKH SUHVHQW VWXG\ GLVFXVVHV WKH &RXUW¶V FDVH-law 
holistically. The temporal scope also differs substantially. Although both 
                                                             
9
 F. Vanneste, General International Law before Human Rights Courts ± Assessing the 
Specialty Claims of International Human Rights Law (Intersentia, Antwerp-Oxford-Portland, 
2010); M. Forowicz, The Reception of International Law by the European Court of Human 
Rights (Oxford University Press, New York, 2010). 
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monographs are quite recent, they do not take recent judgments of the Court 
(2008-2010) into account, which, as it will be seen, are fundamental to drawing 
final conclusions regarding the practice of the ECtHR.       
 
2. Definition of terminology  
It is essential to clarify the meaning of certain terms which are used 
WKURXJKRXW WKH WKHVLV 7KH UHDGHU FDQ VHH WKH WHUP µSXEOLF LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ
QRUPV¶ DOUHDG\ LQ WKH WLWOH RI WKH WKHVLV This term refers to the sources of 
international law, as envisaged in Article 38 (1) of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice: international treaties, international custom and 
general principles of law recognised by civilised nations (general principles of 
law). It additionally includes non-binding international instruments (soft-law). 
)RUUHDVRQVRIFRQYHQLHQFHµSXEOLFLQWHUQDWLRQDOODZ¶ZLOOEHKHUHDIWHUUHIHUUHG
WRDVµ3,/¶ 
There are also other important terms which will be used in the 
,QWURGXFWLRQDQGWKURXJKRXWWKHWKHVLVIRUH[DPSOHµJHQHUDOLQWHUQDWLRQDOODZ¶
General international law is a concept that is often used but rarely defined. If 
fact, there is no authoritative definition of the term.10 International lawyers 
often adopt a negative definition, namely general international law is anything 
but treaty law (lex specialis).11 However, if treaties are excluded altogether 
from its scope, a narrow meaning would be attributed to general international 
                                                             
10
 07 .DPPLQJD µ)LQDO 5HSRUW RQ WKH ,PSDFW RI ,QWHUQDWLRQDO +XPDQ 5LJKWV /DZ RQ
*HQHUDO ,QWHUQDWLRQDO /DZ¶ LQ 07 .DPPLQJD 0 6FKHLQLQ HGV The Impact of Human 
Rights on General International Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009) 1, 2; R. 
Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010) 262. 
11
 Kamminga, (note 10). 
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law.12 Consequently, general international law for the present purposes means 
public international law which is binding on a large number of States. This 
includes international custom, general principles of law, jus cogens and 
multilateral treaties, which are widely ratified and are open to all States (for 
example, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights).  
µ,QWHUQDWLRQDO FRXUWV DQG WULEXQDOV¶ LV DOVR D WHUP ZKLFK ZLOO EH
frequently encountered. It refers to a standing organ or an ad hoc arbitral 
tribunal which is established by an international legal instrument and which 
interprets and applies international law and renders binding decisions. For 
UHDVRQVRIFRQYHQLHQFH,XVXDOO\HPSOR\WKHWHUPµLQWHUQDWLRQDOFRXUWV¶ZKLFK
LQFOXGHV DUELWUDO WULEXQDOV WRR ,Q FHUWDLQ LQVWDQFHV WKH WHUP µLQWHUQDWLRQDO
ERG\¶ LVXVHG LQRUGHU WRFRYHU more widely, monitoring mechanisms which 
interpret and apply PIL, but which are not endowed with judicial functions and 
whose views are not legally binding, such as the United Nations Treaty bodies.     
Finally, the study uses a number of different terms denoting the 
H[HUFLVH RI µWDNLQJ FRJQLVDQFH RI¶ VXFK DV µWDNH LQWR DFFRXQW¶ µWDNH LQWR
FRQVLGHUDWLRQ¶µWDNHDFFRXQWRI¶µLQWHUSUHW LQOLJKWRI¶µUHO\¶µILQGUHFRXUVH¶
µKDYHUHFRXUVH¶I use these phrases interchangeably. 
 
3. Delimiting the scope of the present research  
This thesis focuses on judgments delivered by the Grand Chamber 
between January 2000 and September 2011. Confining the focus from 2000 
RQZDUGV LV MXVWLILHGRQWKHEDVLV WKDW WKH(&W+5¶VSUDFWLFHRI LQWHUSUHWLQJWKH
                                                             
12
 Gardiner, (note 10); cf. J. Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law 
(Cambridge University Press, New York, 2003) 148. 
8 
 
ECHR by taking cognisance of PIL norms became more regular since then. I 
refer and, in certain instances, I discuss some important judgments predating 
this time-frame, when it is deemed necessary for the analysis. One of the 
original aspects of this study is that it discusses a series of recent judgments by 
the Grand Chamber (2008-2011), which are important for the present purposes 
and which have not been discussed in previous studies. 
The thesis primarily addresses judgments of the Grand Chamber. An 
H[KDXVWLYHVXUYH\RIWKH&RXUW¶VFDVH-law on almost any topic is very difficult, 
if not impossible, due to the great number of judgments and decisions. Also, it 
EHFDPHREYLRXVIURPWKHLQLWLDOVWDJHVRIWKHUHVHDUFKWKDWWKH&RXUW¶VSUDFWLFH
of taking cognisance of PIL norms is so common within the jurisprudence that 
any expectation of exhaustively treating the subject, especially within the 
confines of a Ph.D. thesis, is proven untenable. Therefore, the present author 
chose to focus on the Grand Chamber.  
This choice is justified by virtue of the authoritativeness of the Grand 
&KDPEHU¶V MXGJPHQWV 7KH WH[W RI WKH (&+5 H[SOLFLWO\ DFNQRZOHGJHV WKH
authority of the Grand Chamber to deal with cases which raise serious 
questions affecting the interpretation of the ECHR or the AP thereto or threaten 
WKH FRQVLVWHQF\ RI WKH &RXUW¶V MXULVSUXGHQFH13 Moreover, as it has been 
DGPLWWHGE\WKHIRUPHU3UHVLGHQWRIWKH&RXUWWKH*UDQG&KDPEHU¶VMXGJPHQWV
PD\ UHSUHVHQW OHVV WKDQ  RI WKH &RXUW¶V MXGJPHQWV EXW WKH\ KDYH D
µSDUWLFXODUO\ VWURQJ LPSDFW¶14 on the &RXUW¶V MXULVSUXGHQFH+RZHYHU LWRXJKW
                                                             
13
 Articles 30 and 43 ECHR. D.J. Harris et al, Law on the European Convention on Human 
Rights (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009) 17. 
14
 Speech by J.-P. Costa, President of the European Court of Human Rights, on the occasion of 
the opening of the judicial year, 21 January 2010, 5,  available at 
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to be noted that, on certain occasions, some relevant and important judgments 
stemming from the Chambers are included in the analysis, where they are 
considered necessary. 
 A further caveat relates to the exclusion of two types of provisions of 
the ECHR from this examination. The first are the direct references (renvois) to 
PIL, as provided in Article 7, Article 15 (1) Article 35 (1) and Article 1 of the 
first AP. These provisions authorise the Court to have direct recourse to 
µLQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ¶ $UWLFOHV   (&+5 µJHQHUDO SULQFLSOHV RI ODZ DV
UHFRJQLVHG E\ FLYLOLVHG QDWLRQV¶ $UWLFOH   (&+5 µJHQHUDOO\ UHFRJQLVHG
UXOHV RI LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ¶ $UWLFOH   (&+5 DQG µJHQHUDO SULQFLSOHV RI
international ODZ¶$UWLFOH ILUVW$3)LQGLQJUHFRXUVHWR3,/DVDPDWWHURI
applicable law EHIRUHWKH&RXUWLVGLVWLQFWIURPWKH&RXUW¶VSUDFWLFHRIWDNLQJ
cognisance of PIL norms for the purpose of interpreting the ECHR. The 
second type of provisions, which are not discussed, are the provisions of a 
procedural nature contained in the ECHR. This choice was made due to the 
aforementioned time and space constraints.  
Therefore, with these caveats in mind, this study examines judgments 
stemming (mostly) from the Grand Chamber in which the Court takes PIL 
norms into account when interpreting the ECHR. This means that I discuss the 
pertinent case-law that the Court uses PIL norms in its legal reasoning, namely 
other international treaties, international custom, general principles of law and 
non-binding international norms (soft-law). Although, strictly speaking, soft-
law is not part of lex lata PIL, it will be seen that the Court frequently uses 
                                                                                                                                                                 
http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/02526B5A-039E-47B3-9F94-
2393BDDB6291/0/20100129_Speech_PresidentCosta_OpeningofJudicialYear.pdf.  
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instruments which lack binding force. Hence, precluding them from the scope 
of WKLVUHVHDUFKZRXOGQRWJLYHDQDFFXUDWHDFFRXQWRIWKH&RXUW¶VLQWHUSUHWDWLYH
practice. Pertinent examples of soft-law are Recommendations and Resolutions 
of the Committee of Ministers and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council 
of Europe, United Nations documents, reports and legally relevant views issued 
by international bodies.         
 
4. The structure of the thesis 
The thesis is divided into two Parts. Part I examines the question of the 
µIUDJPHQWDWLRQRUXQLW\RI LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ¶3DUW ,DLPV QRWRQly to provide 
the general background to understanding the fragmentation challenges, but also 
WRVKHGOLJKWRQWKH(&W+5¶VMXULVSUXGHQFH&KDSWHUJLYHVDQRYHUYLHZRIWKH
difficulties arising in the fragmentation of PIL context. Chapter 2 discusses 
how international courts and tribunals have addressed these concerns in their 
judgments.  
Part II discusses the relevant case-law of the Court. It is divided into 
three Sections and seven Chapters on the basis of how the ECtHR uses PIL 
norms in its legal reasoning. Section I FRQFHUQV WKH TXHVWLRQ RI µ)LQGLQJ
recourse to public international law in order to define certain terms embodied 
LQWKH(&+5DQGWRGHILQHFHUWDLQFRQFHSWVQHFHVVDU\IRUDSSO\LQJWKH(&+5¶
Chapters 3 and 4 analyse the respective case-law in which the Court takes PIL 
norms into account to define terms embodied in the text of the ECHR and to 
define concepts which are necessary for applying the ECHR (for example, the 
concept of jurisdiction). Section II relates to cases where the Court takes 
cognisance of PIL and restricts the scope of rights and freedoms under the 
11 
 
ECHR. Under this Section, Chapter 5 discusses the restriction of the right to 
access a court by relying on customary international law rules and Chapter 6 
deals with other instances of taking cognisance of PIL norms which restrict 
rights and freedoms under the ECHR. Section III examines judgments in which 
the reliance upon PIL norms expands ratione materiae the scope of the rights 
and freedoms under the ECHR. This Section includes Chapter 7 on enlarging 
the applicability of the ECHR, Chapter 8 on reading positive obligations into 
the protective scope of rights and freedoms and, finally, Chapter 9 concerning 
the use of PIL norms as a material factor to assess the proportionality of a 
restriction to a right envisaged in the ECHR.  
The final Chapter of the thesis draws final conclusions on the practice 
of the Court when it takes PIL norms into account for construing the ECHR 
and how this practice contributes to and further develops the discussion on the 
fragmentation of PIL.    
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PART I7KHTXHVWLRQRIµIUDJPHQWDWLRQRUXQLW\RI 
SXEOLFLQWHUQDWLRQDOODZ¶ 
 
1. 7KHTXHVWLRQRIµIUDJPHQWDWLRQRUXQLW\RISXEOLFLQWHUQDWLRQDOODZ¶ 
 
1.1 Introduction 
7KHTXHVWLRQRI³IUDJPHQWDWLRQRUXQLW\RI LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ´KDVEHHQ
at the forefront of academic debate and international judicial practice over the 
last decade. The fact that two former Presidents of the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) addressed the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) with 
pertinent concerns illustrates the topicality of the issue. Former President 
Schwebel in his 1999 speech discussed the emergence of new international 
judicial institutions and expressed cautiousness regarding the µpossibility of 
significant conflicting interpretations of international law¶.15 In the same vein, 
former President Guillaume in 2000 urged the UNGA towards µrealis[ing] the 
danger of fragmentation of the law¶16  
The same year the International Law Commission (ILC) included the 
topic µRisks Ensuing from the Fragmentation of International Law¶ into its 
long-WHUP ZRUN SURJUDPPH $ 6WXG\ *URXS ZDV HVWDEOLVKHG DQG WKH WRSLF¶V
title was modified, thus becoming µFragmentation of international law: 
difficulties arising from the diversification and expansion of international law¶. 
Between 2002 and 2007 the Study Group issued five Reports examining 
                                                             
15
 Address to the Plenary Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations by Judge S. 
M. Schwebel, President of the International Court of Justice, 26 October 1999, available at 
http://www.icj-cij.org/court/index.php?pr=87&pt=3&p1=1&p2=3&p3=1. 
16
 Address to the Plenary Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations by Judge G.  
Guillaume, President of the International Court of Justice, 26 October 2000, available at 
http://www.icj-cij.org/court/index.php?pr=84&pt=3&p1=1&p2=3&p3=1 (emphasis added).  
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certain aspects of the topic17 and in 2006 its Chairman, Martii Koskenniemi, 
finalised an overall Report accompanied by some General Conclusions.18 
However, what is it really denoted when referring to the so-called 
fragmentation or unity of public international law (PIL)? Is it a dilemma? PIL 
is either fragmented or united? Or should PIL be perceived as being 
fragmented or united? Is it about fragmentation of international law or 
fragmentation in international law? The first question would imply that 
fragmentation is an inherent quality of PIL, whereas the second would indicate 
that fragmentation is a phenomenon that takes place within PIL. Fragmentation 
of PIL is being employed, in literature and in the present thesis, to address 
issues arising from the expansion, diversification and specialisation of the 
scope of PIL. 
The difficulties arising from the fragmentation of PIL should be seen in 
light of an accumulation of different factors that led to the current state of 
affairs.19 First, PIL has been expanded and specialised towards the detailed 
regulation of many fields of international relations. Since the beginning of the 
twentieth century, States pursued intense law-making activity on the 
                                                             
17
 InternDWLRQDO/DZ&RPPLVVLRQ,/&µ5HSRUWRIWKH,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ&RPPLVVLRQRQWKH
Work of its 54th 6HVVLRQ¶  $SULO-7 June and 22 July-16 August 2002) UN Doc A/57/10 
(2002 ILC Rep.); ,/&µ5HSRUWRIWKH,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ&RPPLVVLRQRQWKH:RUNRILWVth 
6HVVLRQ¶0D\-6 June and 7 July-8 August 2003) UN Doc A/58/10 (2003 ILC Rep.); ILC, 
µReport of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 56th 6HVVLRQ¶0D\-4 June 
and 5 July-6 August 2004) UN Doc A/59/10 (2004 ILC Rep.); ,/& µReport of the 
International Law Commission on the Work of its 57th 6HVVLRQ¶0D\-3 June and 11 July-5 
August 2005) UN Doc A/60/10 (2005 ILC Rep.) ,/& µ5HSRUW RI WKH ,QWHUQDWLRQDO /DZ
&RPPLVVLRQRQWKH:RUNRILWVWK6HVVLRQ¶0D\-9 June and 3 July-11 August 2006) UN 
Doc A/61/10 (2006 ILC Rep.). All ILC Reports are available at 
<http://www.un.org/law/ilc/index.html>. 
18
 ,/& µ5HSRUW RI WKH 6WXG\ *URXS RI WKH ,QWHUQDWLRQDO /DZ &RPPLVVLRQ ILQDOLVHG E\ 0
KoskenniemL¶0D\-9 June and 3 July-11 August 2006) UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682 (ILC Final 
Rep.). The General Conclusions of the Study Group are incorporated into the 2006 ILC Final 
Rep. 
19
 <6KDQ\ µ1R/RQJHUD:HDN'HSDUWPHQWRI 3RZHU" 5HIOHFWLRQV RQ WKH(PHUJHQFHRID
1HZ,QWHUQDWLRQDO-XGLFLDU\¶EJIL 73. 
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international plane, by concluding numerous bilateral or multilateral 
international treaties of general or technical nature concerning, for example, 
international peace and security, trade relations or the protection of human 
rights. Detailed treaty provisions conferred specific rights and obligations upon 
State parties, which may complement, conflict or overlap each other.20 
At the same time, many of these treaties or set of treaties governing 
fields in international law, so-called µsub-systems¶21 attained a certain degree 
of autonomy vis-à-vis their normative environment. Tailor-made provisions 
relating to the creation, modification, application and the operation of the body 
of law are included in these sub-systems, thus, creating specific regimes which 
effectively self-regulate many aspects of their implementation. The fact that 
these regimes regulate to a certain extent ± exhaustively or not ± their own 
operation raises the question of their relationship to general international law, 
such as the rules on the law of treaties, for example - as codified in the Vienna 
Convention of 196922 and the rules on State responsibility - as codified in the 
Articles on Responsibility of States for Wrongful Acts of 2001.23 In other 
words, are these bodies of law isolated from the rest of PIL? It also raises the 
question of whether or not, and how, these specific regimes interrelate.24  
                                                             
20
 &:-HQNVµ7KH&RQIOLFWRI/DZ0DNLQJ7UHDWLHV¶;;;BYbkIL 401. 
21
 .=HPDQHNµ7KH/HJDO)RXQGDWLRQVRIWKH,QWHUQDWLRQDO/HJDO6\VWHP¶RdC 1, 
62. Also, H. Kelsen, Introduction to the Problems of Legal Theory (Franz Deuticke, Vienna, 
1934) (translated by B. Litschewski Paulson, S.L. Paulson, Clarendon Press, New York, 1992) 
107. 
22
 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969; entered into force 27 
January 1980) 1155 UNTS 331 (VCLT). 
23
 ,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ&RPPLVVLRQ¶VArticles on Responsibility of States for Wrongful Acts as 
adopted in the Report of its 53rd Session (23 April-1 June and 2 July-10 August 2001) and 
DFNQRZOHGJHGE\WKH81*HQHUDO$VVHPEO\¶V$5HV-DQXDry 2002) YbkILC 2001, 
vol. II, Part Two (Articles on State Responsibility). 
24
 %6LPPDµ6HOI-&RQWDLQHG5HJLPHV¶ ;9,Neth YbkIL 111, 111-118; A. Marschik, 
µ7RR0XFK2UGHU"7KH,PSDFWRI6SHFLDO6HFRQGDU\1RUPVRQWKH8QLW\DQG(IILFDF\RIWKH
InternDWLRQDO/HJDO6\VWHP¶EJIL 212, 212-213. 
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Fragmentation of PIL is also driven by another important development, 
the institutionalisation of international relations through the creation of global 
and regional international organisations. Characteristic examples are the 
creation of the United Nations, as a successor of the League of Nations, the 
World Trade Organisation or the Council of Europe. The establishment of third 
party dispute settlement mechanisms of a judicial or quasi-judicial nature 
entrusted to supervise the proper function of the constitutive treaties of these 
organisations fuels the phenomenon of fragmentation. This development is 
usually referred to in thH OLWHUDWXUHDVWKHµSUROLIHUDWLRQRI LQWHUQDWLRQDOFRXUWV
DQGWULEXQDOV¶25 The increasing establishment and functioning of international 
bodies is not only a parallel development to the expansion of international law 
but further contributes to the challenges arising from this expansion, since 
these bodies of a judicial or semi-judicial nature interpret, apply, elucidate and 
develop their respective treaty instruments and PIL. Hence, the possibility of 
conflicting or overlapping jurisdictions and divergent pronouncements 
concerning similar or identical PIL norms gradually becomes a reality.    
7KHSUHVHQW&KDSWHU LQWURGXFHVWKHTXHVWLRQRIµIUDJPHQWDWLRQRUXQLW\
RI LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ¶ IURPD OHJDOSHUVSHFWLYH,WGLVFXVVHVWKHGLIILFXOWLHV WKDW
have arisen in light of international case law, the academic debate and the 
,/&¶V ZRUN The second section clarifies the distinction between substantive 
and procedural coherence of PIL and underlines that the focus of this thesis is 
on substantive issues. The third section discerns three main strands of thought 
                                                             
25
 * *XLOODXPH µ$GYDQWDJHV DQG 5LVNV RI 3UROLIHUDWLRQ $ %OXHSULQW IRU $FWLRQ¶  
JIntlCrimJ  60 6FKZHEHO µ7KH 3UROLIHUDWLRQ RI ,QWHUQDWLRQDO 7ULEXQDOV 7KUHDW RU
3URPLVH"¶LQ0$QGHQDVHG), Judicial Review in International Perspective, vol. III (Kluwer 
Law International, The Netherlands, 2000) 3. Cf $$& 7ULQGDGH µ7KH 'HYHORSPHQW RI
International Human Rights Law by the Operation and the Case-Law of the European and 
Inter-American CourWVRI+XPDQ5LJKWV¶HRLJ 157, 158.  
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in the present literature insofar as the fragmentation of PIL and the 
multiplication of international courts and tribunals are concerned. Each strand 
identifies different problems and suggests different ways to mitigate the 
challenges of fragmentation of PIL. The fourth section builds upon these 
different views and argues what are, in the view of the present author, the 
crucial challenges.          
 
 
1.2 The substantive and procedural coherence of public international 
law 
The challenges posed by the expansion and specialisation of PIL are 
closely linked to the proliferation of international courts and other international 
monitoring bodies entrusted with the supervision of treaties.26 Two different 
aspects of these challenges may be distinguished, the substantive and the 
procedural, although the ILC and the present thesis focus on the substantive 
aspect.27  
The first aspect relates to substantive issues, namely a scenario in which 
different international courts interpreted a PIL norm in different ways.28 
International law scholars are mostly concerned with the construction of 
general international law ± customary international law, general principles of 
law and widely ratified multilateral treaties open to all States ± which serves 
                                                             
26
 ILC Final Rep., [157]. 
27
 ILC Final Rep., [47]-[55]. 
28
 % .LQJVEXU\ µ)RUHZRUG ,V WKH 3UROLIHUDWLRQ RI ,QWHUQDWLRQDO &RXUWV DQG 7ULEXQDOV D
6\VWHPLF3UREOHP"¶N.Y.U.J.Intl.L.&Pol. 679. 
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the role of unifying PIL.29 Special attention is also drawn to the question of 
how international courts treat the rules on treaty interpretation, because they 
function as the spinal column of international law and they provide PIL with a 
³FRPPRQODQJXDJH´KHQFHSUHVHUYLQJLWVXQLW\30 The ILC stressed in its work 
the relevance and significance of the rules on treaty interpretation, as envisaged 
in the VCLT, as a unifying framework transcending general and special (treaty) 
international law.31  
The second aspect concerns procedural issues, hence, instances when 
more than one international court exercises jurisdiction over the same legal 
dispute (overlapping or concurrent jurisdiction). It is argued that the absence of 
formal links between the international courts or/and treaty supervisory 
mechanisms, such as a hierarchical structure or rules regulating the 
delimitation of competence among courts, renders the procedural coherence of 
the dispute settlement system fragile.32  
An example illustrating both the procedural and substantive aspects of 
fragmentation of PIL is the Mox Plant dispute between Ireland and the United 
Kingdom (UK). At issue were a number of facilities on a site at Sellafield, on 
the coast of the Irish Sea, including the Mox plant facility, designed to recycle 
plutonium. Ireland claimed that the operation of the plant violated the 
                                                             
29
 B. Rudolf, µ8QLW\ DQG 'LYHUVLW\ LQ WKH 6HWWOHPHQW RI ,QWHUQDWLRQDO 'LVSXWHV¶ LQ $
Zimmermann, R. Hofmann (eds.), Unity and Diversity in International Law (Duncker and 
Humbolt, Berlin 2006) 389, 392; N. Matz-/ȨFN µ3URPRWLQJ WKH8QLW\ RI ,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ
Standard-6HWWLQJ E\ ,QWHUQDWLRQDO 7ULEXQDOV¶ LQ ' .|QLJ et al. (eds.), International Law 
Today: New Challenges and the Need for Reform (Springer, Heidelberg, 2008) 99, 117-118.  
30
 P.-0 'XSX\ µ7KH 'DQJHU RI )UDJPHQWDWLRQ RU 8QLILFDWLRQ RI WKH ,QWHUQDWLRQDO /HJDO 
6\VWHPDQGWKH,QWHUQDWLRQDO&RXUWRI-XVWLFH¶ N.Y.U.J.Intl.L.&Pol. 791, 792, 796. 
31
 ILC Final Rep., [17]. 
32
 -,&KDUQH\µ,V,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ7KUHDWHQHGE\0XOWLSOH,QWHUQDWLRQDO7ULEXQDOV"¶
271 RdC 101, 134, 373; Y. Shany, The Competing Jurisdictions of International Courts and 
Tribunals (Oxford University Press, New York, 2003) 106-110; 77UHYHVµ$GYLVRU\2SLQLRQV
RI WKH ,QWHUQDWLRQDO &RXUW RI -XVWLFH RQ 4XHVWLRQV 5DLVHG E\ 2WKHU ,QWHUQDWLRQDO 7ULEXQDOV¶
(2000) 4 Max Planck YbkUNL 215. 
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international obligations of the UK under the UN Convention of the Law of the 
Sea (UNCLOS), the European Community (EC) law and the Convention on the 
Protection of the Marine Environment of the North East Atlantic (OSPAR 
Convention). Ireland brought complaints before three different international 
tribunals.33 The European Court of Justice (ECJ) was also involved in the 
dispute.34 This resulted in four different international courts rendering 
decisions relating to different aspects of the same dispute.  
The UK raised the objection before the International Tribunal for the 
Law of the Sea (ITLOS) that the tribunal lacked jurisdiction, because the main 
elements of the dispute were governed by the compulsory dispute settlement 
procedures under the OSPAR Convention and the EC Treaty. The ITLOS in its 
Order on the interim measures procedure categorically dismissed this argument 
upholding that the Tribunal has prima facie jurisdiction. It maintained that  
even if the OSPAR Convention, the EC Treaty and the Euratom 
Treaty contain rights and obligations similar to or identical with the 
rights and obligations set out in the [UNCLOS], the rights and 
obligations under those agreements have a separate existence from 
those under the [UNCLOS].35  
It went on to explain that this is because   
                                                             
33
 Pending the constitution of the Annex VII arbitral tribunal, Ireland seised ITLOS for a 
measure of interim relief Article 290 (5) UNCLOS. Decisions were issued by the International 
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea Mox Plant (Ireland v. UK), Provisional Measures, 3 December 
2001, (2002) 41 ILM 405 (ITLOS Mox Plant decision). An UN Convention on the Law of the 
Sea tribunal gave also a judgment in the Mox Plant (Ireland v. UK) Procedural Order No 3, 
Suspension of Proceedings on Jurisdiction and Merits, and Request for Further Provisional 
Measures, 24 June 2003, 42 ILM 1187 (UNCLOS Mox Plant case). The Permanent Court of 
Arbitration tribunal gave its view in Access to Information under Article 9 of the OSPAR 
Convention (Ireland v. UK), Final Award, 2 July 2003, 42 ILM 1118 (Ospar Convention 
Award). 
34
 Commission v. Ireland, Case C-459/03, 18 January 2006 (Grand Chamber). 
35
 ITLOS Mox Plant decision, [50] (emphases added).  
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the application of international law rules on interpretation of treaties 
to identical or similar provisions of different treaties may not yield 
the same results having regard to, inter alia, differences in the 
respective contexts, objects and purposes, subsequent practice of 
parties and travaux preparatoires.36  
/LNHZLVHWKH263$5WULEXQDOKHOGWKDWµ>H@DFKRIWKH263$5&RQYHQWLRQDQG
[EC law] is an independent legal source that establishes a distinct legal 
UHJLPH¶37 
The UNCLOS arbitral tribunal took a slightly different position in its 
judgment. It did accept that the ITLOS Order was correct in finding that the 
UNCLOS Tribunal has prima facie jurisdiction over the dispute. Moreover, it 
reiterated that, regardless of whether certain aspects of the dispute are regulated 
by other international treaties (OSPAR Convention and the EC treaty), the 
character of the dispute is one involving the interpretation and application of 
the UNCLOS.38 However, given the exclusive jurisdiction of the ECJ over EC 
law, the UNCLOS tribunal doubted whether any provisions of the UNCLOS 
µZRXOGLQIDFWJLYHULVHWRDself-contained and distinct dispute capable of being 
resolved by >LW@¶39 It decided to suspend its proceedings, on the basis of 
µFRQVLGHUDWLRQV RI PXWXDO UHVSHFW DQG FRPLW\¶40 towards the ECJ, until the 
latter gave its judgment.   
The ECJ, in turn, did not share the same degree of sympathy for parallel 
international judicial proceedings. It decided that, if a significant part of the 
                                                             
36
 Ibid, [51] (emphases added). 
37
 Ospar Convention Award, [142]. 
38
 UNCLOS Mox Plant decision, [18]. 
39
 Ibid, [26] (emphases added). 
40
 Ibid, [28]. 
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dispute concerns the interpretation and application of Community law, then 
µ>L@W LV IRU WKH &RXUW VKRXOG WKH QHHG DULVH WR LGHQWLI\ WKH HOHPHQWV RI WKH
dispute which relate to provisions of international agreements in question 
ZKLFK IDOO RXWVLGH LWV MXULVGLFWLRQ¶41 Hence, the ECJ asserted its jurisdiction 
over the dispute irrespective of whether or not certain parts of the dispute were 
governed by other international treaties.  
The Mox Plant dispute demonstrates, from the procedural angle, that 
each international court may assert its jurisdiction over certain aspects of the 
dispute. Also, the ITLOS and Ospar tribunals explicitly highlighted the 
substantive point of view, which is the focus of the present thesis. Similar or 
even identical rights and obligations under different treaties retain their 
separate existence (ITLOS Tribunal) because their interpretation may lead to 
different results, notwithstanding the respective contexts, objects and purposes, 
subsequent practice of parties and preparatory work of each treaty. In the Ospar 
WULEXQDO¶V ZRUGV HYHU\ WUHDW\ IRUPV D distinct legal regime. This 
µGLVWLQFWLYHQHVV¶DSSHDUVWREHSDUWDQGSDUFHORI WKH LQWHUSUHWDWLRQSURFHVVDV
well. Although the international courts apply the PIL rules on treaty 
interpretation, as prescribed in the VCLT, they may reach different conclusions 
on the construction of similar or identical treaty provisions since the 
application of the interpretation principles is subMHFW WR WKH GLVWLQFW µOLIH¶ RI
every treaty instrument. Therefore, the role of and limits posed to the VCLT 
principles of interpretation as a unifying factor also come into play.  
Moreover, the fact that in the Mox Plant dispute the international courts 
stress the distinctive nature of the case before them raises the question of how 
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 ECJ, Commission v Ireland, [135].  
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they should, in fact, decide the case. Should they strictly limit themselves to the 
confines of their own distinct legal regime or should they take other relevant 
PIL norms into account during the interpretation process? For example, should 
the Ospar tribunal duly appreciate the obligations of the parties under EU law? 
Conversely, should the ECJ take any obligations of member States under the 
UNCLOS into account? The argument of this thesis is that treaties are not 
µVHOI-FRQWDLQHG¶ RU SODFHG LQ D YDFXXP DQG LW LV DUJXHG WKDW WDNLQJ RWKHU
relevant PIL norms into account when construing a treaty mitigates the 
fragmentation of PIL concerns.   
 
1.3 The three main strands of thought concerning the fragmentation of 
public international law 
In the literature one can discern three main strands of thought 
concerning the fragmentation of PIL. Each strand identifies different problems, 
depending on how they perceive PIL, and, accordingly, proposes different 
solutions. The first strand treats the multiplicity of international courts as a 
danger to the unity of PIL. It argues that the ICJ holds a critical role within the 
international dispute settlement system, at least, in so far as the interpretation 
and application of general international law. The second strand suggests that 
WKH FRPSHWLWLRQ DPRQJ LQWHUQDWLRQDO FRXUWV RYHU WKH µEHVW LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ¶ ZLOO
benefit the development of PIL. The third perspective, which appears to reflect 
the mainstream view in literature and in international judicial practice, asserts 
that the so-called fragmentation of PIL is not a danger to but rather a challenge 
for the unity of PIL. 
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The short outline of these views gives the opportunity to place the 
question of fragmentation of PIL in the case-law of certain international courts 
and tribunals. It also lays the basis for identifying, in the view of the present 
author, the main legal questions which will be discussed when analysing the 
practice of the ECtHR.  
 
1.3.1 The proliferation of international courts as a danger to the unity of 
public international law 
The first line of thought suggests that the proliferation of specialised 
and regional international courts is a threat to the unity of PIL and, especially, 
general international law - customary international law, general principles of 
law and treaties which are widely ratified and open to all States. It is argued 
that the only international court which has the authority and competence to 
pronounce on general international law is the ICJ. This is because, firstly, the 
ICJ is entrusted with an unrestricted ratione materiae jurisdiction and, 
secondly, its composition reflects the representativeness of the main legal 
systems in the world.42 Hence, regional and specialised international courts 
should be cautious and, moreover, should avoid pronouncing on general 
international law,43 thereby consistently developing their case-law with the 
judgments of the ICJ.44  
                                                             
42
 .-.HLWKµ7KH,QWHUQDWLRQDO&RXUWRI-XVWLFHPrimus Inter Pares"¶Intl OrgLRev 
7, 21. Also, D. Terris, C.P.R. Romano, L. Swigart, The International Judge ± An Introduction 
WR WKH 0HQ DQG :RPHQ :KR 'HFLGH WKH :RUOG¶V &DVHV (University Press of New England, 
Hanover and London, 2007) 58-59.  
43
 7 %XHUJHQWKDO µ3UROLIHUDWLRQ RI ,QWHUQDWLRQDO &RXUWV DQG 7ULEXQDOV ,V LW *RRG RU %DG"¶
(2001) 14 LJIL 267, 272-273. 
44
 Infra QRWHVDQG**XLOODXPHµ7KH)XWXUHRI,QWHUQDWLRQDO-XGLFLDO,QVWLWXWLRQV¶
44 ICLQ 848, 862; Guillaume, (note 11), 302; C.W. Jenks, The Prospects of International 
Adjudication (Stevens and Sons Limited-Oceana Publications, London-New York, 1964) 175-
181; G. Abi-6DDEµ)UDJPHQWDWLRQRU8QLILFDWLRQ6RPH&RQFOXGLQJ5HPDUNV¶-1999) 31 
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There are two well-cited examples from international case-law which 
gave rise to these views. The first example concerns the allegedly different 
interpretations of the circumstances under which a State may be held 
responsible for the acts of non-state actors with which it is associated, as 
employed by the ICJ and the Appeals Chamber of the ad hoc International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). The ICTY has 
jurisdiction to prosecute persons that committed or gave orders to commit 
grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions (Article 2 ICTY Statute). In 
order to exercise its jurisdiction, it has first to affirm that the breaches took 
place in the context of an international conflict. In the 7DGLü case,45 the ICTY 
had to decide whether an international armed conflict existed between the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The crucial 
question was whether the acts of the armed forces of a Bosnian armed group 
could be attributed to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 
The ICTY went on to discuss the Nicaragua case,46 in which the ICJ 
established that for a State to be held responsible for acts of non-State actors, it 
PXVWEHSURYHQWKDW LWH[HUFLVHGµHIIHFWLYHFRQWURO¶RYHUVSHFLILFRSHUDWLRQVLQ
the course of which breaches had occurred. The ICTY declined to apply the 
µHIIHFWLYHFRQWURO¶WHVW,t found the Nicaragua test not to be consonant with the 
logic of State responsibility and to be at variance with judicial and state 
                                                                                                                                                                 
N.Y.U.J.Intl.L.&Pol. 919; G. Abi-6DDE µ7KH ,QWHUQDWLRQDO &RXUW DV D :RUOG &RXUW¶ LQ 9
Lowe, M. Fitzmaurice (eds.), Fifty Years of the International Court of Justice (Cambridge 
University Press, New York, 1996) 3; Schwebel, (note 11); Buergenthal, (note 29). 
45
 3URVHFXWRUY7DGLü (Judgment of Appeals Chamber) IT-94-1-A, 15 July 1999 (7DGLü case).  
46
 Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua 
v. United States of America), Judgment, Merits, ICJ Rep. 1986, p. 14 (Nicaragua Case), [109]-
[116]. 
24 
 
practice.47 7KH ,&7< LQVWHDG DGRSWHG WKH µRYHUDOO FRQWURO¶ WHVW KROGLQJ WKDW
there was no need to prove that such control was exercised by the State over 
each and every military operation.48  
In the 2007 Genocide case,49 Bosnia and Herzegovina, by invoking the 
7DGLü case, questioned the validity of the Nicaragua test before the ICJ.50 The 
ICJ gave FDUHIXO FRQVLGHUDWLRQ WR WKH $SSHDOV &KDPEHU¶V UHDVRQLQJ, but it 
µIRXQG LWVHOIXQDEOH WR VXEVFULEH WRWKH&KDPEHU¶VYLHZ¶51 It maintained that 
the ICTY in the 7DGLü case addressed an issue which was not indispensable for 
the exercise of its jurisdiction and that µthe positions adopted by the ICTY on 
issues of general international law do not lie within the specific purview of its 
jurisdiction¶52 ,W DOVR IRXQG WKH µoveralO FRQWURO¶ WHVW µunpersuasive¶ and 
µunsuitable¶in the context of State responsibility for specific acts committed in 
the course of a conflict.53   
A few days after the ICJ gave its judgment on the Genocide case, the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) appeared to have endorsed the 7DGLü 
approach in the Lubanga case, without explicitly referring to the Nicaragua or 
the Genocide cases.54 
Many international law scholars have qualified the ICTY and the ICJ 
dictums as conflicting or, at least, divergent in so far as the interpretation and 
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 7DGLü, [115]-[136].  
48
 Ibid, [145].  
49
 Case concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, Merits, 26 
February 2007, ICJ Rep. 2007, p. 43 (Genocide case). 
50
 Ibid, [402]; Written Proceedings (Merits and Counter-claims), Reply of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, 23 April 1998, Chapter 9, 758-761 and Chapter 10, [75]-[79]. 
51
 Ibid, [403]. 
52
 Ibid. 
53
 Ibid, [404] and [406] respectively. 
54
 Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 29 January 
2007, ICC-01/04-01/06, [210]-[211]. 
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application of a rule of customary international law.55 Both the ICJ and the 
ICTY openly addressed the fact that they hold different views on the 
interpretation and application of the rules on State responsibility.56 Not only 
did thH\ ILQGHDFKRWKHU¶V UHDVRQLQJXQSHUVXDVLYHEXW Post importantly, the 
ICJ questioned the authority and competence of the ICTY to pronounce on the 
content and scope of general international law, when this is not necessary for 
exercising its jurisdiction. 
A second pertinent example is the Loizidou case.57 The ECtHR held 
WKDW7XUNH\¶VUHVHUYDWLRQFRQFHUQLQJDWHUULWRULDO UHVWULFWLRQRI WKHDFFHSWDQFH
of its jurisdiction was not compatible with the ECHR. It held that the 
reservation was not only invalid but also separable from the declaration of 
DFFHSWLQJWKH(&W+5¶VMXULVGLFWLRQDQGLWZHQWRQWRGHFLGHWKHFDVHEHIRUHLW
Turkey strongly contested this conclusion, arguing that the pertinent provisions 
of the ECHR regarding reservations were almost identical to Article 36 of the 
ICJ Statute and, thus, the ECtHR should not find the reservation invalid and 
separable.58 The ECtHR, however, justified its position on the basis of the 
object and purpose of the ECHR, as guaranteeing practical and effective rights, 
and the subsequent practice of member States accepting the jurisdiction of the 
Court without any restrictions.59 It also underlined that the ECHR is a treaty 
for the collective enforcement of human rights and that the Court is entrusted 
                                                             
55
 Buergenthal, (note 29); Rudolf, (note 15), 407-1/DYUDQRVµ2QWKH1HHGWR5HJXODWH
&RPSHWLQJ -XULVGLFWLRQV EHWZHHQ ,QWHUQDWLRQDO &RXUWV DQG 7ULEXQDOV¶ (8, :RUNLQJ 3DSHU
MWP 2009/14, 35. 
56
 67DOPRQµ7KH5HVSRQVLELOLW\RI2XWVLGH3RZHUVIRU$FWVRI6HFHVVLRQLVW(QWLWLHV¶
58 ICLQ 494, 504-6/LQWRQ).7LEDµ7KH,QWHUQDWLRQDO-XGJHLQDQ$JHRI0XOWLSOH
,QWHUQDWLRQDO&RXUWVDQG7ULEXQDOV¶Chi.J.Intl.L. 407, 453-456. 
57
 Loizidou v. Turkey, Preliminary Objections, 23 April 1995, (Grand Chamber) (Loizidou 
case). 
58
 Ibid, [67]. 
59
 Ibid, [72], [79]-[82]. 
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with the observance of the engagements undertaken by the High Contracting 
3DUWLHV$UWLFOH(&+5KHQFHDGLIIHUHQWFRQFOXVLRQFRQFHUQLQJ7XUNH\¶V
reservation would undermine the effectiveness of the ECHR and would 
ZHDNHQWKH&RXUW¶VUROH LQGLVFKDUJLQJ LWV IXQFWLRQV60 By way of replying to 
7XUNH\¶V REMHFWLRQV LW H[SUHVVO\ GLVWLQJXLVKHG LWV SRVLWLRQ DQG UROH IURP WKH
ICJ.  According to the ECtHR, the fact that its jurisdiction is limited regionally 
with a specific subject matter on directly supervising a law-making treaty 
concerning the protection of human rights marked a fundamental difference.61  
Many international law scholars found the Loizidou case a disturbing 
insistence on separateness.62 They thought that Loizidou was a wrong and 
impermissible exception or divergence to WKH ,&-¶V Advisory Opinion on 
Reservations to the Genocide Convention,63 hence, threatening the unity of 
PIL. However, as it will be argued in the following sections, Loizidou (as seen 
in 2012), in fact, paved the way for the development and enrichment of PIL.64 
It should be noted, at this point, that the ECtHR distinguished the ECHR to the 
,&- 6WDWXWH DQG LWV RZQ UROH WR WKH ,&-¶V UROH E\ HPSOR\LQJ WKH YHU\ 9&/7
principles of interpretation.65 It also considered the fact that general 
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 Ibid, [70], [75]. 
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 Ibid, [83]-[84].   
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 )RUH[DPSOH5<-HQQLQJVµ7KH-XGLFLDU\,QWHUQDWLRQDODQG1DWLRQDODQGWKH'HYHORSPHQW
RI,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ¶ICLQ 1, 6. 
63
 Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 
Advisory Opinion, 28 May 1951, ICJ Rep. 1951, p. 15. 
64
 Infra 5+LJJLQVµ+XPDQ5LJKWVLQWKH,QWHUQDWLRQDO&RXUWRI-XVWLFH¶LJIL 
745, 747; Joint Separate Opinion of Judge Higgins, Judge Kooijmans, Judge Elabary, Judge 
Owada and Judge Simma, in Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo 
(Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda) (New Application: 2002), Judgment, 
Jurisdiction of the Court and Admissibility of the Application, 3 February 2006, ICJ Rep. 
2006, p. 6, [23]. 
65
 See also G. Abi-6DDEµ7KH$SSHOODWH%RG\DQG7UHDW\,QWHUSUHWDWLRQ¶LQ*6DFHUGRWLet al. 
(eds.), The WTO at Ten (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006) 457, 460. 
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international law, as identified by the ICJ at the moment, treated the issue of 
reservations differently.      
The strand of opinion which qualifies cases, like the TDGLü and Loizidou 
as disturbing threats to the unity of PIL, builds upon the preeminent role of the 
ICJ and suggests the establishment of mechanisms which would guarantee a 
formal hierarchy among international courts. Pertinent ideas, which seem to be 
a recurring theme in international law scholarship,66 include a referral 
mechanism or an appeal procedure before the ICJ, when, for example, an 
international court encounters difficulties with the interpretation and 
application of general international law.67 Both the desirability and feasibility 
of such proposals have been strongly criticised.68 
The perception of the multiplicity of international courts as a danger to 
the unity of PIL partly UHIOHFWVWKHKHJHPRQLFFRQIOLFWVWHPPLQJIURPWKHµORVV
of hierarchical position by institutions of the ancient régime¶.69 It is telling that 
forceful advocates of this persuasion are former Judges of the ICJ (Jennings, 
Guillaume, Schwebel). On the other end of the spectrum, Trindade, former 
President of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) and recently 
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 Treves, (note 18), 217-606FKZHEHOµ3UHOLPLQDU\5XOLQJVE\WKH,QWHUQDWLRQDO&RXUW
RI -XVWLFH DW WKH ,QVWDQFH RI 1DWLRQDO &RXUWV¶ LQ Justice in International Law (Cambridge 
University Press, New York, 1994) 84; Jenks, (note 30). 
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 Guillaume, (note -3DXZHO\Qµ%ULGJLQJ)UDJPHQWDWLRQDQG8QLW\,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZDV
D8QLYHUVHRI,QWHUFRQQHFWHG,VODQGV¶-2004) 25 Michigan JIL 903, 916. 
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 5+LJJLQVµ$%DEHORI-XGLFLDO9RLFHV"5XPLQDWLRQVIURPWKH%HQFK¶ICLQ 791, 
799; Charney, (note 18), 129-$$XVWµ3HDFHIXO6HWWOHPHQWRI'LVSXWHV$3UROLIHUDWLRQ
3UREOHP"¶ LQ701GLD\H5:ROIUXPHGV Law of the Sea, Environmental Law and the 
Settlement of Disputes (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden/Boston, 2007) 131, 141; B. 
CoQIRUWL µ8QLWpHW)UDJPHQWDWLRQGX'URLW ,QWHUQDWLRQDO³*OLVVH]PRUWHOVQ¶DSSX\H]SDV´¶
[2007] RGDIP 5, 10-11; Rudolf, (note 15), 416, although she accepts that a reference 
procedure might be useful in specific instances. 
69
 0 .RVNHQQLHPL µ*OREDO /HJDl Pluralism: Multiple regimes and Multiple Modes of 
7KRXJKW¶ +DUYDUG  0DUFK   DYDLODEOH DW
<http://www.helsinki.fi/eci/Publications/Koskenniemi/MKPluralism-Harvard-
05d%5B1%5D.pdf>; cf. Treves, (note 18), 221. 
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appointed Judge at the ICJ bench, has given the following response to such 
views:  
[I]n some international legal circles attention has been [drawn] to 
the false problem of the so-FDOOHG µSUROLIHUDWLRQ RI LQWHUQDWLRQDl 
WULEXQDOV¶ 7KLV QDUURZ-minded, unelegant and derogatory 
expression simply misses the key point of the considerable 
advances of the old idea of international justice in the contemporary 
world.70 
 
 
1.3.2 The multiplicity of international courts as enhancing norm 
competition 
A second strand of thought asserts that possible inconsistencies in the 
construction of PIL are not detrimental. On the contrary, a degree of 
experimentation and exploration among international courts gives way to 
cross-fertilisation, encouragLQJµWKHbest norms WREHZLGHO\DGRSWHG¶71 In the 
same vein, Pauwelyn argues that if international courts decide differently on 
the interpretation of the same rule, the best interpretation is likely to surface 
through competition.72 In a nutshell, the main idea is to allow international fora 
to compete, each championing their own interpretation of a PIL norm as 
correct.73   
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 Trindade, (note 11), 158. 
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 Charney, (note 18), 347 (emphasis added). 
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 3DXZHO\QQRWH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International Judicial LawmDNLQJ¶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 +* &RKHQ µ)LQGLQJ ,QWHUQDWLRQDO /DZ 3DUW ,,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It does not come as a surprise that advocates of the position that the 
proliferation of international courts poses a threat to the unity of PIL have 
VWURQJO\REMHFWHGWRWKLV OLQHRI WKRXJKW*XLOODXPHRSSRVHGWKH µFRPSHWLWLRQ
VFKHPH¶ E\ VWDWLQJ WKDW µ>W@KH ODZ RI WKH PDUNHW >«@ FDQQRW EH WKH ODZ RI
MXVWLFH¶74 A somewhat weaker response came from Shany who argued that this 
LV µ³a progress E\ FDWDVWURSKH´ OLQH RI UHDVRQLQJ¶75 According to him, a 
competition among international courts will eventually lead to a state of 
anarchy and will undermine the credibility of the international judicial process. 
He suggests that there is the need for jurisprudential coherence and harmony, 
which can be served through the drafting of rules regulating the jurisdiction of 
WKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOFRXUWVDQGWKHH[HUFLVHRIMXGLFLDOµFRPLW\¶DPRQJWKHP 
The meaning of the best interpretation or the best norm is unclear. Even 
more, in a battle of interpretative communities over the meaning and content of 
PIL norms, there is no guarantee that the better rules or the better 
interpretations will always win. It could equally be a question of which 
interpretative community is the more influential.76 For example, who is the 
winner in the 7DGLü-Nicaragua alleged dichotomy between the ICTY and the 
ICJ (and the ICC)? However, it cannot be disregarded that there is some merit 
in these views. A so-called competition among international courts is likely to 
further the quality of judicial reasoning77 and enhance a sense of shared 
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 Shany, (note 18), 122. 
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 Cohen, (note 59), 48. 
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 (8 3HWHUVPDQQ µ-XVWLFH DQG &RQIOLFW 5HVROXWLRQ 3UROLIHUDWLRQ )UDJPHQWDWLRQ DQG
Decentralisation of Dispute SettOHPHQWLQ,QWHUQDWLRQDO7UDGH¶(8,:RUNLQJ3DSHU/$:1R
2004/10, 50. 
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responsibility on the part of all concerned.78 Most importantly, the underlying 
tenet of this strand of thought is that it does not acknowledge that the ICJ has 
an a priori inherent monopoly over PIL, and specifically, general international 
law. All international courts are equal players in engaging with and 
pronouncing on general international law.          
 
 
1.3.3 The multiplicity of international courts as the emergence of 
different contexts  
According to a third perspective, the alleged danger stemming from the 
varying constructions of PIL by different international courts is overestimated. 
It has characteristically been stated that µmany authors even speak of the 
³SUROLIHUDWLRQ´RILQWHUQDWLRQDOFRXUWVDQGWULEXQDOVDVLIWKH\ZHUHZHDSRQVRI
mass destruction threatening the international legal order¶79 International 
scholars of this strand of thought do acknowledge that certain challenges 
arise,80 but they prefer to see the multiplicity of international courts as an 
opportunity and to treat variances in the case-law of international courts as a 
reflection of different contexts.81 The basic tenet is that the unity of PIL is to be 
preserved, unless context dictates otherwise.82 Varying constructions of general 
international law, for example, or different solutions adopted for the same legal 
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 %6LPPDµ8QLYHUVDOLW\)URPWKH3HUVSHFWLYHRID3UDFWLWLRQHU¶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questions can be explained and legitimised, since each international court is 
bound by its own applicable law, as defined in its constitutive instrument.83 In 
this sense, every international court places a case brought before it within the 
confines of its constitutive instrument and, thus, the case attains a specific legal 
and factual context.84 
Rosalyn Higgins, former President of the ICJ, strongly argues that, 
DOWKRXJK GLIIHUHQFHV RI SHUFHSWLRQ DPRQJ LQWHUQDWLRQDO FRXUWV UHPDLQ µgiven 
the different relevant contextsWKH\KDUGO\FRQVWLWXWHDGUDPD¶.85 This statement 
was referring to the 7DGLü± Nicaragua alleged divergence on the rules of State 
responsibility. Without denying that a different perception between the ICJ and 
the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY exists, it is stressed that the different context 
of the cases should be duly appreciated. The fact that the ICTY held that the 
conflict was of an international character and, hence, it had to apply the rules 
on State responsibility with respect to individual accountability in the context 
of international humanitarian law mark a significant difference.86  
The different context may also refer to the features of a treaty and the 
role of the international body entrusted to supervise it. The ITLOS and Ospar 
tribunals stressed this in the Mox Plant dispute, when they highlighted that 
their constitutive instruments must be read in light of their object and purposes, 
subsequent practice and other contextual nuances.87 The Loizidou case was also 
articulated from this angle. Although Article 57 ECHR (former Article 46) 
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FRQFHUQLQJ WKH &RXUW¶V MXULVGLFWLon was modelled on Article 36 of the ICJ 
Statute, for the ECtHR it was material that it had a specific subject matter 
jurisdiction over a law-making treaty on human rights.  
7KH µGLIIHUHQW FRQWH[W¶ DSSURDFK KRZHYHU DWWDLQV D JUHDW GHJUHH RI
circularity. In other words, a different context justification may be applied to 
every single instance when someone purports to find distinctiveness. Does this 
mean that context may always justify a variance or a divergence between 
international courts concerning the construction of PIL? International judicial 
practice already witnesses examples of such unlucky instances,88 such as the 
disagreement of the ICJ and the IACtHR with respect to the interpretation of 
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR).89 Article 
36 VCCR concerns the privileges relating to a consular post and, in particular, 
issues of communication and contact with nationals of the sending State. The 
ICJ, in the LaGrand case, found that Article 36 VCCR creates individuals 
rights, but it considered it unnecessary to decide whether these rights were also 
human rights.90 The IACtHR was also called upon to interpret Article 36 
VCCR. In its Advisory Opinion it held that these rights can be qualified as 
µSDUWRI WKH ERG\RI LQWHUQDWLRQDO KXPDQ ULJKWV ODZ¶91 Shortly after LaGrand 
case, the same issue arose again before the ICJ in the Avena case and Mexico 
invoked the view of the IACtHR. The ICJ restated that it was not necessary to 
examine whether individual rights under Article 36 VCCR should be qualified 
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as human rights, but it added in passing that there seemed to be no indication to 
support such an argument.92 Although the ICJ did not give a definite answer on 
whether or not individual rights under Article 36 VCCR are also human rights, 
it is clear that ± for the time being ± the ICJ and the IACtHR hold different 
views on the interpretation of the same treaty provision.  
International law scholars coming from this perspective argue that the 
challenges concerning the fragmentation of PIL may be alleviated through 
interpretation. Treaties and their progressive development by their supervisory 
bodies should not be treated as distinct and special, but should be perceived as 
being embedded within PIL.93 The ILC in its work on fragmentation adopted 
the same position.94 In practice, this means that international courts should 
place their constitutive instruments within PIL and construe them, to the extent 
possible, by taking other relevant PIL norms into account.95 The pertinence of 
Article 31 (3)(c) VCLT has been highlighted in this respect, which provides 
that a treaty should be interpreted by taking any relevant rules of international 
law applicable in the relations between the parties into account.    
Other suggestions include drafting specific treaty clauses in 
international treaties for regulating the phenomenon of overlapping 
jurisdictions,96 the application of general principles (lis alibi pendens, abuse of 
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process, forum non conveniens and res judicata),97or the exercise of judicial 
comity among international courts.98 It is also important to establish informal 
links between the courts and that the Judges sitting on their benches be 
LQIRUPHG RI DQG UHVSHFW HDFK RWKHU¶V GHFLVLRQV DQG HQFRXUDJH MXULVSUXGHQWLDO
harmonisation.99 The composition of international courts and the appointment 
of Judges with expertise in PIL are also relevant factors.100   
 
 
1.4 Conclusion: Fragmentation of public international law as a legal 
challenge 
In sum, one of the main concerns of international law scholars is the 
role of general international law and its development by the ICJ in retaining the 
unity between different fields in PIL. This unity is being challenged by the 
varying interpretations of the same or similar rules, especially general 
international law, by special and/or regional international courts. However, 
views differ on how to address these challenges.     
 The present thesis argues that special and regional international courts 
do not necessarily threaten the unity of PIL or the role of general international 
law in uniting PIL. Therefore, in principle, they have the authority and 
competence to engage with general international law, when necessary, in 
deciding their cases. This is supported by a number of preliminary points.  
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 First, one should carefully note that, when discussing the role of general 
international law as a unifying frame for PIL, general international law is not a 
static notion. The identification and construction of customary international 
law and general principles of law, as well as the interpretation and application 
of multilateral treaties widely ratified and open to all States, are not held in 
clinical isolation from the rest of PIL or from the jurisprudence of regional or 
special courts. By way of example, many concepts of general international law, 
such as the duty to make reparation and the exhaustion of internal legal 
remedies prior to a diplomatic claim, have been developed and elucidated by 
arbitral tribunals or specialised and regional international courts.101 Moreover, 
general international law is constantly reshaped to embody new developments 
stemming from special fields of PIL. In the investment protection field, more 
than two thousand concordant bilateral investment treaties have arguably 
altered the customary international law rules governing the treatment of foreign 
investment.102 The ICJ, in its recent judgment in the Diallo case, accepted that 
customary rules of diplomatic protection are subject to the impact of various 
international agreements governing investment protection.103 International 
human rights law has also influenced the structure and content of general 
international law, as has been well argued.104 Existing general international law 
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is reinterpreted or reoriented to accord with overarching human rights 
imperatives.105 These examples demonstrate that the boundaries between 
general international law and special law are blurred, since both inform each 
other.106 Both the content of general international law and the concept of unity 
of PIL are not static notions. This conclusion does not come to diminish the 
significance of general international law as unifying PIL as a whole. However, 
it highlights that general international law is receptive to developments from all 
the fields of PIL. 
Since general international law is being informed by such 
developments, the present author sees no valid reason why special and/or 
regional international courts (or other monitoring bodies) should, as a matter of 
principle, be disapproved of pronouncing on questions concerning the content 
and application of general international law. The question of whether varying 
or divergent interpretations of general international law by different 
international courts should be treated as a development of or an exception to or, 
perhaps, bad application of general international law (as it stands at any given 
moment) does not always provide an easy answer. Nonetheless, it is clear that 
other international courts highlight developments in PIL, as does the ICJ. 
Furthermore, other international courts develop PIL themselves. Although 
many instances may be perceived as disturbing and threatening to general 
international law, in fact, they enrich and inform it. An example of such a case 
would be Loizidou, which has already been discussed. International law 
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scholars, currently sitting on the bench of the ICJ, underlined that the practice 
of the ECtHR, the IACtHR and the Human Rights Committee (HRC) to decide 
on the compatibility of a reservation with their respective treaty is a 
development of PIL and not an exception to it.107 
Moreover, on certain occasions, regional and/or specialised 
international courts introduce adequate solutions to problems or develop PIL 
when the ICJ fails to do so. The failure of the ICJ to endorse or pronounce on 
jus cogens rules is in contrast to the fact that the ICTY and the ECtHR have 
recognised and incorporated the prohibition of torture as a jus cogens rule in 
their case-law.108 Also, despite the reluctance of the ICJ, the idea of obligations 
erga omnes has been mainstreamed through the practice of other international 
bodies and it may be considered an established part of PIL.109 Bruno Simma, 
currently an ICJ Judge, would readily welcome a regional court providing 
adequate judicial control of certain acts of the UN Security Council, admitting 
WKDWµ>LI@XQLYHUVDOLW\PLJKWVXIIHU>«@LWZRXOGEHa kind of universality which 
deserved to suffer¶110 
 Interestingly, the ICJ in certain, recent judgments, has shifted from its 
long-standing practice and appears to duly appreciate the role of regional and 
special international bodies.111 In the 2010 Diallo case, the ICJ used and 
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followed the views of the HRC and the jurisprudence of the IACtHR and 
ECtHR in order to confirm its own interpretation of provisions of the 
International Covenant in Civil and Political Rights and the African Charter on 
+XPDQ DQG 3HRSOH¶V 5LJKWV112 It reasoned that its reliance on other 
LQWHUQDWLRQDO ERGLHV LV D ZD\ RI PDLQWDLQLQJ WKH µQHFHVVDU\ FODULW\ DQG WKH
HVVHQWLDOFRQVLVWHQF\RILQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZDVZHOODV OHJDOVHFXULW\¶113 In 2012 
in the Jurisdictional Immunities of the State case,114 the ICJ relied again on the 
case-law of the ECtHR in order not only to reinforce its legal reasoning,115 but 
also to directly support its final conclusion regarding the customary status of 
State immunity in proceedings for torts allegedly committed on the territory of 
another State by its armed forces.116 Therefore, the ICJ expressly acknowledges 
the competence of special and regional international courts to develop and 
assert authority with regards to general international law and PIL. 
The fact, however, that international bodies and courts with limited jurisdiction 
have the competence to pronounce on PIL, when necessary, without 
threatening its unity necessarily entails that they should be aware and cautious 
of the challenges in light of the fragmentation of PIL. Hence, it is argued that 
they should place the treaties under their supervision within the corpus of PIL 
by means of interpretation.           
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2. Addressing the legal challenges of the fragmentation of public 
international law through interpretation 
 
2.1 Introduction  
Chapter 1 established two main points; firstly, that although certain 
legal challenges arise in the context of the fragmentation of PIL, the alleged 
dangers to the unity of PIL are overestimated. It was underlined that 
international courts of restricted jurisdiction have, in principle, the authority to 
pronounce on issues of general international law without posing a threat to the 
unity of PIL. Furthermore, PIL on the whole benefits from the developments 
and trends stemming from international courts. The second point was that 
international courts are responsible for demonstrating their awareness of the 
difficulties that may arise due to the different interpretations of similar or 
identical PIL norms by different bodies.   
Special and/or regional international courts and tribunals adopt a 
confined view of the cases brought before them due to their restricted ratione 
materiae and personae jurisdiction. The Appeals Chamber of the ICTY in the 
7DGLü case stateG WKDW µLQ LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ HYHU\ WULEXQDO LV D VHOI-contained 
V\VWHP XQOHVV RWKHUZLVH SURYLGHG¶117 International courts have to make 
adjustments to a given dispute and the claims brought before them to their 
specific jurisdiction and to the body of law that they are entrusted to interpret 
and apply.  
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It is notable that these considerations are equally applicable, to a greater 
rather than a lesser extent, to the ICJ. Even though the ICJ is a body of general 
jurisdiction, it also operates, in practice, within the jurisdictional constraints of 
the case brought before it.118 Recently, in the Georgia v Russia case, the 
Russian Federation objected to the jurisdiction of the ICJ on the basis that the 
dispute was not about racial discrimination, but rather a dispute relating to 
other bodies of law, such as the use of force and international humanitarian 
law.119 The ICJ, however, was restricted to entertaining the dispute only over 
violations of the Convention of the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (CERD). The Court found that the acts alleged by Georgia 
appeared to be capable of contravening rights provided under the CERD, even 
if these acts could also be covered by other rules of PIL ± rules over which the 
ICJ was not entitled to pronounce.120 This conclusion was confirmed in the 
MXGJPHQW RQ WKH SUHOLPLQDU\ REMHFWLRQV LQ ZKLFK WKH ,&- VWDWHG WKDW µRQH
situation may contain disputes which relate to more than one body of law and 
ZKLFKDUHVXEMHFWWRGLIIHUHQWGLVSXWHVHWWOHPHQWSURFHGXUHV¶121  
Moreover, as the ILC emphasised, in certain cases a treaty or a cluster 
of treaties establish special regimes, in that they provide for a detailed set of 
rules concerning the creation, interpretation, application, modification or 
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termination of the body of law within this regime.122 Hence, when an 
international court is established by and functions within such a regime it also 
has to take account of the specific features of the institutional setting of which 
it forms part. Metaphorically speaking, every treaty and the international body 
entrusted to supervise it form a planet within the universe of PIL.123 It is, 
indeed, hard to miss that each planet has a very specific worldview and adopts 
a particular position with regards to the interpretation of its constitutive 
instrument, the construction of PIL and the resolution of the disputes brought 
before it.124 The role of the supervisory bodies in this respect is material, 
largely determining the extent of autonomy of the planets and their interaction 
with the universe.125  
Therefore, in the fragmentation of PIL debate, one of the important 
challenges is to find the means to ensure that the different planets - namely 
treaties (or special regimes) and international bodies - interact with each other. 
An intrinsic aspect of this question is also how the planets interact with general 
LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ,IRQHZDQWHGWRIXUWKHU6LPPDDQG3XONRZVNL¶VPHWDSKRU
then general international law should be somehow cosmic matter permeating 
the universe of PIL and, hence, all the planets too. This analogy is fitting, first, 
because Chapter 1 highlighted that general international law is in a constant 
process of informing and being informed by special law and, secondly, because 
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JHQHUDOLQWHUQDWLRQDOODZVHUYHVDVµWKHJOXHWKDWELQGVWKH>GLIIHUHQW planets of 
LQWHUQDWLRQDOODZ@WRJHWKHU¶126 
The present thesis argues that international courts, despite their limited 
jurisdiction, can mitigate the challenges of fragmentation of PIL by interpreting 
their constitutive instruments against the background of PIL. This is also the 
position of the ILC in its work on the fragmentation of PIL, which highlights 
the potential of using the VCLT to alleviate the arising difficulties.127 In this 
UHVSHFW WKH DUWLFXODWLRQ RI WKH LQWHUQDWLRQDO FRXUWV¶ OHJDO UHDVRQLQJ HYLGences 
whether or not they follow such a practice and, importantly, to what extent.128 
The present Chapter investigates, in brief, the practice of international 
courts and tribunals employ to construe their constitutive instruments by taking 
PIL norms into account. The discussion is divided into three sections. The first 
section inquires into the practice of international courts and tribunals when 
they take customary international law and general principles of law into 
account for interpretation purposes. The second section surveys their practice 
when they take cognisance of other treaties and non-binding international 
instruments. This analysis will be informative when addressing specific 
questions that are raised in the practice of the ECtHR.  
 
2.2 Interpreting a treaty by taking customary international law and 
general principles of law into account 
Generally, international courts readily declare that the interpretation 
and application of their constitutive instruments should not take place in 
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isolation from customary international law and general principles of law and 
that they should promote a harmonious interpretation, as far as possible.129  
An interesting example is the decision of the ICSID Annulment 
Committee where it held that the ICSID arbitral tribunal in the CMS case had 
manifestly exceeded its powers because, among other things, it did not place 
the ICSID convention against PIL.130 Before the arbitral tribunal Argentina 
claimed a state of necessity under both customary international law, as codified 
in Article 25 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility, and a specific clause 
in the Argentina-US Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT). Although the tribunal 
assessed (and rejected) both claims, the Annulment Committee opined that it 
should have examined the relationship between the treaty clause and 
FXVWRPDU\LQWHUQDWLRQDOODZVLQFHµWKRVHWZRWH[WV>KDYH@DGLIIHUHQWRSHUDWLRQ
DQG FRQWHQW¶131 Thus, the tribunal should have more thoroughly assessed if, 
and to what extent, customary international law informs the content of the 
treaty obligation.132 
Nevertheless, on certain occasions, it is clear that customary 
international law does not come into play when interpreting a treaty provision. 
In the Dispute regarding Navigational and Related Rights, the question of the 
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exWHQWRI&RVWD5LFD¶VULJKWRIIUHHQDYLJDWLRQWKURXJKWKH6DQ-XDQ5LYHUZDV
before the ICJ. Although Costa Rica and Nicaragua had specifically concluded 
a treaty on the use of the river, Costa Rica argued that its right of free 
navigation is regulated, in part, by the customary international law on 
international rivers.133 The ICJ rejected this claim, deciding that the treaty is 
sufficient to settle the dispute. Finding recourse to customary international law 
is not deemed necessary when a provision clearly excludes it, by way of 
establishing a modification or an exception to it, or explicitly regulates an 
activity in a self-sufficient manner.134 This equally applies where a treaty 
completely opts out from the general rules on State responsibility, as in the 
Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran. 
'LSORPDWLF ODZZDVKHOGWRµSURYLGHWKHQHFHVVDU\PHDQVRIGHIHQFHDJDLQVW
DQG VDQFWLRQ IRU LOOLFLW DFWLYLWLHV >«@ 7KH UXOHV RI GLSORPDWLF ODZ LQ VKRUW
constitute a self-contained reJLPH¶135 
On the other hand, however, the exclusion, or inclusion, of customary 
international law or general principles of law from the construction of a treaty 
is not usually an easy question to answer. It is not sufficient to proclaim that it 
applies insofar as a treaty does not contract out of it.136 Since, as discussed in 
Chapter 1, the relationship between a treaty provision and general international 
law is not fixed or static, it is a matter of interpretation on a case-by-case basis 
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for deciding if, and how, general international law informs a treaty.137 A 
relevant example comes from the field of international investment law. Article 
25 of the ICSID convention provides the requirements for a tribunal to 
establish its jurisdiction:  
(1) [t]he jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute 
arising directly out of any investment between a Contracting State 
«DQGDQDWLRQDORIDQRWKHU&RQWUDFWLQJ6WDWH>«@ 
µ1DWLRQDORIDQRWKHU&RQWUDFWLQJ6WDWH¶PHDQV 
     (a) any natural person who had the nationality of a Contracting 
State other than the  State party to the dispute. 
$QDWLRQDORIDQRWKHU&RQWUDFWLQJ6WDWHLVGHILQHGE\³SRVLWLYH´DQG³QHJDWLYH´
requirements, namely a natural or juridical person that has the nationality one 
of the Contracting Parties (positive requirement) but does not have the 
nationality of the State which is a party to the dispute (negative requirement). 
This is a special rule, which modifies or displaces the standard under the 
customary international law regarding diplomatic protection.138 It is an 
instance where, as the ICJ noted in the Diallo FDVH µWKH UROH RI GLSORPDWLF
SURWHFWLRQVRPHZKDW IDGH>V@¶139 in light of the detailed provisions in treaties. 
At first glance, it appears that there is no need to find recourse to customary 
international law for the construction of Article 25 ICSID convention. Yet, 
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despite the lex specialis, tribunals hold different views on the relevance of 
customary international law.140  
In the Champion Trading case,141 Egypt, as the respondent State, raised 
a preliminary objection, arguing that the claimants were, in fact, dual nationals 
(American and Egyptian nationals) and, thus, were excluded ratione personae 
IURP WKH WULEXQDO¶V MXULVGLFWLRQ 7KH FODLPDQWV LQ WXUQ UHVSRQGHG WKDW WKH\
were not dual naWLRQDOVDQGLQWKHDOWHUQDWLYHLIWKH\ZHUHµXQGHULQWHUQDWLRQDO
SXEOLF ODZ >«@ DQ LQWHUQDWLRQDO WULEXQDO GHDOLQJ ZLWK WKH TXHVWLRQ RI WKH
nationality of a party in an investment dispute under the Convention must look 
to the real and effective nationalLW\¶142 7KHWULEXQDODFFHSWHG(J\SW¶VREMHFWLRQ
and found that customary international law had no application in the case, since 
µWKH>,&6,'@&RQYHQWLRQLQ$UWLFOHDFRQWDLQVDFOHDUDQGVSHFLILFUXOH
UHJDUGLQJ GXDO QDWLRQDOV¶143 Another tribunal in the Olguín case,144 however, 
held that it had, first, to examine what the real and effective nationality of the 
claimant was, according to customary international law, and, then, apply Article 
25 ICSID convention.145 Hence, the tribunals reach different conclusions on the 
basis of whether customary international law should inform the interpretation of 
the ICSID convention. Although Article 25 of the ICSID convention contains a 
lex specialis provision on the positive and negative requirements on nationality, 
it does not define nationality as such. This is why customary international law 
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on diplomatic protection and the notion of effective nationality might come into 
play and bring to the fore the question as to what extent customary international 
law is relevant under Article 25 of the ICSID convention.146     
The arbitral tribunal in the Iron Rhine arbitration also shed some light 
on these issues. Having found that sustainable development has attained the 
status of a general principle of law, the tribunal examined how this could be 
UHOHYDQW IRU LQWHUSUHWLQJ 1HWKHUODQG¶V DQG %HOJLXP¶V ULJKWV DQG REOLJDWLRQV
under the 1839 Treaty of Separation. The Treaty concerned the Iron Rhine 
railway which linked the port of Antwerp to Germany by crossing the 
Netherlands.147 The Netherlands and Belgium disagreed about who should bear 
the costs for adapting and modernising the railway lines in territory belonging 
to the Netherlands. The tribunal thought that it should construe the 1839 Treaty 
according to the principle of effectiveness and in an evolutive manner, in light 
of the new technical developments relating to the operation and capacity of the 
railway.148 It relied on Article 31 (3)(c) VCLT, which prescribes that when a 
treaty is interpreted there shall be taken into account, together with the context 
any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the 
parties. It interpreted the 1839 Treaty by taking the duty to sustainable 
GHYHORSPHQWLQWRDFFRXQW$VDFRQVHTXHQFHWKHWULEXQDOKHOGWKDW%HOJLXP¶V
right of transit had to be reconciled, to the extent possible, with the 
1HWKHUODQGV¶ HQYLURQPHQWDO FRQFHUQV149 The Iron Rhine judgment is a very 
good example of how reading a treaty in conjunction with a general principle 
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RIODZLQIRUPVWKHWUHDW\¶VFRQVWUXFWLon. If the tribunal had not acknowledged 
the duty to sustainable development under general international law and 
interpreted the Treaty in light of this duty, it would not have attempted to 
UHFRQFLOH%HOJLXP¶VWUHDW\ULJKWZLWKSHUWLQHQWHQYLURQPHQWDOFRQFerns.  
 As the Iron Rhine judgment highlighted, it is generally accepted that 
new developments or emerging norms in general international law should be 
taken into account by international courts, when they construe a treaty 
provision, especially when the latter is receptive to follow subsequent pertinent 
(legal and technical) developments.150 This is the case for generic terms whose 
content is expected to be subject to change through time, such as, for example, 
µWHUULWRULDOVWDWXV¶RUµQDWXUDOUHVRXUFHV¶151  
 Although the extent to which general international law may be 
considered relevant is a matter of interpretation, limits can be safely drawn. 
One should not lose sight of the fact that the present discussion concerns the 
resort to general international law for the purpose of interpreting a treaty 
provision, rather than directly applying general international law, as in the case 
when a treaty contains a direct renvoi.152 Hence, the extent to which general 
international law is, in fact, relevant in the process of interpreting a treaty is 
subject to the jurisdictional confines of an international court and the claims 
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raised before it. Otherwise, a treaty would be transformed into an unqualified 
and comprehensible jurisdictional regime.153 
The ICJ seems to have overstepped this limit in the Oil Platforms 
case.154 The main issue before the Court was whether the United States (US), 
by destroying Iranian oil platforms on two occasions, violated its obligations 
under Article X of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and 
Consular Rights between the US and Iran. The jurisdiction of the Court was 
based exclusively upon this Treaty. More specifically, Article X (1) reads that 
µEHWZHHQ WKH WHUULWRULHV RI WKH WZR +LJK &RQWUDFWLQJ 3DUWLHV WKHUH VKDOO EH
freedom of commerce DQGQDYLJDWLRQ¶155 In its defence the US brought Article 
XX into play, arguing that the actions that Iran complained over were measures 
WR SURWHFW WKH 86¶ HVVHQWLDO VHFXULW\ LQWHUHVWV +HQFH HYHQ LI WKHVH DFWLRQV
constituted breaches of Article X, they were justified under Article XX. In the 
view of the Court, since the latter provision was invoked for justifying the use 
RI DUPHG IRUFH LWV FRQVWUXFWLRQ µQHFHVVDULO\ HQWDLOV DQ DVVHVVPHQW RI WKH
conditions of legitimate self-GHIHQFH XQGHU LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ¶156 The ICJ 
highlighted that it should interpret the Treaty by taking any relevant rules 
applicable in the relations between the parties into account (Article 31 (3)(c) 
VCLT). Although the ICJ stressed its limited jurisdiction by virtue of the 1955 
Treaty, it brought the Charter of the United Nations and the totality of 
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customary international law on the use of force to the fore and pronounced that 
WKH86¶DFWLRQVFRQIRUPHGWRWKLVFRUSXVRIODZ157    
It appears that, when general international law (customary international 
law) is brought into play for interpreting a treaty provision, it is easy to 
overlook that general international law is not to be applied but merely to 
inform the treaty provision to a certain extent. In the Oil Platforms case, the 
incorporation of the totality of customary international law on the use of force 
µRYHUVKDGRZHG¶WKHWUHDW\SURYLVLRQLQWKDWWKH,&-PLVSODFHGWKH7UHDW\
from the center of its inquiry. Therefore, it seems that the ICJ not only went 
beyond the limits of treaty interpretation, but it also did not respect the strictly 
conferred limits of its jurisdiction, namely to find whether Article X of the 
1955 Treaty had been breached.158  
By way of summary, international courts and tribunals concur that they 
should interpret their constitutive instruments by taking general international 
law, customary international law and general principle of law, into account. 
International courts and tribunals do not seem to justify their interpretation on a 
specific legal basis. Only in the Iron Rhine and Oil Platforms cases was Article 
31 (3)(c) VCLT specifically invoked and applied. The non-use of Article 31 
(3)(c) VCLT is not material since it appears that the duty to interpret a treaty 
by taking general international law into account fRUPV SDUW RI WKH µFRPPRQ
VHQVH¶RI WKH LQWHUQDWLRQDO MXGJH159 However, views differ on whether or not, 
and to what extent, general international law informs the construction of a 
given treaty. In certain instances, it is clear that the recourse to general 
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international law is unnecessary due to the detailed and effective regulation 
provided by a treaty provision (Dispute regarding Navigational and Related 
Rights case, Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran case). Conversely, the 
inclusion of terms in a treaty, which are generic or evidence their receptiveness 
to new legal and technical developments, illustrates the necessity to take 
relevant general international law into account (the Iron Rhine case). In other 
cases, even though a treaty stipulates a lex specialis provision, difficulties arise 
in the interpretation process as to whether or not general international law 
should inform the treaty (Champion Trading and Olguín cases). The 
interpretative influence of general international law on the construction of a 
treaty provision could be material, as demonstrated in the Iron Rhine judgment. 
Nonetheless, as the Oil Platforms case demonstrates, one should not lose sight 
of the fact that the applicability and relevancy of general international law is 
restricted to informing, not substituting or overriding, the meaning of a treaty.   
   
2.3 Interpreting a treaty by taking other treaties and non-binding norms 
into account 
2.3.1 Interpreting a treaty by taking other treaties into account  
Placing a treaty against the background of PIL does not only involve 
customary international law and general principles of law, but it also includes 
other treaties. Although the ILC highlighted this in its work on fragmentation, 
it did not discuss in detail the use of treaties for interpreting another treaty. 
Chapter 1 stressed that the fragmentation of PIL relates not only to differing 
interpretations of general international law or the emergence of special law as 
an exception or development to general international law, but it is also 
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concerned with whether or not, and how, different treaties and bodies of law 
differentiate and interact.160 Hence, it is equally important to examine how 
international courts interpret and apply a given treaty under their jurisdiction 
by taking cognisance of other treaties.   
When interpreting a treaty international courts often appear to have recourse to 
other treaties in order to ascertain the ordinary meaning of certain terms within 
the treaty in question. In the Genocide case,161 the ICJ had to ascertain the 
ordinary meaning of the word undertake in Article I of the Genocide 
Convention.162 The fact that other international treaties163 employ this 
particular term as imposing specific obligations and not merely statements of 
aspirations was material for the ICJ in finding that the provision conferred a 
binding and autonomous international obligation on member States.164 
Likewise, in the Nicaragua case the ICJ had to interpret and apply Article XXI 
of the 1956 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the US 
and Nicaragua.165 At issue was whether the ICJ had jurisdiction to pronounce 
on whether the US measures could be justified as exceptions to the normal 
implementation of the Treaty. The court compared the provision of the bilateral 
Treaty to Article XXI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
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(GATT).166 The treaties were not similarly worded and the ICJ concluded a 
contario that it had jurisdiction to pronounce on the specific question, whereas 
the GATT left the evaluation to the contracting party.167 One can find 
numerous similar examples in the judgments of the ICJ168 and in the everyday 
practice of many international bodies entrusted to supervise a given treaty.169  
The fact that international bodies do not invoke a specific legal basis or 
an interpretative principle under Articles 31-33 VCLT to justify this practice 
does not come as a surprise. The international judge is inclined towards 
HPSOR\LQJ D µFRPSDUDWLYH UHDGLQJ¶ RI WUHDWLHV HVSHFLDOO\ GXULQJ WKH LQLWLDO
stage of the interpretation process. It is a legitimate means for identifying the 
ordinary meaning of a term under a given treaty.170 In certain instances, a 
given treaty may qualify as an element and evidence under different 
interpretative principles, such as subsequent practice in the application of the 
treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its 
interpretation (Article 31 (3)(b) VCLT),171 or, as a relevant rule of 
international law applicable in the relations between the parties (Article 31 
(3)(c) VCLT).172 Nevertheless, Article 31 (1) VCLT seems the most fitting 
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legal basis, thereby interpreting a treaty in good faith and identifying the 
common use of a term by States in PIL.173 
In the event that the interpretation of a treaty provision becomes a more 
complex exercise than employing a at ILUVW JODQFH µFRPSDUDWLYH UHDGLQJ¶ RI
treaties, international courts appear reluctant to read their constitutive 
instruments in light of other treaties. The United States ± Restrictions on 
Imports of Tuna case is a good example.174 The dispute concerned a complaint 
brought by the EC and the Netherlands against the US, arguing that certain US 
embargo practices were not consistent with the GATT. The US claimed that 
the embargo fell within the general exception clause (Article XX) and, in 
particular, the conservation of exhaustible natural resources.175 It submitted 
that the Panel should interpret Article XX by taking other relevant treaties into 
consideration, such as the Convention on International Trade in Endangered 
Species. The Panel rejected the US arguments on the basis that these 
agreements were not binding on all GATT contracting parties176 and, hence, 
they did not fall within either Article 31(3)(a) VCLT or Article 31 (3)(b) 
VCLT. It is unclear, however, why the Panel did not examine whether or not 
these agreements could trigger the applicability of Article 31 (3)(c) VCLT or 
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Article 31 (1) VCLT, as evidence of the ordinary meaning of a treaty or as an 
aspect of the general principle of harmoniously interpreting, to the extent 
possible, different treaties.177  
Nevertheless, the WTO Appellate Body (AB) undertook a different 
approach in the US-Shrimp case178 to the Panel in the Restrictions on Import of 
Tuna case. The case before it was similar, insofar as having to identify whether 
WKH PHDQLQJRI µH[KDXVWLEOH QDWXUDO UHVRXUFHV¶XQGHU$UWLFOH;;J LQFOXGHV
OLYLQJ UHVRXUFHV ,W GLG ILQG µSHUWLQHQW WR QRWH WKDW PRGHUQ LQWHUQDWLRQDO
FRQYHQWLRQVDQGGHFODUDWLRQV¶179 refer to natural resources by embracing both 
living and non-living resources. Specific mention was made to two treaties, the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Convention on 
Biological Diversity. The AB did not provide a specific legal basis for using 
other treaties to interpret the GATT, although it seems that the evolutionary 
nature of the term facilitated its reasoning.180  
In other instances, however, as in the Restrictions on Import of Tuna 
case, the Panel was not inclined towards using other treaties in its 
interpretation. In the EC-Biotech Products case, the Panel categorically 
dismissed the applicability of relevant treaties, because they were not binding 
on all contracting parties to the GATT.181 This was based on the conclusion 
that when Article 31 (3)(c) VCLT refers to rules applicable in the relations 
between the parties, it means all the contracting parties to the treaty under 
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interpretation. If the treaty, which could be used for informing the 
interpretation of another treaty, is not binding on all contracting parties, the 
interpreter is not entitled to use it. Even though it is established that Article 31 
(3)(c) VCLT covers treaties,182 it is disputed ZKHWKHUWKHµSDUWLHV¶XQGHU$UWLFOH
31 (3)(c) are only the parties to a given dispute or all contacting parties to the 
treaty under interpretation.183  
The only international court which has developed an extensive practice 
of taking other treaties into account for the interpretation of its constitutive 
instrument is the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR). By way of 
example, in a cluster of cases concerning the rights of indigenous peoples, it 
drew interpretive guidance from the International Labour Organisation 
Convention No. 169 concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent 
Countries (ILO Convention No. 169).184 In the Yakye Axa Indigenous 
Community185 and Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community186 cases, the 
applicants complained of a violation of their right to use and enjoy their 
property under Article 21 Inter-American Convention on Human Rights 
(IACHR)187 and, more specifically, their right to the communal property of 
their ancestral lands. The IACtHR considered Article 13 of the ILO 
Convention No. 169, which concerns the duty of State parties to respect the 
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special importance of the relationship that indigenous peoples may develop 
with the lands that they occupy or use. Article 21 (1) IACHR was interpreted in 
light of this provision and the IACtHR established a collective understanding 
of the right to property under the IACHR.188   
In its legal reasoning the IACtHR employed a series of legal bases for 
legitimising the use of other treaties in the interpretation process. The IACtHR 
has acknowledged that the construction of the IACHR should take account of 
WKH µWKH V\VWHP RI ZKLFK IRUPV SDUW RI LW¶189 (Article 31 (3) VCLT). It also 
invokes the need for an evolutive interpretation of human rights and the 
principle of the corpus juris of human rights protection190.  
In sum, international courts and tribunals have a widespread practice of 
taking other treaty provisions into account during their inquiry to ascertain the 
ordinary meaning of a term, especially when said term is commonly employed 
by States in treaties. More generally, however, international bodies appear 
reluctant to use other treaties when they interpret their constitutive instruments. 
From the previously discussed cases, it is only the IACtHR which is proactive 
in ascertaining the scope and content of rights under the IACHR by taking 
other detailed treaty provisions into account.    
It should be noted, at this point, that the ILC has suggested what 
appears to be a very specific fashion for using other treaties in the 
interpretation process. It asserted that Article 31 (3)(c) VCLT reflects the 
µV\VWHPLF LQWHJUDWLRQ¶ LQWHUSUHWDWLYH SULQFLSOH ZKLFK KDV WKH REMHFWLYH WR
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µFRQQHFW WKHVHSDUDWHWUHDW\SURYLVLRQV>«@DVDVSHFWVRIDQRYHUDOl aggregate 
RI WKH ULJKWV DQG REOLJDWLRQV RI WKH 6WDWHV¶191 The meaning of this is not 
entirely clear. Taking other treaties into account, when interpreting a treaty, 
enhances the consistency of the PIL rules applicable to the States and 
contributes to avoiding conflicts or inconsistencies.192 However, the systemic 
integration of treaties somehow implies a specific objective of interpreting one 
WUHDW\E\UHIHUHQFHWRDQRWKHUWUHDW\ LQRUGHUWRDFKLHYH µDVHQVHRIFRKHUHQFH
DQG PHDQLQJIXOQHVV¶193 Although interpretation may achieve a certain degree 
of consistency and harmonisation between different treaties, it is doubtful 
whether it can integrate them into a coherent whole and whether this should be 
the objective of Article 31 (3)(c) VCLT. The application of this provision and, 
in general, the practice of interpreting a treaty by taking other treaties into 
account reach their limits within the interpretation process and should not 
relate to law-making.194  
2.3.2 Interpreting a treaty by taking non-binding norms into account 
The question of using non-binding law (soft-law) for interpreting a 
WUHDW\KDVQRWEHHQDGGUHVVHGHLWKHUE\WKH,/&¶VZRUNRQIUDJPHQWDWLRQRI3,/
or in academic literature. As far as the VCLT interpretative principles are 
concerned, soft-law could, perhaps, may aid the interpretation of a treaty 
provision as evidence of the ordinary meaning (Article 31(1)). The AB WTO 
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in the US-Shrimp case used Agenda 21195 and the Resolution on Assistance to 
Developing Countries196 in this way.197 Alternatively, non-binding PIL norms 
could trigger the applicability of Article 31 (3)(c) VCLT, if it is accepted that 
µUXOHV RI LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ¶ LQFOXGH QRQ-binding sources of law. Nonetheless, 
the mainstream view is that Article 31 (3)(c) VCLT does not come into play in 
the case of considerations that are not firmly established as binding rules.198 
Gardiner is right, however, in carefully noting that the current practice of 
international courts is insufficiently developed.199   
The Ospar tribunal in the Mox Plant case dismissed IrelDQG¶V
suggestion to take non-binding international instruments to interpret the Ospar 
Convention. Ireland had specifically invited the tribunal to take µHYROYLQJ
LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZDQGSUDFWLFHRQDFFHVVWRHQYLURQPHQWDO LQIRUPDWLRQ¶200 into 
account and referred to the Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development201 and the Aarhus Convention.202 The Rio Declaration is a non-
binding instrument and the Aarhus Convention was not ratified by either of the 
parties to the dispute. The tribunal accepted, in principle, the possibility of 
drawing from current international law and practice to inform the interpretation 
of the OSPAR convention. Yet, it proceeded to reject any interpretative 
guidance from not lex lata PIL norms, which are not admissible under Article 
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31 (3)(c) VCLT.203 One of the arbitrators, Griffith, dissented from the 
judgment arguing that not-binding PIL norms could have normative and 
evidentiary value for informing the OSPAR convention.204  
*ULIILWK¶V YLHZ FDQQRW EH GLVPLVVHG DV EHLQJ ZLWKRXW PHULW 7KH IDFW 
that an international instrument has no binding force does not necessarily mean 
that it is of no relevance when interpreting a treaty.205 It is true that the use of 
soft-law cannot be easily justified on the basis of the interpretative principles in 
Articles 31-33 VCLT. Yet, its evidential weight is acknowledged by the 
,$&W+5¶VMXULVSUXGHQFHDpertinent example of which is the Saramaka People 
case.206 In this case the applicants were members of an indigenous people in 
Suriname who complained of a breach of their right to enjoy and use their 
traditionally occupied lands and resources under Article 21 IACHR. The 
IACtHR took the ICCPR and a number of non-treaty instruments and evidence 
of international practice into account.207 It referred to the UN Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and it extensively discussed the views and 
General Comments by the Human Rights Committee, General 
Recommendations by the Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination. The IACtHR concluded that Suriname had the obligation to 
protect the right of the Saramaka community to enjoy and use their 
traditionally occupied lands and resources. It also identified certain safeguards 
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DJDLQVWUHVWULFWLRQVRIWKHFRPPXQLW\¶VULJKW208 Notably, these safeguards, such 
as the effective participation and sharing of benefits regarding development or 
investment projects within tribal territories, were inferred by reference to the 
non-treaty instruments.    
     
2.4 Conclusions 
This Chapter highlighted that international courts and tribunals have a 
considerable practice in interpreting their constitutive instruments by taking 
PIL into account. It is generally accepted that international courts and tribunals 
have the duty to take general international law, especially customary 
international law and general principles of law, into account. In most instances, 
whether or not and to what extent general international law is considered 
relevant to inform a treaty is a matter of a case-by-case interpretation. The 
restricted jurisdiction of the court or tribunal and the confines of the 
interpretation process dictate the limit of the interpretative influence that 
general international law may have on the construction of a treaty provision.  
Turning to the question of taking other treaties into account to construe 
the treaty under interpretation, international courts and tribunals seem to be 
hesitant. With the exception of the IACtHR, which employs other treaties in its 
legal reasoning, the international case-law previously discussed indicates that 
such a practice is rarely encountered. Lastly, international court and tribunals - 
except the IACtHR - are rather dismissive of using non-binding PIL norms due 
to the lack of binding force and the difficulty of providing a solid legal basis 
under the VCLT for justifying their consideration. 
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PART II: The case-law of the Court 
 
Part I of this thesis discussed the challenges that arise due to the 
fragmentation of PIL. The analysis took the academic debate, the work of the 
ILC and the practice of international courts into account and addressed the 
dangers posed by international courts with a restricted subject-matter 
jurisdiction. Chapter 1 highlighted that, although difficulties exist in light of 
the expansion and diversification of PIL, the alleged dangers to the unity of 
PIL are overestimated. It was underlined that international courts of limited 
ratione materiae jurisdiction should have, in principle, the authority to 
pronounce on issues of general international law without posing a threat to the 
unity of PIL. It was also stressed that PIL, on the whole, benefits from the 
developments and trends stemming from international courts, something which 
is acknowledged by the International Court of Justice too in its recent 
judgments, in the Diallo and Jurisdictional Immunities of the State cases.1 
Chapter 2 investigated, in brief, the practice of international courts to interpret 
their constitutive instruments by taking other relevant PIL norms into account. 
Some informative examples were discussed illustrating that international 
courts, to a different extent, are aware of and try to mitigate the problem of 
different interpretations of same or identical PIL norms.  
The primary aim of this study, however, is to test whether or not, and if 
yes, to what extent, the ECtHR alleviates the challenges arising from the 
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fragmentation of PIL. Part II examines in detail the pertinent case-law of the 
Court (subject to the caveats as they were explained in the Introduction). This 
thesis argues that, although the ECtHR has been accused of ignoring PIL when 
LQWHUSUHWLQJDQGDSSO\LQJWKH(&+5RUIRUPLQJDµOLWWOHVHSDUDWHHPSLUH¶KDV
in fact, an extensive practice of engaging with other PIL norms during the 
process of the interpretation of the ECHR. The main argument is that the 
ECtHR has developed an autonomous interpretative principle of taking 
cognisance of other PIL norms when construing the ECHR. It will be 
demonstrated that this interpretative principle functions in a distinctive manner 
WRRWKHUFDUGLQDOSULQFLSOHV LQWKH&RXUW¶V MXULVSUudence, namely the principle 
of effectiveness, the dynamic interpretation and the comparative interpretation.  
Admittedly, interpreting the ECHR by relying upon other PIL norms is 
QRW D UHFHQW SKHQRPHQRQ LQ WKH &RXUW¶V FDVH-law. By way of example, the 
Court, in 1975, in one of its leading judgments, the Golder case, found 
recourse to the µXQLYHUVDOO\ ³UHFRJQLVHG´ IXQGDPHQWDO SULQFLSOHV RI ODZ¶2 in 
order to assert that the right to access a court is an inherent element of the right 
to a fair trial under Article 6 ECHR. The Court also employed in its reasoning 
Article 31 (3)(c) VCLT which explicitly states that when interpreting a treaty 
other relevant, applicable in the relations between the parties rules of 
international law will be taken into account. Nonetheless, it will be seen that 
WKH &RXUW LQ LWV UHFHQW SUDFWLFH IROORZV DQ H[HPSODU\ µRSHQ DQG JHQHURXV
approach as it recognises the commonality of human rights problems, as well 
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DV WKH LQWHFRQQHFWHGQHVV RI UHJLRQDO DQG LQWHUQDWLRQDO UHJLPHV¶3 Construing 
tKH (&+5 E\ ILQGLQJ UHFRXUVH WR RWKHU 3,/ QRUPV LV RQH RI WKH &RXUW¶V
priorities and this is precisely the reason why it employs an autonomous 
interpretative argument.  
3DUW ,, ZLOO VWXG\ WKH &RXUW¶V OHJDO UHDVRQLQJ LQ RUGHU WR DVFHUWDLQ
whether it is possible to discern patterns in the jurisprudence. It will explore the 
interpretative means that the Court employs for alleviating the difficulties of 
fragmentation. The analysis will also show whether certain limits should be set 
to applying this interpretative principle. The three different Sections reflect the 
GLIIHUHQW LPSDFW WKDW 3,/ QRUPV PD\ KDYH RQ WKH &RXUW¶V UHDVRQLQJ DQG WKH
interpretation of the ECHR. The Court finds recourse to and uses PIL norms in 
order to define terms embodied in the ECHR and ascertain the meaning of 
concepts which are necessary for applying the ECHR (Section I); to restrict the 
protective scope of the rights and freedoms under the ECHR (Section II); and 
to expand ratione materiae the scope of the ECHR (Section III). The analysis 
will lay the basis for concluding on whether the ECtHR endangers the unity of 
PIL or rather develops its case-law consistently with PIL and what is the 
SRWHQWLDOLPSDFWRIWKH&RXUW¶VLQWHUSUHWDWLYHSUDFWLFHRQWKH(&+5 
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Section I: Finding recourse to public international law norms in order to 
define certain concepts necessary for applying the ECHR and to define 
certain terms embodied in the ECHR 
 
Section I discusses cases in which the Court has recourse to PIL norms 
in order to ascertain the meaning of certain concepts necessary for applying the 
ECHR and to define specific terms contained in the ECHR. It will be seen that 
WKHXVHRI3,/QRUPVSHQHWUDWHVWKH ILUVWVWDJHRI WKH&RXUW¶V OHJDOUHDVRQLQJ
This Section is divided into two Chapters.  
ChapteU  LQYHVWLJDWHV WZR H[DPSOHV IURP WKH &RXUW¶V SUDFWLFH 7KH
first instance is taking cognisance of PIL norms in order to find the meaning of 
the concept of jurisdiction (Article 1 ECHR) and the second example is to 
determine the effects (if any) of State succession in human rights treaties on the 
construction of the ECHR. Chapter 4 examines judgments in which the Court 
relied on PIL norms in order to define specific terms embodied in the text of 
WKH(&+5VXFKDVµHYHU\RQH¶RUµVODYHU\¶ 
This Section shares certain common features with the discussion in 
Chapter 2 in which it was concluded that international courts and tribunals are 
generally inclined towards employing PIL norms when they define a term 
found in the treaty under interpretation or when they have to settle a necessary 
matter in order to proceed to the merits of a claim. Hence, the Section provides 
an exploration as to whether the ECtHR has a similar interpretative practice.     
 
 
66 
 
3. Finding recourse to public international law in order to define 
certain concepts necessary for applying the ECHR  
 
3.1 Introduction 
7KLV &KDSWHU H[SORUHV WKH &RXUW¶V UHFRXUVH WR 3,/ QRUPV LQ RUGHU WR
identify the meaning of certain concepts which are necessary for applying the 
ECHR. Two series of cases will be discussed; the first concerns the notion of 
jurisdiction under Article 1 ECHR. The relevant judgments that will be 
examined are, perhaps, the most well-NQRZQ RFFDVLRQV RI WKH &RXUW¶V
interpretative practice of taking cognisance of PIL norms. Although the 
%DQNRYLü case, for example, is frequently cited as a fitting illustration of 
reading the ECHR harmoniously with PIL, the present author will critically 
address this view. Secondly, this Chapter will address whether the Court in 
cases concerning State succession relies on PIL norms in order to assess the 
effect in the application of the ECHR.   
   
 
3.2 The question of exercising jurisdiction under Article 1 ECHR 
$UWLFOH(&+5VWDWHVWKDWµWKH+LJK&RQWUDFWLQJ3DUWLHVVKDOOVHFXUHWR
everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I 
RI WKLV &RQYHQWLRQ¶ 7KH SURYLVLRQ SUHVFULEHV ratione loci the scope of the 
Convention and is important because the question of whether the applicant falls 
within the jurisdiction of a member State is a precondition for the Court to 
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examine the merits of a complaint.1 Yet, the text of the ECHR offers no 
guidance as to the precise meaning of the term jurisdiction. It is the Court 
which has elucidated the concept of jurisdiction in its jurisprudence.   
The Loizidou case is one of the leading cases.2 The Grand Chamber had 
to ascertain whether Turkey could be held responsible for violations of the 
ECHR outside its territory, in the northern part of Cyprus. The Court, when 
addressing the question of whether Turkey exercised jurisdiction over the 
northern Cyprus, recalled that the concept of jurisdiction is not restricted to the 
national territory of member States. If a member State exercises effective 
control of an area outside its national territory, its responsibility under the 
ECHR may arise.3 7KHH[HUFLVHRIHIIHFWLYHFRQWUROGHULYHG IURPµWKH fact of 
such control whether it [is] exercised directly, through its armed forces, or 
WKURXJKDVXERUGLQDWHORFDODGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶4 The Court, in light of the facts of 
the case, found that Turkey exercised jurisdiction over the northern part of 
&\SUXV VLQFH 7XUNH\ RFFXSLHG WKDW SDUW DQG KDG HVWDEOLVKHG WKH µ7XUNLVK
5HSXEOLF RI 1RUWKHUQ &\SUXV¶5 The Grand Chamber in the Cyprus v Turkey 
case reaffirmed this conclusion.6  
 However, the Court in %DQNRYLü,7 by finding recourse to PIL, changed 
its position on the meaning of jurisdiction.8 The NATO air strikes against the 
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Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and, in particular, the bombings of three 
television stations and four radio stations were at issue. The question was 
whether the applicants fell within the jurisdiction of the respondent States 
during the bombings. The Court stated that Article 1 ECHR should be 
interpreted on the basis of the general rule on treaty interpretation, Article 31 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). It highlighted Article 31 
(3)(c) according to which a treaty should be interpreted by taking any relevant 
and applicable in the relations between the parties rules of international law 
into account. It was noted that  
>«@ WKH SULQFLSOHV XQGHUO\LQJ WKH &RQYHQWLRQ FDQQRW EH LQWHUSUHWHG
and applied in a vacuum. The Court must also take into account any 
UHOHYDQW UXOHV RI LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ >«@ DOWKRXJK LW PXVW UHPDLQ
PLQGIXO RI WKH &RQYHQWLRQ¶V VSHFLDO FKDUDFWHU DV a human rights 
WUHDW\>«@7KH&RQYHQWLRQVKRXOGEHLQWHUSUHWHGDVIDUDVSRVVLEOHLQ
harmony with other principles of international law of which it forms 
SDUW>«@9 
The Court asserted that the ordinary meaning of jurisdiction under PIL is 
µSULPDULO\ WHUULWRULDO¶10 whereas other bases of jurisdiction (nationality, flag, 
diplomatic and consular relations, effect, passive personality, and universality) 
are exceptional and require special justification. This assertion was 
substantiated by citing academic authorities.11 Since Article 1 ECHR should 
                                                                                                                                                                 
Spain, Turkey and the United Kingdom, Admissibility Decision, 12 December 2001, (Grand 
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reflect this notion of jurisdiction, the Court declared the application 
inadmissible on the basis that the applicants did not fall in a legal sense within 
either the territorial jurisdiction of the respondent States or any of the 
exceptional bases of jurisdiction. 
$OWKRXJK WKH &RXUW¶V SRVLWLRQ WKDW D FRQFHSW XQGHU WKH (&+5 VKRXOG
reflect the respective notion under PIL is, in principle, welcome and sound, it is 
DUJXHG WKDW LQ WKLV LQVWDQFH WKH &RXUW¶V DSSURDFK ZDV LQFRUUHct. The Court 
found recourse to the concept of jurisdiction under PIL, which is, however, 
different to the concept of jurisdiction under Article 1 ECHR.12 The concept of 
MXULVGLFWLRQXQGHU3,/FRQFHUQVWKH6WDWH¶VOHJDOFRPSHWHQFHQDPHO\ZKHWKHU
and the extent to which, a State may regulate its conduct or the consequences 
of certain acts outside of its territory, without infringing the sovereignty of 
another State. This legal competence is indeed governed by a number of 
principles upon which a State may ground its conduct, such as the principle of 
territoriality or other bases of jurisdiction relating to nationality, flag, 
diplomatic and consular relations etc.13 Thus, as the Court correctly underlined, 
the exercise of jurisdiction under PIL is a legal question. Nonetheless, the 
question as to whether a member State to the ECHR exercises jurisdiction 
extraterritorially is not a question of whether a member State is entitled as a 
matter of law to exercise jurisdiction;14 it is a question of whether a State 
exercises its power as a matter of fact. The lawful or unlawful conduct of a 
State is irrelevant and the exercise of jurisdiction relates to the actual exercise 
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 F. Vanneste, General International Law before Human Rights Courts (Intersentia, Antwerp-
Oxford-Portland, 2010) 157. 
13
 C. Ryngaert, Jurisdiction in International Law (Oxford University Press, New York, 2008) 
6; 00LODQRYLüµ)URP&RPSURPLVHWR3ULQFLSOH&ODULI\LQJWKH&RQFHSWRI6WDWH Jurisdiction 
LQ+XPDQ5LJKWV7UHDWLHV¶HRLRev 411, 425. 
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 Cf. %DQNRYLü (GC), [60]. 
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of power.15 Moreover, although %DQNRYLü is supposed to clarify Loizidou 
(according to the Court), it actually departs from and limits Loizidou without 
sound justification. The Loizidou and Cyprus v Turkey cases assessed the 
question as to whether Turkey exercised jurisdiction as a fact, whereas 
%DQNRYLü, by invoking PIL, construed a legal presumption of territoriality 
which does not fit well within Article 1 ECHR.16  
 It is unclear why the Grand Chamber took this stand, especially in light 
of the fact that four former professors of international law sat in %DQNRYLü 
(Judges Ress, Rozakis, Caflisch and Wildhaber). The view that the Court shied 
away from the true reasons of its judicial policy claiming an alleged respect for 
PIL, in order to deal with a difficult case, does not lack merit.17 Further, it is 
notable that, although the Court was receptive to the notion of jurisdiction 
under PIL, it was dismissive of other pertinent developments in PIL. More 
specifically, the applicants in %DQNRYLü argued that the Court, when 
interpreting Article 1 ECHR, should consider how other treaty supervisory 
bodies entrusted with the protection of human rights, such as the Human Rights 
Committee (HRC) and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
(IAComHR), interpret the concept of jurisdiction in their constitutive 
instruments.18 7KH &RXUW QRWHG WKDW LW ZDV QRW FRQYLQFHG E\ WKH DSSOLFDQWV¶
DUJXPHQWVDQGLWIRXQGXQQHFHVVDU\WRSURQRXQFHRQWKHµspecific meaning to 
be attributed in various contexts to the allegedly similar jurisdiction provisions 
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 5:LOGHµ7ULJJHULQJ6WDWH2EOLJDWLRQ([WUDWHUULWRULDOO\7KH6SDWLDO7HVWLQ&HUWDLQ+XPDQ
5LJKWV 7UHDWLHV¶, in R. Arnold, N. Quénivet (eds.), International Humanitarian Law and 
Human Rights Law - Towards a New Merger in International Law (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, Leiden-Boston, 2008) 133, 142. 
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-29, 136; A. Orakhelashvili, The Interpretation of Acts and Rules in 
Public International Law (Oxford University Press, New York, 2008) 142. 
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  
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in [other] LQWHUQDWLRQDO LQVWUXPHQWV¶19 This statement brings to mind the 
discussion in Chapter 1 concerning the fact that identical or similar PIL norms 
may have different meanings subject to the treaty context that they stem from. 
The question is whether the Court was correct in drawing this line on this 
occasion or not.  
The Grand Chamber emphasised that the pertinent provision of the 
$PHULFDQ 'HFODUDWLRQ GLG QRW HQYLVDJH D VLPLODU OLPLWDWLRQ WR WKH (&+5¶V
limitation to its territorial reach20 and that this is why the IAComHR follows a 
different approach in the Coard Report.21 ,WLVZRUWKRIFLWLQJWKH,$&RP+5¶V
conclusion in the Coard Report:  
while [the notion of jurisdiction] most commonly refers to persons 
within a state's territory, it may, under given circumstances, refer to 
FRQGXFW ZLWK DQ H[WUDWHUULWRULDO ORFXV >«@ In principle, the inquiry 
turns not on the presumed victim's nationality or presence within a 
particular geographic area, but on whether, under the specific 
circumstances, the State observed the rights of a person subject to its 
authority and control.22 
Despite the fact that Article II of the American Declaration does not prescribe 
WKH WHUP µMXULVGLFWLRQ¶ LW LV QDWXUDO WKDW WKH ,$&P+5 H[DPLQHV ZKHWKHU DQ
LQGLYLGXDO IDOOVZLWKLQD6WDWH¶V MXULVGLFWLRQ. The IACmHR acknowledges that 
jurisdiction is a concept principally referring to the national territory without, 
however, precluding that it could refer to extraterritorial conduct, under certain 
                                                             
19
 Ibid, [78]. 
20
 $UWLFOH,,SURYLGHVWKDWµDOOSHUVRQVDUHHTXDOEHIRUHWKHODZDQGKDYHWKHULJKWVDQGGXWLHV
established in this Declaration, without distinction as to race, sex, language, creed or any other 
IDFWRU¶ 
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 Coard et al. v. United States, Case 10.951, Report No 109/99, 29 September 1999. 
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circumstances. Even though, at first glance, the IACmHR and the ECtHR in 
%DQNRYLü appear to adopt the same line of reasoning, there is a considerable 
difference between the two positions. According to the IACmHR, the 
extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction is not an exception subordinated to the 
rule of territoriality and, hence, no special justification is required. The 
presumption of exercising power and authority attains a descriptive character 
(not a legal one) and is equally applicable outside the national territory.23 On 
the contrary, %DQNRYLü establishes a strong legal presumption that jurisdiction 
refers to the territory and, consequently, an exceptional basis of jurisdiction has 
to be specifically justified.24 As far as Article 2 (1) ICCPR is concerned, 25 the 
Court accepted that the provision is similar to Article 1 ECHR and expressly 
limits the jurisdictional scope of the ICCPR. Nonetheless, it noted that the 
+5&¶V exceptional recognition of instances of extraterritorial jurisdiction did 
QRWµ>GLVSODFH@LQDQ\ZD\WKHWHUULWRULDOMXULVGLFWLRQH[SUHVVO\FRQIerred by that 
$UWLFOHRIWKH,&&35¶26 True as it may be that jurisdiction primarily refers to 
the territory of a State, it neither precludes instances of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction, nor establishes a legal presumption requiring special justifications.  
,Q VXP WKH &RXUW¶V UHDVRQLQJ ZLWK UHJDUGV WR GLVWLQJXLVKLQJ WKH
concept of jurisdiction under Article 1 ECHR from relevant PIL norms, does 
not appear to be convincing. There is nothing in the pertinent provisions of the 
American Declaration or the ICCPR or the practice of the IACmHR and the 
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 Ibid, footnote 6. 
24
 Wilde, (note 15), 144. 
25
 µ(DFK 6WDWH 3DUW\ WR WKH SUHVHQW &RYHQDQt undertakes to respect and to ensure to all 
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present 
&RYHQDQW>«@¶ 
26
 %DQNRYLü (GC), [78]. 
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HRC which would deter the Court from taking them into account when 
interpreting the ECHR. Further, the Court in %DQNRYLü furnished no solid 
justification for taking cognisance of the notion of jurisdiction under PIL whilst 
leaving aside the relevant PIL norms in other human rights treaties and the 
respective views of their supervisory bodies.  
The Grand Chamber endorses the %DQNRYLü reasoning in its subsequent 
jurisprudence, incorporating under Article 1 ECHR a strong, legal presumption 
of territoriality on the basis of PIL.27 It was only in the Issa case, in which, 
without abandoning the %DQNRYLü approach, the Court cited the Coard Report 
E\ WKH ,$&P+5 DQG WKH DERYH PHQWLRQHG +5&¶V YLHZV IRU VXSSRUWLQJ LWV
conclusion in casu that Turkey exercised jurisdiction extraterritorially.28 The 
Court, however, did not discuss how the legal presumption of territoriality 
FRXOG EH UHDG WRJHWKHUZLWK WKH ,$&P+5DQG+5&¶V YLHZVRQDVVHVVLQJ WKH
exercise of jurisdiction as a matter of fact.  
 7KH&RXUW¶VLQVLVWHQFHRQQRWFODULI\LQJLWVSRVLWLRQLVLOOXVWUDWHGLQWKH
recent Al-Skeini case.29 The Grand Chamber granted leave to intervene in the 
proceedings to a large number of NGOs and human rights organisations (Bar 
Human Rights Committee, the European Human Rights Advocacy Centre, 
Human Rights Watch, Interights, the International Federation for Human 
Rights, Liberty and the Law Society of England and Wales). In their written 
comments they explicitly invited the Court to take into consideration the 
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 Assanidze v. Georgia, 8 April 2004, (Grand Chamber), [137]-[139]; ,ODúFX DQG RWKHUV Y
Moldova and Russia, 8 July 2004, (Grand Chamber), [312], [314], [376]; Solomou and others 
v. Turkey, 24 June 2008, [43]-[44]; Medvedyev and others v. France, 29 March 2010, (Grand 
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 Issa, [71]. 
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µFRPPRQ JURXQG EHWZHHQ WKH LQWHUQDWLRQDO DQG UHJLRQDO FRXUWV DQG KXPDQ
ULJKWV ERGLHV¶30 concerning the question of extraterritorial jurisdiction. They 
invoked not only the views of the HRC and the IACmHR, but also more recent 
developments which clearly prove the Court wrong insofar its construction of 
the meaning of jurisdiction. They referred to the HRC General Comment No. 
31, according to which the extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction is not 
necessarily an exceptional case from a legal point of view.31 The Advisory 
Opinion by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the Legal Consequences 
of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory was also 
mentioned.32 The ICJ, when discussing the applicability of the ICCPR outside 
the territory of a contracting party, accepted that States exercise jurisdiction 
primarily on their territory, but it was found natural that, given the object and 
purpose of the ICCPR, States are also bound by their obligations when they act 
extraterritorially.33 The ICJ confirmed this position by relying on the constant 
practice of the HRC.34 7KLV LV LQ GLUHFW FRQWUDVW WR WKH (&W+5¶V DVVHUWLRQ LQ
%DQNRYLü WKDW WKH +5&¶V YLHZV FRXOG QRW SURYLGH VXIILFLHQW VXSSRUW WR WKH
H[WUDWHUULWRULDO DSSOLFDELOLW\ RI WKH ,&&35 7KH ,&-¶V SRVLWLRQ WKDW KXPDQ
rights treaties may be applicable outside the national territory has been also 
affirmed in the Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the 
Congo and the Case concerning Application of the International Convention 
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 Al-Skeini (GC), [128]-[129]; written comments by the third-party interveners, p. 12, 
available at the www.interights.org. 
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 HRC, General CRPPHQW1R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 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
Advisory Opinion, ICJ Rep. 2004, p. 136 (Wall Advisory Opinion). 
33
 Wall Advisory Opinion, [109].  
34
 Ibid. 
75 
 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.35 It is unfortunate 
that the Court did not discuss these developments in the Al-Skeini judgment. 
Even though the Court devotes a specific section analysing its relevant case-
law in a systematic manner,36 it did not address whether or not its 
interpretation of the term jurisdiction under Article 1 ECHR is sound or 
concordant to the views of international bodies and the judgments of the ICJ. 
Both the ICJ and the HRC refer to the primary territorial focus of the concept 
of jurisdiction without inferring any kind of presumptions that would require 
an exceptional justification in cases of extraterritoriality.37 7KH&RXUW¶VVLOHQFH
is even more notable given the fact that this thesis will demonstrate in a further 
discussion that its reasoning, in general, is very receptive to the submissions 
and arguments of the third-party interveners.38   
 Although the Grand Chamber accepts in several instances in Al-Skeini 
that the exercise of jurisdiction is a matter of fact,39 its legal reasoning is 
grounded on the %DQNRYLü case.40 The misconception of the meaning of 
jurisdiction is clearly evidenced when refeUHQFH LV PDGH WR D 6WDWH¶V
µMXULVGLFWLRQDOcompetence¶41 which concerns whether or not a State is entitled 
to exercise jurisdiction and not whether it actually exercises jurisdiction in the 
specific circumstances. On the basis of the facts of the case, the Court found 
that a jurisdiction link could be established between the applicants and the UK. 
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 Case concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the 
Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, 19 December 2005, ICJ Rep. 1995, p. 168, [178]-[180] and 
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This was because the UK (together with the United States) assumed in Iraq the 
exercise of some of the public powers normally to be exercised by a 
government and, hence, exercised authority and control over the individuals 
killed in the course of security operations. The aforementioned conclusions 
were based on the UK being an Occupying Power, an official letter sent by the 
UK and the US to the United Nations Security Council creating the Coalition 
Provisional Authority and the legislative acts passed by the said Authority. It is 
not clear whether, and if yes to what extent, the Court follows a factual 
determination of the exercise of jurisdiction. It appears that it grounds its 
reasoning on formal and legal criteria similarly to %DQNRYLü¶VUDWLRQDOH 
 In sum, the %DQNRYLü case is one of the well-cited examples regarding 
the construction of the ECHR in accordance with PIL.42 Even though this 
position is, in principle, correct, it has been shown that its application was 
unfortunate. The Court found recourse to a different concept of jurisdiction 
under PIL and incorporated it under Article 1 ECHR. By way of relying on 
PIL, the Court validated a legal presumption of territoriality which is not akin 
to the ordinary meaning of jurisdiction under the ECHR. At the same time, the 
Court dismissed, without a convincing explanation, the relevance of other 
human rights treaties and the views of international bodies to its interpretation 
of jurisdiction. Only in the Issa case did the Court refer, in passing, to other 
PIL norms for finding that the member State exercised extraterritorial 
jurisdiction. However, the %DQNRYLü FDVH FRQWLQXHV WR GLFWDWH WKH &RXUW¶V
reasoning in the subsequent case-law. It is unclear as to why the Court does not 
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 International Law Commission µ5HSRUW RI WKH 6WXG\ *URXS RI WKH ,QWHUQDWLRQDO Law 
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accept that assessing whether a State exercises jurisdiction is a factual and not 
D OHJDOTXHVWLRQDVDPDWWHURISULQFLSOH7KH&RXUW¶VPHWKRGRORJ\DOVRJLYHV
rise to a selective treatment of relevant PIL norms, since the Court is 
(incorrectly) receptive towards the legal concept of jurisdiction under PIL, but 
it does not take cognisance of other pertinent human rights treaties and their 
uniform interpretation, among others, by the HRC and the ICJ. Consequently, 
WKH&RXUW¶V MXULVSUXGHQFH LVDWGLYHUJHQFHZLWK WKH MXGJPHQWVRI WKH ,&-DQG
the practice of other international bodies and hinders a broader, hence more 
effective to the interests of the applicants, interpretation of the concept of 
jurisdiction.         
 
3.3 The question of State succession in human rights treaties 
Another concept the effects of which are necessary for applying the 
ECHR is State succession. Since the dissolution of the Czech and Slovak 
Federal Republic, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) and the 
former Union of Soviet Socialists Republics, issues concerning the effects of 
State succession frequently arise before the ECtHR. One of the difficulties 
relates to the law of treaties and to the question as to whether a successor State 
continues to be bound by the treaty obligations of the predecessor State. This 
question was the issue at the heart of the %LMHOLü case.43 The applicants lodged 
an application before the Court complaining of the non-enforcement of a final 
eviction order by the authorities of the State of Union of Serbia and 
Montenegro. Before the application was heard by the Court, however, Serbia 
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 %LMHOLüY6HUELDDQG0RQWHQHJUR, 28 April 2009. The Grand Chamber rejected a request for 
a referral.    
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and Montenegro declared their independence. In the first instance, the Court 
found that the impugned enforcement proceedings had been solely within the 
competence of the Montenegrin authorities. Nonetheless, for the Court to 
examine the claim of the non-enforcement of the eviction order, it had to 
decide whether Montenegro should be held bound by the ECHR since the date 
that it became binding on the State of Union of Serbia and Montenegro (3 
February 2004) or since the date that Montenegro acceded to the ECHR (6 
June 2006).  
PIL in the area of State succession is not settled, favouring mostly ad 
hoc solutions through the conclusion of agreements between the interested 
parties. As far as newly independent States are concerned, namely States 
emerging from colonial domination, the general rule is the non-continuity of 
treaty obligations, in that the successor State is not, in principle, bound by the 
treaty obligations of the predecessor State.44 This is also the regulation of the 
1978 Vienna Convention on State Succession (Article 16).45 As far as 
successor States are concerned, Article 34 of the VCSS provides that they are, 
in principle, bound by the treaties which were binding on the predecessor State. 
However, very few States have ratified the VCSS and its acceptance in State 
practice is doubtful.46 In this context, special consideration is given to the 
international obligations assumed by the predecessor States under human rights 
treaties. It is strongly argued that, in any case, human rights treaties continue to 
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bind the successor States. This thesis has found sufficient support in the 
practice and views of many international bodies, such as the HRC and other 
UN treaty monitoring bodies, the International Labour Organisation (ILO).47  
The Court in %LMHOLü did not engage with this discussion and did not 
provide the general context to State succession in respect to human rights 
treaties in its judgment. It was held that Montenegro should be considered as 
bound by the ECHR retroactively to the date that the State of Union of Serbia 
DQG 0RQWHQHJUR UDWLILHG LW 7KH &RXUW UHOLHG RQ 0RQWHQHJUR¶V WUDQVLWLRQDO
domestic legislation; Article 5 of its Constitutional Law envisaged that 
µSURYLVLRQV RI LQWHUQDWLRQDO DJUHHPHQWV RQ KXPDQ ULJKWV DQG IUHHGRPV WR
which Montenegro acceded before 3 June 2006, shall be applied to legal 
UHODWLRQVWKDWKDYHEHHQDULVHQDIWHULWVVLJQDWXUH¶ However, the %LMHOLü case is 
distinguished from the previous case-law in that the Court reinforced its 
reasoning by invoking relevant PIL.48  
The CouUW UHIHUUHG WR µWKHprinciple that fundamental rights, protected 
by international human rights treaties, should indeed belong to the individuals 
living in the territory of the State party concerned, notwithstanding its 
VXEVHTXHQWGLVVROXWLRQRUVXFFHVVLRQ¶.497KH&RXUW¶VDVVHUWLRQZDVJURXQGHGLQ
the HRC General Comment No. 26 regarding the continuity of obligations50 
and the written submissions of the European Commission for Democracy 
through Law (Venice Commission) which was granted leave to intervene 
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before the Court.51 The Venice Commission underlined that despite the general 
rule in PIL on the non-continuity of the treaty obligations, international treaties 
for the protection of human rights deserved special consideration. General 
Comment No. 26, more speciILFDOO\ SURYLGHV WKDW µRQFH WKH SHRSOH DUH
accorded the protection of the rights under the Covenant, such protection 
devolves with the territory and continues to belong to them, notwithstanding 
>«@GLVPHPEHUPHQWLQPRUHWKDQRQH6WDWHRU6WDWHVXFFHVVLRQ¶.52  
Given the fact that the Court does not provide a detailed analysis of the 
questions at hand, its statement that there is a principle concerning the 
continuity of human rights treaty obligations does not appear to be well-
substantiated. Also it is unclear as to whether this principle referring to human 
rights treaties qualifies as an exception to the general rule of non-continuity 
under PIL or if it is part and parcel of the trend concerning the continuity of 
international obligations in case of State succession. Yet, it is notable that, for 
the first time, the Court takes account of relevant PIL in a judgment regarding 
State succession. Despite the fact that the developments reflected into the HRC 
Comment No. 26 and in the Amicus Brief of the Venice Commission were not 
WKHSULPDU\EDVLVIRUWKH&RXUW¶VUHDVRQLQJWKH\VXEVWDQWLDOO\VWUHQJWKHQHGWKH
&RXUW¶VUHDVRQLQJ 
Furthermore, one should not lose sight of the fact that the Court took a 
clear position and contributed to the development of the solid trend concerning 
the continuity of human rights obligations on successor States (automatic 
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succession).53 This is a trend in PIL driven by many international bodies, 
including, among others, UN treaty bodies and the ILO. On the other hand, the 
ICJ, in the Genocide case in 1996 did not address the question of whether 
human rights treaties were automatic binding on successor States,54 refraining 
from pronouncing on the emerging principle in PIL.55 Therefore, %LMHOLü 
supports the argument of this thesis concerning the role of the ECtHR in 
developing PIL. Chapter 1 underlined that PIL may be developed by all 
international courts and tribunals and other international bodies, especially in 
cases where the ICJ is not willing to pronounce on specific questions. In this 
instance the Court, although it did not discuss the relevant issues in detail, 
plays its part in elucidating State succession related matters in PIL, which in 
long term may lead to well-established rules and principles under PIL.  
 
3.4 Conclusions  
7KLV &KDSWHU H[DPLQHG WZR H[DPSOHV IURP WKH &RXUW¶V SUDFWLFH RI
taking cognisance of PIL in order to ascertain the meaning of concepts which 
are necessary for applying the ECHR; the concept of jurisdiction envisaged in 
Article 1 ECHR and State succession.  
 Although the Grand Chamber in %DQNRYLü and the subsequent 
jurisprudence followed a sound legal reasoning, including the application of 
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(Bosnia-Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, 11 July 1996, ICJ 
Rep. 1996, p. 595. 
55
 ^ ? ^ŝǀĂŬƵŵĂƌĂŶ ?  ‘dŚĞ /ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ŽƵƌƚ ŽĨ :ƵƐƚŝĐĞ ĂŶĚ ,ƵŵĂŶ ZŝŐŚƚƐ ? ? ŝŶ ^ ? :ŽƐĞƉŚ ?  ?
McBeth (eds.), Research Handbook on International Human Rights Law (Edward Elgar, 
Cheltenham, 2010) 299, 310. 
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Article 31(3)(c) VCLT, regarding the harmonious placement of the ECHR 
within PIL, it relied on PIL for validating a legal presumption of territoriality 
which is not akin to the ordinary meaning of jurisdiction under the ECHR. 
Notably, the Court selectively dismissed, without a convincing explanation, the 
relevance of other human rights treaties, the views of international bodies and 
MXGJPHQWVRIWKH,&-UHJDUGLQJWKHQRWLRQRIMXULVGLFWLRQ7KH&RXUW¶VFDVH-law 
was found to be divergent from international practice while favouring a narrow 
definition of jurisdiction. 
 On the other hand, %LMHOLü HYLGHQFHVWKH&RXUW¶VUHFHSWLYLW\WRWKHYLHZV
of other international bodies insofar as State succession in human rights treaties 
is concerned and that the PIL norms to which the Court found recourse 
strengthened its legal reasoning. Most importantly, although the Court did not 
engage with the pertinent discussion in PIL in detail, it took a stand on the 
matter of automatic succession to human rights treaties and aligned its case-law 
with the emerging practice of other international bodies.  
 On both occasions the third party interveners before the Court put 
forward a PIL related argumentation and openly invited the Court to align its 
position with the practice of other international bodies (Al-Skeini, Bijeliü). 
Further, the consideration of PIL in %LMHOLü reinforces the effective application 
of the guarantees under the ECHR while progressively developing the content 
of PIL. If the Court in %DQNRYLü, and in its subsequent case-law, had also 
followed the relevant practice of the ICJ and other international bodies, it 
would have employed not only a sound interpretation of the meaning of 
jurisdiction, but also a broader notion of jurisdiction which would more 
effectively protect the rights of applicants under the ECHR.  
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      4. Finding recourse to public international law in order to define 
certain terms embodied in the ECHR 
4.1 Introduction  
Chapter 4 discusses cases in which the Court takes cognisance of PIL 
norms in order to define specific terms embodied in the text of the ECHR, such 
DV µHYHU\RQH¶ RU µVODYHU\¶ 7KH &RXUW HPSOR\V RWKHU 3,/ QRUPV ZKLFK DUH
commonly referred to in PIL as having acquired a specific legal meaning or 
have a specialised focus. This series of cases appears to reflect, to a great 
extent, the general practice of international courts and tribunals to find recourse 
to other treaties for ascertaining the ordinary meaning of the treaty under 
interpretation (Chapter 2.3.1). The analysis lays the basis for drawing certain 
conclusions as to whether, and how, the ECtHR places the ECHR within PIL.1    
The distinction between finding recourse to PIL norms in the present 
Chapter and clarifying the ratione materiae scope of the rights under ECHR, as 
it will be examined in Section III, and especially Chapter 7, is not watertight or 
rigid and certain overlap may exist. This distinction serves analytical purposes 
IRUH[DPLQLQJWKH&RXUW¶VOHJDOUHDVRQLQJ    
 
4.2 'HILQLQJµHYHU\RQH¶XQGHU$UWLFOH(&+5 
The Vo v. France case2 gave the Grand Chamber the opportunity to 
GHOLPLW WKH GHILQLWLRQ RI µHYHU\RQH¶ XQGHU $UWLFOH  (&+53 The applicant 
complained that France had failed to discharge its obligations under Article 2 
                                                             
1
 International Law Commission µ5HSRUW RI WKH 6WXG\ *URXS RI WKH ,QWHUQDWLRnal Law 
Commission finalisHG E\ 0 .RVNHQQLHPL¶  0D\-9 June and 3 July-11 August 2006) UN 
Doc A/CN.4/L.682, [49]-[44]. 
2
 Vo v. France, 8 July 2004, (Grand Chamber). 
3
 The UHOHYDQWSDUWRI$UWLFOHUHDGVWKDWµHYHU\RQH¶VULJKWWROLIHVKDOOEHSURWHFWHGE\ODZ¶ 
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ECHR by not qualifying the loss of life of her unborn child as unintentional 
homicide. France, in its turn, stressed that the wording of Article 2 ECHR did 
not encompass the protection of the foetus. The Centre for Reproductive 
Rights, a United States based NGO, intervened before the Grand Chamber and 
argued against the applicability of the right to life to the foetus. It found 
support in the relevant provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR),4 the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC),5 
the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights (IACHR),6 and the views of 
their supervisory bodies. The heart of the matter was whether the unborn child 
IHOOZLWKLQWKHPHDQLQJRIµHYHU\RQH¶XQGHU$UWLFOH 
 7KH&RXUW¶VVWDUWLQJSRLQWZDVWRFRQWUDVWWKHWH[WRI$UWLFOH(&+5WR
the provision safeguarding the right to life under the IACHR. Article 4 IACHR 
H[SUHVVO\ SURYLGHV WKDW WKH ULJKW WR OLIH LV SURWHFWHG µIURP WKH PRPHQW RI
FRQFHSWLRQ¶ ,W ZDV DOVR QRWHG WKDW PHPEHU 6WDWHV LQ WKHLU OHJLVODWLRQ DQG
practice did not apply the offence of the unintentional homicide to the foetus. 
Further, the Court drew guidance from recent, specialised PIL norms 
concerning biomedicine. The Oviedo Convention on Human Rights and 
Biomedicine (Oviedo Convention) and the two Additional Protocols to the said 
Convention did not provide a definitLRQ RI WKH WHUPV µHYHU\RQH¶ RU µKXPDQ
EHLQJ¶7KHWH[WRIWKHWUHDWLHVDQGWKHLU([SODQDWRU\5HSRUWVFOHDUO\LQGLFDWHG
that the contracting parties could not reach an agreement on the definitions and 
                                                             
4
 Concluded on 16 December 1966; entered into force on 23 March 1976; 999 UNTS 17.   
5
 Adopted by UNGA Res. 44/25 (20 November 1989) UN Doc A/RES/44/25; entered into 
force on 2 September 1990; 1577 UNTS 3. 
6
 Concluded on 22 November 1969; entered into force on 18 July 1978; OAS Treaty Series No. 
36. 
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the matter was left to national regulation.7 The Grand CKDPEHU¶V DQDO\VLV
afforded considerable weight to these PIL norms for ascertaining the absence 
of a European consensus.8 This is, perhaps, justified given that the Oviedo 
Convention and its Additional Protocols were (at the time) recently concluded 
instruments which dealt specifically with the question of when life begins. 
They were also concluded under the auspices of the Council of Europe and, 
hence, were presumably representative of the common ground among member 
States. Yet, the Ovideo Convention at the time, although being in force, was 
ratified only by seventeen member States (out of forty seven).9 Fourteen States 
ratified the first Additional Protocol10 and the second Additional Protocol was 
not opened for signature yet.11 Therefore, it is not entirely clear to what extent 
these treaties accurately reflected and substantiated (the absence of) a common 
ground, since they were not widely ratified.  
Nonetheless, the Court refrained from giving a definite answer on the 
PHDQLQJRIµHYHU\RQH¶XQGHU$UWLFOH(CHR. Instead, it proclaimed that, even 
assuming that the right to life was applicable to foetus, the State was not 
                                                             
7
 Vo (GC), [84]. 
8
 Conversely, if the Oviedo Convention provides for specific standards, as in the case of 
regulating the conditions for giving a free and informed consent, the Court drew interpretive 
guidance from it and scrutinised the national regulatory framework against these standards: 
Glass v. United Kingdom, 9 March 2004, [58], [74]-[78]. 
9
 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard 
to the Application of Biology and Medicine (concluded on 4 April 1997; entered into force on 
1 December 1999) CETS No 164;. 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=164&CM=8&DF=10/08/2012
&CL=ENG.  
10
 Additional Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the 
Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine, on the Prohibition of 
Cloning Human Rights (concluded on 12 January 1998; entered into force on 1 March 2001) 
CETS No 168; 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=168&CM=8&DF=10/08/2012
&CL=ENG.  
11
 Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine concerning 
Biomedical Research (concluded on 25 January 2005; entered into force on 1 September 2007) 
CETS No 195; 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=195&CM=8&DF=10/08/2012
&CL=ENG.  
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obliged under Article 2 to provide for criminal law remedies concerning 
unintentional homicide. Likewise, the Court in the Evans case, by taking into 
consideration, among other things, PIL norms derived the absence of a 
European consensus on the legal definition of the beginning of life and 
GLVPLVVHGWKHDSSOLFDQW¶VFODLPVDVQRWIDOOLQJZLWKLQ$UWLFOH(&+512  
The Court in the Vo and Evans cases takes the national legislation of 
member States and PIL norms into consideration in order to identify the 
existence or not of a European consensus. It is very common for the Court to 
inject comparative law analysis regarding the legislation and national practice 
of member States into its reasoning. This practice has attained the role of an 
LQWHUSUHWDWLYHSULQFLSOH LQ WKH&RXUW¶V MXULVSUXGHQFHFRPPRQO\ UHIHUUHG WRDV
comparative interpretation of the ECHR (or otherwise consensual interpretation 
since the national standards reflect a consensus among member States).13 It is 
interesting, for the present purposes, that the Court construes and invokes the 
relevance of the European consensus by relying also on PIL norms. It conflates 
national standards with PIL norms. The Marckx case is a well-known, early 
example of this practice.14 7KH FRQIODWLRQ XQGHU WKH KHDGLQJ µ(XURSHDQ
FRQVHQVXV¶ LV WKHUHDVRQWKDWPDQ\ OHJDOVFKRODUV WUHDWWKH&RXUW¶VSUDFWLFHRI
taking cognisance of PIL norms as an integral part of the comparative or 
consensual interpretation,15 as a type of European consensus,16 or as evidence 
RIDµGRXEOHFRPSDUDWLYHLQWHUSUHWDWLRQ¶17  
                                                             
12
 Evans v. United Kingdom, 10 April 2007, (Grand Chamber), [54]. 
13
 3 0DKRQH\ µ7KH &RPSDUDWLYH 0HWKRG LQ -XGJPHQWs of the European Court of Human 
5LJKWV5HIHUHQFHEDFNWR1DWLRQDO/DZ¶LQ*&DYLQHWet al. (eds.), Comparative Law before 
the Courts (BIICL, London, 2004) 135, 136-138. 
14
 Marckx v Belgium, 13 June 1979, (Plenary), [41]. 
15
 C. Ovey, R. White (eds.), Jacobs and White, The European Convention of Human Rights 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010) 168.  
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It is submitted, however, that the interpretation of the ECHR by taking 
PIL norms into account is a separate interpretative principle to the comparative 
interpretation. It cannot be disregarded that in the Vo, Evans, Marckx and other 
similar cases, domestic and PIL norms are different sources of law and 
different enquiries in the examination of the existence or not of common 
standards.18 In these instances, domestic standards converge with PIL norms, 
leading to the same interpretative outcome, namely the absence of common 
standards. Yet Chapters 7 and 8 will illustrate that the consideration of PIL 
norms serves a decisive role LQ WKH &RXUW¶V UHDVRQLQJ HYHQ LQ WKH DEVHQFH RI
common legal standards in national practice or, all the more, when member 
States have contrary national practice.19 Hence, the autonomy of the principle 
of taking PIL norms into account becomes more obvious when the two 
interpretative principles diverge. It will be also seen that the idea of the 
(XURSHDQFRQVHQVXVLVVHPLQDOLQWKH&RXUW¶VUHDVRQLQJLQVRIDUDVWKHUHOLDQFH
upon PIL norms.  
The Vo and Evans cases lend also support to the argument of 
distinguishing the principle of taking PIL norms into account from the dynamic 
(or evolutive) interpretation, according to which the ECHR must be interpreted 
in light of the changing conditions and higher standards of member States. 
                                                                                                                                                                 
16
 .']HKWVLDURX µ'RHV&RQVHQVXV0DWWHU"/HJLWLPDF\ RI (XURSHDQ&RQVHQVXV LQWKH&DVH
/DZRIWKH(XURSHDQ&RXUWRI+XPDQ5LJKWV¶PL 534, 548. 
17
 J. Christoffersen, Fair Balance: Proportionality, Subsidiarity and Primarity in the European 
Convention of Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden-Boston, 2009) 59.  
18
 Marckx (Pl.), [41]; V. v. United Kingdom, 16 December 1999 (Grand Chamber), [64], [73]-
[77]; Mangouras v. Spain, 28 September 2010, (Grand Chamber), [59]; cf. Joint Dissenting 
Opinion of Judges Wildhaber, Sir Nicolas Bratza, Bonello, Loucaides, Cabral Barreto, Tulkens 
and Pellonpää in Odièvre v. France, 13 February 2003, (Grand Chamber), [15] where they 
criticised WKHPDMRULW\IRUµIDLO>LQJ@WRUHIHUWRWKHYDULRXVLQWHUQDWLRQDOLQVWUXPHQWVWKDWSOD\D
GHFLVLYHUROHLQDFKLHYLQJDFRQVHQVXV¶ 
19
 Infra 7.3, 7.6, 8.2, 8.3, 8.4, 8.5, 8.9. 
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Many commentators subordinate the first to the second.20 Nonetheless, in these 
cases applying both principles creates tension, something that the dissenting 
Judges stressed in the Vo case.21 PIL norms (and national standards) function 
as a limitation to the application of the dynamic interpretation, since they do 
QRW VXIILFLHQWO\ VXEVWDQWLDWH D G\QDPLF UHDGLQJ RI µHYHU\RQH¶ XQGHU $UWLFOH 
ECHR.22 
 
4.3 'HILQLQJµWRUWXUH¶XQGHU$UWLFOH(&+5 
$UWLFOH(&+5SURYLGHVWKDWµQRRQHVKDOOEHVXEMHFWHGWRWRUWXUHRUWR
inhuman or degrading treatment or SXQLVKPHQW¶ 7KH WH[W RI WKH &RQYHQWLRQ
GRHVQRWFRQWDLQDGHILQLWLRQIRUDQ\RIWKHWKUHHFRQFHSWVµWRUWXUH¶µLQKXPDQ¶
RU µGHJUDGLQJ¶ WUHDWPHQW RU SXQLVKPHQW ,W ZDV WKH (XURSHDQ &RPPLVVLRQ
which in its early practice concerning the definition of the prohibited practices 
under Article 3 ECHR, considered the definition of torture as encapsulated in 
WKH  *HQHUDO $VVHPEO\¶V 'HFODUDWLRQ RQ WKH 3URWHFWLRQ RI $OO 3HUVRQV
from being subjected to Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (UN Declaration on the protection against Torture).23 
                                                             
20
 &/5R]DNLVµ7KH(XURSHDQ-XGJHDV&RPSDUDWLVW¶ LQ6LU%0DUNHVLQLV-)HGWNHHGV
Judicial Resource to Foreign Law. A New Source of Inspiration (UCL Press, London, 2006) 
338, 343- $ 0RZEUD\ µ$Q ([DPLQDWLRQ RI WKH (XURSHDQ &RXUW RI +XPDQ 5LJKWV¶
Approach to Overruling its Previous Case Law¶HRLRev 179, 193-194, 197. Contra 
937]HYHOHNRVµ7KH8VHRI$UWLFOH&RIWKH9&/7LQWKH&DVH/DZRIWKH(&W+5
An Effective Anti-Fragmentation Tool or a Selective Loophole for the Reinforcement of 
+XPDQ5LJKWV7HOHRORJ\"¶Michigan JIL 621, 648, 659-660. 
21
 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Ress, [5]; Dissenting Opinion of Judge Mularoni joined by 
-XGJH6WUiåQLFNiS 
22
 $0RZEUD\µ7KH&UHDWLYLW\RIWKH(XURSHDQ&RXUWRI+XPDQ5LJKWV¶EHRLRev 
57, 68. Also V. v UK (GC), [64], [73]-[77]; Stummer v Austria, 7 July 2011, (Grand Chamber), 
[132].   
23
 Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from being subjected to Torture and other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, UNGA Res 3452 (9 December 1975) 
UN Doc. A/RES/3452 (XXX). 
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In the Greek case,24 WKH&RPPLVVLRQKHOGWKDWWRUWXUHLVDQµLQKXPDQWUHDWPHQW
which has a purpose, such as obtaining of information or confessions, or the 
infliction of punishment, and it is generally an aggravated form of inhuman 
WUHDWPHQW¶25 Thus, according to the Commission, torture under Article 3 
ECHR contains two definitional elements: an aggravated form of inhuman 
treatment and the purposive element. These elements were endorsed and 
further developed in the UN Declaration on the protection against Torture and 
subsequently in the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT),26 as necessary conditions for 
qualifying a treatment as torture.27  
The Court in its case-law, however, took a different view from the 
&RPPLVVLRQ¶VSRVLWLRQLQWKHGreek case. It seems that it distanced itself from 
the CAT definition insofar as the purposive element is concerned.28 The 
Plenary Court in the Ireland v. United Kingdom case analysed the meaning of 
torture by exclusive reference to the distinction embodied in Article 3 ECHR 
between the notions of torture, inhuman and degrading treatment or 
                                                             
24
 Greek case, Report of the European Commission, 5 November 1969, 12 Ybk ECHR 1, 186. 
25
 Greek case, 186 (emphases added). 
26
 Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (concluded on 10 December 1984; entered into force on 26 June 1987) 1465 
UNTS 85. 
27
 M.D. Evans, R. Morgan, Preventing Torture (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1998) 74; M. 
Nowak, E. McArthur, The United National Convention against Torture: A Commentary 
(Oxford University Press, New York, 2008) 557-558; J.H. Burgers, H. Danelius, The United 
Nations Convention against Torture (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Netherlands, 1988) 115. 
28
 $UWLFOH&$7VWDWHVWKDWµIRUWKHSXUSRVHVRIWKLV&RQYHQWLRQWRUWXUHPHDQVDQ\DFWE\
which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a 
person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, 
punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having 
committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on 
discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or 
with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official 
capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to 
ODZIXOVDQFWLRQV¶HPSKDVLVDGGHG 
For an analysis of the purposive element in the CAT definition Nowak, McArthur, (note 27), 
75-77; M'(YDQVµ*HWWLQJWR*ULSVZLWK7RUWXUH¶ICLQ 365, 375-378. 
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punishment. According to the Court, the principal differentiating feature of 
torture from the other practices under Article 3 ECHR is the intensity of 
suffering inflicted upon the individual. 29 In its legal analysis, the Court 
referred to the UN Declaration on the protection against Torture in order to 
support this assertion. AcFRUGLQJ WR $UWLFOH   µWRUWXUH FRQVWLWXWHV DQ
aggravated and deliberate form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
SXQLVKPHQW¶ ,W VHOHFWLYHO\ RPLWWHG KRZHYHU WR FLWH WKH ILUVW SDUDJUDSK RI
Article 1 which emphasised that torture must be inflicted for specific 
purposes.30 Admittedly, in the assessment of the facts of the case, the Court 
IRXQG WKDW µWKH REMHFW >RI WKH ILYH WHFKQLTXHV@ ZDV WKH H[WUDFWLRQ RI
FRQIHVVLRQV WKH QDPLQJ RI RWKHUV DQGRU LQIRUPDWLRQ¶31 Yet, it is not clear 
whether or not the Court included the purposive element as a necessary 
requirement for defining torture under Article 3 ECHR.32 Similarly, in 
Selmouni, although explicit reference was made to the CAT definition and to 
the fact that the pain inflicted on the applicant served the purpose of extracting 
a confession for an offence he was suspected of having committed, it appears 
that the Court made this statement in passing.33 The conclusion that the Court 
does not necessarily attach a legal significance to its reference to the purpose of 
the impugned act is reinforced by the fact that in other instances, when other 
forms of ill-treatment were under consideration, it also examines the purpose of 
                                                             
29
 Ireland v. United Kingdom, 18 January 1978, (Plenary), [167]. 
30
 µ>«@IRUVXFKSXUSRVHVDVREWDLQLQJIURP>WKHLQGLYLGXDO@RUDWKLUGSHUVRQLQIRUPDWLRQRUD
confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of 
KDYLQJFRPPLWWHGRULQWLPLGDWLQJRUFRHUFLQJKLPRUDWKLUGSHUVRQ¶ 
31
 Irish case, [167]. 
32
 C. Ingelse, The United Nations Committee against Torture ± An Assessment (Kluwer Law 
International, The Hague, 2001) 58-59; Evans, Morgan, (note 27), 77. 
33
 Selmouni v. France, 28 July 1999, (Grand Chamber), [96]-[97]. 
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the prohibited treatment in order to overall assess the circumstances of the 
case.34 
The first time that the Grand Chamber explicitly endorsed the CAT 
approach, as far as the purposive element is concerned, is in 2000, in the 
Salman and Ilhan cases.35 It further reaffirmed its position more recently in the 
Gäfgen case.36 The Grand Chamber stated that 
in addition to the severity of the treatment, there is a purposive 
element as recognised in the [CAT], which defines torture in terms of 
the intentional inflicting of severe pain or suffering with the aim, 
inter alia, of obtaining information, inflicting punishment or 
intimidating.37       
Here, the purposive element is adopted as a necessary condition and is treated 
on equal footing to the element of the severity of the treatment. In the Salman 
and Ihlan cases, however, when the Court went on to assess the facts of the 
case, it did not discuss whether the purposive requirement was met. Although 
in principle, it endorsed the CAT definition of torture under Article 3 ECHR, 
there is no clear evidence that it examined in casu that the ill-treatment 
suffered by the applicants had one of the enumerated purposes listed in Article 
1 CAT.38 On the other hand, in the Gäfgen case the Court addressed the 
purpose of the threats for extracting information from the applicant.39 In this 
                                                             
34
 For example, V. UK (GC), [71]; Peers v. Greece, 19 April 2001, [74]; Hénaf v. France, 27 
November 2003, [47]. 
35
 Salman v. Turkey, 27 June 2000, (Grand Chamber); Ilhan v. Turkey, 27 June 2000, (Grand 
Chamber). 
36
 Gäfgen v. Germany, 1 June 2010, (Grand Chamber).   
37
 Salman (GC), [114]; Ilhan (GC), [85]. Also Gäfgen (GC), [90]. 
38
 Salman (GC), [115]; Ilhan (GC), [87]. 
39
 Gäfgen (GC), [105]. 
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instance, the Court incorporated the CAT purposive element in its legal 
reasoning and assessed it against the particular circumstances.  
 In sum, the jurisprudence creates confusion. Until the Ihlan and Salman 
cases, the Court had never clearly proclaimed that it has incorporated the 
purposive CAT element of torture into Article 3 ECHR. Any references to the 
purpose of the prohibited practice were in passing and in the context of 
assessing the facts of the cases.40 Even though in the Salman, Ihlan and Gäfgen 
cases the Court expressly mentions the purposive element, it is not clear 
whether, and to what extent, it incorporates the element in its analysis.  
$UHDVRQDEOHH[SODQDWLRQIRUWKH&RXUW¶VXQFOHDUSUDFWLFHLVWKDWLWLVLQ
fact, unwilling to transpose the CAT definition of torture under the ECHR. In 
the context of the CAT the purposive element of the definition of torture has a 
prominent role. Despite the fact that the CAT is sometimes understood as a 
³KXPDQ ULJKWV WUHDW\´ LW LV DQ LQWHUQDWLRQDO WUHDW\ ZKLFK ILUVW DQG IRUHPRVW
purports that States assert their jurisdiction over acts of torture.41 This is 
evidenced in the CAT structure (only one provision addresses other forms of 
ill-treatment) and in the substantive obligations incumbent on State parties for 
exercising universal jurisdiction and establishing an effective criminal law 
framework.42 If the ECtHR uncritically incorporates the CAT purposive 
                                                             
40
 Evans, Morgan, (note 27), 77; Evans, (note 28), 377; M.W. Janis et al., European Human 
Rights Law (Oxford University Press, New York 2008) 204. Contra )1t$RLOiLQµ7KH(&+5
DQGLWV3URKLELWLRQRQ7RUWXUH¶LQ6/HYLQVRQHGTorture ± A Collection (Oxford University 
Press, New York, 2004) 213, 217. Cf &RQFXUULQJ 2SLQLRQ RI -XGJH =XSDQþLþ LQ Jalloh v. 
Germany  -XO\  *UDQG &KDPEHU ZKR RSLQHG WKDW µLQ Selmouni v. France we 
integrated Article 1 of the United Nations Convention against Torture >«@LQWRRXURZQFDVH
ODZ¶HPSKDVLVDGGHG 
41
 Evans, (note 28)RUVLPLODUWKRXJKWV66LYDNXPDUDQµ7RUWXUHLQ,QWHUQDWLRQDO+XPDQ
5LJKWV/DZDQG,QWHUQDWLRQDO+XPDQLWDULDQ/DZ7KH$FWRUDQGWKH$G+RF7ULEXQDOV¶
18 LJIL 541; Contra M. Forowicz, The Reception of International Law in the European Court 
of Human Rights (Oxford University Press, New York, 2010) 229. 
42
 Burgers, Danelius, (note 27), 70-71.  
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element as a sine qua non condition for defining torture under Article 3 ECHR, 
it leaves out many instances of ill treatment which cannot be qualified as 
WRUWXUH ,I KRZHYHU WKH &RXUW GHFLGHV WKDW µWRUWXUH LV WRUWXUH ZKDWHYHU LWV
SXUSRVHPD\EH¶43 it adopts a broader definition and a more inclusive approach. 
The CAT definition weakens the protection under the ECHR.44 Given the 
important, different contextual nuances between the ECHR and CAT, it would 
be reasonable for the Court to explicitly state that it should not follow the CAT 
definition to the letter. Although the practice of using definitions of concepts 
contained in other PIL norms serves to avoid conflicting interpretations and 
HYHQSURPRWHVWKH LGHDRIµKDUPRQLVLQJ LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ¶45 the different context 
of PIL norms should always kept in mind. The CAT definition can be used as 
an interpretive aid in order to define torture under the ECHR, but this does not 
necessary entail that all the conditions under Article 1 CAT should be 
transplanted under the ECHR.46     
7KH &RXUW¶V OLQH RI UHDVRQLQJ UHJDUGLQJ WKH SXUSRVLYH HOHPHQW RI WKH
CAT definition should be contrasted to its case-law concerning the question of 
who can be the actor of torture. According to Article 1 CAT, the prohibited 
SUDFWLFHPXVWEHµE\RUDWWKHLQVWLJDWLRQRIRUZLWKWKHFRQVHQWRUDFTXLHVFHQFH
RI D SXEOLF RIILFLDO RU RWKHU SHUVRQ DFWLQJ LQ DQ RIILFLDO FDSDFLW\¶ 7KH CAT 
definition is embedded into the idea of torture as an official act.47 The ECtHR, 
                                                             
43
 Separate Opinion of Judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, in the Irish case, 117. 
44
 Contra Forowicz, (note 41), 229. 
45
 % 5XGROI µ8QLW\ DQG 'LYHUVLW\ LQ WKH 6HWWOHPHQW RI ,QWHUQDWLRQDO 'LVSXWHV¶ LQ $
Zimmermann, R. Hofmann (eds.), Unity and Diversity in International Law (Duncker and 
Humbolt, Berlin, 2006) 389, 392. 
46
 Prosecutor v. Dragoljub KunarDü5DGRPLU.RYDþDQG=RUDQ9XNRYLü, Case Nos IT-96-23-
T and IT-96-23/1-T, Appeals Chamber, 12 June 2002, [146]-[148] and Prosecutor v. 
'UDJROMXE .XQDUDü 5DGRPLU .RYDþ DQG =RUDQ 9XNRYLü, Case Nos IT-96-23-T and IT-96-
23/1-T, Trial Chamber, 22 February 2001, [465]-[497]. 
47
 Evans, (note 28), 375-376. 
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however, has taken a different position on this: member States are obliged to 
take measures to ensure that private individuals are not subjected to torture by 
other private individuals.48 7KHUHIRUH WKH &$7¶V GHILQLWLRQDO HOHPHQW RI
torture, as being only an official act, has clearly not been incorporated into the 
definition of torture under Article 3 ECHR.49 Admittedly, the articulation of 
positive obligations under Article 3 ECHR50 and, in general, the language of 
State responsibility under human rights treaties may be a legitimate means to 
overcome the CAT restriction regarding the actor of torture.51 However, this 
does not alter the fact that, according to the ECtHR, the said restriction of the 
&$7GHILQLWLRQGRHVQRWILWZHOO LQWKH&RQYHQWLRQ¶VFRQWH[WDQGKHQFH LW LV
not incorporated under Article 3 ECHR. In light of this practice, it is deemed 
preferable that the Court clarifies its stand also with regards to the purposive 
CAT definitional element.  
 
4.4 'HILQLQJµIRUFHGRUFRPSXOVRU\ODERXU¶XQGHU$UWLFOH(&+5 
In the Van der Mussele case52 the applicant, a lawyer, complained that 
he was required to provide his services without receiving any remuneration or 
reimbursement for his expenses. He alleged a violation of the prohibition of 
forced or compulsory labour under Article 4 (2) ECHR. The Plenary Court 
QRWHGWKHODFNRIDGHILQLWLRQRIWKHWHUPµIRUFHGRUFRPSXOVRU\ODERXU¶ LQWKH
text of the ECHR and the absence of any guidance from its preparatory work. 
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 A v. United Kingdom, 23 September 1998, [22]; Kudla v Poland, 26 October 2000, (Grand 
Chamber), [97]. 
49
 Nowak, McArthur, (note 27), 78; Sivakumaran, (note 41), 552-553; Evans, (note 28), 378-
381. 
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 D.J. Harris et al., Law of the European Convention on Human Rights (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2009) 106-111. 
51
 Evans, (note 28), 378-379; Sivakumaran, (note 41), 553. 
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 Van der Mussele v. Belgium, 23 November 1983, (Plenary). 
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The Court had recourse to the 1932 International Labour Organisation (ILO) 
Convention concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour53 and the 1959 ILO 
Convention on the Abolition of Forced Labour.54 The resort to extraneous to 
the ECHR international treaties was justified on a two-fold basis. First, the 
Court underlined that the apparent, textual similarity between Article 4 (2) 
ECHR and Article 2 of the pre-existing ILO Convention No 29 was not 
accidental. Secondly, it noted that both ILO Conventions were binding on 
nearly all member States of the Council of Europe, including the respondent 
State (Belgium). However, it was stressed that the definition of forced or 
compulsory labour contained in ILO Convention No 29 shall provide a 
µstarting point IRUWKHLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRI$UWLFOH¶55 DQGWKXVµVLJKWVKRXOGQRW
EHORVWRI>WKH(XURSHDQ@&RQYHQWLRQ¶VVSHFLDOIHDWXUHV¶56  
The ILO Convention No 29 GHILQHV µIRUFHG RU FRPSXOVRU\ ODERXU¶ as 
µDOOZRUNRUVHUYLFHZKLFKLVH[DFWHGIURPDQ\SHUson under the menace of any 
SHQDOW\ DQG IRU ZKLFK WKH VDLG SHUVRQ KDV QRWRIIHUHG KLPVHOI YROXQWDULO\¶57 
When the Court proceeded to examine whether the services rendered by the 
applicant amounted to compulsory labour, it encountered the difficulty on the 
PHDQLQJ RI µPHQDFH RI DQ\ SHQDOW\¶ ,W DSSURDFKHG WKH QRWLRQ E\ WDNLQJ
cognisance of the standards adopted by the ILO Committee of Experts58 and 
FRQFOXGHGWKDWWKHULVNRIVWULNLQJWKHDSSOLFDQW¶VQDPHRIIWKHUROORISXSLOVRU
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 Convention concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour, C29 (concluded on 28 June 1930; 
entered into force on 1 May 1932) 39 UNTS 55 (ILO Convention No 29). 
54
 Convention concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour, C105 (concluded on 25 June 1957; 
entered into force on 17 January 1959) 320 UNTS 291 (ILO Convention No 105).  
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 Van der Mussele (Pl), [32] (emphases added).  
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 Ibid. 
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 Article 2 (1). 
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 µ$EROLWLRQRI)RUFHG/DERXU¶*HQHUDO6XUYH\E\WKH&RPPLWWHHRI([SHUWVRQ$SSOLFDWLRQ
of Conventions and Recommendations, 1979. 
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rejecting his application for entry on the register of advocates qualified as a 
penalty.  
As far as the second element of the definition is concerned, namely 
whether the applicant performed the service unwillingly, the crucial question 
was whether his prior consent to the general legal regime concerning legal aid 
in Belgium precluded compulsory labour from coming into play. According to 
the Plenary Court, the prior consent of the applicant should be given relative 
weight and other factors should be taken into account. It gave due regard to the 
QDWLRQDO VWDQGDUGV RI PHPEHU 6WDWHV DQG WR WKH &RQYHQWLRQ¶V XQGHUO\LQJ
objective of guaranteeing effective and practical rights.59 In light of the facts, it 
found that there was no unreasonable imbalance between the aim pursued by 
the Belgian legislation and the obligations incumbent on the applicant.  
7KH&RXUW¶VUHVRUWWR,/2&RQYHQWLRQ1RKDGDQLQIRUPDWLYHLPSDFW
on the construction of Article 4 ECHR. Forced or compulsory labour was 
defined by reference to the ILO Convention - a pre-existing (to the ECHR) 
treaty regulating ad hoc forced labour - and the standards stemming from the 
ILO. At the same time, the Court sets certain limits as to the impact of the ILO 
definition on the interpretation of Article 4 ECHR. The question whether the 
applicant unwillingly offered his services was assessed against the structure and 
the aims of Article 4 ECHR and the Court did not follow a formal approach on 
the meaning of consent. Hence, the ECtHR did not employ an unqualified 
reliance on ILO Convention No 29, preserving the specificity of the ECHR. 
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 Van der Mussele (Pl), [37]. J.G. Merrills, The Development of International Law by the 
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The Siliadin case also relates to the definition of forced and compulsory 
labour. The applicant was a French national of Togolese origin who had been 
brought to France at fifteen years of age. Her passport was taken away from 
her and she became an unpaid housemaid working under inhuman conditions. 
She complained before the Court that the criminal law provisions applicable in 
France at the material time did not ensure her adequate protection against the 
treatment to which she was subjected. Moreover, she argued that the French 
FULPLQDO ODZ IUDPHZRUN ZDV LQ µGLYHUJHQFH ZLWK WKH (XURSHDQ DQG
LQWHUQDWLRQDOFULWHULDIRUGHILQLQJVHUYLWXGHDQGIRUFHGRUFRPSXOVRU\ODERXU¶60 
The Court took cognisance, again, of the ILO Convention No 29 for 
GHILQLQJµIRUFHGRUFRPSXOVRU\ODERXU¶DFFRUGLQJWRZKLFKWKHZRUNRUVHUYLFH
had to be extracted by an individual under the menace of penalty. It admitted 
that the applicant in the specific circumstances had not been threatened by a 
µSHQDOW\¶ EXW LW VWDWHG WKDW µWKH IDFW UHPDLQV WKDW VKH ZDV LQ DQ HTXLYDOHQW
VLWXDWLRQ LQWHUPVRIWKHSHUFHLYHGVHULRXVQHVVRI WKHWKUHDW¶61 The equivalent 
VWDWXVZDVLQIHUUHGRQWKHSDUWLFXODUFLUFXPVWDQFHVRIWKHDSSOLFDQW¶VYXOQHUDEOH
position (a minor who was unlawfully present on French territory) and her fear 
that the police would arrest her. Therefore, the Court, in light of the specific 
facts, equated the ILO standard of being threatened by a menace of penalty to 
perceiving to be threatened by a penalty. This is more flexible and favourable 
to the individual interpretation.  
In sum, in both Siliadin and Van der Mussele cases the Court is guided 
by the definition of forced or compulsory labour, as contained in ILO 
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 Siliadin , [59]. 
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Convention No 29 and developed by the standards of the ILO Committee of 
Experts. It will be also seen below, that the Court has a standard practice of 
reading the PIL norms that takes into account in conjunction with the views 
(either binding or not) of their (if existent) supervisory bodies. This is crucial 
for two reasons; the first reason is that, in this way, the Court places the PIL 
norms in the treaty context from which they originate, hence, acknowledging 
the contextual differences of every treaty. This is a fundamental aspect of the 
fragmentation of PIL, as discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, since similar or 
identical norms may attain different meanings and interpretations, in light of 
the structure, aim and specificities of the treaty that they stem from. In practice, 
the Court starts its interpretation process, by taking the ILO definition into 
account, because it identifies a core of similarity between Article 4 ECHR and 
the ILO Convention No 29. 62 However, the Court by reading the ILO 
Convention No 29 in its treaty context, also identifies a core of difference 
between the ECHR and the ILO context, setting a limit to the interpretative 
guidance that it derives from the external PIL norms. In Van der Musselle the 
meaning of unwillingness was approached by reference to the aim of the 
ECHR and the practice of member States. In Siliadin the Court relaxed the 
strict ILO requirement of being threatened. In this respect, one should not lose 
VLJKWRIWKHIDFWWKDWWKH,/2&RQYHQWLRQUHODWHVWRWKHµODERXUODZSDUDGLJP¶
whereas the ECHR is a treaty for the protection of human rights.63  
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 7 %URXGH < 6KDQ\ µ7KH ,QWHUQDWLRQDO /DZ DQG 3ROLF\ RI 0XOWL-Sourced Equivalent 
1RUPV¶LQ7%URXGH<6KDQ\HGV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(Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2011) 1, 5. 
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 Cf. Forowicz, (note 41), 361 who uncritically argues that the ECHR and the ILO Convention 
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µVWULYHIRUWKHVDPHJRDOV¶$OVRinfra 7.4. 
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7KHVHFRQGUHDVRQWKDWWKH&RXUW¶VSUDFWLFHRIUHDGLQJWKHH[WHUQDO3,/
QRUPV LQ OLJKW RI WKHLU VXSHUYLVRU\ ERGLHV¶ YLHZV LV LPSRUWDQW LV EHFDXVH LW
alleviates the danger of having two international bodies interpreting the same 
PIL norm in different ways. The Court employs the PIL norm in its reasoning, 
whose content has been elucidated and developed through time by its 
supervisory body.64 This enhances consistency and harmonisation of standards 
in PIL as different international bodies develop them. Nonetheless, the VCLT 
general rules of interpretation (Articles 31-33) do not appear to accommodate 
the interpretative development of treaties by their supervisory bodies,65 
although it is an arguable claim that their practice may qualify as a subsequent 
practice in the application of the treaty (Article 31 (3)(b) VCLT).66 This is a 
point that should be kept in mind regarding the possible limits of the VCLT for 
addressing the challenges of the fragmentation of PIL. 
 
4.5 'HILQLQJµVODYHU\¶DQGµVHUYLWXGH¶XQGHU$UWLFOH(&+5 
7KHGHILQLWLRQVRI µVODYHU\¶DQG µVHUYLWXGH¶XQGHU$UWLFOH (&+5
came to the fore in the Siliadin case. The Court clarified the meaning of these 
terms by finding recourse to a series of international conventions concerning 
slavery and practices similar to slavery. 
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 For example, D. McGoldrick, The Human Rights Committee ± Its Role in the Development of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1991). 
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 07 .DPPLQJD µ)LQDO 5HSRUW RQ WKH ,PSDFW of International Human Rights Law on 
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 %3HWHUVµ$VSHFWVRI+XPDQ5LJKWV,QWHUSUHWDWLRQE\WKH817UHDW\%RGLHV¶LQ+.HOOHU
G. Ulfstein (eds.), United Nations Human Rights Treaty Bodies ± Law and Legitimacy 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2012) 29, as being available at 
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 :LWK UHJDUG WR WKH FRQFHSW RI µVHUYLWXGH¶ WKH &RXUW EXLOW XSRQ WKH
(XURSHDQ &RPPLVVLRQ¶V SUDFWLFH67 and drew guidance from the 1956 
Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade and 
Institutions and Practices similar to Slavery.68 Although the Supplementary 
Convention on the Abolition of Slavery does not contain a definition of 
servitude, it defines related concepts, such as debt bondage and serfdom. Since 
servitude constitutes a particularly serious form of denial of freedom, the Court 
took the concept of serfdom into account 69 DQG GHILQHG VHUYLWXGH DV µDQ
REOLJDWLRQWRSURYLGHRQH¶VVHUYLFHVWKDWLVLPSRVHGE\WKHXVHRIFRHUFLRQ¶70  
)RU WKH QRWLRQ RI µVODYHU\¶ WKH &RXUW UHIHUUHd to the definition 
prescribed in the 1926 Slavery Convention.71 Article 1 (1) conceptualises the 
SUDFWLFHRIVODYHU\DVµWKHVWDWXVRUFRQGLWLRQRIDSHUVRQRYHUZKRPDQ\RUDOO
RI WKH SRZHUV DWWDFKLQJ WR WKH ULJKW RI RZQHUVKLS DUH H[HUFLVHG¶ 7KH &RXUW
adopted this definition for the purposes of Article 4 ECHR and examined 
whether, in the light of the facts of the case, its elements were met. It 
concluded that, although the applicant had been clearly deprived of her 
personal autonomy, the treatment to which she was subjected could not qualify 
as slavery. This was because, according to the Court, no indication existed that 
µDJHQXLQHULJKWRIOHJDORZQHUVKLS>ZDVH[HUFLVHG@RYHUKHUWKXVUHGXFLQJKHU
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 Van Droogenbroeck v. Belgium, Report of the European Commission, 9 July 1980 (Series B, 
vol 44, p. 30), [78]-[80].  
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 Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade and Institutions and 
Practices similar to Slavery (concluded on 7 September 1956; entered into force on 30 April 
1957) 226 UNTS 3 (Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery).  
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 $UWLFOHGHILQHVµVHUIGRP¶DVµWKHFRQGLWLRQRUVWDWXVRIDWHQDQWZKRLVE\ODZFXVWRPRU
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 Siliadin, [124]. 
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 Slavery Convention (concluded on 25 September 1926; entered into force on 9 March 1927) 
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WRWKH VWDWXVRIREMHFW¶72 Several scholars criticised the Court due to its rigid 
application of the definition, which did not reflect the ordinary meaning of 
slavery.73 It was argued that the Court disregarded the plain wording of the 
6ODYHU\ &RQYHQWLRQ¶V GHILQLWLRQ ZKLFK LQGLFDWHG WKDW LW ZDV VXIILFLHQW WR
ascertain either the exercise of the right of ownership over an individual or the 
exercise of powers attaching to the right of ownership over an individual.74 In a 
more recent case the Court took the opportunity to revisit its approach.  
In the Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia case75 the applicant argued that his 
daughter had been subjected to a practice amounting to slavery under Article 4 
(1) ECHR. The Court took cognisance of the definition of the Slavery 
Convention and relevant judgments by the Appeals Chamber of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). The ICTY 
in the .XQDUDü case76 was of the view that the notion of slavery should not be 
exhausted to the so-FDOOHGµFKDWWHOVODYHU\¶EXWLWVKRXOGDOVRHQFRPSDVVRWKHU
contemporary forms of slavery. It stressed that the element of exercising any or 
all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership may be present in many 
different situations. The ECtHR, in the Rantsev case, by way of relying on the 
,&7<¶V UHDGLQJ RI WKH 6ODYHU\ &RQYHQWLRQ DFFHSWHG WKDW WKH H[HUFLVH RI
powers attaching to the right of ownership was sufficient for a practice to 
amount to slavery.77 
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 Siliadin, [122]. 
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 -$OODLQµ7KH'HILQLWLRQRI6ODYHU\LQ,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ¶-2009) 52 Howard L.J. 239, 
242-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 Allain, (note 73), 274. 
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 Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, 7 January 2010. 
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 .XQDUDü case, [106]-[124].  
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 Rantsev, [142]-[143], [280]-[282]. 
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It has been argued that the ICTY Appeals Chamber in the .XQDUDü and 
the ECtHR in the Siliadin cases employed divergent interpretations of the 
concept of slavery.78 1RWDEO\ µ,QWHULJKWV¶ ZKLFK ZDV JUDQWHG OHDYH WR
intervene before the Court in the Rantsev case, invited the Court to align its 
approach to the ICTY judgments.79 However, the view of the present author is 
that, in light of the fact that the Slavery definition explicitly encompasses 
µH[HUFLVLQJ DQ\ RU DOO RI WKH SRZHUV DWWDFKLQJ WR WKH ULJKW RI RZQHUVKLS¶ WKH
ECtHR in Siliadin lost sight of the clear wording of the Slavery Convention 
and it came in Rantsev to correct its approach.  
 
4.6 Defining the ne bis in idem principle under Article 4 of Additional 
Protocol 7 to ECHR 
In the Zolotukhin case,80 the applicant alleged a violation of Article 4 of 
Additional Protocol 7 (Article 4 of AP7) to the ECHR, complaining that he had 
been prosecuted twice for the same offence. He was charged before the 
administrative courts with a breach of public order, in the form of swearing at 
and pushing away police officers, and he was charged before the criminal 
courts with breaching public order, by uttering obscenities, threatening police 
officers with violence and offering resistance to them.      
The Grand Chamber heard the application after granting a referral of 
the case. The Court admitted, at the outset, that there were a series of different 
approaches regarding the interpretation of the provision in its case-law. Article 
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 Allain, (note 73), 242-,.RORGL]QHUµ5Y7DQJ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 RI $3  UHDGV WKDW µQR RQH VKDOO EH OLDEOH WR EH WULHG RU SXQLVKHG DJDLQ LQ
criminal proceedings under the jurisdiction of the same State for an offence for 
which he has already been finally acquitted or convicted in accordance with the 
ODZDQGSHQDOSURFHGXUHRIWKH6WDWH¶HPSKDVLVDGGHG7KH&RXUW¶VGLIIHUHQW
approaches reflected the different meaningV DWWULEXWHG WR WKH WHUP µRIIHQFH¶
$FFRUGLQJ WRWKHGRPLQDQWSRVLWLRQ WKH WHUPµRIIHQFH¶ VKRXOG EHXQGHUVWRRG
by reference to the legal classification under national law.81 Consequently, if an 
act was classified as two distinct criminal offences under municipal law, the 
prohibition under Article 4 of AP 7 did not come into play. 
Although the Chamber did not make any reference to relevant PIL 
norms in its judgment, the Grand Chamber revisited the definition of the term 
µRIIHQFH¶ E\ ILQGLQJ UHFRXUVH WR VLPLOarly drafted PIL norms envisaging 
formulations of the ne bis in idem principle. Reference was made to the 
respective provisions of the ICCPR, the Statute of the International Criminal 
Court (ICC Statute),82 the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union (EU Charter),83 the Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement 
(Schengen Agreement)84 and the IACHR. The ICCPR and the EU Charter 
FRQWDLQ WKH WHUP µRIIHQFH¶85 WKH ,$&+5 UHIHUV WR µFDXVH¶86 the Schengen 
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$JUHHPHQW PHQWLRQV µDFWV¶87 and the ICC Statute SUHVFULEHV µFRQGXFW¶88 The 
Court also emphasised that the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) followed a 
more favourable to the individual approach. On this basis, it proclaimed that it 
FRXOG QRW µMXVWLI\ DGKHULQJ WR D PRUH UHVWULFWLYH DSSURDFK¶89 than the one 
followed by the ECJ and the IACtHR, and that it must ensure practical and 
HIIHFWLYH ULJKWV 7KH *UDQG &KDPEHU KHOG WKDW µRIIHQFH¶ XQGHU WKH (&+5
should be understood as encompassing the same sets of facts as well.  
This interpretation of the ne bis in idem principle as formulated under 
AP 7 overrules the previous case-law of the Court. It dictates a different 
GHILQLWLRQ RI WKH WHUP µVDPH RIIHQFH¶ DQG GUDPDWLFDOO\ DOWHUV WKH VFRSH Rf 
DSSOLFDELOLW\RI WKHSURYLVLRQ:KHUHDVWKH&RXUW¶VSRVLWLRQZDVWRUHIHUEDFN
to the national legislation and practice of the respondent State, the Zolotukhin 
case deviates and establishes that Article 4 AP 7 should also include the same 
set of facts. The judgment is informative with respect to the fact that the Court 
invokes three different interpretative principles to justify its interpretation in a 
distinct way: the evolutive interpretation, the principle of effectiveness and the 
interpretation of the ECHR in light of PIL norms. Thus, the three autonomous 
interpretation principles function as a synergy,90 leading to and reinforcing the 
same interpretive outcome. The following Chapters will show that the Court 
                                                                                                                                                                 
86
 Article 8 (4) stipulates WKDWµDQDFFXVHGSHUVRQDFTXLWWHGE\DQRQ-appealable judgment shall 
not be subjected to a new trial for the same cause¶HPSKDVLVDGGHG 
87
 $UWLFOHUHDGVµDSHUVRQZKRVHWULDOKDVEHHQILQDOO\GLVSRVHGRILQRQHRIWKH&RQWUDFWLQJ
Party may not be prosecuted in another Contracting Party for the same acts SURYLGHGWKDW>«@¶
(emphasis added). 
88
 $UWLFOHUHDGVµH[FHSWDVSURYLGHGLQWKLVStatute, no person shall be tried before the 
Court with respect to conduct ZKLFKIRUPHGWKHEDVLVRIFULPHV>«@¶ (emphasis added).  
89
 Zolotukhin (GC), [80]. 
90
 G. Cohen-Jonathan, J.-) )ODXVV µ&RXU (XURSpHQQH GHV 'URLWV GH O¶ +RPPH HW 'URLW
,QWHUQDWLRQDO*pQpUDO¶/,9AFDI 529, 530. 
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invokes this synergetic relation between these principles of interpretation in 
other instances as well.91 In such cases, the specificities of the ECHR ± need 
for effective and practical guarantees and dynamic interpretation ± 
harmoniously coexist with the principle of reading the ECHR in light of other 
PIL norms. Yet, WKHGULYLQJ IRUFHEHKLQGWKH&RXUW¶VUHDVRQLQJ in Zolotukhin 
ZDV WKH FRQVWUXFWLRQRI WKH(&+5 LQ OLJKWRI WKH3,/ QRUPVDQG WKH&RXUW¶V
willingness to align its position with the jurisprudence of other international 
courts.          
 Nonetheless, the Zolotukhin judgment reveals certain weak points in 
WKH&RXUW¶VPHWKRGRORJ\(YHQWKRXJKWKH&RXUWSODFHGWKHH[WHUQDO3,/QRUPV
into their specific treaty context and acknowledged that they embodied 
different formulations of the principle ne bis in idem, it used them in an 
inappropriate way in its interpretation of the ECHR. The strong inferences 
drawn by the jurisprudence of the ECJ and the IACtHR on the pretext of the 
most favourable to the individual interpretation are not reasonable. The two 
international courts develop the Schengen Agreement and the IACHR 
respectively, which define the ne bis in idem prohibition in broader terms to the 
ECHR. When the ECJ and the IACtHR employed a comparative overview of 
other PIL norms (an identical methodology to that of the ECtHR), they both 
underlined that the text of their own treaties provided broader terms and this is 
why they concluded that it would be absurd to follow a more restrictive 
interpretation.92 Ironically, the ECtHR relied upon this practice in order to 
SURYLGH D EURDG GHILQLWLRQ WR WKH VSHFLILF DQG UHVWULFWHG WHUP µRIIHQFH¶ XQGHU
                                                             
91
 Infra 7.2, 7.4, 7.5, Chapter 9. 
92
 Zolotukhin (GC), [36]-[38], [40].  
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Article 4 of AP 7. Therefore, the interpretation by analogy and the inspiration 
drawn from the comparison are not sound.    
A second weak point in the Grand ChambeU¶VUHDVRQLQJLVWKDW LWJDYH
VXFKH[WHQVLYHPHDQLQJWRWKHWHUPµRIIHQFH¶WKDWLWHIIHFWLYHO\GLVUHJDUGHGWKH
textual limits of the Convention. The Court afforded such great weight to the 
PIL norms, which resulted in a contra legem interpretation. The definition 
DWWULEXWHG WR WKH WHUP µRIIHQFH¶ ZHQW EH\RQG WKH H[SUHVV WH[W RI WKH (&+5
Although the Court generally acknowledges in its case-law that the 
LQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIWKH(&+5VKRXOGQRWOHDGWRDµGLVWRUWLRQRI>LWV@ODQJXDJH¶93 
in this instance, the limits between judicial law-making and interpretation are 
blurred. The construction of the ECHR should not result in redrafting its 
provisions. Furthermore, it appears that the Court in other instances (as in the 
Scoppola and Mamatkulov cases) attempted to justify an interpretation of the 
ECHR, which cannot be accommodated within the text of the Convention, by 
way of invoking the synergy of the principle of effectiveness, the dynamic 
interpretation and the need to take cognisance of other PIL norms.94 In the view 
of the present author, this is not a positive example of constructive dialogue 
among international courts or an opportunity to fill in gaps, but rather 
unfortunate instances.95 All the more, since the text of the ECHR also delimits 
WKH&RXUW¶V MXULVGLFWLon, a distortion of the text raises the question of whether 
                                                             
93
 Pretty v. United Kingdom, 29 April 2002, [39]; Johnston and others v. Ireland, 18 December 
1986, (Plenary), [53]; Dissenting Opinion of Judge Myjer in Muñoz Díaz v. Spain, 8 December 
2009, 27-28. 
94
 The Court followed the same methodology in Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, 4 
February 2005, (Grand Chamber), [109]-[113], [123]-[125] and in Scoppola v. Italy (No 2), 17 
September 2009 (Grand Chamber) infra 7.2. 
95
 Contra Forowicz, (note 41), 360- 7 7UHYHV µ-XGLFLDO /DZPDNLQJ LQ DQ (UD RI
³3UROLIHUDWLRQ´ of International Courts and Tribunals: Development or Fragmentation of 
,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ"¶LQ5:ROIUXPDQG95|EHQHGVDevelopments of International Law 
in Treaty-Making (Springer, Berlin-Heidelberg-New York, 2005) 587, 614-615. 
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the Court exceeds the boundaries of its jurisdiction.96 In other words, as 
Chapter 2 discussed on the occasion of the Oil Platforms case, the jurisdiction 
of the Court and the clear text of the ECHR set clear limits to the impact that 
other PIL norms may have on the construction of the ECHR.97  
4.7 Conclusions 
This Chapter demonstrated that the ECtHR is inclined to find recourse 
to PIL norms in order to define certain terms embodied in the ECHR. Given 
that the Convention and its Additional Protocols contain many generic terms, 
without providing for their definitions, it seems natural that the Court looks for 
guidance and interpretive aid outside the ECHR. The ECtHR identifies the 
meaning of the terms under the ECHR by reference to the usage of the identical 
or similar terms in other PIL norms, mostly international treaties. In most 
cases, external PIL norms specifically govern the subject matter, such as 
torture or slavery.  
Evidence was provided that the &RXUW¶V LQWHUSUHWLYHSUDFWLFHRI WDNLQJ
PIL norms into account is autonomous to other interpretative principles in its 
jurisprudence. The Vo and Evans cases illustrated that interpreting the ECHR 
by taking cognisance of PIL should not be conflated with the comparative 
interpretation. Even though the Court employs the European consensus idea, 
domestic and PIL norms are different sources of law and different enquiries in 
the examination of the existence or not of common standards. Also, these cases 
demonstrated that when international developments and PIL norms are not 
sufficient to validate a dynamic interpretation of the ECHR, the interpretation 
                                                             
96
 Separate Opinion of Judge Verdross, in Golder v United Kingdom, 21 February 1975, 
(Plenary), 20-21. 
97
 Infra 2.2. 
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of the ECHR by taking PIL norms in account limits the application of the 
dynamic interpretation. The Zolotukhin case exemplified that taking 
cognisance of PIL norms is a distinct principle to the principle of effectiveness 
and the dynamic interpretation. Although the Court invoked all three principles 
in a synergetic fashion, it deems it necessary to invoke them separately. 
Crucially, in Zolotukhin WKHGULYLQJ IRUFH EHKLQG WKH&RXUW¶V OHJDO UHDVRQLQJ
and in overruling its previous case-law was the cognisance of PIL norms. It is 
of interest that the parties to the cases also frame their arguments with regard to 
the relevant PIL norms. In Siliadin the applicant invited the Court to find that 
WKH UHVSRQGHQW 6WDWHV¶ OHJLVODWLRQ ZDV LQ GLYHUJHQFH ZLWK (XURSHDQ DQG
international standards; in the Vo and Rantsev cases the NGOs, which 
intervened before the Court, based their submissions on the PIL norms that the 
Court should take into account.    
From a methodological point of view, the Court does not invoke a 
specific legal basis for its practice of drawing interpretative guidance from 
other PIL norms when defining terms under the ECHR. As seen in Chapter 2, 
international courts and tribunals are inclined to identify the ordinary meaning 
of a term under a given treaty by taking other PIL norms into account, 
especially treaties.98 Also, they do not invoke a specific legal basis in their 
reasoning, taking for granted that examining the common use of a term by 
States in PIL is an integral part of finding the ordinary meaning.99 Moreover, 
the practices of drawing a contrario arguments (Vo), inferring analogies 
                                                             
98
 Infra 2.3.1; R. Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010) 283; 
%6LPPD7.LOOµ+DUPRQLVLQJ,QYHVWPHQW3URWHFWLRQDQG,QWHUQational Human Rights: First 
6WHSVWRZDUGV$0HWKRGRORJ\¶LQ&%LQGHUet al. (eds.), International Investment Law for the 
21st Century (Oxford University Press, New York, 2009) 678, 683-686. 
99
 Gardiner, (note 98), 282-284; F. %HUPDQ µ7UHDW\ ³,QWHUSUHWDWLRQ´ LQ D -XGLFLDO &RQWH[W¶
(2004) 29 Yale JIL 315, 318. 
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(Zolotukhin) or generall\ µERUURZLQJ¶ GHILQLWLRQV IURP RWKHU 3,/ QRUPV
contributes to harmonisation of standards and ensuring consistent international 
jurisprudence, as far as possible.  
 The Court is careful to place the PIL norms that it uses into the specific 
treaty context that they originate from (Van der Mussele, Siliadin, Zolotukhin). 
In practice, this means that it reads them in conjunction with the views (either 
binding or not) of their (if existent) supervisory bodies. This is very 
informative for identifying any contextual nuances tailored to the norms and 
for taking cognisance of their progressive development by their supervisory 
bodies. Although this practice does not seem to be easily accommodated by 
Articles 31-33 VCLT,100 it is of seminal importance in avoiding divergent 
interpretations and harmonising approaches. Notably, the Court is also 
receptive to considering how a PIL norm has been interpreted by another 
international court, which does not supervise a given instrument, such as in 
Siliadin case in which it took cognisance of the ICTY approach on the meaning 
of slavery under the Slavery Convention. These instances evidence what 
Chapter 1 underlined, in that a treaty provision cannot be deprived of the 
context, object and purpose of its treaty. Even if a definition of a term, which 
the Court takes into account, refers to an identical or similar term found under 
the ECHR, the Court gives careful consideration to the different treaty context. 
Therefore, the Court reads harmoniously the ECHR to other PIL norms, subject 
to important differences in their context.   
The cautious consideration of the different treaty context draws the line 
to the impact that the Court derives from other PIL norms. It appears that the 
                                                             
100
 Infra footnotes 64-66 and accompanying text. 
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&RXUW¶V SRVLWLRQ LV WKDW XQLW\ DQG KDUPRQLVDWLRQ RI VWDQGDrds are subject to 
context. In Van der Musselle and Siliadin cases the Court applied the ILO 
standards (meaning of unwillingness and requirement of being threatened) in 
the construction of Article 4 ECHR by adapting them to the aims of the ECHR. 
However, tKH &RXUW DGRSWV DQ XQFOHDU GHILQLWLRQ RI µWRUWXUH¶ XQGHU $UWLFOH 
ECHR with respect to the incorporation or not of the CAT purposive element. 
The analysis showed that the Court should take a clear-cut position on the non-
incorporation of this element under the ECHR. It is argued that, given the 
serious contextual differences between the CAT and the ECHR, it is reasonable 
for the Court not to transplant the CAT definition.       
Finally, the weight afforded to the PIL norms and the interpretative 
principle of taking them into account should not result in exceeding the clear 
limits of the text of the Convention, as the Court did in the Zolotukhin case. 
7KLV XQGHUPLQHV WKH &RXUW¶V UHDVRQLQJ DQG TXHVWLRQV WKH ERXQGDULHV RI LWV
jurisdiction.   
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Section II: Restricting the scope of rights and freedoms under the 
Convention by taking public international law norms into account 
 
Section II of the thesis examines cases in which the Court takes 
cognisance of PIL norms and restricts the protective scope of the rights and 
freedoms under the ECHR. This part of the jurisprudence is rather neglected by 
legal scholars who mostly emphasise the practice of the Court to rely on PIL 
for expanding the ratione materiae scope of the Convention. Chapters 5 and 6 
identify the pertinent case-law and highlight several patterns that may be found 
LQ WKH &RXUW¶V UHDVRQLQJ 6HFWLRQ ,,, LV LPSRUWDQW EHFDXVH LW DGGUHVVHV WKH
question as to whether the interpretative practice to read the ECHR in light of 
PIL should find any limits when PIL prevents the rights and freedoms under 
the ECHR from attaining their full weight. In other words, should the ECtHR 
harmoniously interpret the ECHR with other PIL norms, even if this means that 
it hinders the effective application of the rights and freedoms under the ECHR? 
How should international courts mitigate the possible tension between ensuring 
the unity of PIL and preserving the effectiveness of their constitutive 
instruments? The present Section purports to answer these questions.  
Chapter 5 discusses the well-known cases concerning the rule of State 
immunity. In these instances, the Court found recourse to customary 
international law for construing the right to access a court. Chapter 6 examines 
WKH&RXUW¶VMXULVSUXGHQFHZKHUHRWKHU3,/QRUPVDUHWDken into consideration.     
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5. Restricting the right to access a court under Article 6 ECHR by taking 
customary international law rules on State immunity into account 
5.1 Introduction  
In 2001 the European Court gave its judgments in three cases 
concerning State immunity: the Fogarty,1 McElhinney2 and Al-Adsani cases.3 
7KHDSSOLFDQWVFRPSODLQHG WKDWXSKROGLQJ6WDWHV¶ LPPXQLW\ IURP MXULVGLFWLRQ
before domestic courts violated their right to access a court under Article 6 (1) 
ECHR. All three applications brought before the Court involved the 
identification of the status and scope of the relevant PIL norms, since the 
applicants argued that their cases fell within exceptions to the rule on State 
immunity. It was upon the Court, firstly, to ascertain the legal status of State 
immunity in PIL and, secondly, to examine whether the facts of the cases 
triggered the scope of the alleged exceptions to State immunity.  
The following analysis is also informed by some other pertinent cases 
of the Court where it is deemed necessary. The second sub-section examines in 
detail the PIL norms that the Court had recourse to and how it construed 
customary international law. The third sub-section inquires how the Court 
attempted to read the ECHR harmoniously to a customary international law 
rule and what was the impact on the interpretation of Article 6 ECHR. The 
fourth sub-section explores in an overall manner what type of role the ECtHR 
assumes in these cases and the last sub-section concludes. 
 
 
                                                             
1
 Fogarty v. United Kingdom, 21 November 2001, (Grand Chamber). 
2
 McElhinney v. Ireland, 21 November 2001, (Grand Chamber). 
3
 Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, 21 November 2001, (Grand Chamber). 
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5.2 The public international law norms that the Court took into account  
The Fogarty case concerned the dismissal of an Irish national from a 
post working as administrative assistant at the United States (US) embassy in 
London. She brought proceedings before the industrial tribunal against the US 
government for an unlawful dismissal because she was allegedly sexually 
harassed. The tribunal granted her request for compensation. The applicant was 
unsuccessful in her subsequent application for another post in the embassy. 
Again, she brought proceedings before national courts alleging that she was 
once more a victim of discrimination because the refusal to employ her was 
due to her previous history with the embassy. The US government notified the 
tribunal that it would claim immunity from jurisdiction since the said post was 
covered by State immunity. The applicant was advised by her counsel not to 
pursue further her claims before domestic courts.4  
The Court admitted that there appeared to be a trend in PIL toward 
limiting the scope of State immunity with respect to employment issues. 
Reference was made to Article 5 (1) of the European Convention on State 
Immunity (Basle Convention)5 and Article 11 (1) of the International Law 
&RPPLVVLRQ¶V'UDIW$UWLFOHVRQ-XULVGLFWLRQDO,PPXQLWLHVRI6WDWHV and Their 
Property (ILC Draft Articles).6 Both provided that a State cannot claim 
immunity from the jurisdiction of a court of another contracting State, if the 
proceedings relate to a contract of employment. The Court noted, however, that 
international practice was divided regarding employment in a foreign embassy. 
                                                             
4
 Fogarty (GC), [10]-[14]. 
5
 European Convention on State Immunity (concluded on 16 May 1972; entered into force on 
11 June 1976) ETS No 74. 
6
 Draft Articles on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property (text adopted by the 
International Law Commission in 1991 and submitted to the General Assembly) YbkILC 1991, 
vol. II, Part Two.  
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Article 32 of the Basle Convention exempted privileges and immunities 
relating to the exercise of the functions of diplomatic missions and consular 
posts and of persons connected with them from the scope of Article 5. 
Nonetheless, the question of who actually exercises such functions did not 
produce a uniform answer. The Court considered Article 11 (2) (b) of the ILC 
Draft Articles, which included the recruitment of an individual within the 
exercLVH RI VXFK IXQFWLRQV ,W FRQFOXGHG WKDW WKH DSSOLFDQW¶V FDVH GLG QRW IDOO
within an exception to the State immunity rule and, thus, the respondent State 
did not exceed its margin of appreciation.7   
7KH&RXUW¶VDQDO\VLVGLG QRW LQYROYHDQH[WHQVLYH LQYHVWigation of the 
sources of PIL. It assumed that State immunity has acquired the status of a 
generally recognised rule of PIL or a customary rule of PIL solely by 
grounding its assertion on the Basle Convention. Despite being in force and 
binding on the United Kingdom, only eight States had ratified the Basle 
Convention. Given that the Basle Convention ± or at least not all of its 
provisions - did not reflect the current state in PIL, it is reasonable to question 
on which basis the Court substantiated the customary status of the rule on State 
immunity.8  
More recently, in the Cudak case the Grand Chamber unanimously 
reaffirmed that a civil claim requesting compensation for unlawful dismissal 
with regards to employment contracts (without involving the recruitment 
aspect of the contract) was a well-established exception to State immunity and, 
                                                             
7
 Fogarty (GC), [37]-[38]. 
8
 A. Orakhelashvili, µ6WDWH ,PPXQLW\ LQ1DWLRQDODQG ,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ7KUHH5HFHQW&DVHV
before the (XURSHDQ&RXUWRI+XPDQ5LJKWV¶LJIL 703, 706-709. 
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hence, found a violation of Article 6 ECHR.9 The ILC Draft Articles - which at 
the time of the judgment had already been adopted by the United Nations 
General Assembly as the Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States 
and their Property10 (UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities) - expressly 
provided that the rule of non-LPPXQLW\GRHVQRWDSSO\LIµthe subject-matter of 
the proceeding is the recruitment, renewal of employment or reinstatement of 
DQLQGLYLGXDO¶11 Hence, a contrario, the rule of immunity applied to unlawful 
dismissal. What is of interest here is how the Court treated and justified the use 
of the PIL material.    
As the Court admitted, Lithuania was not a party to the Basle 
Convention.12 The UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities was not yet in 
force and Lithuania had not even signed it. The Court attempted to legitimise 
its choice to use the said Convention by underlining that Lithuania did not 
object to the ILC Draft Articles and subsequently did not vote against the text 
of Article 11 of the UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities. This is an 
obscure statement since these facts may serve as indications of the practice or 
opinio juris of a State, but in no case may one safely assume that a State is 
somehow bound by a treaty provision or its content.  
,WZDVDOVRDVVHUWHGWKDW µLW LVSRVVLEOH WRDIILUP WKDW$UWLFOHRI WKH
[ILC Draft Article and of the UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities] 
apSOLHVWRWKHUHVSRQGHQW6WDWHXQGHUFXVWRPDU\ LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ¶13 The text 
                                                             
9
 Cudak v. Lithuania, 23 March 2010, (Grand Chamber), [62]-[65]. 
10
 United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Property 
(adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 2 December 2004, A/RES/59/38; 
not yet in force). 
11
 Article 11 (2)(c) UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities. 
12
 Cudak (GC), [27]. 
13
 Ibid, [67]. Sabeh El Leil v France, 29 June 2011, (Grand Chamber), [54]. 
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of the judgment, however, provides no convincing evidence that Article 11 
UHIOHFWV FXVWRPDU\ LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ 7KLV LV EHFDXVH ILUVWO\ WKH ,/&¶V ZRUN
involved both codification and progressive development elements and the 
Court did not clarify whether this provision codifies customary international 
law.14 Secondly, as the Court cites, the ILC in its Commentary to the Draft 
Articles stated that the rules formulated in Article 11 appeared to be consistent 
with the emerging trend in the legislative and treaty practice of a growing 
number of States.15 7KH,/&DOVRQRWHGWKDWµ>S@DUDJUDSKE LVGHVLJQHGWR
FRQILUP WKH H[LVWLQJ SUDFWLFH RI 6WDWHV LQ VXSSRUW RI WKH UXOH RI LPPXQLW\¶16 
NHLWKHUVWDWHPHQWVGRQRWVHHPWRVXSSRUWWKH&RXUW¶VGHILQLWHFRQFOXVLRQWKDW
Article 11 reflected or had acquired the status of a rule of customary 
international law. Perhaps it would have been preferable for the Court to 
simply highlight the fact that the UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities 
qualifies as the most authoritative statement available on current international 
understanding of State immunity.17 In this way it would retain a validly 
justified position for relying on relevant and informative authorities without 
having to construct unclear arguments on the alleged applicability of the UN 
Convention to the respondent State. 
In McElhinney the applicant brought an action before Irish courts 
against a British soldier and the British Secretary of State claiming for damages 
because the soldier had wrongfully assaulted him. Domestic courts, however, 
JUDQWHG WKH %ULWLVK 6HFUHWDU\¶V FODLP IRU LPPXQLW\ DQG GLVPLVVHG
                                                             
14
 Ibid, [64]. 
15
 Ibid, [66] (emphases added); YbkILC 1991, vol. II, Part Two, 44, [14]. 
16
 YbkILC 1991, vol. II, Part Two, 43. 
17
 (%DWHVµ6WDWH,PPXQLW\IRU7RUWXUH¶HRLRev 651, 664. Concurring Opinion of 
Judge Cabral Barreto joined by Judge Popovic in Cudak (GC), 22; Dissenting Opinion of 
-XGJHV&DIOLVFK&DEUDO%DUUHWRDQG9DMLüLQMcElhinney (GC), 19. 
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0F(OKLQQH\¶VDFWLRQ0F(OKLQQH\FRPSODLQHGEHIRUHWKH(&W+5WKDWWKHUXOH
granting immunity from jurisdiction and his inability to access national courts 
were in breach of Article 6 ECHR.18  
Similarly to the Fogarty case, the Court took cognisance of the Basle 
&RQYHQWLRQ $UWLFOH  PDGH DQ H[FHSWLRQ IRU µSURFHHGLQJV ZKLFK UHODWH WR
redress for LQMXU\WRDSHUVRQ>«@LIWKHIDFWVZKLFKRFFDVLRQHGWKHLQMXU\>«@
occurred in the territory of the State of the forum, and if the author of the injury 
ZDVSUHVHQWLQWKDWWHUULWRU\DWWKHWLPHWKRVHIDFWVRFFXUUHG¶IURPWKHVFRSHRI
the State immunity rule. The crux of the matter was, however, whether this 
exception encompassed instances where a member of the armed forces of 
another State causes personal injury. The Court noted that, according to Article 
31 of the Basle Convention,19 State immunity should be granted in such 
instances. This finding was further supported by emphasising the fact that the 
,/&¶V ZRUN LQGLFDWHG WRZDUG WKH VDPH GLUHFWLRQ WKHUHE\ H[FHSWLQJ RQO\
insurable risks relating to traffic accidents.20 The Grand Chamber found that 
despite the emerging trend with respect to claims for personal injuries, the 
DSSOLFDQW¶VDFWLRQEHIRUHQDWLRQDOFRXUWVGLGQRWFRQFHUQDQ\RIWKHUHFRJQLVHG
exceptions to the rule granting States immunity from jurisdiction and, hence, 
his right to access a court had not been disproportionately restricted.    
                                                             
18
 McElhinney (GC), [20]. 
19
 µ1RWKLQJ LQ WKLV &RQYHQWLRQ VKDOO DIIHFW DQ\ LPPXQLWLHV RU SULYLOHJHV HQMR\HG E\ D
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 Article 12 of the ILC Draft Articles on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their 
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The Court once again approached the Basle Convention rather 
uncritically. In terms of treaty law, Ireland was not bound by it. With respect to 
its alleged customary status Article 31 did not reflect customary international 
law and, thus, the majority should not have drawn definite conclusions solely 
by virtue of this treaty provision.21 Dissenting Judges Caflisch, Cabral Barreto 
DQG 9DMLü FRQGXFWHG D PRUH WKRURXJK LQYHVWLJDWLRQ RI WKH SHUWLQHQW 3,/
material in order to ascertain the scope of the exception to State immunity. 
They referred to the national legislation of certain States and to international 
practice evidenced by a series of authorities, such as a resolution adopted by 
WKH,QVWLWXWHRI,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZRQµ&RQWHPSRUDU\3UREOHPV&RQFHUQLQJWKH
,PPXQLW\RI6WDWHVLQ5HODWLRQWR4XHVWLRQVRI-XULVGLFWLRQDQG(QIRUFHPHQW¶
the 198 ,QWHUQDWLRQDO /DZ $VVRFLDWLRQ¶V 5HYLVHG 'UDIW $UWLFOHV IRU D
Convention on State Immunity and the ILC Draft Articles and Commentary.22 
Although these were non-binding legal instruments, their critical assessment 
appears to shed light on the content of the immunity rule. Contrary to the 
conclusions of the majority, the minority found that Article 12 of the ILC Draft 
$UWLFOHVVXVWDLQHGWKHDSSOLFDQW¶VFRPSODLQWDQGWKDWKLVFDVHLQIDFWIHOOXQGHU
one of the exceptions to State immunity. This is arguably a more accurate 
approach since the ILC has equipped Article 12 with a very broad scope.23 
Therefore, although minority and majority analysed almost identical PIL 
norms, ironically, they employed different interpretations of the said norms and 
reached different conclusions to the case at hand. 
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 Dissenting Opinion of Judges Caflisch, Cabral %DUUHWRDQG9DMLüLQMcElhinney (GC), 18. 
22
 Ibid, 17-20. 
23
 Ibid, 19; YbkILC 1991, vol. II, Part Two, 45, [3] and 46, [11].  
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Turning to the Al-Adsani case, the applicant, a dual British/Kuwaiti 
national, filed a civil suit before English courts against the State of Kuwait for 
being subjected to torture. He complained before the Court that English courts 
had failed to secure his right not to be tortured and also his right to a fair trial 
by granting immunity from suit to the State of Kuwait. 
The Court examined whether there was an exception to State immunity 
in PIL with respect to civil proceedings before national courts when the alleged 
torture did not take place on the territory of the forum State. It relied only on 
the Basle Convention which did not prescribe such an exception, unless such 
proceedings were linked to injury caused on the territory of the forum State.24 
7KH &RXUW QRWHG WKDW WKLV µSURYLVLRQ UHIOHFW>HG@ D JHQHUDOO\ DFFHSWHG UXOH RI
LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ¶ µH[FHSW LQVRIDU DV LW DIIHFWV FODLPV IRU GDPDJHV IRU
WRUWXUH¶25  
7KH DSSOLFDQW¶V PDLQ DUJXPHQW KRZHYHU ZDV WKDW D lex specialis 
humDQ ULJKWV¶H[FHSWLRQ WR6WDWH LPPXQLW\FRXOGEHVXVWDLQHGXQGHU3,/+H
argued that the rule on the prohibition of torture was a jus cogens rule and, 
hence, should take precedence over any other rule of PIL, including State 
immunity. The Court affirmed the jus cogens nature of the prohibition of 
torture. It referred to the absolute prohibition of torture as enshrined in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)26 and the Convention against 
Torture.27 It also placed great emphasis on the judicial pronouncement by the 
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 Articles 11 and 15 Basle Convention; Al-Adsani (GC), [21]-[22], [57]. 
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 Al-Adsani (GC), [57]. 
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 Article 5 UDHR and Article 7 ICCPR stipulate that µ[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or 
FUXHOLQKXPDQRUGHJUDGLQJWUHDWPHQWRUSXQLVKPHQW¶. 
27
 Al-Adsani (GC), [27]-[29]. 
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International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the 
)XUXQGåLMD case where the prohibition of torture was recognised as a 
peremptory norm under PIL.28 This, as the Court noted, was followed by the 
subsequent case law of the ICTY, endorsed by the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda and considered to be - already at the time of deciding Al-
Adsani - an accepted position. The recognition of the jus cogens character of 
the prohibition of torture by the Court is one of the instances where 
international courts and tribunals develop PIL. Chapter 1 stressed that 
specialised or/and regional international courts not only do not threaten the 
unity of PIL, but also enrich and develop PIL. Despite the hesitance of the 
International Court of Justice towards the concept of jus cogens, the ICTY in 
)XUXQGåLMD and the ECtHR in Al-Adsani, explicitly acknowledged and 
developed that concept in their judgments. The peremptory character of the 
prohibition of torture is now considered an established position in PIL.29   
Yet, the Grand Chamber with a marginal vote of nine to eight did not 
accept that, in the specific instance, the jus cogens rule on the prohibition of 
torture could override the rule granting immunity from jurisdiction before 
domestic courts. The majority could not discern a firm basis that as a matter of 
PIL a State no longer enjoys immunity from civil suit in the courts of another 
State where acts of torture are alleged.30 The Court took a critical stance toward 
the pertinent PIL norms by drawing a distinction between, on one hand, the 
criminal liability of an individual for alleged acts of torture and, on the other 
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 3URVHFXWRU Y )XUXQGåLMD, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, 10 December 1998, [144]-[154]; Al-
Adsani (GC), [30]-[31], [60]. 
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 Separate Opinion of Judge ad hoc Dugard in Case Concerning Armed Activities on the 
Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda), [5]; infra 1.4. 
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 Al-Adsani (GC), [61], [66]. 
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hand, the immunity of a State in a civil suit for damages in respect of acts of 
torture within the territory of that State. It noted that the UDHR and ICCPR did 
not relate to State immunity or civil proceedings. This point is unclear, since 
these are provisions of a general nature and they do not relate to criminal 
liability either. All the more, it has been highlighted that the practice of the 
Human Rights Committee supports the inclusion of civil suits within an 
exception to immunity.31 The Court also underlined that no definite evidence 
could be drawn from recent State practice and legislation as incorporated into 
WKH,/&¶VZRUNDQGWKH'UDIW$UWLFOHVVLQFHWKHSOHDRI6WDWHLPPXQLW\VHHPHG
to be upheld by national courts in the case of civil suits. Finally, it clarified that 
ground-breaking judgments, such as the )XUXQGåLMD and Pinochet cases,32 again 
related only to the criminal liability of individuals. Although it appears that the 
Court in Al-Adsani discusses and engages more systematically with the PIL 
norms before it, its legal reasoning seems rather poor insofar the justification 
given for this critical distinction is concerned.  
The minority strongly opposed the assertion that the lex specialis 
human rights exception to State immunity could not be discerned in PIL. 
Dissenting Judges Rozakis and Caflisch joined by Judges Wildhaber, Costa, 
Cabral Barreto and VajLü GLVDSSURYHG RI WKH PDMRULW\¶V GLVWLQFWLRQ EHWZHHQ
civil and criminal proceedings as not being consonant with the very essence of 
the operation of a jus cogens rule. They argued that jus cogens is a higher 
source of law in the vertical hierarchy of the international legal system 
overriding any other rules of PIL. Hence, the procedural bar of State immunity 
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 $ 2UDNKHODVKYLOL µ5HVWULFWLYH ,QWHUSUHWDWLRQ RI +XPan Rights Treaties in the Recent 
-XULVSUXGHQFHRIWKH(XURSHDQ&RXUWRI+XPDQ5LJKWV¶EJIL 529, 555. 
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 Regina v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate and Others, ex parte Pinochet 
Ugarte (No. 3), 24 March 1999, UKHL, [1999] 2 All E.R. 97. 
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is automatically lifted and does not produce any legal effect.33 Similarly to 
McElhinney, the majority and minority both allege that they decided the case as 
a matter of PIL. However, they employ different interpretations of the same 
PIL norms and, consequently, construe the scope of the exceptions to State 
immunity in different ways.  
7KH*UDQG&KDPEHU¶VMXGJPHQWVUHYHDOUHOXFWDQFHDQGHYHQFRQIXVLRQ
when addressing the legal status of State immunity in PIL. It also appears that 
the Court does not sufficiently understand certain concepts of PIL, which is 
HYLGHQFHG E\ WKH &RXUW¶V LQFRQVLVWHQW WHUPLQRORJ\ 6WDWH LPPXQLW\ LV
LQWHUFKDQJHDEO\TXDOLILHGDVDµFRQFHSWRILQWHUQDWLRQDOODZ¶34 DµGRFWULQH¶35 a 
µUXOH¶36 D µJHQHUDOO\ UHFRJQLVHG UXOH RI SXEOLF LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ¶37 or a 
µJHQHUDOUXOHRILQWHUQDWLRQDOODZ¶38 It was only certain dissenting Judges who 
explicitly stated that State immunity is a rule of customary international law.39 
Yet, more recent pronouncements by the Grand Chamber in the Cudak and 
Sabeh El Leil judgments refer clearly to State immunity as a rule of customary 
international law.40 
This uncertainty is not confined to issues of terminology. It extends to 
the choice of norms and legal material to which the Court refers. Strong or 
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 Dissenting Opinion of Judges Rozakis and Caflisch joined by Judges Wildhaber, Costa, 
&DEUDO%DUUHWRDQG9DMLüLQAl-Adsani (GC), 29-30. Judge Loucaides agreed on this point with 
their Dissenting Opinion. 
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 Al-Adsani (GC), [54]; Fogarty (GC), [34]; McElhinney (GC), [35]. 
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 Al-Adsani (GC), [56], [66]; Fogarty (GC), [36]; McElhinney (GC), [32], [37]. Cudak (GC), 
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 Fogarty (GC), [38]. 
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 Al-Adsani (GC), [56], [57]; Fogarty (GC), [36]; McElhinney (GC), [37]. Cudak (GC), [57]. 
38
 Al-Adsani (GC), [64]. 
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 Dissenting Opinion of Judges Rozakis and Caflisch joined by Judges Wildhaber, Costa, 
&DEUDO %DUUHWR DQG 9DMLü LQ Al-Adsani (GC), 30 (point 2); dissenting Opinion of Judge 
Loucaides in Fogarty (GC), 19.  
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 Cudak (GC), [66], [67]; Sabeh El Leil (GC), [54]. H. Fox, The Law of State Immunity 
(Oxford University Press, New York, 2008) 393.  
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exclusive reliance on certain instruments appears selective and lacking in 
sufficient justification:41 the unreserved reliance on the Basle Convention when 
it is not ratified by the respondent State (Cudak, McElhinney) or when it does 
not reflect customary international law (Fogarty, Cudak);42 and the obscure 
reasoning regarding the applicability of the UN Convention on Jurisdictional 
Immunities to Lithuania (Cudak). Moreover, in McElhinney and Al-Adsani it 
was the minority who conducted a more thorough and convincing investigation 
into relevant PIL norms for determining the scope of the exceptions to State 
immunity.  
7KH&RXUW¶V PLVJLYLQJVVKRXOG EHDOVRVHHQ LQ OLJKWRI the fact that it 
encountered the challenge of having to pronounce itself on questions of PIL 
which were in a fluid state and unsettled at that moment.43 Three months later 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) came to clarify certain issues 
surrounding the exceptions to State immunity under PIL.44 It cannot, however, 
be dismissed that in many instances the Court does not provide a convincing 
justification for using the specific PIL norms and drawing the said conclusions 
from them. For example, in Cudak it drew a definite conclusion on the 
customary status of Article 11 of the UN Convention on Jurisdictional 
Immunities, despite the fact that it did not seem to be supported by the ILC 
work. In McElhinney, the Court disregarded the broad scope attached to Article 
12 of the ILC Draft Articles; a point addressed by the minority. In Al-Adsani, 
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 M. Forowicz, The Reception of International Law in the European Court of Human Rights 
(Oxford University Press, New York, 2010) 295. 
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 Without in this respect exploring the possibility of the respective 
respondent States being persistent objectors to the customary international 
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 Fox, (note 40), 391-393; Forowicz, (note 41), 307.  
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 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), Judgment, 
14 February 2002, ICJ Rep. 2002, p. 3; Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v 
Italy: Greece Intervening) Judgment, 3 February 2012, General List No 143, [53]-[58], [78]. 
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the discussion of controversial and exceptionally complex questions was 
OLPLWHGWRDYHU\IHZSDUDJUDSKVLQWKH&RXUW¶VUHDVRQLQJDQGWKHH[SODQDWLRQ
for drawing the critical distinction between criminal jurisdiction and civil suits 
was supported by rather weak authorities and arguments. In sum, despite 
FHUWDLQ PLVJLYLQJV LQ WKH &RXUW¶V FRQVWUXFWLRQ RI 3,/ QRUPV WKH PDLQ
difficulty, in the view of the present author, is the &RXUW¶V REVFXUH RU SRRU
reasoning in justifying its conclusions. In principle, the Court does not seem to 
seriously lack in expertise in PIL, but it lacks in confidently engaging with and 
construing customary international law. These thoughts will be further 
explored in the fourth sub-section regarding the role that the Court assumes as 
an international court when addressing customary international law.              
 
 
5.3 Accommodating the restrictive impact of the State immunity rule 
within the ECHR 
As it was previously discussed - with the exception of Cudak - in 
Fogarty, McElhinney and Al-Adsani the Court did not find it established that 
WKH DSSOLFDQWV¶ FLUFXPVWDQFHV WULJJHUHG WKH DSSOLFDELOLW\ RI DQ H[FHSWLRQ WR
State immunity. Hence, it had to assess whether the refusal of national courts to 
entertain the civil suits breached their right to access a court under Article 6 
ECHR.    
The Court followed the same methodology and reasoning in all cases. It 
acknowledged that State immunity serves as a legitimate aim for restricting the 
DSSOLFDQWV¶ULJKWLQRUGHUIRU6WDWHVWRFRPSO\ZLWK3,/,WIXUWKHUUHFDOOHGWKDW
while being mindful of the special character of the ECHR as a human rights 
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treaty, it should not place it in a vacuum. Hence, on the basis of Article 31 
(3)(c) VCLT, the ECHR must be interpreted by taking other relevant rules of 
international law into account, namely the rule on State immunity and the 
(&+5µVKRXOGVRIDUDVSRVVLEOHEHLQWHUSUHWHGLQKDUPRQ\ZLWKRWKHUUXOHVRI
international law of wKLFKLWIRUPVSDUW¶45 It followed, according to the Court, 
that when the measures taken by a member State reflect generally recognised 
rules of PIL on State immunity they cannot in principle be regarded as 
imposing a disproportionate restriction on the right to access a court; these 
measures qualify as an inherent limitation to Article 6.46  
The Court was very careful not to mention the word conflict in the text 
of its judgments or to discuss a conflict of norms, even though certain 
dissenting Judges addressed the issue.47 7KH &RXUW¶V UHDVRQLQJ OD\V WKH EDVLV
for avoiding through interpretation, a possible conflict between the customary 
rule of State immunity and Article 6 ECHR. This approach is followed in 
subsequent case law concerning the rules on State immunity48 and diplomatic 
immunity.49 In this way the Court attempts to accommodate the restrictive 
impact of State immunity under PIL within the structure of the ECHR.50 
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,QWHUQDWLRQDO*pQpUDO¶[2004] RGDIP 5, 61; /&DIOLVFKµ/¶$SSOLFDWLRQGH'URLW,QWHUQDWLRQDO
*pQpUDOSDUOD&RXU(XURSpHQQHGHV'URLWVGHO¶+RPPH¶, in I. Buffard, J. Crawford, A. Pellet 
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The position that the ECHR ought not to be placed in a vacuum, and 
should be construed by taking other PIL norms into account, reflects 
international judicial practice.51 µ,Q GRXEWIXO FDVHV DQG ZKHUH LW LV QRW
established that the parties intended to depart from customary law rules, 
WUHDWLHV VKRXOG EH LQWHUSUHWHG LQ KDUPRQ\ ZLWK FXVWRPDU\ ODZ¶52 in order to 
avoid the tendency to overemphasise the alleged self-contained nature of a 
treaty system.53 7KHUHIRUH DOWKRXJK WKH &RXUW FRXOG µKDYH VLPSO\ EUXVKHG
DVLGH6WDWHLPPXQLW\DVQRWUHOHYDQWWRWKHDSSOLFDWLRQRI WKH>(&+5@>«@LW
GLGQRWGRVR¶54 On the contrary, it placed the right to access a court under the 
ECHR against the background of PIL.  
 On the other hand, the Court recalled that it should be mindful of the 
special character of the ECHR as a human rights treaty - the meaning of which 
is not entirely clear. A reasonable assumption could be that the Court refers to 
the guarantee of practical and effective rights under the ECHR. It is interesting 
that the reference is made in passing, whereas in other cases the Court devotes 
a separate paragraph in its legal reasoning to elaborate on the principle of 
effectiveness. Hence, the tension between the interpretative principle of 
effectiveness and the principle of taking cognisance of relevant norms of PIL 
does not become obvious. When the interpretative principle of taking 
                                                                                                                                                                 
et al. (eds.), International Law Between Universalism and Fragmentation  (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, Leiden-Boston, 2008) 627, 633. 
51
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 R. BernhardW µ,QWHUSUHWDWLRQ LQ ,QWHUQDWLRQDO /DZ¶, in R. Bernhardt (ed.), Encyclopedia of 
Public International Law, Instalment 7 (1984) 318, 323. 
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 G. Schwarzenberger, International Law, Vol. I (International Law as Applied by 
International Courts and Tribunals: I) (Stevens & Sons Limited, London, 1957) 529. 
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 ,QWHUQDWLRQDO /DZ &RPPLVVLRQ µ5HSRUW RI WKH 6WXG\ *URXS RI WKH ,QWHUQDWLRQDO /DZ
Commission finalisHG E\ 0 .RVNHQQLHPL¶ 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cognisance of PIL norms leads to a restriction of the ECHR, the Court tends to 
hide away the contravention with the principle of effectiveness. Instead, it 
stresses the necessity that the ECHR should not be applied in a vacuum. In line 
with the main argument of the thesis, not only the principle of taking PIL 
norms into account and the principle of effectiveness are autonomous and 
distinct from each other, but also the two principles may conflict in their 
application. In these instances, the principle of effectiveness reinforces the 
special nature of the ECHR and prioritises the full weight of rights and 
freedoms under the ECHR over the construction of the ECHR in light of PIL. 
On the other hand, the principle of taking PIL norms into account introduces 
WKHUHOHYDQW3,/QRUPVLQWKH&RXUW¶VOHJDOUHDVRQLQJDQGUHVWULFWVWKHHIIHFWLYH
application of the ECHR. Thus, this part of the jurisprudence illustrates that the 
interpretation of the ECHR by taking cognisance of PIL norms should be 
treated separately to the principle of effectiveness.55  
0RUHRYHUDSDWWHUQDSSHDUVWRH[LVWLQWKH&RXUW¶VMXULVSUXGHQFH,WZLOO
be seen in other cases as well that when the Court takes account of PIL norms 
which restrict the scope of the rights of the ECHR,56 it downplays the 
application of the principle of effectiveness. On the contrary, where the 
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 Merrills, in his seminal work, perceptively discusses the principle of effectiveness and, in 
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relevant PIL norms reinforce the effective protection of the rights and freedoms 
under the ECHR the Court fully elaborates on the necessity of applying the 
principle of effectiveness.57  
The reference to the special character of the ECHR brings not only the 
guarantee of practical and effective rights under the ECHR into the fore, but it 
DOVR KLJKOLJKWV WKH &RXUW¶V UHVWULFWHG ratione materiae jurisdiction. Judge 
Loucaides made an explicit point concerning the lex specialis and applicable 
law before the Court.58 Hence, the question that emerges is how the Court 
should treat customary international law or general principles of international 
law, if they are not embodied in the ECHR by direct reference. When drafting 
the ECHR the Legal Committee of the Consultative Assembly of the Council 
of Europe foresaw that the Court should necessarily apply general principles of 
law recognised by civilised nations as stipulated in Article 38 (1) (c) ICJ 
Statute in the execution of its duties. It is for this reason that inserting a specific 
clause was not deemed necessary.59  
In this respect, it is also important to consider whether or not it makes 
any difference if the recourse to PIL for interpreting the ECHR restricts the 
VFRSH RI ULJKWV DQG IUHHGRPV XQGHU WKH (&+5 7KH &RXUW¶V MXULVSUXGHQFH
witnesses examples where general principles of law or customary international 
law have been relied upon. In Golder, for example, universally recognised 
fundamental principles of law and principles of international law prohibiting 
WKH GHQLDO RI MXVWLFH ZHUH XWLOLVHG WR VXSSRUW WKH FRQFOXVLRQ WKDW µIDLU WULDO¶
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 Dissenting Opinion in McElhinney (GC), 21. 
59
 Golder v United Kingdom, 21 February 1975, (Plenary), [35]; Demir and Baykara (GC), 
[71]. 
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includes the right to access a court60 and to expand the scope of Article 6 
ECHR. Nonetheless, it is a quite rare instance for the Court to use the position 
under PIL in order to justify a restrictive interpretation of the ECHR.61 It has 
been argued that the Court should be particularly reluctant to read restrictions 
on ECHR rights derived from customary international law.62 This is because 
the guarantee of the right to access a court under the ECHR should be 
preserved over the requirements of the immunity rule under PIL.63 However, 
there is nothing in the ECHR that safely and specifically indicates that the right 
to a fair trial and its implied guarantees establishes a lex specialis rule - which 
modifies or displaces the requirements of State immunity. 
The Court does not take a clear-cut position on the previous questions. 
It attempts to preserve the specificity of the ECHR while at the same time 
reading it in light of the customary rule on State immunity. This is in line with 
the practice of international courts and tribunals examined in Chapter 2. The 
relevance of, and the extent to which, general international law will inform the 
construction of a treaty is a matter of interpretation on a case-by-case basis.64 
Hence, the extent to which PIL will inform the construction of the ECHR 
should be carefully assessed on the basis of the relevance and weight afforded 
to the State immunity rule when interpreting and applying Article 6 ECHR in 
casu.65 It is for this reason that the Grand Chamber brought Article 31 (3)(c) 
VCLT into the fore. However, it seems that the Court employs Article 31 (3)(c) 
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 Golder (Pl.), [35].  
61
 One example is the series of cases concerning the expulsion of aliens: Merrills, (note 55), 
206. 
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 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Loucaides in Maslov v. Austria, 22 March 2007, 12. 
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 $ 2UDNKHODVKYLOL µ6WDWH ,PPXQLW\ DQG ,QWHUQDWLRQDO 3XEOLF 2UGHU 5HYLVLWHG¶  49 
GYbkIL 327, 346; Merrills, (note 55), 206; Forowicz, (note 41), 311. 
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 Infra 1.4 and 2.2. 
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 ILC Final Rep, [473]-[474]; & 0F/DFKODQ µ7KH 3ULQFLSOH RI 6\VWHPLF ,QWHJUDWLRQ DQG
$UWLFOHFRIWKH9LHQQD&RQYHQWLRQ¶ICLQ 279, 310. 
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VCLT in an inappropriate way. It invokes the provision in order to support the 
harmonious interpretation of the ECHR to PIL and the presumption that the 
rule on State immunity is not, in principle, a disproportionate restriction to 
Article 6 ECHR. These assertions are read in the judgment as if they are 
causally linked.66 Nonetheless, neither of these statements logically lead to the 
other and ought not to be conflated. When interpreting the ECHR Article 31 
(3)(c) VCLT is used as an interpretative tool to introduce any relevant and 
DSSOLFDEOH UXOHV RI 3,/ LQWR WKH &RXUW¶V OHJDO UHDVRQLQJ ,W LV GRXEWIXO WKDW
Article 31 (3)(c) can support a presumed proportionate restriction of the 
ECHR. Although the said provision does not address how other rules of PIL 
are to be employed in the legal reasoning,67 nor what kind of bearing they will 
have in the interpretation process,68 it does not require interpreting the ECHR 
in order to make it compatible with the rule of State immunity.69 Even more, its 
placement in the proportionality assessment,70 besides being methodologically 
unsound, implies that the Court treats it as a medium for balancing conflicting 
interests and norms. In the view of the present author, the Court unnecessarily 
conflates the interpretation process of the ECHR with the proportionality 
assessment of the impugned restriction. It also conflates the well-recognised 
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 The CRXUW IRUH[DPSOHXVHV WKHH[SUHVVLRQµ>L@W IROORZV¶ Fogarty (GC), [36]; McElhinney 
(GC), [37]; Al-Adsani (GC), [56]. Caflisch, (note 50), 634. 
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 $ YDQ $DDNHQ µ'HIUDJPHQWDWLRQ RI 3XEOLF ,QWHUQDWLRQDO /DZ 7KURXJK ,QWHUSUHWDWLRQ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0HWKRGRORJLFDO3URSRVDO¶ (2009) 16 IJGLS 483, 502. 
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 7KH,QWHUQDWLRQDO&RXUWRI-XVWLFHTXDOLILHGLWDVDµFHUWDLQEHDULQJ¶LQCertain Questions of 
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Djibouti v. France), Judgment, 4 June 2008, ICJ Rep. 
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 Orakhelashvili, (note 63), 345937]HYHOHNRVµ7KH8VHRI$UWLFOH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RIWKH9&/7
in the Case Law of the ECtHR: An Effective Anti-Fragmentation Tool or a Selective Loophole 
IRU WKH 5HLQIRUFHPHQW RI +XPDQ 5LJKWV 7HOHRORJ\"¶  Michigan JIL 621, 666-667; E. 
-RXDQQHWµ/H-XJH,QWHUQDWLRQDO)DFHDX[3UREOqPHVG¶,QFRKHUHQFHHWG¶,QVWDELOLWpGX'URLW
,QWHUQDWLRQDO¶RGDIP 917, 934-935. 
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 Fogarty (GC), [35]; McElhinney (GC), [36]; Al-Adsani (GC), [55]. Cf. Cudak (GC), [55]-
[56]. 
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interpretative principle of reading, in case of a doubt, a treaty in light of PIL 
with its own presumption that the State immunity rule cannot have a 
disproportionate effect on the right to access a court.71 The ILC and PIL 
VFKRODUV IRXQG FRPPRQ JURXQG LQ WKH &RXUW¶V UHDVRQLQJ LQ WKHVH FDVHV WR
employ an appealing vision of Article 31 (3)(c) VCLT as a principle of 
systemic integration.72 They have not convincingly explained, however, the 
content of this principle, namely if it has an aim to serve besides placing a 
treaty instrument against PIL and introducing relevant rules in the process of 
WKHIRUPHU¶VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQ73  
Any interpretative attempt towards harmonising two potentially 
FRQIOLFWLQJUXOHVVKRXOGQRWUHVXOWLQµVHW>WLQJ@DVLGH¶74 the rules of the ECHR.75 
Interpretation cannot make a conflict disappear. The Court, from the very 
beginning of its reasoning, establishes a particularly strong presumption 
regarding the harmonious reading of the ECHR to the rule on State immunity. 
This is not a proper starting point in the interpretation process since the Court 
does not start with the treaty terms (Article 6 ECHR) of its own constitutive 
instrument and does not apply the interpretative rules contained in Article 31 
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 Fogarty (GC), [36]; McElhinney (GC), [37]; Al-Adsani (GC), [56]. 
72
 ILC Final Rep, [410]-[460]; McLachlan, (note 65); - G¶$VSUHPRQW µ7KH 6\VWHPLF
Integration of International Law by Domestic Courts: Domestic Judges as Architects of the 
Consistency of the International Legal 2UGHU¶LQ A. Nollkaemper, O.K. Fauchald (eds.), The 
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 ICLQ 
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http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1534086&download=yes. 
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 ILC Final Rep, [438]. 
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 Weckel, (note 50), 1742-1743. 
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VCLT in its logical order;76 it starts instead with how an inherent limitation can 
be read to Article 6. In other words, the Court should have started with the 
interpretation of the right to a fair trial and subsequently placed it ± to a certain 
extent - against the background of customary international law.77 Affording 
such heavy weight to the extraneous State immunity rule from the very 
beginning of the interpretation process diminishes the significance of the plain 
meaning and purpose of the right to access a court since the interpretive 
influence of the State immunity concept overshadows all the other elements 
and principles of interpretation.78 Even if the right to access to justice is an 
implied right under Article 6 ECHR and may be more receptive to stricter 
limitations,79 the proportionality of the restriction on the right to access a court 
should not be presumed. It should rather be assessed on the basis of 
interpretation and on the facts of the case, which is something that the Court 
did not do.80 These remarks are made as a matter of proper methodology and 
sound legal reasoning. It is to be admitted, however, that ± subject to the 
(evolving) scope of the State immunity rule ± in Al-Adsani State immunity 
necessarily touches upon the core and essence of the right to access a court.  
,QWHUHVWLQJO\ LQOLJKWRIQHZGHYHORSPHQWVWKH&RXUW¶VUHDVRQLQJPD\
be pointing in a different direction. In the recent Cudak and Sabeh El Leil cases 
the Grand Chamber unanimously follows the same methodology to the letter 
without, however, including the assertion regarding the necessity of reading the 
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 R. Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (Oxford University Press, New York, 2010) 279-280; F. 
%HUPDQµ7UHDW\,QWHUSUHWDWLRQLQD-XGLFLDO&RQWH[W¶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 Concurring opinion of Judge Ress in Bosphorus (GC), [5]. 
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 Schwarzenberger, (note 51), 14; Orakhelashvili, (note 63), 345. 
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University Press, New York, 2007) 392; cf. Orakhelashvili, (note 31), 564-565.   
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 See Judge Loucaides concerns arguing that a blanket immunity should not have been 
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ECHR in harmony with the State immunity rule.81 Given that the wording of 
the reasoning in every other respect is identical to all relevant cases, this 
omission may signify a slightly different approach. Secondly, the outline of its 
interpretative principles is now placed not within the proportionality 
assessment but under the general principles derived from its case law.82 
Thirdly, the Grand Chamber explicitly stressed the importance of ensuring 
practical and effective rights under Article 6 ECHR.83 It now becomes clearer 
that the interpretive principle of taking cognisance of PIL norms contravenes 
the principle of effective interpretation and leads towards different interpretive 
outcomes. In fact, the weight afforded to the external rule of State immunity 
and the respective impact that the Court readily accommodates within the 
scope of the ECHR dramatically restricts Article 6 ECHR. Hence, the fact that 
the Court chose in these recent cases to devote a paragraph in its reasoning on 
the importance of ensuing practical and effective rights possibly evidences its 
willingness to openly counterbalance the simultaneous application of the two 
principles.       
Arguably, this different approach in the Cudak and Sabeh El Leil cases 
is all the more important since the Court has widely mainstreamed the 
McElhinney, Fogarty and Al-Adsani legal reasoning in its subsequent case law. 
The Al-Adsani FDVH FRQVWLWXWHV D FRQVWDQW H[SOLFLW FLWDWLRQ LQ WKH &RXUW¶V
jurisprudence alongside the Golder, Loizidou (and the subsequent Demir and 
Baykara, as it will be discussed below84) cases. From a methodological point of 
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 Cf., on one hand, Fogarty (GC), [35]; McElhinney (GC), [36]; Al-Adsani (GC), [55] and, on 
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 Cudak (GC), [55]-[56]; Sabeh El Leil (GC), [47]-[48]. 
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 Cudak (GC), [58]; Sabeh El Leil (GC), [50]. 
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view, Al-Adsani has developed an impact beyond its confines. Cases before the 
Grand Chamber that exemplify this practice are numerous.85 It is cited by the 
Court when it takes cognisance of other treaty rules and their interpretation by 
other international bodies and it may support either an expansive interpretation 
of the ECHR provisions86 or a restrictive one.87 7KH&RXUW¶VZRUGLQJKRZHYHU
slightly differs throughout its jurisprudence. A variety of expressions are 
HPSOR\HGLQGLFDWLQJWKDWWKH(&+5VKRXOGEHLQWHUSUHWHGµLQOLJKWRI¶88 RUµLQ
harmoQ\ZLWK¶89 RUµLQDFFRUGDQFHZLWK¶90 RUE\µWDN>LQJ@LQWRDFFRXQW¶91 other 
norms of PIL. Although in theory these expressions entail different 
consequences, it seems that the Court uses them interchangeably. Therefore, it 
remains to be seen whether or not the Court in its future case law will follow 
and apply what it seems to be a different interpretive approach in the recent 
Cudak and Sabeh El Leil cases. 
 
5.4 The role of the Court 
7KH DQDO\VLV H[SORUHG ILUVW WKH &RXUW¶V PHWKRGRORJ\ ZKHQ LW ILQGV
recourse to customary international law and, secondly, the accommodation of 
its restrictive impact within the scope of Article 6 ECHR. These issues, 
however, relate not only to the interpretation of the ECHR as such but, more 
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JHQHUDOO\ WR WKH &RXUW¶V SHUFHSWLRQ Rf its role concerning PIL and, in 
particular, customary international law. Judge Pellonpää tackled the issue as 
follows:  
[W]hen having to touch upon central questions of general 
international law, this Court should be very cautious before taking 
upon itself the role of a forerunner.92  
+HZHQWRQWRFLWH6LU5REHUW-HQQLQJV¶FRQFHUQVRQµWKHWHQGHQF\RISDUWLFXODU
tribunals to regard themselves as different, as separate little empires which 
PXVW DV IDU DV SRVVLEOH EH DXJPHQWHG¶93 Other Judges emphasised the 
overarching importance and the basic imperative of the rule on State immunity 
in PIL.94 These preoccupations illustrate that the Court is aware of the 
challenges revolving around the fragmentation of PIL and of the criticism 
directed towards its case law.  
,QWKHFDVHVH[DPLQHGWKHPDMRULW\NHSWDSRVLWLRQRIµVHOI-UHVWUDLQW¶LQ
that, if in their view an exception to the rule of State immunity did not very 
clearly emerge from the pertinent PIL norms, then they readily reaffirmed the 
applicability of the immunity rule to the case.95 In contrast, the dissenting 
Judges, in all three cases, not only held different views on the current state of 
PIL and the interpretation of the same norms, but they also appear to invite the 
Court to be more confident in its approach towards PIL.96 Interestingly, most of 
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 Concurring Opinion of Judge Pellonpää joined by Judge Sir Nicolas Bratza in Al-Adsani 
(GC), 27.  
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 Ibid, 28. 
94
 &RQFXUULQJ2SLQLRQRI-XGJHV&DIOLVFK&RVWDDQG9DMLüLQFogarty (GC), 17. 
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Fogarty (GC), McElhinney (GC) and Al-Adsani (GC); Dissenting Opinion of Judge Rozakis in 
136 
 
the dissenting Judges - Rozakis, Costa, Wildhaber and Caflisch - had strong 
PIL expertise.97 Judge Caflisch articulated this invitation in his Concurring 
Opinion joined by Judge Ziemele in the Hirschhorn case, which concerned 
diplomatic immunity:  
,WZRXOGDSSHDU>«@WKDWWKH,QWHUQDWLRQDO&RXUWRI-XVWLFH LVQRW
very favourably disposed towards specialised international courts - 
a category which includes this Court - ruling on issues of public 
international law. Despite the reservations of the main judicial 
body of the United Nations, I would have liked to see the majority 
of this Court adopt a position on the immunity issues raised [in 
this case].98 
 7KH TXHVWLRQ WKHQ LV ZKHWKHU WKH &RXUW¶V UHOXFWDQFH LV MXVWLILHG The 
fact that the Court appears hesitant to pronounce upon questions of PIL which 
were at the moment unsettled does not seem to be unreasonable. Should the 
&RXUW KRZHYHU UHWDLQ D SRVLWLRQ RI µVHOI-UHVWUDLQW¶ DV D PDWWHU RI SULQFLSOH"
Should its authority to pronounce on questions of PIL, such as customary 
LQWHUQDWLRQDOODZEHGLVDSSURYHGRUTXHVWLRQHG"&KDSWHUGLVFXVVHGWKH,&-¶V
YHU\ FULWLFDO DSSURDFK WRZDUG WKH ,&7<¶V SURQRXQFHPHQWV RQ TXHVWLRQV RI
PIL.99 The ICJ not only disagreed on the interpretation and application of the 
rules on State responsibility but also strongly disapproved of the authority of 
the ICTY to pronounce on customary international law. In fact, the previously 
                                                                                                                                                                 
McElhinney (GC); DLVVHQWLQJ 2SLQLRQ RI -XGJHV &DIOLVFK &DEUDO %DUUHWR DQG 9DMLü LQ
McElhinney (GC). 
97
 %DWHV DOVR VSRWV WKLV GHWDLO ( %DWHV µ7KH Al-Adsani Case, State Immunity and the 
3URKLELWLRQRI7RUWXUH¶HRLRev 193, 213. 
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 Concurring Opinion of Judge Caflisch joined by Judge Ziemele in Hirschhorn v. Romania, 
26 July 2007, [2] (emphases added). 
99
 Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, 26 
February 2007, General List No 91; infra 1.3.1. 
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mentioned Concurring Opinion of Judge Caflisch refers to this judgment. The 
ECtHR was also criticised in the Loizidou FDVHIRUFUHDWLQJDµVFKLVP¶LQ3,/
Chapters 1 showed, however, that the ECtHR in Loizidou and other 
international courts and tribunals in their judgments, in principle, develop PIL, 
rather than fragment it. There is an inherent paradox in the way many PIL 
scholars treat regional or specialised courts. On one hand, regional and/or 
specialised courts accept criticism for regarding themselves as separate, little 
empires. On the other hand, if they do take on board, and inevitably engage 
with, customary international law, they are treated as an imminent danger to 
the unity of PIL.  
Yet, the view that a regional tribunal and/or a tribunal with restricted 
ratione materiae jurisdiction should not recklessly take up the role of a 
forerunner when a field of PIL is in a fluid state does not lack merit. To a 
certain extent this is equally applicable to all international bodies. From the 
perspective of the ECtHR, despite its regional scope and its jurisdictional 
confines, is still an international court, being incumbent to interpret and apply 
an international treaty. Many of the Judges sitting on its bench have a very 
good background and expertise in PIL. In fact, the 2010 Interlaken Declaration, 
adopted by the Committee of Ministers, prescribes that one of the criteria for 
the establishment of lists of candidates to be elected as Judges is to have 
knowledge of PIL.100 Consequently, in the future, the PIL expertise within the 
Court will be reinforced. It is also a Court which is entitled to take other PIL 
norms into account when interpreting its constitutive instrument, the ECHR. 
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Therefore, if the Court has before it a specific question, which necessarily 
involves customary international law and it is indispensable for the exercise of 
its jurisdiction and for entertaining the dispute, it has the competence and 
authority to take a position.101 &HUWDLQPLVJLYLQJV LQWKH&RXUW¶VPHWKRGRORJ\
and reasoning, which were highlighted in the second sub-section, were 
arguably due to its hesitance to articulate and reason on the basis of customary 
international law. Yet, as long as the analogous PIL expertise exists within the 
Court and cautiousness is exercised, the ECtHR should perceive itself as an 
µHTXDO SOD\HU¶ DPRQJ LQWHUQDWLRQDO FRXUWV Wo pronounce on customary 
international law.     
 
 
5.5 Conclusions 
In the above series of cases the Court engaged for the first time with 
questions of customary international law in order to ascertain the scope of the 
rule on State immunity and the exceptions attached to it. The Court had before 
it a possible conflict of the ECHR with a rule of customary international law. It 
fully acknowledged the relevance of the external PIL norms and avoided the 
conflict by way of interpretation. The Court attempted to read the ECHR in 
harmony with the customary rule on State immunity and to accommodate its 
restrictive impact within the ECHR. However, this led to a dramatic restriction 
to the right to access a court, without preserving the very core of the right. 
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In terms of its legal reasoning, the Court did not conduct a very 
thorough investigation of the relevant sources in order to ascertain the status of 
the immunity rule. In identifying the scope of the respective exceptions, the 
&RXUW¶V GLVFXVVLRQ LV VRPHWLPHV SRRU or not convincing. Its methodology 
LQYROYHGWKHDSSOLFDWLRQRI$UWLFOHF9&/77KHSURYLVLRQ¶VSODFHPHQW
within the proportionality assessment implies that the Court overestimates - if 
not misuses - the potential of the said provision. The Court afforded 
considerable weight to the PIL norms that it took into consideration, to the 
detriment of the effective application of the right to access a court. An 
important finding of this Chapter is that the Court hides away the tension 
between the principle of taking PIL norms into account and the principle of 
effectiveness. However, it can be safely concluded that the two principles are 
distinct and, in fact, conflict in their application. In more recent case law 
(Cudak case) the Court appears to apply the two principles in a more balanced 
and transparent way.  
 The majority of the Court adopts a quite reluctant position as far as its 
engagement with customary international law is concerned. Nonetheless, a 
number of dissenting Judges, the majority of which are the ones with the strong 
PIL expertise, suggest a more assertive role for the Court. It is argued that the 
Court should be confident on its competence to pronounce on customary 
international law questions and that it should not hesitate to elaborate in its 
reasoning.  
'HVSLWH WKH PLVJLYLQJV DQG WKH SUREOHPDWLF SRLQWV LQ WKH &RXUW¶V
reasoning that have been already discussed, the present author is, in principle, 
LQDJUHHPHQWZLWKWKH&RXUW¶VSUDFWLFHWREDODQFHWKHQHFHVVLW\IRUWKHXQLW\RI
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PIL with the effective application of the ECHR. The ECtHR should take other 
3,/ QRUPV LQWR DFFRXQW HYHQ LI WKH\ UHVWULFW WKH &RQYHQWLRQ¶V VFRSH
Otherwise, the necessity of addressing the difficulties arising from the 
fragmentation of PIL would be grounded on a selective basis.102 As it was 
stressed, however, the weight accorded to the external, relevant PIL norms 
VKRXOG QRW UHVXOW LQ VHWWLQJ DVLGH WKH (&+5¶V FRUH JXDUDQWHHV ,I WKH SUHVHQW
DXWKRU¶V YLHZ LV FRUUHFW LQ WKDW WKH &RXUW LQ Cudak adopts a more balanced 
application of the principle of effectiveness and the principle of taking 
cognisance of the rule on State immunity, it would be a welcome development.  
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6. Restricting the scope of rights and freedoms under the ECHR by 
taking public international law norms into account 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Chapter 6 discusses cases in which the Court restricts the scope of 
rights and freedoms under the ECHR by having recourse to PIL norms. These 
cases involve the scenario of a possible conflict between a right or freedom 
under the ECHR and an external PIL norm. In contrast to Chapter 5 which 
concerned customary international law rules, the present Chapter examines 
mostly other treaty provisions. In certain instances, the Court takes note of non-
treaty binding norms, for example, United NDWLRQDO 6HFXULW\ &RXQFLO¶V
Resolutions, or non-binding European Union (EU) law. It should be clarified 
that secondary EU law (Regulations, Directives), although binding on EU 
member States, is not binding from the standpoint of PIL. This Chapter is 
informative because it shows that the Court is willing to read the ECHR in 
harmony with other PIL norms, even if this would mean that the rights and 
freedoms under the ECHR do not attain their full weight. The analysis will 
explore the extent of this practice and the methodology followed in order to 
assess whether or not the ECtHR endangers the unity of PIL. 
In many of the cases that will be discussed, a conflict may exist 
EHWZHHQWKH(&+5DQGD3,/QRUP)RUUHDVRQVRIFODULW\WKHWHUPµFRQIOLFW¶
denotes a situation where two treaty provisions may be applicable to the same 
set of facts with conflicting results.1 A distinction is usually drawn between 
                                                             
1
 M.E. Villiger, Commentary on the 1969 VCLT (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden-Boston, 
&:-HQNVµ7KH&onflict of Law-0DNLQJ7UHDWLHV¶;;;BYbkIL 401, 425-
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apparent or prima facie conflict, which can be avoided through interpretation, 
and genuine or real conflict, which cannot be resolved through interpretation.2 
The term divergence is also used by some international lawyers as being a 
broader concept to conflict.3 7KLV &KDSWHU PDLQO\ XVHV WKH WHUP µSRVVLEOH
FRQIOLFW¶ :KHQ WKH DXWKRU DUJXHV WKDW D JLYHQ VLWXDWLRQ TXDOLIies as a real 
conflict it will be made explicit. The definition also includes a conflict between 
an obligation under the ECHR and an extraneous permissive PIL norm.4 This is 
a more inclusive approach that broadens the notion of conflict in order to 
encompass cases where a State is not under a duty to do something but has a 
choice of means. An integral part of the analysis will be how (if at all) the 
Court defines and address a (possible) conflict between the ECHR and another 
PIL norm.  
This Chapter is divided into five sections. The second section discusses 
the practice of the Court to accommodate the restrictive impact of PIL norms 
ZLWKLQWKH(&+5,WGLVFHUQVWKH&RXUW¶VJHQHUDODSSURDFKDQGWKHILQGLQJVDUH
equally applicable to the sections following it. The third, fourth and fifth 
VHFWLRQV H[DPLQH VHULHV RI FDVHV LQ ZKLFK WKH &RXUW¶V SUDFWLFH DWWDLQV FHUWDLQ
distinctive features and follows certain patterns. It is argued that the Court 
gives special consideration to certain PIL norms. The last section summarises 
the conclusions.     
                                                                                                                                                                 
.:ROIUDPµ7UHDWLHV&RQIOLFWV%HWZHHQ¶LQ5%HUQKDUGWHGEncyclopedia of Public 
International Law, Instalment 7 (1984) 467, 468.  
2
 :ROIUDPQRWH00LODQRYLüµ1RUP&RQIOLFWLQ,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ:KLWKHU+XPDQ
5LJKWV"¶Duke JComp&IntlL 69, 73. 
3
 Wolfram, (note 1), 468. 
4
 International Law Commission µ5HSRUW RI WKH 6WXG\ *URXS RI WKH ,QWHUQDWLRQDO /DZ
Commission finalisHG E\ 0 .RVNHQQLHPL¶  0D\-9 June and 3 July-11 August 2006) UN 
Doc A/CN.4/L.682, [24]-[25] (ILC Final Rep.); J. Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public 
International Law (Cambridge University Press, New York, 2008) 184-0LODQRYLüQRWH
2), 73. 
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6.2 The practice of the Court to accommodate the restrictive impact of 
public international law within the ECHR   
 
6.2.1 The practice of the Court not to acknowledge a possible conflict 
between the ECHR and an external public international law norm  
The Soering v. United Kingdom case5 serves as one of the earliest 
H[DPSOHVLQWKH&RXUW¶V MXULVSUXGHQFHRIDSRVVLEOHFRQIOLFWEHWZHHQD(&+5
right and the binding provision of another treaty on a member State. Soering 
complained that if extradited to the United States he would be subjected to the 
death-row phenomenon in violation of the prohibition of inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment under Article 3 ECHR. The UK denied that the 
extradition would engage its responsibility. If this approach were followed, the 
UK argued, it would cause interference with its treaty obligations under the 
USA-UK Extradition Treaty, leading to a possible conflict of norms.6  
The Court famously acknowledged the non-refoulement principle under 
Article 3 ECHR7 and proclaimed that the extradition by a Contracting State 
PD\ JLYH ULVH WR DQ LVVXH XQGHU $UWLFOH  (&+5 7KH PHPEHU 6WDWH¶V
responsibility under the ECHR could be engaged, where substantial grounds 
are shown for believing that the person concerned, if extradited, faces a real 
risk of being subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment in the requesting country. Assessing the facts of the case, it 
concluded that if the decision to extradite Soering in the USA were to be 
implemented, the United Kingdom would breach Article 3 ECHR.    
                                                             
5
 Soering v. United Kingdom, 7 July 1989 (Plenary). 
6
 Ibid, [83]. 
7
 Ibid, [86], [88], [90]. 
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What was left unsaid, however, is that if the UK was not in a position to 
honour its treaty obligation to extradite Soering, this may have involved a 
possible conflict of treaty obligations. Yet, in the said circumstances, a real 
conflict was rather remote since under the terms of the bilateral extradition 
treaty, the Secretary of the State enjoyed the discretion not to sign the arrest 
warrant.8 What is important for the present purposes, however, is that the Court 
neither framed the question before it as a possible conflict, nor replied to the 
UHVSRQGHQW6WDWH¶VFRQFHUQV,WFRQVLGHUHG LWVXIILFLHQW WRDSSO\WKHWHVWRI WKH
non-refoulement principle and to assert that member States retain their liability 
XQGHUWKH(&+57KH6WDWHV¶OHJLWLPDWHLQWHUHVWVLQWKHH[WUDGLWLRQSURFHVVIRU
preventing fugitive offenders from evading justice were not completely 
ignored. Their relevance and importance were acknowledged in passing,9 but 
the extradition treaty per se was not treated as possibly conflicting with the 
application of the ECHR. 
It could be argued that the Court did not entertain the possibility of a 
conflict due to the absolute prohibition of Article 3 ECHR which provides for 
no limitation clause. In this sense, the Court is precluded from taking 
cognisance of relevant treaty obligations which would restrict the scope of 
Article 3 ECHR. Such an argument is reasonable, but it does not sufficiently 
explain a series of other cases in which the Court did not acknowledge similar 
treaty engagements as a potential restriction to qualified rights under the 
ECHR.  
                                                             
8
 & :DUEULFN µ&RKHUHQFH DQG WKH (XURSHDQ &RXUW RI +XPDQ 5LJKWV 7KH $GMXGLFDWLYH
Background to the Soering &DVH¶-1990) 11 Michigan JIL 1073, 1093.     
9
 Soering (Pl), [86]. 
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By way of example, in the Kaboulov and Soldatenko cases10 the 
applicants were held in detention in Ukraine in order to be extradited to 
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan respectively, by virtue of the 1993 
Commonwealth of Independent States Convention on Legal Assistance and 
Legal Relations in Civil, Family and Criminal Matters (Minsk Convention). 
They maintained before the Court that their detention was not in conformity 
with the requirements under Article 5 (1)(f) ECHR.11 In both cases the Court 
did not address the question of a possible conflict between Article 5 ECHR and 
the Minsk Convention. It reviewed and subjected the lack of safeguards under 
the Minsk Convention against the standards of its case law. The ECtHR did not 
hesitate to hold that the Minsk Convention did not provide for a specific 
procedure to be followed in the requested State, and thus, it did not offer 
adequate safeguards against arbitrariness, in breach of Article 5 (1)(f) ECHR.12 
Therefore, any possible conflict between the ECHR and treaty obligations 
binding on the respondent State is transformed before and by the Court into a 
review of a given extradition treaty against the safeguards of the ECHR.  
The practice not to address possible conflicts laid the basis for the view 
that the Court perceives the ECHR as superior to other treaty obligations of 
member States. It has been suggested that the ECHR has the potential to trump 
                                                             
10
 Kaboulov v. Ukraine, 19 November 2009. The request for referral to the Grand Chamber was 
dismissed. Soldatenko v. Ukraine, 23 October 2008. 
11
 µ(YHU\RQHKDV WKHULJKW WR OLEHUW\DQGVHFXULW\ RISHUVRQ1R RQHVKDOOEHGHSULYHGRIKLV
libert\VDYHLQWKHIROORZLQJFDVHVDQGLQDFFRUGDQFHZLWKDSURFHGXUHSUHVFULEHGE\ODZ>«@
(f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into 
the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or 
H[WUDGLWLRQ¶ 
12
 Kaboulov, [136]; Soldatenko, [112]. Shamayev and others v. Georgia and Russia, 12 April 
2005, [337]. ,=LHPHOHµ&DVH-Law of the European Court of Human Rights and Integrity of 
,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ¶LQ5+9LQDL[D.. Wellens (dir.), /¶,QIOXHQFHGHV6RXUFHVVXUO¶8QLWpHW
la Fragmentation du Droit International (Bruylant, Bruxelles, 2006) 187, 205; (GH:HWµ7KH
5ROH RI (XURSHDQ &RXUWV LQ 5HYLHZLQJ &RQIOLFWLQJ 2EOLJDWLRQV XQGHU ,QWHUQDWLRQDO /DZ¶
(2008) 5 Intl OrgLRev 359, 360.   
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any other treaty obligation13 HLWKHU GXH WR WKH (&+5¶V UHJLRQDO SXEOLF RUGHU
character or due to the allegedly higher status of human rights norms over other 
international treaty undertakings.14 Certain recent jurisprudential developments 
have retrospectively strengthened this hierarchical perception of the ECHR. 
The Grand Chamber in Mamatkulov and Askarov referred in passing to the 
Soering FDVH DQG VWDWHG WKDW LQ WKDW LQVWDQFH WKH &RXUW µUHVROYHG WKH conflict 
[between the ECHR and the bilateral extradition treaty] by giving precedence 
WR WKH IRUPHU¶15. In the Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi case, whereas the Court 
reiterated its standard position, regarding the fact that States retain their 
responsibility under the ECHR even if they engage in other anterior or 
posterior treaty obligations, it mentioned Soering as an example where Article 
ZDVµKHOGWRoverride¶16 the bilateral extradition treaty between the USA and 
WKH 8. 7KHVH SURQRXQFHPHQWV DSSHDU WR EH DW RGGV ZLWK WKH &RXUW¶V
jurisprudence. It should be noted that they were obiter dicta, since the Court 
was reiterating its previous case law without overruling or bypassing the 
Soering approach. Hence, it is suggested that the choice of the wording was 
rather unfortunate.  
There is one case, however, the Al-Jedda case,17 in which the ECtHR, 
for the first time, openly addressed the possibility of a conflict between the 
                                                             
13
 M. Forowicz, The Reception of International Law in the European Court of Human Rights 
(Oxford University Press, New York, 2010) 388- ( GH :HW µ7KH (PHUJHQFH RI
International and Regional Value Systems as a Manifestation of the Emerging International 
&RQVWLWXWLRQDO 2UGHU¶   LJIL 611. Cf % &RQIRUWL µ&RQVLVWHQF\ DPRQJ 7UHDW\
2EOLJDWLRQV¶ LQ ( &DQQL]]DUR HG The Law of Treaties Beyond the Vienna Convention 
(Oxford University Press, New York 2011) 187, 189. 
14
 J. Dugard, C9DQGHQ:\QJDHUWµ5HFRQFLOLQJ([WUDGLWLRQZLWK+XPDQ5LJKWV¶
AJIL 187. 
15
 Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, 4 February 2005, (Grand Chamber), [107] (emphases 
added).   
16
 Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. United Kingdom, 2 March 2010, [128]. 
17
 Al-Jedda v United Kingdom, 7 July 2011, (Grand Chamber). 
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ECHR and another PIL norm. The applicant complained that he was held in 
preventive detention (internment) without trial and judicial guarantees by 
British armed forces in Iraq in violation of Article 5 (1) ECHR. Having 
established that the applicant fell within the jurisdiction of the respondent 
State, the Court proceeded to examine the merits of the complaint. The UK 
argued that it was under the obligation by virtue of the United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC) authorisation to take all necessary measures to restore and 
maintain international peace and security in Iraq. Since member States were, 
according to Article 25 UN Charter, obliged to accept and carry out decisions 
of the Security Council and since Article 103 UN Charter indicates that 
obligations under Article 25 have to prevail over other international treaties,18 
the application of Article 5 ECHR was displaced. The Grand Chamber did not 
share this position. It found that the internment or preventive detention was not 
D ODZIXOUHDVRQ IRU WKHDSSOLFDQW¶VGHWHQWLRQDFFRUGLQJWRWKHUHTXLUHPHQWVRI
Article 5 ECHR. The Court, by way of reading the ECHR in light of PIL 
norms, proceeded to examine whether or not PIL provided a legal basis for the 
DSSOLFDQW¶VSUHYHQWLYHGHWHQWLRQ19  
7KH &RXUW¶V VWDUWLQJ SRLQW ZDV WKDW IRU $UWLFOH  81 &KDUWHU WR EH
applicable a conflict PXVW H[LVW EHWZHHQ $UWLFOH  (&+5 DQG 6WDWHV¶
obligations under the UN Charter. Hence, it had to examine if the UK was, in 
fact, under the obligation to hold the applicant in internment on the basis of the 
UNSC Resolutions. Although the Court admitted that it is not its role to seek 
the authoritative meaning of other international instruments, it maintained that 
                                                             
18
 $UWLFOH81&KDUWHUSURYLGHVWKDWµ>L@n the event of a conflict between the obligations of 
the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any 
other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail¶. 
19
 Al-Jedda (GC), [76], [105]. 
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it was indispensable to examine whether the UN Charter and the UNSC 
5HVROXWLRQVSURYLGHGDSODXVLEOHEDVLVIRUWKH8.¶VDFWLRQV7KH&RXUWUHDGWKH
UNSC Resolution by relying on the Advisory Opinion of the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Namibia case, which stated that a UNSC 
Resolution should be interpreted by considering not only its language but also 
the context in which it was adopted.20 Crucially, the Court included in the 
notion of context the purposes of the UN Charter (Article 1). It asserted that the 
UNSC Resolution 1456 should be read not only in light of maintaining 
international peace and security, but also in light of the aim of promoting 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. The Court concluded, that, 
unless the text of the UNSC Resolution does not clearly provide otherwise,21 a 
presumption should be established in that the UNSC does not intend to impose 
an obligation on States to breach human rights. In light of the facts of the case 
and the language of UNSC Resolution 1456, the Grand Chamber found that the 
Resolution did not impose an obligation on the UK to detain the applicant, but 
rather gave States a choice of means. Thus, Article 103 UN Charter was not 
applicable and no conflict arose. The United Kingdom was found in breach of 
its obligations under Article 5 ECHR.  
The Grand Chamber in Al-Jedda reads the notion of conflict as 
restrictively as possible. It asserted that when the State has a choice of means 
rather an obligation, the possibility of a conflict with the ECHR is ruled out. 
Such a narrow definition of conflict was crucial in finding that Article 103 UN 
Charter did not come into play and no conflict existed in the first place. This 
                                                             
20
 Ibid, [76], [101]-[102]. 
21
 Cf. partially dissenting Opinion of Judge Poalelungi in Al-Jedda (GC), 66-67. 
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QDUURZGHILQLWLRQRIFRQIOLFWLVQRWVXUSULVLQJLQOLJKWRIWKH&RXUW¶VSUDFWice of 
avoiding, as much as possible, a conflict between the ECHR and other PIL 
QRUPV 7KHUHIRUH LQ FRQWUDVW WR WKH ,/& DQG LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ VFKRODUV¶
arguments, the Court does not endorse the possibility of a conflict between a 
provision of the ECHR and a permissive PIL norm.22  
Besides this narrow definition, a possible conflict was avoided to a 
great extent due to the presumption inferred by the ECtHR, namely that - 
unless clearly stated - the UNSC does not impose an obligation on States to 
breach human rights. This strong presumption is a ground-breaking 
pronouncement by an international court.23 ,W LV WKH (&W+5¶V RULJLQDO
contribution to develop PIL in this area. It paves the way for securing 
compliance of the Security Council to human rights.24 According to the Court, 
if a breach of human rights is intended, it would have to be clear in the plain 
wording of a UNSC Resolution. This is one of the rare instances in which the 
Court takes up the task of ascertaining the authoritative meaning of another PIL 
norm, and especially of the UN Charter and Resolutions of the Security 
Council.25 Such a task was even more difficult, since little authority exists 
insofar the interpretation of UNSC Resolutions is concerned.26 
The Al-Jedda is a judgment in which the ECtHR appears confident to 
engage with general international law. It supports the argument of this thesis 
that regional and/or speciliased courts have the authority to pronounce on 
                                                             
22
 Ibid and authorities infra footnote 2. Also Dissenting Opinion of Judges Caflisch, Cabral 
%DUUHWRDQG9DMLüLQ McElhinney v. Ireland, 21 November 2001, (Grand Chamber), 20. 
23
 0& :RRG µ7KH ,QWHUSUHWDWLRQ RI 6HFXULW\ &RXQFLO 5HVROXWLRQV¶   Max Planck 
YbkUNL 73, 92-93. 
24
 1':KLWHµ816DQFWLRQV:KHUH3XEOLF/DZ0HHWV3XEOLF,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ¶
MLR 456, 466-469. 
25
 Cf. infra 8.8. 
26
 Wood, (note 23), 75, 86; A. Orakhelashvili, The Interpretation of Acts and Rules in Public 
International Law (Oxford University Press, New York, 2008) 486-493. 
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general international law and that, when they do, they benefit its progressive 
development. Chapter 5 highlighted that the Court discussed general 
international law (rule on State immunity) with great hesitance and that this 
was one of the reasons which led to a poor reasoning. On other occasions, the 
&RXUW¶VUHFRXUVHWRJHQHUDOLQWHUQDWional law had serious misgivings, such as in 
the case of the concept of jurisdiction (Chapter 3). The Al-Jedda case, 
however, is closer to the %LMHOLü case in which the Court took a stand and 
developed PIL with regard to State succession in the law of treaties.27 Yet, the 
Al-Jedda LV D EHWWHU MXGJPHQW LQ WKH VHQVH WKDW WKH *UDQG &KDPEHU¶V
discussion is detailed and the reasoning is persuasive. It is a well-balanced 
judgment too, in that the Court takes a stand on the relevant questions before it, 
without unnecessarily articulating on peripheral and seriously contested issues, 
such as the disputed effects of Article 103 UN Charter (if it were to be 
applied); or on giving a definite answer as to whether the UNSC Resolutions 
are covered by the scope of Article 103 UN Charter.28 Lastly, Al-Jedda is a 
very good example of placing the ECHR within the corpus of PIL. On one 
hand, the Court investigated whether the UNSC Resolutions could provide for 
D SODXVLEOH EDVLV IRU WKH DSSOLFDQW¶V SUHYHQWLYH GHWHQWLRQ DQG LW DFFHpted the 
relevance of Article 103 UN Charter. On the other hand, the Grand Chamber 
SUHVHUYHG WKH HIIHFWLYHQHVV RI WKH (&+5¶V JXDUDQWHHV +HQFH WKH Al-Jedda 
case illustrates how the Court in casu balances the unity of PIL with the 
effective application of the ECHR. 
                                                             
27
 Infra 3.3. 
28
 0 0LODQRYLü µAl-Skeini and Al-Jedda LQ 6WUDVERXUJ¶   EJIL 121, 138; R. 
%HUQKDUGW µ$UWLFOH ¶ LQ % 6LPPD et al (eds.), The Charter of the United Nations ± A 
Commentary, vol. II (Oxford University Press, New York, 2002) 1292, 1295-1296. 
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1RQHWKHOHVV RQH VKRXOG QRW ORVH VLJKW RI WKH IDFW WKDW WKH &RXUW¶V
general practice, as discussed in Soering and as it will be explored in this 
Chapter, is not to acknowledge a possible conflict of norms.29 Al-Jedda is an 
exceptional instance because it involved the possible applicability of Article 
103 UN Charter, which is the only treaty provision of its kind, claiming, under 
certain conditions, primacy over any other treaty obligations of UN member 
States, in order to serve the UN aims and purposes.30 Yet, Al-Jedda is also in 
the same line with the prevalent tendency in the case-law, in that the Court 
follows, to the extent possible, a conflict-avoidance practice through 
LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ 7KH &RXUW¶V SULQFLSDO WKHVLV ZKLFK TXDOLILHV DV D FRQVWDQW
reminder to member States, is that they cannot be absolved from their 
responsibility under the ECHR on the pretext of any other international 
obligations they have undertaken. Such a position does not relate to a 
hierarchical perception and the Court does not address the cases brought before 
it in terms of primacy or hierarchy of the ECHR. This position is akin to the 
&RXUW¶VUHVWULFWHGMXULVGLFWLRQWRLQWHUSUHWDQGDSSO\WKH(&+5WRZKLFKLWRZHV
its existence (Articles 19 and 32 ECHR).31 To put it otherwise, before the 
ECtHR, there is no conflict to begin with. For a conflict to exist between the 
ECHR and another PIL norm the two norms should have an equal standing 
before the Court. In order to acknowledge, and all the more resolve, a conflict 
the Court must be in a position to apply both norms. However, the Court does 
not have the competence to apply other PIL norms. It is incumbent to ensure 
                                                             
29
 J. Klabbers, Treaty Conflict and the European Union (Cambridge University Press, New 
York, 2009) 104, footnote 67. 
30
 ILC Final Rep., [328]-[360]. 
31
 Dugard, Van den Wyngaert, (note 14), 195. 
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the observance of the engagements undertaken under the ECHR.32 This is the 
consequence of the fact that international courts and tribunals are treaty 
creatures with a specific applicable law before them. As Chapter 2 argued, 
these considerations are equally applicable to all international courts and 
tribunals, including the ICJ (subject, of course, to the precise terms of a case 
EURXJKWEHIRUHLWE\WKHSDUWLHV$OWKRXJKWKH,/&¶VSRVLWLRQLVQRWYHU\FOHDU
on this, it does stress the limitations to the jurisdiction of international courts.33 
Therefore, the ECtHR is confined to apply only the ECHR, even if it is obvious 
that a possible or real conflict between the ECHR and another treaty provision 
(or PIL norm) exists. In this sense, the Court due to its restricted treaty-based 
competence decides a given case from its own particular perspective. The 
conflict remains from another perspective.34 If, for example, the same set of 
facts were to be decided by another international court they would most likely 
lead to a different solution given that this court would have to apply its own 
constitutive instrument.35 
On the other hand, however, it is not correct either to say that the Court 
displaces other obligations of member States,36 or that it ignores the 
international law context to the cases.37 The Soering, Shamayev, Kaboulov, 
Soldatenko and Al-Jedda cases and the cases that follow demonstrate that the 
                                                             
32
 Jenks, (note 1), 447-448.  
33
 ILC Final Rep., [43]. 
34
 I. van Damme, Treaty Interpretation by the WTO Appellate Body (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2009) 18. 
35
 -3DXZHO\Q/(6DOOHVµ)RUXP6KRSSLQJ%HIRUH,QWHUQDWLRQDO7ULEXQDOV5HDO&RQFHUQV
,P3RVVLEOH6ROXWLRQV¶Cornell Intl LJ 77, 84; R. Michaels, J3DXZHO\Qµ&RQIOLFW
of Norms or Conflict of Laws?: Different Techniques in the Fragmentation of International 
/DZ¶ LQ T. Broude, Y. Shany (eds.), Multi-Sourced Equivalent Norms in International Law 
(Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2011) 19, 36-37. 
36
 P. LangforGµ([WUDGLWLRQDQG)XQGDPHQWDO5LJKWVWKH3HUVSHFWLYHRIWKH(XURSHDQ&RXUWRI
+XPDQ5LJKWV¶IJHR 512, 513. 
37
 Klabbers, (note 29), 5. 
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Court not only does not ignore other PIL norms, but it takes account of them. It 
attempts to avoid a possible conflict by introducing and accommodating the 
PIL norms in its legal reasoning and by placing them within the structure of the 
ECHR provisions (mostly limitation clauses). Hence, to use the metaphor 
employed in Chapter 2, if the ECHR were a planet, despite of its specific 
worldview, is not isolated from the universe and the other planets.  
 
 
6.2.2 Avoiding possible conflicts between the ECHR and an external 
public international law norm through interpretation  
The practice of the Court to avoid possible conflicts through 
interpretation becomes clearer in Jersild v. Denmark,38 which involved a 
possible conflict between the right to freedom of expression under the ECHR 
and Article 4 of the United Nations International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD).39 The applicant 
was a journalist employed by the Danish Broadcasting Corporation. When he 
presented a television programme, during which members of a racist group 
made abusive and derogatory remarks against immigrants and ethnic groups in 
Denmark, he was criminally charged, and finally convicted, for aiding and 
abetting these derogatory comments before the national courts. He resorted to 
the ECtHR complaining of a breach of his right to freedom of expression and 
to disseminate information under Article 10 ECHR. 
                                                             
38
 Jersild v. Denmark, 23 September 1994, (Grand Chamber). 
39
 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (adopted 
and opened for signature and ratification by the GA Res. 2106 (XX) on 21 December 1965; 
entered into force on 4 January 1969) 66 UNTS 195. 
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'HQPDUNDUJXHGEHIRUHWKH&RXUWWKDWµ$UWLFOH(&+5VKRXOGQRWEH
interpreted in such a way as to limit, derogate or destroy the right to protection 
DJDLQVW UDFLDO GLVFULPLQDWLRQ¶40 It made extensive reference to its obligations 
under Article 4 CERD including the duty to criminalise practices concerning 
the dissemination of racist ideas. The applicant, on the other hand, asserted that 
DFFRUGLQJWRWKHµGXHUHJDUG¶FODXVH LQ$UWLFOH&(5''HQPDUN¶VREOLJDWLRQ
to criminalise such practices was subject to guaranteeing his freedom of 
H[SUHVVLRQVLQFHµ6WDWHV3DUWLHV«XQGHUWDNHWRDGRSWLPPHGLDWHDnd positive 
measures designed to eradicate all incitement to, or acts of, such discrimination 
 ZLWK GXH UHJDUG WR¶ WKH IUHHGRP RI RSLQLRQ DQG H[SUHVVLRQ The Court, 
KRZHYHU GLG QRW FRQVLGHU LWVHOI FRPSHWHQW WR LQWHUSUHW WKLV µGXH UHJDUG¶
clause.41  
The Court acknowledged the significance of combating racial 
discrimination and accepted that the object and purpose of the CERD are 
ZHLJKW\ IDFWRUV LQ DVFHUWDLQLQJ ZKHWKHU WKH DSSOLFDQW¶V FRQYLFWLRQ ZDV D
necessary interference within the meaning of Article 10 (2) ECHR. In this way, 
the importance of combating racial discrimination qualifies as a legitimate aim 
under the ECHR and it is placed within the structure (limitation clause) of 
$UWLFOH(&+57KH&RXUWIXUWKHUVWDWHGWKDWµ'HQPDUN¶VREOLJDWLRQVXQGHU
Article 10 must be interpreted, to the extent possible, so as to be reconcilable 
ZLWK LWV REOLJDWLRQV XQGHU WKH 81 &RQYHQWLRQ¶42 Thus, the Court follows a 
conflict avoidance practice through interpretation attempting to read the ECHR 
together with the obligations undertaken by State parties by virtue of the 
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CERD.43 The interpretive impact inferred from the CERD provisions was 
restrictive for the construction of Article 10 ECHR, although Judges Garlcüklü, 
Russo and Valticos in their Joint Dissenting Opinion posited that the majority 
should had inferred a greater (more restrictive) impact from the prohibition of 
GHIHQGLQJUDFLDOKDWUHGRQWKHVFRSHRIWKHDSSOLFDQW¶VIUHHGRPRIH[SUHVVLRQ44 
This highlights how difficult it is to reach an agreement on precisely what 
impact should be inferred from an extraneous PIL norm on the construction of 
the ECHR in the interpretation process.  
A last point concerns the (non) implication of Article 4 CERD in the 
&RXUW¶V OHJDO UHDVRQLQJ 7KH &RXUW UHIXVHG WR HQJDJH ZLWK $UWLFOe 4 CERD, 
which invites States parties to give effect to their obligation under the CERD to 
criminalise certain prohibited practices by paying due regard to the protection 
RIWKHIUHHGRPRIH[SUHVVLRQ6XFKDUHIXVDOLVMXVWLILHGJLYHQWKH&RXUW¶VODFN
of competence to provide for an authoritative interpretation of a provision of 
another treaty. Nevertheless, the Court uses CERD provisions for construing 
(and restricting) the scope of the right to expression under the ECHR. Treating 
the said CERD provisions in a compartmentalised fashion without placing 
them within their own treaty context may enhance instances of selectiveness 
and misguided readings of the CERD.       
On the other hand, if the ECtHR were to engage with the CERD due 
regard clause, the latter would have a dubious legal relevance before it. Despite 
the fact that commentators have stressed that compatibility clauses, such as 
Article 4 CERD, have a crucial role to play in precluding the possibility of a 
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conflict between different rights and treaties, it seems that judicial practice 
witnesses their limited usefulness. This is the case when the wording and remit 
of such clauses is unclear with respect to avoiding conflicts, which is also the 
case with Article 4 CERD.45 All the more, in the present context, it becomes 
clear that the CERD as a treaty and the compatibility clause contained therein 
indicate a certain structure and balance of interests different to those of the 
ECHR. According to the CERD clause, the duty to criminalise certain practices 
should be interpreted by giving due regard to the right of expression. For the 
ECHR the right to expression is the main protected interest which may be 
restricted under certain conditions. Hence, the two treaties ± CERD and ECHR 
± prioritise different rights and interests. In practice, this means that the 
interpreter adopts different starting points in the interpretation process 
depending on the instrument that he engages with, which in turn marks a great 
difference concerning the scope of protection afforded to each right and the 
extent to which exceptions may be accommodated. In this sense, it is hard to 
see how the Court could employ the clause in its reasoning without upsetting 
the established priorities, protected interests and structure of the ECHR. What 
is notable is that the Court, despite the absence of a similar clause in the 
ECHR, through its interpretive practice accommodates PIL norms, hence, 
contributing to a minimum of consistency of international standards.  
` However, the Court does not pursue the same approach and legal 
reasoning in all cases concerning racial discrimination. In subsequent 
judgments with respect to various aspects of racial hatred, in which the CERD 
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 &-%RUJHQµ5HVROYLQJ7UHDW\&RQIOLFWV¶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should come into play, the Court did not take it into account.46 This raises the 
question of selectiveness, namely why the Court acknowledges that certain 
extraneous international norms are relevant for the construction of the ECHR 
but only in certain instances. It also gives rise to lack of legal certainty and 
unequal treatment of similar situations before the Court, especially since the 
CERD may advance an instrumental impact on the interpretation of Article 10 
ECHR.   
 
 
6.3 Accommodating the restrictive impact of public international law 
norms when they reflect unique historical circumstances or the 
interests of restoration and maintenance of international peace and 
security 
This thesis argues that the Court has a practice of giving special 
consideration and attaching a heavy weight on PIL norms due to their specific 
aims and functions in PIL. In the Prince Hans-Adam case47 the Prince of 
Liechtenstein lodged an application before the European Court alleging inter 
alia a violation of his right to access to justice under Article 6 ECHR. The case 
concerned the post-Second World War confiscation of property of German 
nationals in Czechoslovakia. In 1946 the former Czechoslovakia confiscated 
WKHSURSHUW\RIWKHDSSOLFDQW¶VIDWKHU LQFOXGLQJDSDLQWLQJE\LPSOHPHQWLQJD
series of Presidential Decrees on the confiscation and accelerated allocation of 
agricultural property of German and Hungarian persons, and of those having 
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committed treason and acted as enemies of the Czech and Slovak people. In the 
past, the applicant had unsuccessfully attempted to regain the aforementioned 
painting before the Hungarian courts. When the painting was found on German 
territory, he instituted proceedings before German courts asking for its return. 
The German courts declined his case for adjudication due to Article 3 of the 
1952 Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising out of the War and 
Occupation (Settlement Convention) which excluded their jurisdiction. Before 
the ECtHR he argued that the application of the Settlement Convention 
impaired the essence of his right to access to courts. He also argued that the 
Settlement Convention was not applicable to the circumstances in the first 
place, and that, therefore, the German courts should have entertained 
jurisdiction to hear his case.  
With respect to the applicability and interpretation of the Settlement 
Convention, the Court reiterated that it has no power to review the national 
FRXUWV¶MXGJPHQWVLQVRIDUDVWKH\DUHQRWDUELWUDU\RUPDQLIHVWO\HUURQHRXV,WV
role is rather confined to review the compatibility of the implementation - or in 
WKH&RXUW¶VRZQZRUGVµWKHHIIHFWVRIVXFKDQLQWHUSUHWDWLRQ¶48 - to the ECHR. 
Turning to the merits of the complaint, it recalled that a limitation to the right 
to access to justice should not impair its very essence and that States cannot be 
absolved from their responsibility under the ECHR on the pretext of other 
treaty commitments.49 On the facts the Court found that the limitations 
LPSRVHG RQ WKH MXULVGLFWLRQ RI *HUPDQ FRXUWV DQG KHQFH RQ WKH DSSOLFDQW¶V
right to access to justice had a legitimate objective and were not 
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disproportionate because of the unique historical circumstances which led to 
the conclusion of the Settlement Agreement and the sui generis international 
status of Germany after the Second World War.50   
The striking feature of Prince Hans-Adam is that the Grand Chamber 
unanimously found no breach of Article 6 ECHR, although there were no 
DOWHUQDWLYH PHDQV IRU SURWHFWLQJ HIIHFWLYHO\ WKH DSSOLFDQW¶V ULJKW WR DFFHVV D
court. The importance of the German courts giving effect to the Settlement 
Convention played an instrumental role in assessing the proportionality of the 
restriction. The Court attached significant weight to the Settlement Convention 
due to the fact that it reflected unique historical circumstances and the special 
status of the Federal Republic of Germany in PIL. 
Nevertheless, the Court, in effect, set aside the guarantees under the 
ECHR giving a solution to a real conflict since no conflict avoidance 
interpretation could reconcile Article 6 ECHR with the Settlement Convention. 
This resulted in an infringement of the essence of the right to a fair trial51 and 
upsetting the structure and specificity of the ECHR. It is an example of the fact 
that interpretation cannot make a treaty conflict disappear. The only similar 
LQVWDQFHIURPWKH&RXUW¶V MXULVSUXGHQFe is the State immunity related cases in 
Chapter 5. As it was argued in Chapter 5, the Court should not have derived 
such a great restrictive impact on the ECHR by way of diminishing the core of 
the right to access a court. Reading the ECHR in harmony with other PIL 
norms should take place to the extent possible. The alleged unity of PIL may 
not set aside the applicable law before the Court, when real conflicts cannot be 
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avoided. Chapter 5 argued, in detail, that, in such instances, the Court should 
balance better the application of the interpretative principle of taking PIL 
norms into account with the principle of effectiveness.    
Another pertinent example is the Slivenko v. Latvia case52 the 
applicants were the family members of a former Soviet army officer. He and 
his family were stationed to Latvia until the conclusion of his time in service 
and continued residing there until they were deported, after Latvia regained 
independence. Their legal status and their residence rights were determined 
according to /DWYLD¶V GRPHVWLF ODZ DQG WZR ELODWHUDO WUHDWLHV WKDW /DWYLD KDG
VLJQHGZLWK5XVVLD7KH ILUVWDSSOLFDQWZDV WKHRIILFHU¶VZLIHDQG WKH VHFRQG
applicant was their daughter who was born in Latvia. Among other things, the 
two applicants complained that their deportation from Latvia violated their 
right to family life under Article 8 ECHR. They submitted that their 
deportations were required neither by Latvian law nor by the Latvian-Russian 
treaty on the withdrawal of Russian troops and that the impugned measures did 
not serve any legitimate aim and were unnecessary in a democratic society.53   
The Latvian-Russian treaty concerned the withdrawal of the ex-
USSR/Russian troops from the Latvian territory and provided that all members 
of the armed forces of the Russian Federation and the members of their family 
should leave the territory of the Republic of Latvia by the 31st of August 1994 
(Article 2). At the same time, Latvia resumed the obligation to guarantee the 
rights and freedoms of Russian Federation military troops affected by the 
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withdrawal, and also of their families, in accordance with the legislation of the 
Republic of Latvia and principles of international law (Article 9). 
The second agreement signed between Latvia and Russia concerned the 
social protection of retired members of the Russian Federation armed forces 
and their families residing within the territory of Latvia. This treaty was 
principally applicable to individuals discharged from the Soviet armed forces 
before Latvia regained its independence and permanent residents therein. It 
stipulated that, if they so desired, they could retain their rights to reside without 
hindrance in the territory of Latvia. The two States undertook the obligation to 
issue specific lists and that the individuals concerned should follow the 
administrative procedures stipulated therein. Hence, on the basis of the two 
bilateral treaties members of the Soviet armed forces who had retired before 
/DWYLD¶VLQGHSHQGHQFHDQGWKHLUIDPLOLHVFRXOGLQSULQFLSOHREWDLQDUHVLGHQFH
permit in Latvia and avoid the deportation.  
The Latvian Government denied that there was an interference with the 
right to family life and, in the alternative, that such interference was compatible 
with domestic law and the Latvian-Russian treaties. The Court permitted a 
third party intervention by the Russian Government. Russia argued, in contrast, 
that the removal of the bilateral treaty did not require the removal of the 
applicants, since the latter was not applicable to the circumstances at hand. It 
was submitted that the interpretation of the treaty employed by the Latvian 
courts was incorrect.  
The Court reiterated that it is not its task to settle a dispute between the 
parties as to the applicability or the correct interpretation of the Russian-
Latvian bilateral treaty, but to review whether the reasoning of the national 
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courts is compatible with the guarantees under the ECHR.54 In light of the facts 
it assessed that the deportation of the applicants had a sound legal basis: the 
bilateral treaty was accessible and foreseeable by the applicants and the 
/DWYLDQFRXUWV¶GHFLVLRQGLGQRWDSSHDUWREHDUELWUDU\7KHLUUHPRYDOVHUYHGD
OHJLWLPDWH DLP XQGHU WKH (&+5 QDPHO\ WKH SURWHFWLRQ RI /DWYLD¶V VHFXULW\¶V
LQWHUHVWV JLYHQ WKH µZLGHU FRQWH[W RI WKH FRQVWLWXtional and international law 
DUUDQJHPHQWVDIWHU/DWYLD¶VLQGHSHQGHQFH¶55 However, the deportation did not 
PHHW WKH &RXUW¶V QHFHVVLW\ WHVW 7KH IDFW WKDW WKH /DWYLDQ DXWKRULWLHV DSSOLHG
and executed the general scheme, envisaged under the Latvian-Russian treaty, 
without examining the necessity of the deportation for each individual case 
exceeded their margin of appreciation under Article 8 ECHR.56  
6L[-XGJHVVWURQJO\GLVVHQWHGWRWKHPDMRULW\¶VSRVLWLRQ57 In their view, 
the specific historical context of LatYLD¶VLQGHSHQGHQFHDQGWKHDLPSXUVXHGE\
the bilateral treaty, namely the eradication of the consequences of the Soviet 
rule of Latvia were not sufficiently appreciated by the majority. They stressed 
that Article 8 ECHR should not be construed in such a way as to demand a 
detailed evaluation in each individual case, since general schemes relating to 
WKH ZLWKGUDZDO RI D 6WDWH¶V DUPHG IRUFHV IURP DQRWKHU 6WDWH¶V WHUULWRU\ E\
nature cannot easily accommodate procedures of an individual character. Such 
an inteUSUHWDWLRQRI$UWLFOHµZRXOGXQGHUPLQHWKHHIIHFWLYHLPSOHPHQWDWLRQRI
WKH>ELODWHUDO@WUHDW\¶58  
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The onus of the disagreement is WR ZKDW H[WHQW WKH &RXUW¶V OHJDO
reasoning and the ECHR construction should be receptive to accommodating 
the restrictive impact of the bilateral agreement. The majority gave priority to 
SUHVHUYLQJ WKH HIIHFWLYH SURWHFWLRQ RI WKH DSSOLFDQW¶V ULJKWV RYHU /DWYLD¶V
possibly conflicting obligations. In contrast, the minority considered that it was 
the effective application of the bilateral arrangements that should not be 
undermined.59 Although a real conflict between the ECHR and the bilateral 
arrangements was unlikely, since it appears to have been a matter of how the 
said agreements were given effect in Latvian law, the minority covered this 
point too. It was stressed that in any case it would be difficult the bilateral 
treaty to provide for detailed individual considerations when applying a general 
VFKHPH FRQFHUQLQJ WKH ZLWKGUDZDO RI RQH 6WDWH¶V DUPHG IRUFHV IURP WKH
territory of another one. Hence, in their view, the effective implementation of 
the bilateral agreements should have been prioritised and accommodated under 
$UWLFOH(&+5WRWKHGHWULPHQWRI WKHHIIHFWLYHSURWHFWLRQRI WKHDSSOLFDQW¶V
rights.       
In both the Prince Hans-Adam and Slivenko cases the Court attaches a 
heavy weight on the extraneous treaties due to their specific aim and function 
in PIL. This in turn advances a strong impact first on the construction of the 
protective scope of the ECHR, and secondly on the assessment of the 
proportionality test and whether or not the State has exceeded its margin of 
appreciation. The final outcome of these cases was different, leaving a wide 
discretion to Germany in Prince Hans-Adam. A reason for this could be the 
prevailing factual circumstances which are intrinsic to the appreciation of each 
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application before the Court. It may also have mattered that, in Slivenko, the 
restrictive effect of the external rules had to be accommodated and assessed 
under the specifically prescULEHGµQDWLRQDOLQWHUHVWV¶H[FHSWLRQRI$UWLFOH
whereas in Prince Hans-Adam the right to access to justice is an implied right 
under Article 6 ECHR and may be more receptive toward stricter limitations.60 
7KH &RXUW¶V LQFOLQDWLRQ WR GLVWLQJXLVK WKH GLfferent extents to which it will 
accommodate the restrictive impact of other PIL norms on the basis of the 
purpose served by these norms is further evidenced by way of contrasting 
Slivenko to other cases related to deportation. In the Saadi case the respondent 
State similarly to Slivenko invoked its interest in effectively applying the 
cooperation agreement on crime prevention between Italy and Tunisia.61 The 
Grand Chamber neither addressed the concern in this instance nor the 
relevance of the said agreement when interpreting the ECHR. 
There is a strong tendency in the case-law to restrict the scope of the 
ECHR by attaching a great interpretative weight to external PIL norms when 
they reflect weighty functions in PIL. Such weighty functions may relate to a 
variety of general interests in PIL. In Slivenko at issue was the specific 
KLVWRULFDOFRQWH[WRI/DWYLD¶VLQGHSHQGHQFHDQGWKHDLPSXUVXHGE\WKHELODWHUDO
treaty. The Grand Chamber acknowledged and accommodated special post-war 
treaty arrangements (Prince Hans-Adam) or agreements serving the restoration 
of peace like the Dayton Agreement in the 6HMGLü DQG )LQFL case, which is 
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discussed in Chapter 9.62 Also, in the Al-Jedda case, the Court paid due regard 
to the interest of maintaining international peace and security, as has already 
been discussed, and in the Bosphorus case, which is examined in detail below. 
This is not to suggest that the Court should take general interests in PIL as such 
during its interpretation process. Such a task could be part, for example, of 
assessing the margin of appreciation or examining the proportionality of a 
restriction to a right under the ECHR. However, for the present purposes, it is 
argued that the Court is willing to substantially restrict the ECHR when the 
relevant PIL norms reflect and are embedded in such weighty interests. It 
should be noted that in certain instances the Court seems to overstress the 
allegedly important interests that relevant PIL norms serve, as in the 
Mangouras case.63 
 
 
6.4 Accommodating the restrictive impact of the recognised right of States 
in public international law to regulate their international relations on a 
bilateral basis   
A notable finding is that the Court acknowledges the restrictive impact 
of the absence of PIL norms in areas where States traditionally reserve their 
right to regulate their international relations on a bilateral basis. If a member 
State has the discretion in PIL to regulate a field by engaging in bilateral 
cooperation and it has not done so, the Court accepts the absence of ad hoc 
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agreements as cogent considerations. In practice, this means that the Court will 
respect and take the absence of PIL norms into account. In such a scenario, the 
absence of these rules is duly appreciated on an equal basis with their 
existence. In other words, the Court acknowledges and takes cognisance of the 
recognised right and established practice of States to regulate a field of PIL on 
a bilateral basis. An example is the practice of States to conclude bilateral 
treaties for settling State succession related matters. In the .RYDþLü case the 
Grand Chamber deferred to the necessity that Slovenia enters into a bilateral 
agreement and did not proceeded to examine the merits of the complaint.64 
Another pertinent example is the regulation of social security matters 
under PIL by means of bilateral treaties. In Carson the application concerned 
thHUHIXVDORI%ULWLVKDXWKRULWLHVWRDGMXVWWKHDSSOLFDQWV¶SHQVLRQVLQOLQHZLWK
inflation.65 The applicants, who were all British nationals, were not residents in 
the United Kingdom at that time. According to national legislation, although 
the basic State pension was payable to individual residents outside of the 
United Kingdom (UK), non-residents were disqualified from receiving 
adjusted to inflation pensions. The only exception provided was where the UK 
had concluded a bilateral reciprocal social security treaty with the State in 
which British nationals were residents. The applicants, who had paid their 
relevant social security contributions but were residing in States that had not 
entered in such agreements with the respondent State, complained of 
discrimination on the basis of their place of residence. The UK argued before 
the Grand Chamber that it only concluded reciprocal arrangements with certain 
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States on the basis of its interests. If the Court would find that the applicants 
had suffered discriminatory treatment, this ZRXOGHIIHFWLYHO\µQHJDWHWKHSRZHU
WRHQWHULQWRELODWHUDOWUHDWLHVRIWKLVNLQG¶66  
7KH*UDQG&KDPEHUHQGRUVHGWKH*RYHUQPHQW¶VVXEPLVVLRQ,WUHIHUUHG
to a series of multilateral treaties under the auspices of the International Labour 
Organisation confirming that States have the right under PIL to regulate social 
security rights by virtue of specific bilateral or multilateral engagements. The 
µUHFLSURFLW\FRQGLWLRQ¶LVDQHVVHQWLDOIHDWXUHLQWKLVILHOG67 It was held that  
it would be extraordinary if the fact of entering into bilateral 
arrangements in the social security sphere had the consequence of 
creating an obligation to confer the same advantages on all others 
living in all other countries. [It] would effectively undermine the right 
of States to enter into reciprocal agreements and their interest in so 
doing.68 
On this basis the Court concluded that no different treatment may be 
found under Article 14 ECHR since those living in reciprocal agreements 
countries are not in an analogous position with other individuals. The absence 
of a reciprocal agreement in itself precluded the possibility of analogous and 
comparable situations, hence, restricting the scope of the applicability of the 
DSSOLFDQWV¶ULJKWV 
The Carson judgment is notable HVSHFLDOO\ LQ OLJKW RI WKH &RXUW¶V
previous jurisprudence. In other instances the Court did not accommodate such 
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considerations in its legal reasoning.69 Almost one year before the Carson 
judgment, the Grand Chamber in the Andrejeva case was not receptive to the 
UHVSRQGHQW6WDWH¶VLGHQWLFDODUJXPHQW,WDVVHUWHGWKDWDOWKRXJKLWLVIXOO\DZDUH
of the importance of such bilateral agreements, Latvia could not be absolved of 
its responsibility under Article 14 ECHR on the grounds that it is not bound by 
a pertinent inter-State agreement on social security with Russia and Ukraine.70 
Consequently, the Carson case should be either seen as overruling the previous 
jurisprudence71 or it could be seen as a judgement with limited relevance. A 
feature that distinguishes Carson from Andrejeva is that the alleged 
discrimination in the former concerned the place of residence, whereas in the 
ODWWHU UHODWHG WR WKH DSSOLFDQWV¶ QDWLRQDOLW\ $OWKRXJK Carson does not make 
such a distinction and its dictum appears equally applicable to all grounds of 
discrimination, this cautious caveat should be entered since the Court affords 
different weight to the grounds of discrimination under Article 14 ECHR.72 It 
should be noted that the force of the reciprocity argument in the international 
social security field is acknowledged and endorsed in the same fashion by other 
international bodies too,73 a reference that the Court did not make in order to 
support or reinforce its conclusions in Carson.  
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6.5 Accommodating public international law norms reODWLQJ WR 6WDWHV¶
membership of international organisations  
A last series of cases concerns PIL norms which relate to member 
6WDWHV¶ PHPEHUVKLS RI LQWHUQDWLRQDO RUJDQLVDWLRQV ,Q WKH Waite and Kennedy 
case,74 the applicants employed by a British company were placed at the 
disposal of the European Space Agency (Agency) created under the 
Convention for the Establishment of a European Space Agency. Subsequent to 
the termination of the cooperation of the British company with the Agency, 
they were informed that their contracts would be terminated too. They resorted 
to domestic labour courts arguing that they had acquired the status of 
employees of the Agency. National courts, however, refused to decide the case 
GXH WR WKH $JHQF\¶V LPPXQLW\ IURP MXULVGLFWLRQ 7KH applicants came before 
WKH &RXUW FRPSODLQLQJ WKDW WKH $JHQF\¶V LPPXQLW\ IURP MXULVGLFWLRQ
constituted a violation of their right of access to a court under Article 6 ECHR.  
Two of the points raised by the applicants were, first, that the Agency 
could not rely on its immunity from jurisdiction, since it had waived this right; 
and secondly, they TXHVWLRQHG WKH OHJLWLPDWH DLP VHUYHG E\ WKH $JHQF\¶V
privileges and immunities and asserted that, in any event, the protection of their 
human rights should claim priority over applying the immunity. With respect to 
the first point, the Court recalled that it is not its task to substitute itself for 
GRPHVWLFFRXUWVDQGWKDWLWVUROHLVRQO\WRDVFHUWDLQµZKHWKHUWKHHIIHFWVRI>WKH
GRPHVWLFFRXUWV¶@LQWHUSUHWDWLRQDUHFRPSDWLEOHZLWKWKH&RQYHQWLRQ¶75 It found 
WKDWWKHFRXUWV¶LQWHUSUHWDWLRQUHJDUGLQJWKHDSSOLFDELOLW\RIWKHLPPXQLW\GLGQRW
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appear to be arbitrary. As far as the legitimate aim of the immunity under Article 
6 ECHR is concerned, the Court stressed that immunities of international 
organisations form part of a well-established practice in international law and 
DUHHVVHQWLDOPHDQVIRUWKHLUSURSHUIXQFWLRQLQJ,WKLJKOLJKWHGµWhe importance 
of this practice is enhanced by a trend towards extending and strengthening 
LQWHUQDWLRQDOFRRSHUDWLRQLQDOOGRPDLQVRIPRGHUQVRFLHW\¶76  
 Turning to the question of proportionality, the Court recalled that the 
proper functioning of an international organisation could not impair the 
effective protection of human rights and that States cannot be absolved from 
their responsibility under the ECHR in relation to any field of activity. It went 
on, however, to state that the proportionality test could not be applied in such a 
way as to compel an international organisation to submit itself to national 
litigation and to the employment conditions prescribed under national law.77 
This would run counter to the current trend of strengthening international 
cooperation. An important factor in light of the facts was that the applicants 
had alternative means for their claims to be heard by an independent body 
within the Agency. The Grand Chamber in unanimity concluded that the 
UHVWULFWLRQ LPSRVHGE\WKH LPPXQLW\ IURP MXULVGLFWLRQRQWKHDSSOLFDQWV¶ULJKW
to access a court was not disproportionate.   
In the same vein as the previously examined cases, the Court does not 
address the possibility of a conflict between Article 6 ECHR and the treaty 
SURYLVLRQ FRQFHUQLQJ WKH $JHQF\¶V LPPXQLW\ IURP MXULVGLFWLRQ ,W
accommodates the restrictive impact stemming from the extraneous treaty 
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provision within the ECHR. In fact, it accorded significant weight to it due to 
its specific function, namely qualifying as the essential means for the proper 
functioning of international organisations and forming part of a well-
established practice in PIL.78 This consideration was instrumental in assessing 
the proportionality of the restriction,79 since the Court stressed that it could not 
apply the proportionality test under the ECHR in such a way as to negate the 
internatLRQDO RUJDQLVDWLRQ¶V LPPXQLW\ 6LPLODUO\ WR WKH FDVHV FRQFHUQLQJ WKH
State immunity rule, and to many of the judgments examined in the present 
chapter, the Court employs a conflict avoidance interpretation of the 
Convention to the expense of the effective protection of the ECHR rights and 
freedoms. All the more, it established a presumptive proportionate effect of the 
restriction imposed by the extraneous treaty immunity rule. The proportionate 
relation of the said restriction to the aim served under the Convention was not 
DIILUPHGDJDLQVW WKH VDPHFULWHULDDV LQ WKH UHVWRI WKH&RXUW¶VFDVH ODZ WKXV
marking a special ratio decidendi.  
This special ratio decidendi was further articulated and developed by 
the Court in the Bosphorus case.80 The Court addressed the applicant 
FRPSDQ\¶V FRPSODLQW WKDW WKH LPSRXQGLQJ RI LWV OHDVHG DLUFUDIW E\ ,UHODQG
violated its right to property under Article 1 of Additional Protocol No 1. The 
airline charter company had leased an aircraft from the national airline of the 
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former Yugoslavia. The aircraft was impounded in Ireland by national 
authorities by virtue of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions 
implemented by the European Union (EU) and subsequently by its member 
States, including Ireland.  
The Court found that the above interference was based on EU acts, 
which were transposed into the Irish legal order, rather than the Resolutions of 
the UNSC, which were not part of Irish law. In this way, the Court evaded the 
difficult question of the relationship of the UNSC Resolutions with the ECHR 
provisions, which was at issue in the Al-Jedda case.81 It also established that 
the Irish authorities had no discretion in implementing these EU acts affirming 
that State action was taken in compliance with legal obligations stemming from 
,UHODQG¶V(8PHPEHUVKLS82  
Turning to assessing whether the impugned measure was justified, the 
Court acknowledged once again the growing importance of international 
cooperation and the need for the proper functioning of international 
organisations ,W IXUWKHU UHLWHUDWHG WKDW ,UHODQG¶V PHPEHUVKLS LQ WKH (8 LV D
legitimate interest of a considerable weight.83 It went on to state that  
µthe Convention has to be interpreted in the light of any relevant 
rules and principles of international law applicable in relations 
between the Contracting Parties (Article 31 § 3 (c) [VCLT], and Al-
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Adsani >«@ ZKLFK SULQFLSOHV LQFOXGH WKDW RI pacta sunt 
servanda¶84  
The placement of Article 31 (3)(c) VCLT into brackets alongside relevant case 
law does not make it clear whether the Court applies the said provision or 
whether it invokes it as a supportive consideration to its own, perhaps 
distinctive, interpretative practice of taking other relevant norms of PIL into 
account. Interestingly, the Court includes general principles of law in the 
norms that must be taken into account when interpreting the ECHR. The 
citation to Al-Adsani and Article 31 (3)(c) VCLT do not support this statement, 
however, since neither refer to principles. Yet, although Article 31 (3)(c) refers 
exSOLFLWO\WRµUXOHVRI LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ¶ LW LVDUJXHGWKDWJHQHUDOSULQFLSOHVRI
law fall within its scope.85 ,Q WKH &RXUW¶V SUDFWLFH LW LV QRW XQFRPPRQ WR
include general principles of law in the norms that should be taken into account 
when construing the Convention.86  
It is also unclear what the Court means when it stated that it takes the 
principle pacta sunt servanda into consideration. The pertinent PIL norms 
which were critical in casu were the EU Regulations establishing the sanctions 
regime. From the perspective of PIL these are not binding rules, although they 
qualify as binding law among EU member States. This further evidences that 
the Court is not applying Article 31 (3)(c) VCLT since soft law does not trigger 
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its applicability.87 As far as the meaning of the reference to the principle pacta 
sunt servanda is concerned the judgment strongly indicates that it relates to 
,UHODQG¶V (8 PHPEHUVKLS DQG WR WKH QHHG IRU WKH SURSHU IXQFWLRQLQJ RI
international organisations. Consequently, in the same vein as the cases 
discussed in the previous section, the Court incorporates the said treaty 
provision (primary EU law) into its reasoning, which attains a heavy weight 
because it is seen as being attached to and embedded within the need for 
international cooperation. It is difficult, however, to discern how this general 
principle informs the meaning and scope of the right to property during the 
interpretation process. For the Court, pacta sunt servanda is more like a 
rhetorical reference used to highlight the impoUWDQFH RI ,UHODQG¶V (8
membership. It has been argued that the Court in Bosphorus, by applying 
$UWLFOH  F EULQJV LQWR LWV UHDVRQLQJ QRW DQ\ µQRUPDWLYH VRXUFHV RI
LQWHUQDWLRQDOODZEXWUDWKHU>«@DQH[FHSWLRQDOVRUWRILQWHUQDWLRQDOQHFHVVLW\- 
that LVWKHµµQHHG¶¶WRVHFXUHWKHSURSHUIXQFWLRQLQJRIWKH(&OHJDORUGHU¶88 
This is different to arguing that the Court takes certain PIL norms into 
consideration which may substantially restrict the scope of the ECHR because 
they reflect weighty functions and interests in PIL. It is submitted that 
assessing such arguments and vague interests in PIL without establishing a 
solid basis on specific PIL norms falls outside the task of treaty 
interpretation.89 It could be a reasonable factor, for example, in the evaluating 
WKHPHPEHU6WDWHV¶PDUJLQRIDSSUHFLDWLRQ 
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2QWKHEDVLVRIWKLVOHJDOUHDVRQLQJWKH&RXUWPDLQWDLQHGWKDW,UHODQG¶V
FRPSOLDQFH ZLWK (8 REOLJDWLRQV µLV MXVWLILHG DV ORQJ DV WKH UHOHYDQW
organisation is considered to protect fundamental rights, as regards both the 
substantive guarantees offered and the mechanisms controlling their 
observance, in a manner which can be considered at least equivalent to that for 
ZKLFK WKH &RQYHQWLRQ SURYLGHV¶90 It established that if the organisation 
provides for such equivalent or comparable protection, it will be presumed that 
the State has not departed from the ECHR requirements. In this respect, 
Bosphorus substantially evolves the Waite and Kennedy case. Whereas in 
Waite and Kennedy the Court accepted that the proportionality of the 
UHVWULFWLRQ FRXOG QRW EH DVVHVVHG E\ QHJDWLQJ WKH $JHQF\¶V LPPXQLW\ LQ
Bosphorus it introduces a formal presumption of compliance with the ECHR 
ZLWKRXW HYHQ DSSO\LQJ WKH SURSRUWLRQDOLW\ WHVW 7KH &RXUW¶V OHJDO UHDVRQLQJ
however, does not support its conclusion. The use of Article 31 (3)(c) VCLT is 
not causally linked to the equivalent protection presumption. The consideration 
by the Court of the institutional aspects of international cooperation in the 
context of a supranational organisation, such as the EU in casu, extends well 
beyond the confines of the interpretation process.91 In this sense, Article 31 
(3)(c) VCLT and the use of other relevant norms of PIL are merely rhetorical 
devices. The Grand Chamber used Article 31 (3)(c) in a similar fashion in the 
State immunity related cases (Chapter 5) in that it was employed in order not 
RQO\WRLQWURGXFHUHOHYDQW3,/QRUPVLQWKH&RXUW¶VOHJDOUHDVRQLQJEXWDOVRWR
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support a very strong presumed proportionate restriction to the ECHR, which 
led, in turn, to a dramatic restriction of the right to access a court.  
Moreover, the Court in Bosphorus frames in abstracto a presumption 
regarding the compatibility of any State action in compliance with EU law 
obligations to the ECHR guarantees.92 This could be seen as an extreme 
version of its conflict avoidance practice through interpretation, although as it 
was underlined it clearly departs from the interpretation process. Also, the 
presumption effectively suspends, if not displaces, the applicable law before 
the Court. Whereas the Court in other cases involving possible conflicting 
international obligations of States parties restricts the scope of a right under the 
Convention, in the present instance the Court will not scrutinise the impugned 
measure at all. The presumptive equivalence means that a given restriction to a 
right or freedom under the ECHR will, in principle, be considered legitimate 
and necessary which leads to a reversal of the structure and architecture of the 
&RQYHQWLRQ¶V WH[W LWVHlf. The Convention guarantees certain rights and 
freedoms and prescribes specific limitation clauses according to which a right 
may be restricted under certain conditions. This state of affairs does not fully 
apply in the context of the presumption: a given restriction by virtue of EU law 
to a right under the ECHR is not anymore exceptional and it will not be 
assessed on an ad hoc basis against the proportionality and necessity tests.93 
Moreover, the rigidness of the presumption is striking. The condition imposed 
by the Court for rebutting it is for the applicant to prove that in the 
circumstances of a particular case the protection of the Convention was 
                                                             
92
 J. Christoffersen, Fair Balance: Proportionality, Subsidiarity and Primarity in the European 
Convention on Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, London-Boston, 2009) 321 et seq. 
93
 Joint Concurring Opinion of Judges Rozakis, Tulkens, Traja, Botoucharova, Zagrebelsky 
and Garlicki in Bosphorus (GC).  
177 
 
manifestly deficient.94 This is a heavy burden of proof incumbent on the 
applicant insofar as available recourses and legal advice that the applicant will 
have to have in his disposal in order to prove such a claim.  
 
 
6.6 Conclusions 
This Chapter concludes that the Court reads the ECHR in harmony with 
other PIL norms, even if this would mean that the rights and freedoms under 
the ECHR do not attain their full weight. The unity of PIL and the imperative 
QRWWRSODFHWKH(&+5LQDYDFXXPDUHSURPLQHQWFRQFHUQVLQWKH&RXUW¶VFDVH-
law. The present author does not concur with the view that the ECtHR is not 
motivated by the need to reduce the fragmentation of PIL.95 It was 
demonstrated that the restriction of the scope of the ECHR by taking 
cognisance of PIL norms is not exceptional.96 The Court acknowledges the 
relevance of a variety of PIL norms, such as external treaty provisions, binding 
UNSC Resolutions (Al-Jedda) or secondary EU law (Bosphorus). It pursues a 
conflict avoidance practice between the ECHR and another PIL norm through 
interpretation and attempts to read the ECHR in harmony with them, as much 
as possible.  
It became clear that, in this series of cases, the interpretation of the 
ECHR by taking PIL norms into account conflicts with the principle of 
effectiveness. Acknowledging and taking relevant PIL norms into account 
leads to a restriction of WKH (&+5¶V scope. In contrast, the principle of 
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effectiveness tends to preserve the specificity of the ECHR and stresses its 
µVHOI-FRQWDLQHG¶ IXQFWLRQ, in order to ensure the application of practical and 
effective rights. Hence, )RURZLF]¶VDUJXPHQWWKDWthe principle of effectiveness 
unconditionally enhances the reception of PIL LQ WKH&RXUW¶VUHDVRQLQJ is not 
convincing.97 An equally important finding is that treating the interpretative 
principle of taking cognisance of PIL norms under the heading of the principle 
of effectiveness obviously falls short to discuss this part of the jurisprudence.98 
Consequently, in line with the main argument of this thesis, the interpretative 
principle of taking other relevant PIL norms into account is an autonomous 
principle to the priQFLSOH RI HIIHFWLYHQHVV 0RVW LPSRUWDQWO\ WKH &RXUW¶V
practice evidences that it supersedes the application of the principle of 
effectiveness. However, it is suggested that in certain cases (Prince Hans 
Adam, Bosphorus) the Court attached such a great interpretative weight to the 
external PIL norms that it effectively set aside the core of guarantees under the 
ECHR. In such cases, the Court should balance better the application of the 
principle of effectiveness with the application of the principle of taking 
cognisance of PIL norms. This is because the ECHR should be interpreted in 
harmony with other PIL norms, as much as possible, without displacing the 
applicable law before the Court. Chapter 5 drew the same conclusion with 
respect to the Al-Adsani case.    
*HQHUDOO\WKH&RXUW¶VUHDVRQLQJDQGFRQVWUXFWLRQRIWKH(&+5LVYHU\
receptive to external PIL norms, substantially restricting the scope of 
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protection. In certain instances (Prince Hans-Adam, Bosphorus) the Court 
arguably infringed the essence of the right under the ECHR, since a real 
conflict of norms cannot go away by means of interpretation. This is the case 
especially in Bosphorus in which the Grand Chamber presumed the 
proportionality of the restriction to the ECHR. Article 31 (3)(c) VCLT was 
invoked by the Court to validate this presumption. As it was highlighted, the 
Court does not share the enthusiasm of international scholars about the use of 
Article 31 (3)(c) VCLT. The said provision was employed only in Bosphorus 
where it served the role of a rhetorical device rather than a substantive 
FRQWULEXWLRQWRWKH&RXUW¶VUHDVRQLQJ7KH&RXUWHPSOR\HG$UWLFOHFLQ
the same manner in the Al-Adsani case (Chapter 5). Conversely, in the few 
judgments in which the majority decided in casu that the restriction to a given 
right under the ECHR was disproportionate (Jersild, Slivenko, Andrejeva), 
there were strong dissenting views by Judges positing that the impact drawn 
from the external norms should have been greater.    
 Another finding from the case-law is that the Court attaches 
significantly heavy weight to PIL norms, and treats them differently, when they 
serve an important function in PIL (Prince Hans-Adam, Slivenko, Al-Jedda, 
Bosphorus); when States have a recognised right and established practice of 
regulating a field in PIL on a bilateral basis (Carson); in the context of 
international cooperation (Waite and Kennedy, Bosphorus). It does not appear 
to matter if the relevant PIL norm is a bilateral treaty (Slivenko) or a 
multilateral treaty establishing an international organisation (Waite and 
Kennedy, Bosphorus) or the very absence of international regulation (Carson). 
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7KH&RXUW¶VVWDQGDUGSRVLWLRQLVWKDWLWVUROHLVQRWWRVHWWOHDQ\GLVSXWH
regarding the interpretation of other PIL norms. It is competent to review the 
compatibility of the implementation of these norms by States with the ECHR 
guarantees. As it was argued, this is GXHWRWKH&RXUW¶VOLPLWHGratione materiae 
jurisdiction under Articles 19 and 32 ECHR to interpret and apply only the 
ECHR. For this reason too the Court does not acknowledge a possible conflict 
of norms. The Mamatkulov and Askarov and Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi cases 
were highlighted as recent developments which may indicate otherwise. In the 
view of the present author, there were rather unfortunate choices of wording. 
The Al-Jedda case is the only instance where the Court openly addressed the 
possibility of a conflict notwithstanding the exceptional function of Article 103 
UN Charter in PIL. In Al-Jedda, the Court also ascertained the authoritative 
LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ RI 816& 5HVROXWLRQV 7KH &RXUW¶V VWDQG DQG LWV SHUVXDVLYH
reasoning lend support to the present view that the ECtHR is a regional court 
with limited jurisdiction ratione materiae which, however, positively 
contributes to the development of PIL without endangering its unity.  
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Section III: Taking public international law norms into account in order 
to expand ratione materiae the scope of the rights and freedoms under the 
ECHR 
6HFWLRQ,,,DGGUHVVHVWKH&RXUW¶VUHOLDQFHon PIL norms for expanding 
ratione materiae the scope of the rights and freedoms envisaged under the 
ECHR. The analysis is divided into three chapters on the basis of the different 
impact that PIL advances on the construction of the ECHR. This division is 
useful for analytical purposes but, most importantly, for exploring how the use 
RI 3,/ LQIOXHQFHV WKH &RXUW¶V OHJDO UHDVRQLQJ LQ GLIIHUHQW VWDJHV RI WKH
interpretation of the ECHR. Chapter 7 concerns the enlargement of the 
applicability of the protective scope of the rights and freedoms; chapter 8 
discusses the positive obligations read under specific provisions. Finally, 
chapter 9 deals with the use of PIL as a material factor for assessing whether or 
not a restriction to a right under the ECHR conforms to the principle of 
proportionality.         
7. Enlarging the applicability of rights and freedoms under the 
ECHR 
7.1 Introduction  
Chapter 7 examines the enlargement of the applicability of the 
protective scope of the rights and freedoms. Chapter 6 discusseG WKH &RXUW¶V
resort to PIL in order to define the terms found under the ECHR. Defining 
terms and expanding the scope of the rights are two distinct analytical 
enterprises when constructing a treaty, although sometimes it is hard to 
distinguish them. According to the first, the Court needs to, strictly speaking, 
conceptualise the precise meaning of a term embodied in the text of the ECHR, 
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VXFKDVIRUH[DPSOHµVODYHU\¶RUµWRUWXUH¶2QWKHRWKHUKDQGWKHDSSOLFDELOLW\
of an ECHR provision involves, more broadly, the identification of the factual 
and legal circumstances that may trigger the protective scope of a provision.  
This Chapter analyses four examples from the jurisprudence in which 
the Court relied on PIL norms for enlarging the applicability of the ECHR 
rights: the recognition of the retroactivity of the more favourable criminal law 
under Article 7 ECHR (7.2); the recognition of indirect discrimination under 
Article 14 ECHR (7.3); acknowledging the right to collective bargaining and 
the right to consultation under Article 11 ECHR (7.4); and ascertaining that 
human trafficking falls within Article 4 ECHR (7.5).  
 
7.2 Recognising the retroactivity of the more favourable criminal law 
under Article 7 ECHR 
Article 7 (1) ECHR embodies the principle of legality in criminal law. It 
provides that 
no one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any 
act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under 
national or international law at the time when it was committed. Nor 
shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at 
the time the criminal offence was committed. 
The question that was brought before the Grand Chamber in Scoppola v Italy 
(No 2) was whether the applicability of the provision encompassed the lex 
mitior principle, namely whether the applicant should have benefited from a 
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more lenient criminal law introduced subsequently to the commission of the 
offence.1  
 The wording of Article 7 (1) does not recognise this principle. The 
Court in its case law had affirmed that, contrary to provisions of other 
international human rights treaties, the ECHR does not envisage the right to a 
more lenient penalty insofar as it is introduced a posteriori to the commission 
of a crime.  
 The applicant, however, argued that Article 7 (1) should now be 
construed differently in light of relevant international texts and international 
judicial practice.2 He referred to Article 15 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),3 Article 9 Inter-American Convention on 
Human Rights (IACHR),4 Article 49 (2) Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union (EU Charter),5 and Article 24 (2) Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC Statute).6 These provisions expressly prescribe the lex 
mitior principle. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) further acknowledged 
that the principle of the retroactive application of the more lenient penalty 
formed part of the common constitutional traditions of the member States.7 The 
applicant also pointed to the view taken by the International Criminal Tribunal 
                                                             
1
 Scoppola v. Italy (No 2), 17 September 2009 (Grand Chamber). 
2
 Ibid, [35]-[41]. 
3
 µ,Isubsequent to the commission of the offence, provision is made by law for the imposition 
RI WKH OLJKWHUSHQDOW\ WKHRIIHQGHUVKDOOEHQHILW WKHUHE\¶; (concluded on 16 December 1966; 
entered into force on 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 17.   
4
 µ,I VXEVHTXHQW WR WKe commission of the offense the law provides for the imposition of a 
OLJKWHU SXQLVKPHQW WKH JXLOW\ SHUVRQ VKDOO EHQHILW WKHUHIURP¶ FRQFOXGHG RQ  1RYHPEHU
1969; entered into force on 18 July 1978) OAS Treaty Series No. 36. 
5µ7KH UHWURDFWLYH DSSOLFDWLRQ of a lighter penalty is a generally an accepted exception to the 
principle of non-UHWURDFWLYLW\¶ RIILFLDO -RXUQDO RI WKH(XURSHDQ &RPPXQLWLHV &
364/1. 
6
 µ,QWKHHYHQWRIDFKDQJHLQWKHODZDSSOLFDEOHWRDJLYHQFDVHSULRUWRDILQDOMXGJHPHnt, the 
ODZ PRUH IDYRXUDEOH WR WKH SHUVRQ EHLQJ LQYHVWLJDWHG SURVHFXWHG RU FRQYLFWHG VKDOO DSSO\¶
(concluded on 17 July 1998; entered into force on 1 July 2002) 2187 UNTS 90. 
7
 Joined cases C-387/02, C-391/02 and C-403/02 (Berlusconi and others case) 3 May 2005, 
[66]-[69]. 
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for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) Appeals Chamber in the 'UDJDQ 1LFROLü 
case concerning the applicability of the said principle to its Statute.8          
 The Grand Chamber devoted a separate section of its judgment to the 
µLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRI$UWLFOHRIWKH&RQYHQWLRQLQWKH&RXUW¶VFDVH-ODZ¶ZKHUHLW
revisited and overruled its previous practice. It opined that it must depart from 
its position because it did not correspond anymore to the needs of the ECHR 
system for the protection of human rights that is driven by the guarantee of 
practical and effective rights and the dynamic and evolutive approach in the 
interpretation of the Convention. According to the Court, the above-mentioned 
international developments demonstrated the existence of a consensus 
gradually emerging in Europe and internationally, whereby the lex mitior 
principle was treated as a fundamental principle of criminal law.9 Therefore, by 
an eleven to six majority vote, it was held that the right to the application of a 
more lenient law introduced subsequently to the commission of the crime 
should be guaranteed under the scope of Article 7 ECHR.  
It cannot go unnoticed that Scoppola shares common features with the 
methodology followed in Zolotukhin in Chapter 4.10 As seen, in Zolotukhin the 
*UDQG &KDPEHU GHILQHG WKH WHUP µRIIHQFH¶ LQ $UWLFOH  RI WKH $GGLWLRQDO
Protocol 7 against the background of similarly-drafted treaty provisions which 
nevertheless envisaged different formulations of the ne bis in idem principle. 
Likewise, in the present case the Court used equivalent11 treaty provisions 
                                                             
8
 3URVHFXWRU Y 'UDJDQ 1LFROLü, Appeals Chamber, Case No. IT-94-2-A, Judgment on 
Sentencing Appeal, 4 February 2005. 
9
 Scoppola (GC), [104]-[106]. 
10
 Infra 4.5. 
11
 %URXGHDQG6KDQ\XVHWKHWHUPµHTXLYDOHQW¶WRGHQRWHQRUPVZKLFKDUHLGHQWLFDORUVLPLODULQ
their normative context and have been established through different instruments or are 
DSSOLFDEOHLQGLIIHUHQWVXEVWDQWLYHDUHDVRIODZLQ7%URXGH<6KDQ\µ7KH,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ
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prescribing the principle of legality. The Court disregards again the fact that 
the extraneous to the ECHR PIL norms explicitly encapsulate the lex mitior 
principle, whereas the ECHR does not. Despite a core of similarity between the 
ECHR and the PIL norms, the Court does not take account of their difference, 
especially in light of the apparent textual divergence.12    
Also, the connection established by the Court between, on one hand, the 
relevant international texts and the respective practice of their supervisory 
bodies and, on the other hand, the interpretation of the ECHR is weak. Until 
Scoppola the very same international instruments were employed by the Court 
as an a contrario argument in order to exclude the lex mitior principle from the 
applicability of Article 7 ECHR.13 In Scoppola the Court used them to 
substantiate the converse conclusion. Even if it were to be accepted that the lex 
mitior principle is a fundamental principle of criminal law and implicitly 
interconnected to the principle of the legality ± a thesis strongly criticised by 
the minority14 and not sufficiently substantiated by the majority ± the Court did 
not put forward a pertinent justification which could resonate the different use 
of the same international rules for interpreting Article 7. The same PIL norms 
are invoked and used in order to serve two converse lines of reasoning,15 
rendering the use of PIL instrumental.       
From a methodological point of view, a second shared feature of the 
Zolotukhin and Scoppola cases is that the Grand Chamber invokes the 
                                                                                                                                                                 
and Policy of Multi-6RXUFHG(TXLYDOHQW1RUPV¶LQ7%URXGH<6KDQ\HGV, Multi-Sourced 
Equivalent Norms in International Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2011) 1, 5.  
12
 Broude, Shany, (note 11), 9. 
13
 Similarly cf. the Wilson, National Union of Journalists and others and the Demir and 
Baykara (GC) cases  and the National Union of Belgian Police (Pl) case (infra 7.4) 
14
 'LVVHQWLQJ2SLQLRQRI-XGJH1LFRODRXMRLQHGE\-XGJHV%UDW]D/RUHQ]HQ-RþLHQp9LOOLJHU
and Sajó, in Scoppola (GC), 44-45. 
15
 7%DXPEDFKµ7KH1RWLRQRI&ULPLQDO3HQDOW\DQGWKHLex Mitior Principle in the Scoppola 
v. Italy &DVH¶Nordic JIL 125, 138.  
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cumulative application (synergy) of the three interpretive principles, namely 
the need for ensuring effective and practical rights, the evolutive interpretation 
DQGWKH&RXUW¶VGXW\WRWDNHUHOHYDQW3,/QRUPV LQWRDFFRXQW7KLV LVDQRWKHU
H[DPSOHRIWKH&RXUW¶VSUDFWLFHRIHPSOR\LQJWKHWKUHHLQWHUSUHWDWLYHSULQFLSOHV
in an explicit and distinctive fashion.16 These principles lead to and reinforce 
the same interpretive result. In Zolotukhin the Court went so far as to explicitly 
VWDWH WKDW LW FRXOG QRW µMXVWLI\ DGKHULQJ WR D PRUH UHVWULFWLYH DSSURDFK¶17 than 
the one followed by other instruments or international bodies. This was also its 
approach in Scoppola where it construed and relied upon the European and 
international consensus. The interpretive guidance derived by the international 
instruments and international judicial practice had such an enormous impact on 
the construction of Article 7 so as to justify the majority overruling the 
jurisprudence of the Court. Hence, the PIL norms were influential in the 
&RXUW¶VUHDVRQLQJ 
Crucially, however, the methodology and final outcome demonstrate 
that the Court does not respect the textual limits of the ECHR. The 
substantially influential extraneous PIL norms concerning the lex mitior 
principle are advanced in a way which cannot be accommodated within the text 
of the ECHR by means of interpretation.18 It is unclear why taking cognisance 
of the PIL norms is a sufficient and legitimate basis for the Court to find that 
the fact that Article 7 ECHR does not provide for the lex mitior principle is not 
decisive.19 The analysis made for the Zolotukhin case equally applies herein. 
                                                             
16
 Infra 4.5 (Zolotukhin (GC)); 7.4 (Demir and Baykara (GC)). 
17
 Zolotukhin (GC), [80]. 
18
 'LVVHQWLQJ2SLQLRQRI-XGJH1LFRODRXMRLQHGE\-XGJHV%UDW]D/RUHQ]HQ-RþLHQp9LOOLJHU
and Sajó in Scoppola (GC), 44-47. 
19
 Scoppola (GC), [107]. 
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The Court distorts the language of the ECHR and exceeds the boundaries of its 
jurisdiction.20 
 
7.3 5HFRJQLVLQJµLQGLUHFWGLVFULPLQDWLRQ¶XQGHU$UWLFOH(&+5 
7.3.1 5HFRJQLVLQJ µLQGLUHFW GLVFULPLQDWLRQ¶ RQ WKH EDVLV RI UDFH DQGRU
ethnic origin 
TKH QRWLRQ RI µLQGLUHFW GLVFULPLQDWLRQ¶ XQGHU $UWLFOH  (&+5 ZDV
acknowledged recently by the Grand Chamber in the D.H. v. Czech Republic 
case,21 which is µDUJXDEO\ WKH PRVW LPSRUWDQW $UWLFOH  FDVH HYHU¶22 The 
&RXUW¶V ILQGLQJV ZHUH VXEVHTXHQWO\ IROORZHG LQ WKH 2UãXã DQG RWKHUV Y
Croatia case.23 For reasons of clarity and convenience the crucial legal 
questions are discussed under two separate headings. The first addresses the 
definition of indirect discrimination and the second examines the means and 
evidence for proving indirect discrimination.  
(i) Recognising indirect racial discrimination in accordance with 
developments in public international law 
In D.H. eighteen Roma pupils of Czech nationality complained that 
they were placed in special schools exclusively on the basis of their race and/or 
ethnic origin, a practice of racial segregation. They argued that they were 
discriminated against the enjoyment of their right to education due to their race 
                                                             
20
 Infra 4.6. 
21
 D.H. and others v. Czech Republic, 13 November 2007 (Grand Chamber). 
22
 D.J. Harris et al., Law of the European Convention on Human Rights (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2009) 615. 
23
 2UãXã DQG RWKHUV Y &URDWLD, 16 March 2010 (Grand Chamber). Since the two cases are 
similar, for the present purposes reference is made to the D.H. and to 2UãXã only where 
necessary.    
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or ethnic origin, namely a breach of Article 2 of Additional Protocol No. 124 to 
the ECHR read together with Article 14 ECHR.  
The Court, on the basis of statistical data submitted by the applicants, 
found an established prima facie indirect discrimination. The Czech Republic 
did not provide for an objective and reasonable justification to the 
discriminatory effect of its national legislation and policy. Claims such as that 
the students were subjected to adequate tests for their placement in the special 
schools, or that the parents gave their prior consent were dismissed and a 
violation of Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 2 of AP No. 1 was 
found.      
Until the D.H. case it was commonplace that the Court did not generally 
address claims concerning indirect discrimination, namely whether a law or 
policy, although it may apply equally to everyone, has a disproportionate effect 
on one part of society.25 Despite the fact that the Court stated that it builds 
upon its previous case law,26 the concept of indirect discrimination was 
introduced in D.H. The term was explicitly employed27 in accordance with EU 
Directive 97/80/EC on the burden of proof in cases of discrimination based on 
sex28 and the EU Directive 2000/43/EC implementing the principle of equal 
                                                             
24
 $UWLFOHRI$GGLWLRQDO3URWRFRO1RWRWKH(&+5KHUHDIWHU$31RUHDGVµ1RSHUVRQ
shall be denied the right to education. In the exercise of any functions which it assumes in 
relation to education and to teaching, the State shall respect the right of parents to ensure such 
education and teaching in conformity with their own religions and philRVRSKLFDOFRQYLFWLRQV¶ 
25
 O.A. Arnardóttir, Equality and Non-Discrimination under the European Convention on 
Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff Pulbishers, The Hague, 2003) 73-83, 122-126; G. Gilbert, 
µ7KH %XUJHRQLQJ 0LQRULW\ 5LJKWV -XULVSUXGHQFH RI WKH (XURSHDQ &RXUW RI +XPDQ 5LJKWV¶
(2002) 24 HRQ 763, 747-750.  
26
 The Court employed LQ LWV FDVH ODZ WKH WHUP µde facto GLVFULPLQDWLRQ¶: cf. Nachova v. 
Bulgaria, 6 July 2005 (Grand Chamber) in which, although it took into consideration many of 
the PIL developments cited in the D.H., it did not infer the respective interpretive impact from 
them regarding the question of defining and proving indirect discrimination under Article 14.  
27
 D.H. (GC), [184]. 
28
 JO L 14/6 (20.01.1998) (Directive 97/80/EC). 
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treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin.29 Both 
instruments provide for the definition of indirect discrimination.30 Mention was 
also made of the definition provided in General Policy Recommendation No. 7 
of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI).31 As the 
Court noted, the ECRI definition is inspired by those found in the EU 
Directives.32 Despite of a slight differentiation in the wording of the three 
definitions, the main elements of the notion of indirect discrimination are found 
in all three definitions.  
Accepting indirect discrimination within the scope of Article 14 ECHR 
and defining the concept in accordance with relevant PIL norms appears to be 
KLJKO\LQIOXHQFHGE\WKHDSSOLFDQWV¶DUJXPHQWVDQGWKHWKLUGSDUW\LQWHUYHQHUV¶
submissions. The applicants, represented before the Court among others by the 
European Roma Rights Centre based in Budapest and Lord Lester of Herne 
Hill, Q.C. - a widely recognised barrister on human rights and honorary 
President of Interights - advanced to a great extent a PIL related line of 
argumentation with respect to the interpretation of Article 14 ECHR. They 
                                                             
29
 JO L 180/22 (19.07.2000) (Directive 2000/43/EC). 
30
 $UWLFOHRI'LUHFWLYH(&SURYLGHVWKDWµLQGLUHFWGLVFULPLQDWLRQVKDOOH[LVWZKHUHDQ
apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice disadvantages a substantially higher 
proportion of the members of one sex unless that provisions, criterion or practice is appropriate 
DQGQHFHVVDU\ DQG FDQ EH MXVWLILHG E\ REMHFWLYH IDFWRUV XQUHODWHG WR VH[¶ $UWLFOH  E of 
Directive 2000/43/EC SUHVFULEHVWKDWµLQGLUHFWGLVFULPLQDWLRQVKDOOEHWDNHQWRRFFXUZKHUHDQ
apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice would put persons of a racial or ethnic origin 
at a particular disadvantage compared with other persons, unless that provision, criterion or 
practice is objectively justified by a legitimate aim and the means of achieving that aim are 
DSSURSULDWHDQGQHFHVVDU\¶ 
31
 ECRI General Policy Recommendation No. 7 on National Legislation to Combat Racism and 
Racial Discrimination (adopted on 13 December 2002) CRI (2003) 8, available at 
<http://www.coe.int! (&5, 5HF 1R  3DUDJUDSK  F VWDWHV WKDW µ³LQGLUHFW UDFLDO
GLVFULPLQDWLRQ´ VKDOO PHDQ FDVHV ZKHUH DQ DSSDUHQWO\ QHXWUDO IDFWRU VXFK DV D SURYLVLRQ
criterion or practice cannot be as easily complied with by, or disadvantages, persons belonging 
to a group designated by a ground such as race, colour, language, religion, nationality or 
national or ethnic origin, unless this factor has an objective and reasonable justification. This 
latter would be the case if it pursues a legitimate aim and if there is a reasonable relationship of 
SURSRUWLRQDOLW\EHWZHHQWKHPHDQVHPSOR\HGDQGWKHDLPVRXJKWWREHUHDOLVHG¶ 
32
 D.H. (GC), [61]. 
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contended that indirect discrimination was prohibited under international law, 
including the ICCPR and the Convention on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination. They noted the ECRI Rec. No. 7, the relevant practice of many 
States of the Council of Europe and the pertinent jurisprudence of the ECJ. It 
was VSHFLILFDOO\ VXEPLWWHG WKDW µWKH UHVWULFWLYH LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ >«@ >RI@ WKH
notion of discrimination was incompatible >«@ZLWKWKHFDVH-ODZ>«@RIRWKHU
MXULVGLFWLRQV LQ (XURSH DQG EH\RQG¶33 DQG WKDW µthe principle of non-
discrimination [should be] interpreted and applied consistently by the two 
(XURSHDQFRXUWV¶34 Moreover, QLQH1*2¶VDVNHGSHUPLVVLRQDQGZHUHJUDQWHG
leave to intervene before the Court.35 The written submissions by Interights and 
Human Rights Watch were of particular significance. A wide range of State 
practice and European and international documentation on the definition of 
indirect discrimination was detailed therein and the Grand Chamber was 
VWURQJO\ LQYLWHG WR µEULQJ >LWV@ MXULVSUXGHQFH >«] in line with existing 
LQWHUQDWLRQDO VWDQGDUGV¶36 The Court responded positively to these arguments, 
aligned its position with PIL norms and acknowledged the notion of indirect 
discrimination within the protective scope of Article 14. 
(ii) Proving indirect racial discrimination 
The core issue, however, besides the formal introduction of the concept 
of indirect discrimination, was the means available to the applicants to prove 
indirect discrimination. According to the established case law of the Court the 
                                                             
33
 Ibid, [128]. 
34
 Ibid, [132]. 
35
 These were: International Step by Step Association, Roma Education Fund, European Early 
Childhood Research Association, Interights, Human Rights Watch, Minority Rights Group 
International, European Network against Racism, European Roma Information Office and 
International Federation for Human Rights. 
36
 Ibid, [161]-[162]; written submissions of Interights and Human Rights Watch, [5], available 
at http://www.interights.org. 
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bXUGHQRISURRILQFDVHVRIµde facto GLVFULPLQDWLRQ¶ZDVDOORFDWHGDVLQWKDWWKH
applicant had to show a difference in treatment (prima facie evidence) and 
subsequently the respondent State had to demonstrate whether this treatment 
was justified. Statistics were not considered sufficient as such to disclose a 
discriminatory practice which means that their use could not provide prima 
facie evidence and, hence, shift the burden of proof.37    
The Grand Chamber in D.H. followed a novel approach.38 It admitted 
that the strict evidential rules posed significant difficulties to the applicants for 
proving the claim of indirect discrimination. It took note of the information 
furnished by the third-party interveners regarding the practice of national 
courts and UN treaty supervisory bodies which accepted statistics as evidence 
of indirect discrimination.39 Human Rights Watch and Interights strongly 
encouraged the Court in their written submission to take a stance which would 
not be at variance with international and comparative practice, including the 
EU Directives and the respective case law of the ECJ, views of the Human 
Rights Committee in individual communications, conclusions of the 
Committee of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General 
Recommendations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination 
against Women and case law of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.40 
The common denominator in all of this documentation was the acceptance of 
statistical data as reliable and credible evidence in order to establish a refutable 
presumption for the existence of indirect discrimination. The applicants also 
                                                             
37
 D.H. (GC), [180].  
38
 Ibid, [188]; cf. D.H. and others v. Czech Republic, 7 February 2006, [46]. 
39
 Ibid, [187]. 
40
 Ibid, [164]; written submissions of Interights and Human Rights Watch, [11]-[21]. For the 
submissions of the Minority Rights Group International, the European Network against Racism 
and the European Roma Information Office ibid, [166]. 
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referred to the practice of UN bodies and stressed the recent EU legislative and 
jurisprudential developments.41 The Court, by giving account to these 
international instruments, aligned its interpretation to the practice of 
international bodies.42 
Interestingly, the Court did not engage with the legislative or judicial 
practice of member States, although there was a clear disagreement between 
applicants and the respondent State regarding the existence or not of a 
European consensus.43 The Court referred in passing to the information 
furnished by the third-party interveners regarding the practice of national 
courts giving the impression that its conclusions are confirmed by domestic 
practice. The detailed written submissions of Interights and Human Rights 
Watch, however, make reference only to the Canadian and US Supreme courts, 
and limited judicial practice stemming from Germany, the UK, the Netherlands 
and Switzerland.44 It seems that the Grand Chamber evaded the question of a 
European consensus and preferred substantiating its methodology and findings 
on the basis of PIL norms and practice without even invoking the evolutive 
interpretation of the ECHR.  
PIL norms were also employed for assessing whether the legal 
justifications provided by the respondent State for the alleged discrimination 
against Roma pupils were reasonable and objective. To give an example, in 
2UãXã the Grand Chamber referred extensively to the Opinions issued by the 
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 Ibid, [136]. 
42
 Ibid, [187], [82]-[91]. 
43
 Ibid, [131], [133], [155]. 
44
 Written submissions of Interights and Human Rights Watch, [2], [6], [17]. 
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Advisory Committee of the Framework Convention on National Minorities45 
with respect to Croatia and to the Comments submitted by Croatia in response 
to these Opinions.46 The Court used the legal assessments and the views 
expressed by the Advisory Committee in order to disqualify the justifications 
put forward by Croatia for the discriminatory treatment.47 In this way, the 
placement of the applicants in separate classes and the transfer and monitoring 
procedure of pupils were scrutinised against the legal yardstick of the Opinions 
of the FCNM Advisory Committee.48 This practice is distinct from using 
findings derived from international reports or other documents as a matter of 
fact.49 7KH$GYLVRU\&RPPLWWHH¶VYLHZVLQWKHSUHVHQWLQVWDQFHZHUe used as a 
matter of law.  
Therefore, the legal criteria articulated by the Advisory Committee 
were incorporated into the analysis and the interpretation of the ECHR. This is 
interesting since the Grand Chamber in Chapman refused to derive interpretive 
guLGDQFH IURP WKH )&10 EHFDXVH WKH ODWWHU µVHWV RXW JHQHUDO SULQFLSOHV DQG
goals but the signatory parties were unable to agree on means of 
                                                             
45
 Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (concluded on 1 February 
1995, entered into force on 1 February 1998) CETS No. 157 (FCNM). 
46
 2UãXã (GC), [159], [164], [166], [174].  
47
 Cf. Dissenting Opinion of Judge Jungwiert in D.H. (GC), 76 (point 5); Joint partly 
'LVVHQWLQJ 2SLQLRQ RI -XGJHV -XQJZLHUW 9DMLüP .RYOHU*\XOXP\DQ -DHJHU 0\MHU %HUUR-
/HIqYUHDQG9XþLQLüLQ2UãXã (GC), [15]. 
48
 Ibid, [159], [174]; D.H. (GC), [200]. 
49
 Cf. M. Forowicz, The Reception of International Law in the European Court of Human 
Rights (Oxford University Press, New York, 2010) 218, 222, 227, 242-244 and A. Rachovitsa, 
µ%RRN 5HYLHZ 0DJGDOHQD )RURZLF] 7KH 5HFHSWLRQ RI ,QWHUQDWLRQDO /DZ LQ WKH (XURSHDQ
&RXUW RI +XPDQ 5LJKWV¶   HRLRev 795, 797. With respect to the standards and 
findings of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment: -3RODNLHZLF]µ$OWHUQDWLYHVWR7UHDW\-Making and Law-Making by 
7UHDW\ DQG ([SHUW %RGLHV LQ WKH &RXQFLO RI (XURSH¶ LQ 5 :ROIUXP V. Röben (eds.), 
Developments of International Law in Treaty Making (Springer, Berlin-Heidelberg-New York, 
2005) 245, 271; comment by J. Trachtman to J. Polakiewicz, in ibid, 291, 292. 
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LPSOHPHQWDWLRQ¶50 Chapman seems to be in conformity with the nature of the 
)&10 LQVRIDU LW µFRQWDLQV PRVWO\ SURJUDPPH-W\SH SURYLVLRQV¶51 ZKLFK µDUH
QRWGLUHFWO\DSSOLFDEOH¶52 and justifiable before national authorities. Hence, the 
FCNM was not meant to create legal rights for persons belonging to minorities; 
it provides only for principles.53 The fact, however, that the FCNM was not 
designed like that retains limited relevance since the Advisory Committee 
started to articulate its own views regarding the construction of the FCNM. 
Although Article 26 FCNM does not afford µVWDQGDUG-VHWWLQJ¶IXQFWLRQVWRWKH
Advisory Committee, the latter formulates its Opinions on the basis of legal 
criteria. Moreover, the Committee has developed a progressive practice 
clarifying and expanding the obligations under the FCNM54 and, in turn, this 
practice has been, in general terms, endorsed by the Committee of Ministers 
entrusted to supervise the implementation of the FCNM.55  
In contrast to Chapman, in the D.H. and 2UãXã cases the Grand 
Chamber derived interpretive guidance from the combined reading of the 
FCNM and the views of the Advisory Committee, hence, placing the external 
treaty norms within their dynamic environment by way of following their 
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 Chapman v. United Kingdom, 18 January 2001, (Grand Chamber), [94]. In fact, both 
judgments cite Chapman: D.H. (GC), [181]; 2UãXã(GC), [148]. 
51
 Explanatory Report to the FCNM, [11], available at <http://www.coe.int>.  
52
 Ibid, [11]. 
53
 5 +RIPDQQ µ7KH )UDPHZRUN &RQYHQWLRQ IRU WKH 3URWHFWLRn of National Minorities: An 
,QWURGXFWLRQ¶LQ0:HOOHUHGThe Rights of Minorities to Europe (Oxford University Press, 
1HZ<RUN/+DQQLNDLQHQµ$UWLFOH¶LQibid, 519, 521-522; R.M. Letschert, The 
Impact of Minority Rights Mechanisms (T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague, 2005) 213. 
54
 .7RSLGLµ$UWLFOHV-¶LQ:HOOHUQRWH53), 573, 585-0:HOOHUµ&RQFOXVLRQ7KH
Contribution of the European Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities 
to the Development of MinRULW\5LJKWV¶LQ:HOOHUQRWH53), 609, 637; Letschert, (note 53), 
176- . +HQUDQG µ(YHU-Increasing Synergy Towards a Stronger Level of Minority 
Protection Between Minority-Specific and Non-Minority-6SHFLILF ,QVWUXPHQWV¶   Eur 
Ybk Min Issues 15, 18, 24. 
55
 Hofmann, (note 53), 12; Letschert, (note 53), 163. 
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progressive development by their supervisory body.56 The interpretative impact 
was significant since the PIL norms and practice effectively disqualified the 
legal justifications invoked by the respondent State under Article 14 ECHR. 
Hence, the Court reads the ECHR in alignment with the standards stemming 
from the FCNM, draws links and synergies between various norms and 
practices and promotes coherency.57    
Nonetheless, the approach to place PIL norms within their dynamic 
environment should be also seen in light of the formal relationship between the 
FCNM and the ECHR. According to Article 23 FCNM which was drafted as a 
specific treaty clause  
the rights and freedoms flowing from the principles enshrined in the 
present framework Convention, in so far as they are the subject of a 
corresponding provision in the Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms or in the Protocols 
thereto, shall be understood so as to conform to the latter provisions.   
7KHDLPRI WKHSURYLVLRQ LV WRHQVXUH ILUVW WKDWµXQGHUQRFLUFXPVWDQFHVFDQ
the Framework Convention modify the rights and freedoms safeguarded in the 
>(&+5@¶58 DQG VHFRQGO\ WKDW WKH µULJhts and freedoms enshrined in the 
IUDPHZRUN &RQYHQWLRQ >«@ must be interpreted in accordance with the 
[ECHR]¶59 ,Q RWKHU ZRUGV WKH &RXUW¶V SUDFWLFH RI DOLJQLQJ LWV SRVLWLRQ ZLWK
and construe the applicability in accordance with the dynamic and progressive 
development of the FCNM by the Advisory Committee is in contrast to the 
                                                             
56
 Also Muñoz Díaz v Spain, 8 December 2009, [60], [64]. 
57
 S. Spiliopoulou-$NHUPDQ µ7KH/LPLWVRI3OXUDOLVP-Recent Jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Human Rights with regard to Minorities: Does the Prohibition of Discrimination Add 
$Q\WKLQJ"¶JEMIE 1, 22.  
58
 Explanatory Report to the FCNM, [92]. 
59
 Ibid, [92] (emphases added). 
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FCNM treaty clause, which dictates the reverse scenario. Although the Court 
itself is not formally bound by Article 23 FCNM, this is another instance which 
illustrates that specific treaty clauses are not useful, or are even obsolete, in 
light of the complex interpretative practice of supervisory bodies of judicial or 
non-judicial nature.60 It also brings to the fore, once more, the fact that the 
VCLT accommodates the current practice of international courts only to a 
certain extent. Chapter 4 underlined, and this is a point equally applicable to all 
the cases discussed in this thesis, that taking a PIL norm into account in 
conjunction with its development by the views of the international body 
supervising it is necessary for mitigating fragmentation of PIL, even though 
this interpretative practice does not fit easily within Articles 31-33 VCLT.61        
The jurisprudence subsequent to the D.H. and 2UãXã cases is not 
entirely consistent. Inconsistency and selectiveness concern the construction of 
the relevant PIL framework to the case at hand, like in the 2UãXã judgment 
(rendered by the Chamber)62 in which the Court did not examine the claim for 
indirect discrimination against the background of relevant PIL norms. 
Discrepancy and selectiveness also exist in that the Court, even though it cites 
relevant PIL norms, does not derive any interpretative guidance from them, as 
in Sampanis.63 In these instances the Court did not follow the methodology and 
the novel approach established by the Grand Chamber in the D.H. judgment. 
Yet, when the Grand Chamber decided the 2UãXã case, it dismissed the 
                                                             
60
 Jersild v. Denmark, 23 September 1994, (Grand Chamber) and infra 6.2.2 for the discussion 
RIWKH&(5'µGXHUHJDUG¶FODXVH 
61
 Infra 4.4, 4.7. 
62
 2UãXãDQGRWKHUVY&URDWLD, 17 July 2008. 
63
 Sampanis v. Greece, 5 June 2008, [37]-[48]. 
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&KDPEHU¶V DSSURDFK DQG LWV ILQDO RXWFRPH KHQFH UHLQIRUFLQJ WKH SRVLWLRQ
taken in D.H 
 
7.3.2 5HFRJQLVLQJµLQGLUHFWGLVFULPLQDWLRQ¶RQWKHEDVLVRIJHQGHU 
The Opuz v. Turkey case64 is a pertinent example of how the Court 
follows up the novel approach consolidated in D.H. insofar as indirect 
discrimination under Article 14 on the basis of gender is concerned. The 
applicant argued that the Turkish authorities failed to protect her and her 
mother from domestic violence. Having found a violation of Articles 2 and 3, 
the Court addressed the alleged breach of Article 14 read in conjunction with 
Articles 2 and 3. In line with D.H., the statistical data provided by the applicant 
was accepted as prima facie proof for the existence of a general and 
discriminatory judicial passivity of Turkish authorities concerning domestic 
violence mostly affecting women.  
The Court thought, however, that in order to assess the indirect 
discrimination claim in the context of domestic violence, it should additionally 
take cognisance of the international law background to the legal question 
before it.65 Reference was made to the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women66 and the practice of its Committee; 
WKH 81 +XPDQ 5LJKWV &RPPLVVLRQ¶V 5HVROXWLRQ RQ (OLPLQDWLRQ RI YLROHQFH
against women;67 the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, 
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 Opuz v. Turkey, 9 June 2009. 
65
 Ibid, [184]. 
66
 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (concluded 
on 18 December 1979; entered into force on 3 September 1981) 1249 UNTS 13 (CEDAW). 
67
 &RPPLVVLRQ RQ +XPDQ 5LJKWV 5HVROXWLRQ  µ(OLPLQDWLRQ RI 9LROHQFH $JDLQVW
:RPHQ¶81'RF(&15(6-45. 
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Punishment and Eradication of Violence against Women68 and the relevant 
practice of the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights.69 It cannot go 
XQQRWLFHGWKDW WKHEDFNJURXQGWRWKHFDVHGRHVQRWUHODWHWR(XURSHDQ6WDWHV¶
standards but concerns exclusively PIL norms and practice stemming from UN 
specialised instruments and bodies and specialised regional standards of Inter-
American origin. 
The common underlying denominator of these PIL norms and practice 
was the establishment of the nexus between gender-based violence and 
discrimination. The Court employed this nexus for affirming the existence of 
indirect discrimination.70 Strictly speaking, it would be sufficient for the Court 
to accept the applicability of the facts of the case to the discrimination claim by 
applying the D.H. novel approach concerning the recognition of and the means 
to prove indirect discrimination under Article 14 ECHR. Until recently, 
KRZHYHUGRPHVWLF YLROHQFHZDV QRWYLHZHGDV D µKXPDQ ULJKWV¶ LVVXH71 The 
PIL norms and practice - besides the significant impact they had on the merits 
of the case72 - enabled the Court to enlarge the applicability of Article 14 
ECHR by way of recognising and consolidating the link between gender-based 
violence and non-discrimination under the ECHR.73 
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 Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence 
against Women (concluded on 9 June 1994; entered into force on 5 March 1995) 33 ILM 1618. 
69
 Opuz, [186]-[190]. 
70
 Ibid, [191]. 
71
 For similar thoughts in a different context see D. McGoldrick, Human Rights and Religion ± 
The Islamic Headscarf Debate in Europe (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2006) 31-33. 
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 Infra 8.3. 
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 60XOODOO\µ'RPHVWLF9LROHQFH$V\OXP&ODLPVDQG5HFHQW'HYHORSPHQWVLQ,QWHUQDWLRQDO
+XPDQ5LJKWV/DZ$3URJUHVV1DUUDWLYH"¶ICLQ 459, 468-469. 
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7.4   Recognising the right to consultation and the right to collective 
bargaining under Article 11 ECHR 
$QRWKHUH[DPSOHRI WKH&RXUW¶VSUDFWLFHRIHQODUJLQJ WKHDSSOLFDELOLW\
of the rights under the ECHR by relying on PIL norms is the series of cases 
concerning the right to consultation and the right to collective bargaining. In 
the Wilson, National Union of Journalists and others case74 the applicants 
argued that the English legislation provided no remedy for them in order to 
ensure the effective protection of their right to collective bargaining. They 
FRPSODLQHGRIWKHLUHPSOR\HUV¶SUDFWLFHRIZLWKGUDZLQJWKHLUUHFRJQLWLRQIURP
the trade unions and subsequently to offer incentives to certain employees 
while asking them to renounce their trade union rights. The Chamber, in line 
with the previous case law, asserted that Article 11 did not guarantee any 
specific type of treatment and, thus, the right to collective bargaining was not 
included under Article 11. Yet, in light of the facts, the Court acknowledged 
that the absence of any remedy available to the trade union against the practice 
RI WKH HPSOR\HUV WR IUXVWUDWH WKH XQLRQ¶V DELOLW\ WR SURWHFW LWV PHPEHUV¶
interests was a breach of the right to association.  
This conclusion was supported by the international obligations that the 
United Kingdom was incumbent with: the European Social Charter (ESC)75 
and the International Labour Organisation (ILO) Conventions No. 8776 and No. 
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 Wilson, National Union of Journalists and others v. United Kingdom, 2 July 2002.  
75
 European Social Charter (revised) (concluded on 3 May 1996; entered into force on 1 July 
1999) CETS 163. 
76
 International Labour Convention (No 87) concerning Freedom of Association and Protection 
of the Right to Organise (concluded on 9 July 1948; entered into force on 4 July 1950) 68 
UNTS 17. 
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98.77 The Court also afforded considerable weight to the interpretation of these 
provisions by their expert bodies. Article 5 ESC protects the right to organise 
DQG $UWLFOH  WKH ULJKW WR EDUJDLQ FROOHFWLYHO\ 7KH (6&¶V &RPPLWWHH RI
Independent Experts (ESC Committee)78 KDG VSHFLILFDOO\ FULWLFLVHG WKH 8.¶V
practice of not providing for the necessary remedies in the national legislative 
and judicial machinery in order for the trade union to protect its rights. Article 
11 of ILO Convention No. 87 prescribes that States should take all necessary 
measures for ensuring the effective exercise of the right to organise. Articles 3 
and 4 of ILO Convention No. 98 envisage similar guarantees for the proper 
utilisation of the machinery for voluntary negotiation. The Court took into 
consideration the Recommendation of the ILO Committee on Freedom of 
Association79 where it was stressed that if collective bargaining is to be 
exercised effectively, then its voluntary character should not be undermined. 
Hence, the Court concluded, if employers impose measures of compulsion, the 
State has the obligation to provide for the necessary framework for the 
objective verification of any claim made by the union. The right to collective 
bargaining was not read under the Convention. These treaties and the expert 
ERGLHV¶ YLHZVSURYLGHG VXSSOHPHQWDU\VXSSRUW IRUDQG UHLQIRUFHG WKH&RXUW¶V
conclusion regarding the applicability of Article 11 to the particular 
circumstances of the case.80  
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 International Labour Convention (No 98) concerning the Application of the Principles of the 
Right to Organise and to Bargain Collectively (concluded on 1 July 1949; entered into force on 
18 July 1951) 96 UNTS 257. 
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 Wilson, National Union of Journalists, [32], [48]. 
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 Ibid, [37], [48].  
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 Cf. Gustafsson v. Sweden, 25 April 1996 (Grand Chamber), [53] in which the Grand 
Chamber adopted a similar reasoning, although the case referred to a slightly different context 
to the one in Wilson, National Union Journalists; Harris et al., (note 22), 539. 
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The Demir and Baykara judgment (held by the Chamber)81 also uses 
PIL norms as strongly supportive evidence in order to enlarge the applicability 
of Article 11 ECHR. The onus of the application was whether Turkey had the 
obligation to ensure the right of civil servants to enter into collective 
bargaining with their employer. The Court endorsed WKH YLHZV RI WKH (6&¶V
Committee with respect to the organic link between the freedom of association 
and the freedom to bargain collectively.82 This was despite the fact that Turkey 
was not bound by the ESC. The Court accepted that the collective agreement in 
question constituted an integral part RIWKHDSSOLFDQWV¶IUHHGRPRIDVVRFLDWLRQ
only in the present circumstances,83 LQ FRQWUDVW WR WKH (6& &RPPLWWHH¶V
Conclusions where the crucial organic link was established generally, in terms 
of law.  
The Demir and Baykara and Wilson, National Union of Journalists and 
others cases are clear instances of the &RXUW¶VSUDFWLFHRIHPSOR\LQJ3,/QRUPV
in its reasoning in order to reinforce and confirm a position that it would have 
taken in any event under the specific factual circumstances, as it was the case, 
for example, in Bijelic in which relevant PIL norms on State succession were a 
VXEVWDQWLDO EXW VHFRQGDU\FRQVLGHUDWLRQ LQ WKH&RXUW¶V UHDVRQLQJ84 This point 
was also made explicit by the Grand Chamber when it discussed the Demir and 
Baykara case.85 Yet the supplementary role of PIL for expanding the 
applicability of Article 11 ECHR should not be underestimated. The Court in 
                                                             
81
 The case was decided by the Chamber Demir and Baykara v. Turkey, 21 November 2006 
and by the Grand Chamber upon request for a referral by the Government: Demir and Baykara 
v. Turkey, 12 November 2008 (Grand Chamber). 
82
 Ibid, [35]. 
83
 Ibid, [36]. 
84
 Infra 3.3. 
85
 Demir and Baykara (GC), [64]. 
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its previous case law had employed the ESC as an a contrario forceful 
argument in order to exclude the right to consultation from the applicability of 
Article 11 ECHR.86 Thus, whereas relevant PIL norms were used to set a limit 
to the interpretation of the ECHR,87 now in the Demir and Baykara and 
Wilson, National Union of Journalists and others cases PIL norms and practice 
UHLQIRUFH DQG VXSSOHPHQW WKH &RXUW¶V OHJDO UHDVRQLQJ WRZDUGV WKH RSSRVLWe 
direction. 
 The interpretative impact of these relevant PIL norms became an 
autonomous and sufficient legal basis for enlarging as a matter of law the 
applicability of Article 11 ECHR when Demir and Baykara found its way, 
through a referral of the case, before the Grand Chamber. The crux of the 
PDWWHUZDVQRWRQO\WKHILQDORXWFRPHRIWKHDSSOLFDWLRQEXWDOVRWKH&RXUW¶V
PHWKRGRORJ\ DQG OHJDO UHDVRQLQJ 7XUNH\ REMHFWHG WR WKH &RXUW¶V SUDFWLFH RI
taking relevant rules of international law into account, unless the conditions set 
out in Article 31 (3)(c) VCLT are met. It argued that the Court should not have 
considered the provisions of the ESC or the ILO Conventions or the views of 
the ESC Committee since neither were binding on the respondent State. It was 
also stressed that the Court is not entitled to create by way of interpretation any 
new obligations which are not provided in the text of the Convention. Hence, 
LQ7XUNH\¶VYLHZWKHULJKWWRFROOHFWLYHEDUJDLQLQJFRXOGQRWEHUHDGXQGHUWKH
right to association as envisaged in Article 11 ECHR.88 The Grand Chamber in 
turn clarified that the Chamber used references to ILO Conventions only in 
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 National Union of Belgian Police v. Belgium, 27 October 1975 (Plenary), [38]; Swedish 
(QJLQH'ULYHUV¶8QLRQY6ZHGHQ, 6 February 1976, [39]; Schmidt and Dahlström v. Sweden, 6 
February 1976, [34], [36]. 
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 E. Bates, The Evolution of the European Convention on Human Rights (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2010) 303. 
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 Demir and Baykara (GC), [62]. 
203 
 
assessing the necessity of the impugned measure and that the views of the 
(6&¶V &RPPLWWHH ZHUH UHIHUUHG WR DV D VXSSOHmentary argument.89 
Nonetheless, it discussed in great detail its methodology of take PIL norms 
into account.90 This is a notable development, since the Court is reluctant and 
perhaps unwilling to articulate general theories in its case law concerning its 
principles of interpretation.91  
(i) 7KH&RXUW¶VPHWKRGRORJ\ 
,W ZDV UHLWHUDWHG WKDW WKH &RXUW LV µguided mainly by the rules on 
LQWHUSUHWDWLRQSURYLGHGIRU LQ$UWLFOHVWR>9&/7@¶92 The Convention is 
first and foremost a system for the protection of human rights and, hence, it 
should be interpreted and applied as ensuring practical and effective rights and, 
in light of the present-day conditions, by way of giving account to evolving 
norms of national and international law. However, the Court does not consider 
WKH &RQYHQWLRQ¶V SURYLVLRQV DV WKH VROH IUDPHZRUN RI UHIHUHQFH IRU LWV
interpretation.  
[O]n the contrary, [the Court] must also take into account any 
relevant rules and principles of international law applicable in 
relations between the Contracting Parties (see Saadi>«@Al-Adsani, 
>«@ %RVSKRUXV +DYD <ROODUÕ 7XUL]P YH 7LFDUHW $QRQLP ùLUNHWL Y
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 Ibid, [64]. 
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 Ibid, [60]-[86]. 
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 ) 0DWFKHU µ4XDUDQWH DQV G¶ DFWLYLWpV GH OD &RXU (XURSpHQQH GHV 'URLWV GH O¶ +RPPH¶
(1997) 270 RdC 237, 273-$0RZEUD\µ7KH&UHDWLYLW\RIWKH(XURSHDQ&RXUWRI+XPDQ
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05) 5 HRLRev 57, 61. 
92
 Demir and Baykara (GC), [65] (emphases added). See also 7ăQDVH Y 0ROGRYD, 27 April 
2010, (Grand Chamber) infra Chapter 9. 
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Ireland >*&@ >«@ VHH DOVR $UWLFOH    F RI WKH 9LHQQD
Convention).93 
Several examples from its jurisprudence were provided, such as taking 
cognisance of proYLVLRQV RI LQWHUQDWLRQDO WUHDWLHV IRU HVWDEOLVKLQJ 6WDWH¶V
positive obligations,94 general principles of law recognised by civilised nations 
or non-binding instruments stemming either from the bodies of the Council of 
Europe or other international bodies.95            
Although Articles 31-9&/7ZHUHLQYRNHGIRUYDOLGDWLQJWKH&RXUW¶V
interpretative practice, it is not clear the extent to which (if any) the Court 
follows the interpretative arguments as enshrined in the general rules of treaty 
interpretation. 7KLVTXHVWLRQLVLPSRUWDQWVLQFH7XUNH\¶VSUHOLPLQDU\REMHFWLRQ
related precisely to the conditions that have to be met when applying Article 
 F 9&/7 7KH IDFW WKDW WKH &RXUW LV µguided mainly¶96 by the VCLT 
implies that Articles 31-33 VCLT is one source of inspiration among others. 
As to Article 31 (3)(c), although explicit reference is made to it, it appears that 
it is used by way of example or a source of guidance.97 It is placed within 
brackets and it is cited with relevant cases.98 A preliminary conclusion could 
thus be that the Court retains its distance from the letter of the provision and 
WKDWLWGRHVQRWFRQVLGHULWVHOIOLPLWHGE\WKHSURYLVLRQ¶VIRUPDOUHTXLUHPHQWV99  
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 Ibid, [67]. 
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 Ibid, [75]. 
96
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Further support to this preliminary conclusion is furnished by the fact 
thatDOWKRXJK$UWLFOHF9&/7UHIHUVWRµUXOHVRILQWHUQDWLRQDOODZ¶WKH
&RXUW DGRSWV D PRUH LQFOXVLYH DSSURDFK 7KLV LV PDGH FOHDU LQ WKH &RXUW¶V
ORRVHUWHUPLQRORJ\VXFKDVµQRUPV¶100 DQGµHOHPHQWV¶101 of PIL instead of only 
rules. The Court admitted that it systematically employs international 
instruments of a non-binding nature, such as treaties not signed, or not ratified, 
by the respondent State, or Resolutions and Recommendations issued by 
Council of Europe bodies, in its legal reasoning.102 Article 31 (3)(c) VCLT, on 
the other hand, covers all sources of international law (treaties, customary 
international law, general principles), but it does not come into play in the case 
of considerations that are not firmly established as binding rules.103  
Another SRLQWWKDWHYLGHQFHVWKH&RXUW¶V ODFNRIDSSOLFDWLRQRI$UWLFOH
31 (3)(c) VCLT concerns the requirement that the relevant rules of 
international law to be taken into account must be applicable in the relations 
between the parties. Chapter 2 showed that scholars and international practice 
DUHGLYLGHGDVWRZKHWKHUµSDUWLHV¶XQGHU$UWLFOHFVKRXOGLQYROYHRQO\
the parties to a given dispute or all contacting parties to the treaty under 
interpretation.104 The ECtHR adopts a different perception of the meaning of 
                                                                                                                                                                 
Fragmentation of International Law (Hart Publishing, Portland, 2012) 117, 122-123. Contra J. 
$UDWR µ&RQVWLWXWLRQDO 7UDQVIRUPDWLRQ LQ WKH (&7+5 6WUDVERXUJ¶V ([SDQVLYH 5HFRXUVH WR
([WHUQDO 5XOHV RI ,QWHUQDWLRQDO /DZ¶   Brook.J.Intl.L. 349, 353 who thinks that the 
Court employs an astonishingly broad construction of Article 31 (3)(c).  
100
 Demir and Baykara (GC), [68], [75], [78], [86]. 
101
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102
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103
 ,QWHUQDWLRQDO /DZ &RPPLVVLRQ µ5HSRUW RI WKH 6WXG\ *URXS RI WKH ,QWHUQDWLRQDO /DZ
Commission finalisHG E\ 0 .RVNHQQLHPL¶  0D\-9 June and 3 July-11 August 2006) UN 
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York, 2010) 266-268. 
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 Infra 2.3.1.  
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DSSOLFDEOH UXOHV ,WV DQDO\VLV UHIHUV WR WUHDWLHV µDSSOLFDEOH in the particular 
sphere¶105 RU µDSSOLFDEOH in respect of the precise subject matter of the case 
concerned¶106 7KHWHUPµDSSOLFDEOH¶DSSHDUVDWWDFKHGWRWKHVXEMHFWPDWWHURI
the case (commonly referred to in the case law as the international law 
background to the legal questions before it),107 rather than to the condition that 
the rule has to be applicable in the relations between the parties.108 The Court 
GLVPLVVHG 7XUNH\¶V REMHFWLRQ LQ WKDW the relevant PIL norms should be 
applicable between the parties, thereby binding on the respondent State.  
The Court sets out an alternative framework and justification for 
construing the notion of relevant and applicable norms when interpreting the 
ECHR. The basic premise in Demir and Baykara is that the Court identifies 
and uses in its reasoning any PIL norm if it qualifies as common international 
and/or domestic law standards accepted by the vast majority of States, hence, 
providing the guarantee that they form part of the European consensus.109  
The content of this European consensus is unclear, as is the exact 
PHDQLQJ RI µDFFHSWHG E\ WKH YDVW PDMRULW\ RI 6WDWHV¶ ,Q Marckx two 
international treaties, albeit not ratified or signed by the majority of member 
States (or the respondent State), were used for demonstrating the existence of 
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,QVLJKWVIURP
:727UDGH(QYLURQPHQWDO/LWLJDWLRQ¶,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZDQG-XVWLFH:RUNLQJ3DSHUs, 2007/1, 
New York University, School of Law, 35, available at http://www.iilj.org/publications/2007-
1Howse.asp.  
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commonly accepted standards.110 In Öneryildiz v. Turkey, the Court used 
treaties which were not yet in force.111 Therefore, the ordinary meaning of the 
requirement of being accepted by the vast majority of States is not being 
strictly followed. This raises the question of how the (European) consensus is 
to be discerned. In D.H. the Court disregarded the absence of the member 
6WDWHV¶ FRQVHQVXV 7KH )&10 SUHVFULEHG SURJDPPH W\SH SURYLsions 
evidencing the explicit lack of agreement among States (Chapman). Yet, the 
Court interpreted the ECHR in light of the FCNM and the progressive views of 
the Advisory Committee. In the same case and on the issue of statistics, the 
Court evaded the question of the existence of a European consensus and 
instead considered a great variety of non-binding materials of an international 
origin in order to follow a new interpretation of Article 14 ECHR overruling 
its previous case law. These examples demonstrate that the European 
consensus idea, as originally construed by the Court and commonly referred to 
in the literature, does not have the same content to date.  
The Court has progressively moved away from defining commonly 
accepted standards, by using the comparative (or consensual) interpretation, as 
solely those found in the legislation and practice of member States. This shift 
involves, contrary to what the Court proclaimed in Demir and Baykara, the 
consideration of international treaties not accepted by the majority of States 
(Marckx, Öneryildiz). It also involves instances in the case-law, in which the 
Court ignores the consensus of States as clearly reflected in certain 
international instruments (D.H. case). Moreover, PIL norms may serve a 
                                                             
110
 Marckx v Belgium, 13 June 1979, (Plenary), [41]; J.G. Merrills, The Development of 
International Law by the European Court of Human Rights (Manchester University Press, 
Manchester, 1993) 79, 225-226. 
111
 Öneryildiz v. Turkey, 30 November 2004 (Grand Chamber); infra 9.1.1. 
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decisive role in the absence of common legal standards in national practice112 
or, all the more, when member States have contrary national practice.113 Of 
course, national legislation and practice may converge with PIL norms (Vo, 
Evans, Marckx);114 in these instances the European consensus is construed and 
µGLVFRYHUHG¶ E\ FRQIODWLQJ GRPHVWLF DQG 3,/ QRUPV DQG SUDFWLFH ZLWKRXW
distinguishing between different sources of law.115  
7KH &RXUW¶V UHFHSWLYHQHVV WR 3,/ QRUPV LV FOHDU DQG LW LV
acknowledged.116 Legal scholars have conceptualised in different ways the 
diverse fashions that PIL interacts with and/or alters the concept of European 
consensus. They argue that considering PIL is one of the types of European 
consensus (international consensus identified through international treaties)117 
RU WKDW WKH &RXUW HPSOR\V D µGRXEOH FRPSDUDWLYH LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ¶118 of the 
ECHR, namely in light of national and international standards. In a similar 
vein, interpreting the ECHR by reference to the general practice of member 
States (comparative interpretation) may include international treaties between 
member States and the Council of Europe, insofar as they could be presumed 
                                                             
112
 Goodwin v United Kingdon, 11 July 2002 (Grand Chamber), [85]; Joint Dissenting Opinion 
of Judges Wildhaber, Sir Nicolas Bratza, Bonello, Louciades, Cabral Barreto, Tulkens and 
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 M. C. v. Bulgaria, 4 December 2003, [154]-[166] infra 9.1.3; Siliadin v. France, 26 July 
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 Letsas, (note 113), 8-12; Mowbray, (note 91),  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Matter? Legitimacy of European Consensus in the Case Law of the European Court of Human 
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 Dzehtsiarou, (note 116), 548 where he refers also to consensus identified comparative 
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 J. Christoffersen, Fair Balance: Proportionality, Subsidiarity and Primarity in the 
European Convention of Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden-Boston, 2009) 
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to embody a consensus.119 The authors refer exclusively to Council of Europe 
treaties and they further articulate the tension between developing human 
ULJKWV RQ WKH EDVLV RI (XURSHDQ ODZ DQG WKH &RXUW¶V ZLOOLQJQHVV WR DYRLG
inconsistencies with other international instruments.120 Yet, the tension 
between the comparative interpretation and taking PIL into account cannot be 
explained in light of cases in which the former deters the reception of PIL in 
WKH&RXUW¶VUHDVRQLQJ121 Others place the interpretation of the ECHR by taking 
3,/ QRUPV LQWR DFFRXQW ZLWKLQ WKH µOLYLQJ LQVWUXPHQW¶ WKHRU\ HYROXWLYH RU
dynamic interpretation),122 while at the same time they do accept that 
international developments (or the lack of them) may function as a limitation 
WRWKHDSSOLFDWLRQRIWKHµOLYLQJLQVWUXPHQW¶WKHRU\123  
The preceding views reveal some confusion and complexity in a 
struggle to place the interpretative practice of taking PIL norms into account 
under the classic interpretation principles followed by the Court. The present 
author argues that this confusion is mitigated, if it is accepted that the 
consideration of PIL is a separate interpretative principle to the European 
consensus idea. It is clear that PIL norms have an impact on the interpretation 
of the ECHR of a distinctive nature to the interpretative impact stemming from 
national practice, functioning either in a converging or a diverging fashion. In 
many cases the Court sets aside the consensus as reflected in international 
                                                             
119
 C. Ovey, R. White (eds.), Jacobs and White, The European Convention of Human Rights 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010) 168.  
120
 Ibid, 77. 
121
 Forowicz, (note 49), 8. 
122
 &/5R]DNLVµ7KH(XURSHDQ-XGJHDV&RPSDUDWLVW¶LQ6LU%0Drkesinis, J. Fedtke (eds.), 
Judicial Resource to Foreign Law. A New Source of Inspiration (UCL Press, London, 2006) 
338, 343- 0RZEUD\ QRWH    $ 0RZEUD\ µ$Q([DPLQDWLRQ RI WKH (XURSHDQ
&RXUW RI +XPDQ 5LJKWV¶ $SSURDFK WR 2YHUUXOLQJ LWV 3UHYLRXV &DVH /DZ¶   HRLRev 
179, 193-194, 197. 
123
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treaties or the consensus flowing from national legal orders. It should be thus 
acknowledged that interpreting the ECHR in light of PIL is a separate 
interpretative principle which interrelates in a manifold way with the 
comparative or consensual interpretation. This conclusion comes to support the 
argument of this thesis and is concordant with the conclusions from previous 
Chapters concerning the distinct nature of the practice of taking cognisance of 
PIL norms to the principle of effectiveness124 and the principle of the evolutive 
interpretation.125  
Most importantly, the European consensus doctrine as articulated in 
Demir and Baykara has certain problematic features. Besides the fact that in 
PDQ\ LQVWDQFHV 3,/ GRHV QRW FRQYHUJH ZLWK 6WDWHV¶ FRQVHQVXV LWV DOOHJHG
European origin and point of reference are not beyond doubt. In cases like 
Scoppola and Opuz PIL norms, which had a determinative impact on the 
&RXUW¶V UHDVRQLQJ KDG QRWhing to do with European developments, but were 
rather related to the IACHR or specialised regional or UN instruments or 
international instruments such as the Statute of the ICC. In other words, these 
instruments construe at the best case an international consensus while the 
European nexus is weak, if existent at all.126 Therefore, the Court uses the 
European consensus as a rhetorical tool to legitimise employing PIL in its 
judgments. The invoked consensus legitimises progress,127 even in cases where 
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 Infra 4.7, 5.5, 6.6. 
125
 Infra 4.7. 
126
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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it is admitted that it is consensus in formation and not established.128 It gives 
the false impression of a positivistic perception of the existence of common 
European standards which are to be found and not created by the Court.129 This 
is the reason that the Court is inclined towards the European consensus idea 
and construing its reasoning on the alleged consensus of member States.130           
(ii) The outcome of the case 
7XUQLQJ QRZ WR WKH DSSOLFDQWV¶ FRPSODLQWV WKHLU DUJXPHQWV LQYROYHG
that their right to join a trade union and to bargain collectively, even though 
they were civil servants, fell under Article 11 ECHR and had been violated. 
The Court on the basis of PIL norms proclaimed that the right of public 
officials to form and join a trade union falls under the applicability of the 
ECHR and in casu had been breached. These PIL norms included UN treaties 
of general scope, such as the relevant provisions of the ICCPR and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR);131 
regional specialised treDWLHV DQG SUDFWLFH VXFK DV WKH (6& DQG WKH (6&¶V
Committee of Independent Experts observations - although the ESC was not 
ratified by Turkey; ILO Convention No. 87 and the views of the ILO 
Committee of Experts and ILO Convention No. 98 and the ILO Committee on 
Freedom of Association. Reference was also made to the EU Charter, the 
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe Recommendation 6 (2000) 
DQG WR WKH PHPEHU 6WDWHV¶ SUDFWLFH 7KH FRPPRQ GHQRPLQDWRU RI WKHVH 3,/
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:72 $SSHOODWH %RG\¶ LQ ( &DQQL]]DUR HG The Law of Treaties Beyond the Vienna 
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norms guaranteed the right of public officials to form trade unions and the 
restrictions provided therein did not come into play in light of the facts of the 
case.  
As far as the right of civil servants to collective bargaining is 
concerned, ILO Conventions No. 98 and No. 151132 - both ratified by Turkey - 
explicitly envisaged this freedom. The first prescribes in Article 6 for the 
H[FHSWLRQ RI µSXEOLF VHUYDQWV HQJDJHG LQ WKH DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ RI WKH 6WDWH¶ EXW
the ILO Committee of Experts interprets the exception as covering only 
officials whose activities were specific to the administration of State. ILO 
Convention No. 151 provides for certain exceptions concerning specific 
categories of employees working in the public sector, but the said right is fully 
applicable to civil servants. Further, Article 6 ESC, to which Turkey was not a 
party, does not provide for an obligation of the State to enter into collective 
bargaining. According to the Committee of Social Rights, however, Article 6 
LPSRVHVDQREOLJDWLRQµWRDUUDQJH IRUWKH LQYROYHPHQWRIVWDIf representatives 
LQ WKH GUDIWLQJ RI WKH DSSOLFDEOH HPSOR\PHQW UHJXODWLRQV¶133 Finally, the EU 
&KDUWHU DQG WKH JUHDW PDMRULW\ RI WKH &RXQFLO RI (XURSH PHPEHU 6WDWHV¶
legislation protected the said freedom. The Court, by way of building upon the 
perceptible evolution in both international and domestic legal systems, 
recognised that the right to bargain collectively with the employer has, in 
principle, become one of the essential elements of Article 11 ECHR and found 
a violation of Article 11 ECHR.134     
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(iii) Re-conceptualising the case-law on Article 11 ECHR 
Following a rather dramatically progressive development since Wilson, 
National Union of Journalists and others DQG WKH &KDPEHU¶V MXGJPHQW LQ
Demir and Baykara in which the right to association was declared to have been 
violated on the basis of the particular circumstances of the cases - as a matter 
of fact - the Grand Chamber in unanimity in Demir and Baykara enlarged the 
applicability of Article 11 ECHR in general terms - as a matter of law. Thus, 
the Demir and Baykara case effectively overruled the previous jurisprudence 
of the Court.135 In this respect, the interpretative argument of reading the 
Convention in the light of other PIL norms was decisive. Although the Court 
referred to the synergetic relation of this principle with the evolutive 
interpretation and the principle of ensuring practical and effective rights, the 
XVHRI3,/QRUPVZDVWKHGULYLQJIRUFHEHKLQGWKH&RXUW¶VUHDVRQLQJDVLQWKH
Scoppola and Zolotukhin cases.136 This should be contrasted, again, to 
National Union of Journalists and others DQG WKH &KDPEHU¶V MXGJPHQW LQ
Demir and Baykara where PIL was merely supportive. The approach and 
reasoning adopted in Demir and Baykara is further reflected in the subsequent 
jurisprudence with respect to the right of collective action and the right to 
strike.137 Demir and Baykara is also followed and explicitly cited in other 
cases outside the context of Article 11 ECHR as far as the PIL related 
methodology introduced is concerned.138 In the same vein, Golder and 
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Loizidou, Al-Adsani and Demir and Baykara appear to advance an impact 
EH\RQG WKHLU FRQILQHV DQG WR GLFWDWH WKH &RXUW¶V UHDVRQLQJ139 In the present 
DXWKRU¶V YLHZ WKH &RXUW VWDUWV GHYHORSLQJ DQG HVWDEOLVKLQJ FHUWDLQ EDVLF
components of its methodology concerning the consideration of PIL norms for 
the interpretation of the ECHR.      
Finally, as it has already been stressed, the Court places the external to 
the ECHR norms in their own dynamic environment. The provisions of the 
international instruments are read in conjunction with the views of their 
supervisory bodies. Such views either affirm the text of the treaties or 
progressively develop their meaning, as the ILO Committee of Experts views 
FRQFHUQLQJ,/2&RQYHQWLRQ1RDQGWKH(6&&RPPLWWHH¶VYLHZVUHJDUGing 
WKH (6& 7KHUH LV DQ DVSHFW LQ WKH &RXUW¶V SURFHVV WR GLVFHUQ WKH FRPPRQ
denominator of many PIL norms while reading them in their own treaty 
context which is not, however, addressed. This involves the fact that the Court 
inevitably engages with regimes which attain their own particularities and 
conceptual structures. For example, the ILO conception of the right to strike 
IROORZV D µKXPDQ ULJKWV DSSURDFK¶ ZKHUHDV WKH (6& FRQFHSWLRQ RI WKH VDPH
ULJKWUHDGV LW LQDPRUHµLQGXVWULDOUHODWLRQV¶FRQWH[W140 Moreover, the ECHR 
RUWKH ,&&35DUHPRVWO\ LQVWUXPHQWVRIDFLYLO DQGSROLWLFDO ULJKWV¶ QDWXUH LQ
FRQWUDVWWRWKH,/2WUHDWLHVZKLFKIRUPSDUWRIWKHµODERXUODZ¶SDUDGLJP6XFK
nuances are disregarded in the process of integrating standards for discerning 
                                                                                                                                                                 
2010 (Grand Chamber); cf. Dissenting Opinion of Judge Ziemele in Andrejeva v. Latvia, 18 
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a common denominator.141 Similar concerns were raised in the Van der 
Mussele and Siliadin cases, in Chapter 4, in which the Court employed PIL 
norms of an ILO origin when defining the concept of forced or compulsory 
labour under Article 4 ECHR.142 The process of reading many PIL norms 
together and, hence, integrating standards is part and parcel of developing PIL. 
At the same time, however, there a fine line to draw concerning the respect of 
different contextual nuances of different norms and the treaty context from 
which they originate. Chapter 1 underlined that international courts should 
pursue the unity of PIL and harmonising interpretations of similar or identical 
norms subject to the fact that different context may dictate otherwise. In other 
words, international courts have valid reasons to justify a different approach, if 
it is deemed necessary by virtue of differences in the purpose, aim, function of 
PIL norms. It is notable that in the instances discussed here the practice of the 
ECtHR reveals pertinent concerns on the other end of the spectrum: the ECtHR 
follows such an intensive integrative and harmonising interpretation of the 
ECHR with other PIL norms that questions the limits of developing and 
uniting PIL. The present author thinks that, in principle, such an interpretation 
is sound subject to not completely disregarding fundamental differences 
among PIL norms.           
7.5 5HFRJQLVLQJµKXPDQWUDIILFNLQJ¶ZLWKLQ$UWLFOH(&+5 
The Rantsev case was discussed in chapter 4 with respect to how the 
Court used 3,/LQRUGHUWRGHILQHµVODYHU\¶XQGHU$UWLFOH143 Here the focus 
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lies on how the Court enlarged the applicability of Article 4 by recognising 
human trafficking within its scope. The application, brought by a Russian 
national against Cyprus and Russia, concerned the circumstances which led to 
KLVGDXJKWHU¶VGHDWK6KHZDVDYLFWLPRI WUDIILFNLQJZKRKDG WUDYHOOHG IURP
5XVVLD WR &\SUXV WR ZRUN DV DQ µDUWLVWH¶ LQ D FDEDUHW $ IHZ GD\V DIWHU KHU
arrival in Cyprus, she died in unidentified and peculiar circumstances. Her 
father, the complainant before the Court, argued for a violation of Article 4 
ECHR.  
7KH VWDUWLQJ SRLQW RI WKH &RXUW¶V DQDO\VLV ZDV WKDW WKH FDVH EHIRUH LW
was a human trafficking case. Given the absence of an express reference to 
trafficking in Article 4, it had to establish that the provision was applicable to 
WKHVSHFLILFFLUFXPVWDQFHV7KH&RXUWIROORZHGWKH*UDQG&KDPEHU¶VMXGJPHQW
in the Demir and Baykara case and set out the same methodology.144 It 
stressed that the provisions of the Convention are not to be considered as the 
sole conceptual framework for the interpretation of the rights and freedoms 
provided therein. The ECHR should be read in its context, which encompasses 
any relevant rules and principles of international law applicable in the relations 
between the parties. Hence, the Convention should be read as far as possible in 
harmony with other rules of international law.145 The Court also drew on the 
synergetic relation of the interpretation of the ECHR in light of relevant PIL 
norms ZLWKWKHµOLYLQJLQVWUXPHQW¶LQWHUSUHWDWLRQDQGWKHJXDUDQWHHRISUDFWLFDO
and effective rights.146 
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The Court construed the relevant international law context as including 
a large number of international treaties on trafficking. Reference was made to 
many trafficking agreements from the early twentieth century,147 the United 
Nations (UN) Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, 
especially Women and Children148 and the Council of Europe Convention on 
Action against Trafficking.149 International instruments of a non-treaty nature 
were cited, such as a series of Recommendations issued by the Committee of 
Ministers and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe150 and the 
Framework Decision to combat Trafficking by the European Union.151 Article 
17 (1)(c) of the Rome Statute concerning enslavement as a crime against 
humanity152 and many provisions of the Slavery Convention were also 
invoked. 
It should be recalled that in Siliadin the Court followed a different 
approach with respect to the identification of the relevant PIL norms.153 
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Although both cases were human trafficking related cases, in Siliadin the 
pertinent context was indicated by reference to the Forced or Compulsory 
Labour Convention and the Slavery and the practices similar to Slavery 
Conventions,154 HYHQ WKRXJK WKH DSSOLFDQW¶V DUJXPHQWV LQYROYHG WUDIILFNLQJ
allegations and the Court cited the Anti-Trafficking Convention under its 
µUHOHYDQW ODZ¶ VHFWLRQ155 In contrast, the Court in Rantsev explicitly 
acknowledged the human trafficking aspect and it took cognisance of more 
recent and specific to the subject matter of human trafficking PIL norms 
(Palermo Protocol, Anti-Trafficking Convention). The well-argued 
submissions by the applicant and third-SDUW\ LQWHUYHQWLRQV E\ µ,QWHULJKWV¶DQG
the A,5(&HQWUHDSSHDUWRKDYHVXEVWDQWLDOO\GLUHFWHGRUVXSSRUWHGWKLV³DQHZ´
relevant international law context.156 Crucially, however, this means that 
Article 4 ECHR is subject to different interpretations in light of different PIL 
norms, even though the set of pertinent facts were similar in both 
applications.157  
This gives rise to the question of what actually qualifies as a relevant 
PIL norm. The International Law Commission did not touch upon this issue 
when it discussed the notion of relevant rules that should be taken into account 
by virtue of Article 31 (3)(c) VCLT.158 The question has not been addressed 
either in academic literature and when it is addressed circular approaches are 
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 +&XOOHQµ6LOLDGLQY)UDQFH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 Siliadin, [91], [92], [50] respectively.  
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 µ,QWHULJKWV¶ ZULWWHQ VXEPLVVLRQ LV DYDLODEOH at 
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 Additionally, Cullen noted that the Court should have considered the more recent ILO 
Convention concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst 
Forms of Child Labour; Cullen, (note 154), 595. 
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 ILC Final Rep., [410]-[480].    
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adopted.159 This is an important matter, however, since different relevant 
norms lead to different interpretations of the ECHR and, hence, advance a 
YDU\LQJLQWHUSUHWDWLYHLPSDFWRQWKHSURWHFWLYHVFRSHRIDSURYLVLRQDQG6WDWHV¶
obligations accordingly.160  
7KHFRQFHSWRIUHOHYDQFHLVORRVHUWKDQWKHQRWLRQRIWKHµVDPHVXEMHFW-
matter¶DVHQYLVDJHG LQ$UWLFOH9&/7161 One should not lose sight of the 
fact that relevant rules are those which provide aid for and inform the 
interpretation of a specific treaty provision rather than those applying in a 
situation generally.162 Former President of the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ), Higgins, stressed this point in her Separate Opinion in the Oil Platforms 
case.163 She noted that according to Article 31 (3)(c) VCLT certain rules are 
relevant if, and to the extent that, they are sufficiently related to the context of 
the said treaty.164 It is for the reason that she found it problematic that the 
majority of the ICJ took the totality of substantive international law on the use 
of force into account in order to interpret a provision of a type of treaty 
concerned with economic and commercial issues (a Friendship, Commerce and 
Navigation treaty). The criterion, however, of ascertaining the type of treaty 
under interpretation is not very clear in cases other than contrasting a 
commercial and economic treaty to the corpus of PIL on the use of force. It is 
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 µ,I WKLV ³RWKHU UXOH´ VKHGV OLJKW RQ WKH PHDQLQJ RI WKH :72 WHUP LW LV ³UHOHYDQW´¶ LQ J. 
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Cambridge, 2008) 263-264. 
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 ')UHQFKµ7UHDW\,QWHUSUHWDWLRQDQGWKH,QFRUSRUDWLRQRI([WUDQHRXV/HJDO5XOHV¶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 Gardiner, (note 103), 266. 
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 Separate Opinion of Judge Higgins in Oil Platforms case, [45]-[46]; infra 2.3.1; F. Berman, 
µ7UHDW\µµ,QWHUSUHWDWLRQ¶¶LQD-XGLFLDO&RQWH[W¶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Yale JIL 315, 316-317. 
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 µ7KHUH VKDOO EH WDNHQ LQWR DFFount together with the context >«@ DQ\ UHOHYDQW UXOHV RI
LQWHUQDWLRQDOODZ>«@¶HPSKDVLVDGGHG 
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difficult to see how useful this consideration can be in finding out what type of 
treaty the ECHR is and how this, in turn, delineates the concept of relevant 
rules to be taken into account. Also, as it has rightly been highlighted, the letter 
of Article 31 (3)(c) does not ask that relevant rules of international law are part 
of the context of the treaty under interpretation, but that they shall be taken into 
account together with the context of that treaty.165 This seems to imply that the 
variety of rules to be relevant is greater. 
The ICJ in the Mutual Assistance case166 in 2008 appears to make a 
different and interesting suggestion regarding the relevance of PIL norms for 
the purpose of interpreting a treaty provision. In this instance, the ICJ accepted 
)UDQFH¶VDUJXPHQWWKDWWKH7UHDW\RI)ULHQGVKLSDQG&RRSHUDWLRQEHWZHHQ
France and Djibouti was a relevant rule for interpreting the 1986 Convention 
on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters. This was the case although the 1977 
7UHDW\¶V SURYLVLRQV ZHUH PRVWO\ DVSLUDWLRQDO LQ FKDUDFWHU ZLWKRXW SURYLGLQJ
any specific operational guidelines. Most importantly, no substantial link 
connected the two treaties, since the fields of cooperation envisaged in the 
1977 Treaty did not include judicial cooperation as prescribed under the 1986 
Convention. Yet, the ICJ by way of applying Article 31 (3)(c) VCLT, affirmed 
WKDWWKH7UHDW\KDVDµFHUWDLQEHDULQJ¶167 on the interpretation of the 1986 
Convention. Hence, according to the ICJ, the concept of relevance includes a 
great spectrum of rules which are not necessarily embedded within or directly 
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 -.ODEEHUV µ5HOXFWDQWGrundnormen: Articles 31(3)(c) and 42 of the Vienna Convention 
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 Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Djibouti v France), Judgment, 
4 June 2008, ICJ Rep. 2008, p. 177. 
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 Mutual Assistance case, [114]. 
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related to the context of a treaty. The certain bearing of the 1977 Treaty on the 
interpretation of the 1986 Convention indicates that if a PIL norm is of limited 
relevance to the treaty provision under interpretation, then the interpretive 
impact should be also limited. The higher the degree of abstraction, the lower 
the impact on the interpretation of the treaty in dispute.168 Likewise, the closer 
to the so-called context of a treaty under interpretation another PIL norm is the 
greater bearing and interpretative impact may the latter advance on the former. 
The relevance - impact dependence seems appealing. It suggests a model which 
is rather inclusive of varying degrees of relevant norms, although it also 
introduces a certain degree of uncertainty. This model - which can be followed 
either by way of applying Article 31 (3)(c) VCLT or generally to the concept 
of relevance - is alsRFRQFRUGDQWZLWKWKH(&W+5¶VSUDFWLFHRIDVFHUWDLQLQJDQG
construing different PIL contexts to different cases. Yet, it raises concerns in 
that identical or similar sets of facts may acquire a different relevant PIL 
context. It gives way to legal uncertainty, selectiveness and different treatment 
of similar cases.  
Turning now to the applicability of Article 4, the Court opined in 
Rantsev that trafficking in itself, as defined in the Palermo Protocol and the 
Anti-Trafficking Convention, falls within the scope of Article 4.169 It found it 
rather unnecessary to assess whether trafficking met the definition of one (or 
more) of the practices envisaged in the provision, namely slavery, servitude 
and forced or compulsory labour. It was asserted that Article 4 comes into 
play, in abstracto, in all cases of human trafficking. This conclusion - 
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according to the references that the Court provides in the text of its judgment - 
was based on the Explanatory Report to the Anti-Trafficking Convention and 
the Reports published by the Cypriot Ombudsman and the Council of Europe 
Commissioner for Human Rights during his visit to Cyprus.170 The cited 
extracts from the two Reports referred to the factual background regarding 
trafficking with a specific emphasis on Cyprus. The Explanatory Report to the 
Anti-Trafficking Convention mentioned that trafficking in human beings is the 
modern form of the old worldwide slave trade. It is difficult to see how these 
UHIHUHQFHVVXEVWDQWLDWHWKH&RXUW¶VDVVHUWLRQVLQFHWKH\GRQRWXVHWKHUHLQWKH 
notion of slavery or the exercise of powers attaching to the right of ownership 
in a legal sense.  
It should be noted that the link between trafficking and the concept of 
slavery is established in the Palermo definition of trafficking through the 
notion of exploitation. Exploitation is considered to be the purpose of 
trafficking and it may involve diverse forms of forced labour or services, 
slavery or practices similar to slavery or servitude.171 Nonetheless, the fact that 
the definition of trafficking under the Palermo Protocol and the Anti-
Trafficking Convention encompasses practices such as those prohibited in 
Article 4 does not necessarily result in Article 4 being applicable to all the 
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 $UWLFOH  D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GLIIHUHQWW\SHVRIWUDIILFNLQJ7KLVPDNHVWKH&RXUW¶VXQFRQGLWLRQDOconclusion 
that trafficking in all its forms falls within Article 4 without the need to 
examine the circumstances of the application before it questionable. The 
concepts under Article 4 ECHR are marginalised.172 A certain degree of 
conflation of notions stemV IURP WKH &RXUW¶V OHJDO UHDVRQLQJ ZLWK UHVSHFW WR
exploitation, slavery and exercise of powers attaching to the right of 
ownership.173     
 
7.6 Conclusions         
This Chapter demonstrated that the Court takes PIL norms into account 
in order to enlarge the applicability of the rights and freedoms under the 
ECHR. The relevant PIL referred to and discussed in the judgments serve 
different functions. First, PIL norms are invoked a contrario so as to exclude a 
given interpretation of the ECHR.174 Second, the consideration of PIL norms 
has a supplementary or reinforcing role along with other legal arguments or 
factual considerations (Wilson, National Union of Journalists and others; 
Chamber judgment in Demir and Baykara). Third, in most cases, however, the 
consideration of PIL norms had a determinative impact on the construction of 
the ECHR and the final outcome of the case. In Scoppola, D.H., 2UãXã, Opuz 
and Demir and Baykara cases the Grand Chamber overruled its previous case 
law and the use of PIL norms in (re-)interpreting the ECHR was the primary 
factor to this end.  
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In the series of cases where PIL had a decisive impact on the 
construction of the ECHR the Court invokes the synergetic relation of three 
principles of interpretation: the principle of ensuring practical and effective 
rights, the principle of evolutive interpretation and the interpretation of the 
ECHR by taking other relevant PIL norms into account (Rantsev, Scoppola, 
Demir and Baykara FDVHV<HWWKHGULYLQJIRUFHEHKLQGWKH&RXUW¶VUHDVRQLQJ
is the reliance upon PIL norms (Opuz, D.H., 2UãXãcases). 
 From the cases examined, it may be concluded that the Court employs 
the European consensus idea in order to legitimise the use of PIL. In most of 
the instances it is invoked as a rhetorical tool. The Court construes and uses 
common standards that are neither based on a consensual nature nor are of a 
European origin. In Scoppola the emerging standards were mostly 
international. In D.H. the Court not only evaded the question of the existence 
of a European consHQVXVEXWDOVRGLVUHJDUGHGWKHPHPEHU6WDWHV¶FRQVHQVXVDV
reflected in the FCNM and preferred aligning its position with the views of the 
FCNM Advisory Committee which were progressively developing the FCNM 
standards. In Opuz the common standards were exclusively of international and 
inter-$PHULFDQRULJLQ7KHUHIRUHWKH&RXUW¶VSUDFWLFHRIWDNLQJFRJQLVDQFHRI
PIL norms should not be conflated with the European consensus doctrine, 
although in certain cases they may reinforce each other and converge.  
 Another important feature that stems from the present examination is 
that the Court places the PIL norms in their own dynamic environment, namely 
the treaty context from which they come from. This means that when the Court 
takes an external treaty provision into account, it considers the interpretation 
given to it by the respective supervisory body. The same conclusion was also 
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drawn in Chapter 4, witnessing that the Court takes account of the fact that an 
extraneous treaty provision serves a specific purpose within the context, object 
and purpose of another treaty regime. Additionally, in this way, the Court 
follows the most updated and progressive meaning attributed to the external 
norms by their supervisory bodies. The practice of other international courts or 
supervisory bodies is a forceful argument before the Court and it is put forward 
also by the applicants and the third party interveners (Rantsev, D.H., 2UãXã).  
 Nonetheless, certain difficulties arise when the Court reads all these 
external PIL norms together and construes a common denominator of them. On 
one hand, the Court promotes coherence of PIL standards and even serves a 
role of integration. On the other hand, the creative construction of a common 
denominator implies that the Court sees and identifies a core of similarity and 
equivalence between PIL norms which is not always accurate and could be 
problematic. In Scoppola, the Court clearly did not respect the different 
formulations of the lex mitior principle envisaged in numerous treaties leading 
to a distortion of the ECHR language and perhaps to it stepping outside its 
jurisdictional confines. In Demir and Baykara, the nuances and different 
FRQWH[WVRIWKH,/2µODERXUODZ¶SDUDGLJPWKHSHFXOLDULWLHVRIWKH(6&DQGWKH
nature of rights and freedoms under the ECHR seem to be conflated. It is 
submitted that the Court in developing standards under PIL in this way should 
be very cautious of the contextual nuances tailored to the relevant PIL norms.         
Finally, one of the important aspects of the present discussion - 
LOOXVWUDWHGDOVRE\7XUNH\¶VSUHOLPLQDU\REMHFWLRQEHIRUHWKH*UDQG&KDPEHULQ
Demir and Baykara - is whether the Court applies Article 31 (3)(c) VCLT or 
whether it follows an interpretative practice of its own. The conclusion of this 
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Chapter is that, in contrast to the great interest of international lawyers towards 
the interpretive tool of Article 31 (3)(c), the Court is not applying the said 
provision in its everyday practice. Reference was not made to it, except in the 
case of Demir and Baykara, where, although it was cited, it is clear that the 
&RXUWNHHSVLWVGLVWDQFHIURPWKHSURYLVLRQ¶VUHTXLUHPHQWV,WZDVFODULILHGWKDW
the Court is guided mainly by it; that it does not take only rules of international 
law into account but also a great spectrum of PIL norms; and that it does not 
examine if the relevant rules are applicable in the relations between the parties. 
Therefore, the Court does not apply Article 31 (3)(c) VCLT.  
This is a useful conclusion in the sense of being aware of whether the 
&RXUW¶V UHDVRQLQJ SURYLGHV D VRXQG OHJDO EDVLV GHPRQVWUDWLQJ OHJDO FHUWDLQW\
and transparency. This is not to say that the non-use of Article 31 (3)(c) 
automatically rules out meeting these requirements, although it would have 
been preferable for the Court to use an interpretative tool found in the VCLT 
and employ a common methodological language as the rest of international 
courts. Nonetheless, in any case, applying Article 31 (3)(c) does not either 
assure a uniform and consistent approach across international courts in light of 
its open ended conditions which are subject to different interpretations (see in 
Demir and Baykara WKHGLVFXVVLRQDERXWWKHQRWLRQRIµDSSOLFDEOHUXOHVLQWKH
UHODWLRQV EHWZHHQ WKH SDUWLHV¶ RU LQ Rantsev the discussion on the concept of 
relevance).175  
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This brings into fore the question as to whether the Court employs a 
predictable and transparent legal reasoning, which is of importance since the 
Court is under the obligation to give reasons for its judgments.176 There are 
instances of selectiveness and inconsistency in the jurisprudence concerning 
both the construction of the PIL context (for example, Rantsev and Siliadin, 
D.H. and the subsequent case law) and concerning the interpretative impact 
drawn from the relevant norms (for example, D.H. and the subsequent pertinent 
FDVH ODZ :KDW LV LPSRUWDQW KRZHYHU LV WKH &RXUW¶V LQLWLDWLYH WR GUDZ DQ
overarching theory in Demir and Baykara case. This means that it openly 
acknowledges its practice of considering PIL norms and attempts to provide for 
a methodological framework. This framework is loose in many of its 
SDUDPHWHUVEXWLWLVDVWDUW,QWKHSUHVHQWDXWKRU¶VYLHZDemir and Baykara is 
a landmark judgment in this respect and it has already started to have an impact 
in the case law. If we add to this development the constant citations in the 
pertinent case law and the impact of Golder, Loizidou and Al-Adsani cases, 
then one could validly argue that a framework is gradually being developed. It 
would not be reasonable to expect the Court to adopt an absolutely coherent 
interpretative approach from one day to another. As a matter of comparison, 
ZKHQ WKH &RXUW VWDUWHG GHYHORSLQJ LQ WKH VHFRQG KDOI RI ¶V LWV NH\
interpretative techniques and decided Golder, it took some time for them to 
flourish and find their proper place in the case law.177 Overall, the 
interpretation of the ECHR by taking PIL norms into account is under 
evolution and already provides convincing evidence of predictability.      
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         8. Reading positive obligations into the protective scope of rights and 
freedoms 
8.1 Introduction  
The rights and freedoms enshrined in the ECHR, as in most 
international treaties for the protection of human rights, are typically framed as 
imposing negative obligations on the contracting parties. Member States have 
the obligation to refrain from interfering with those rights. The jurisprudence of 
the Court, however, constitutes a driving force towards developing further 
obligations incumbent on States. The case law witnesses the imposition of 
positive obligations on States, namely the duty to take certain action in order to 
secure the effective protection of the rights and freedoms prescribed under the 
Convention.1 
5HOHYDQWVWXGLHVGHPRQVWUDWHWKH&RXUW¶VLQFUHDVLQJSUDFWLFHRf reading 
positive obligations under the scope of the ECHR.2 7KHµFRPPRQMXVWLILFDWLRQ
IRUWKLVMXGLFLDODFWLYLW\KDVEHHQWRHQVXUHWKDWWKHUHOHYDQWULJKWVDUH³SUDFWLFDO
DQGHIIHFWLYH´ LQ WKHLUH[HUFLVH¶ FRQVROLGDWLQJ LQ WKLVZD\ WKH OLQNEHWZHHQ
on one hand, the development of positive obligations and, on the other hand, 
the principle of effectiveness and the dynamic interpretation of the 
Convention.3 7KHSUHVHQWLQTXLU\H[DPLQHVKRZWKH&RXUW¶VUHOLDQFHXSRQ3,/
norms contributes to the development of positive obligations under the ECHR 
and consequently, how the principle of taking PIL norms into account relates to 
the principle of effectiveness and the dynamic interpretation.   
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 D.J. Harris et al., Law of the European Convention on Human Rights (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2009) 18. 
2
 A. Mowbray, The Development of Positive Obligations under the European Convention on 
Human Rights by the European Court of Human Rights (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2004). 
3
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The Chapter is divided into seven sections addressing a variety of 
examples of positive obligations, such as the duty to penalise and prosecute 
certain acts, obligations related to the protection of the environment and access 
to information or to diligently investigate human trafficking.  
 
8.2 Criminalisation of negligent treatment of household waste by public 
authorities under Article 2 ECHR   
In the Öneryildiz v. Turkey case4 the applicants complained of a 
violation of their right to life under Article 2 ECHR. They claimed that the 
Turkish authorities were responsible for the deaths of their relatives as a result 
of a methane explosion at the municipal rubbish tip in Istanbul. Having 
established that the circumstances fell within the applicability of Article 2 
ECHR the right to life,5 the Court proceeded to the merits for assessing 
7XUNH\¶VFRPSOLDQFHZLWKWKHSURFHGXUDOREOLJDWLRQVXQGHUWKHULJKWWROLIH,Q
WKHFDVHRIXQLQWHQWLRQDOKRPLFLGHWKH6WDWHV¶REOLJDWLRQWRVHWXSDQHIIHFWLYH
judicial system does not necessarily require criminal proceedings to be 
brought; this obligation can be equally met if civil, administrative or 
disciplinary remedies are available to the victims.6 The present instance was 
distinguished, however, from the standard case law. The Court opined that it 
should instead apply the legal principles concerning the use of lethal force by 
analogy. This conclusion was justified by virtue of guaranteeing practical and 
                                                             
4
 Öneryildiz v. Turkey, 18 June 2002. The Grand Chamber also delivered a judgment upon a 
request for a referral by Turkey: Öneryildiz v. Turkey, 30 November 2004, (Grand Chamber).  
5
 Öneryildiz (GC), [71]. The characterisation of the waste collection site as dangerous was a 
legal qualification by reference to a series of PIL norms. 7KLVLVDQRWKHUH[DPSOHRIWKH&RXUW¶V
practice of enlarging the applicability of the rights under the ECHR by relying on PIL norms; 
infra Chapter 7. 
6
 Öneryildiz (GC), [92]; Harris et al., (note 1), 48. 
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effective rights7 and by furnishing evidence in developments in the relevant 
European standards.8 
These developments refer to the Convention on the Protection of the 
Environment through Criminal Law (Strasbourg Convention).9 The Strasbourg 
Convention, concluded under the auspices of the Council of Europe, promotes 
a common criminal policy for the protection of the environment, providing that 
member States must criminalise the unlawful disposal, treatment, storage, 
transport, export or import of hazardous waste which causes or is likely to 
cause, intentionally or by negligence, death or serious injury to any person.10 
Nonetheless, the Convention was not in force at the relevant time; being signed 
by twelve States and ratified by one. The Court, by an overwhelming majority 
RIVL[WHHQWRRQHQRWHGWKLVEXWVWDWHGWKDWµLWLVYHU\PXFKLQNHHSLQJZLWKWKH 
current trend towards harsher penalties for GDPDJHWRWKHHQYLURQPHQW¶11 The 
current trend, in turn, was a reference to a Proposal by the European 
Commission for a Directive on the Protection of the Environment through 
Criminal Law12 DQG WKH (XURSHDQ 8QLRQ¶V (8 )UDPHZRUN 'HFLVLRQ 1R
2003/80.13  
The Court drew a strong interpretative impact from these PIL norms ± 
as acknowledged subsequently by a unanimous Grand Chamber in Demir and 
Baykara14- and transposed them into the scope of Article 2 ECHR by way of 
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 Öneryildiz (GC), [69]. 
8
 Ibid, [93]. 
9
 Convention on the Protection of the Environment through Criminal Law (concluded on 4 
November 1998; not into force) ETS No. 172. 
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 Articles 2(b) and 3. 
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 Öneryildiz (GC), [61] (emphasis added). 
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 COM (2001) 139 Final OJ C 180E (26.06.2001), p. 238.  
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imposing the positive obligation to criminalise the negligent treatment of 
household waste by public authorities on States. These norms were either non-
binding material (the Proposal for a Directive, the 2003 Framework Decision) 
or instruments which were not in force at the material time (the Strasbourg 
Convention and the 2003 Framework Decision).15 Hence, the criterion set in 
Demir and Baykara, that the Court takes common European or/and 
international standards into account insofar as they are accepted by the vast 
majority of States (as discussed in Chapter 7), is not met.16 Although a trend 
may be discerned, the Strasbourg Convention was signed by a very small 
number of States and the rest of PIL norms neither provide for such detailed 
VWDQGDUGVQRUZHUHPDLQVWUHDPHG LQ6WDWHV¶SUDFWLFH7KH&RXUW¶VUHVRrt to an 
HPHUJLQJFRQVHQVXVKDGKRZHYHUDVLJQLILFDQW LPSDFWRQ6WDWHV¶REOLJDWLRQV
under Article 2 ECHR. 
 
8.3 Establishment and effective application of a system punishing all forms 
of domestic violence and providing sufficient safeguards for the victims 
under Article 2 
In Opuz WKHDSSOLFDQWFRPSODLQHGRIWKH7XUNLVKDXWKRULWLHV¶IDLOXUHWR
protect her and her mother from domestic violence arguing for a breach of 
Article 2 due to the lack of a deterring effect of Turkish legislation. The Court 
noted at the outset that 
there seems to be no general consensus among States Parties 
regarding the pursuance of the criminal prosecution against 
                                                             
15
 The 2003 Framework Decision imposed certain obligations on EU member States from 27 
January 2005 onwards (Article 10(1)). 
16
 Infra 7.3.  
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perpetrators of domestic violence when the victim withdraws her 
complaints.17 
The comparative survey, incorporated in the judgment, evidenced that in the 
great majority of member States authorities enjoyed a margin of discretion in 
deciding whether to pursue criminal proceedings against perpetrators of 
domestic violence.18  
Despite the clear absence of consensus among member States, the 
Court by relying on PIL norms unanimously held that States have the positive 
obligation under the ECHR to establish and effectively apply a system 
punishing all forms of domestic violence and providing sufficient safeguards 
for the victims.19 The fact that the criminal investigations in Turkey were 
strictly dependent on the pursuance of complaints by the victim of the domestic 
violence was found to be regrettable. The outcome of the case was that 
7XUNH\¶V OHJLVODWLRQ ODFNHG DGHTXDWH GHWHUUHQW HIIHFW Dnd that national 
DXWKRULWLHV¶RPLVVLRQVEUHDFKHG$UWLFOH(&+520    
In its legal reasoning the Court referred to a number of PIL norms and 
practice which adopt the concept of due diligence as a yardstick to assess State 
responsibility in the context of violence against women. The applicant and the 
third-party intervener (Interights) substantially contributed to the construction 
of the PIL background to the case.21 Further, reference was made to the 
practice of the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
                                                             
17
 Opuz v. Turkey, 9 June 2009, [138] (emphasis added). 
18
 Ibid, [87]-[90]. 
19
 Ibid, [145]. 
20
 Ibid, [145], [151]-[153].   
21
 Ibid, [131]. Interights written submission available at http://www.interights.org/view-
document/index.htm?id=237.  
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against Women (CEDAW). General Recommendation 19 provides the 
obligation to  
exercise due diligence to prevent, investigate and, in accordance 
with national legislation, punish acts of violence against women, 
whether those acts are perpetrated by the State or by private 
persons.22  
This Recommendation was subsequently affirmed and mainstreamed in the 
views of the CEDAW Committee in individual Communications.23 The Court 
devoted special attention to the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, 
Punishment and Eradication of Violence against Women which is the only 
multilateral instrument in PIL specifically addressing violence against 
women.24 The Inter-American Commission of Human Rights (IACmHR) also 
ascertained that States must exercise due diligence by preventing and 
investigating domestic violence incidents.25 7KH &RPPLWWHH RI 0LQLVWHUV¶
Recommendation on the protection of women against violence26 provides for 
the same triptych definition of due diligence (to prevent, investigate and punish 
certain acts) and indicates specific measures, such as penalising all forms of 
violence within the family and ensuring that victims are able to institute 
                                                             
22
 Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, UN General Assembly 
Resolution 48/104 (20 December 1993) UN Doc A/RES/48/104, Article 4 (c) (emphasis 
added). 
23
 A.T. v. Hungary, CEDAW Committee,  
Communication No. 2/2003, Views adopted on 26 January 2005; Fatma Yildirim v. Austria, 
CEDAW Committee, Communication No. 6/2005, Views adopted on 6 August 2007. 
24
 Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence 
against Women (concluded on 9 June 1994; entered into force on 5 March 1995) (1994) 33 
,/0%HOHP&RQYHQWLRQ$FFRUGLQJ WR$UWLFOH µ6WDWHV3DUWLHVFRQGHPQDOO IRUPVRI
violence against women and agree to pursue, by all appropriate means and without delay, 
policies to prevent, punish and eradicate such violence and undertake to: [...] (b) apply due 
diligence WRSUHYHQWLQYHVWLJDWHDQGLPSRVHSHQDOWLHVIRUYLROHQFHDJDLQVWZRPHQ¶HPSKDVLV
added). 
25
 Maria Da Penha v. Brazil, Report No. 54/01, [55], [56]. 
26
 Recommendation (2002) 5 of the Committee of Ministers on the Protection of Women 
Against Violence. 
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proceedings before domestic courts. The judgment drew upon the 2006 UN 
6SHFLDO 5DSSRUWHXU¶V 5HSRUW RQ violence against women and the standard of 
due diligence where the Rapporteur goes so far as to assert that this standard 
has acquired the status of a rule of customary international law.27  
The impact advanced by the combined reading of these PIL norms on 
the interpretation of Article 2 was material. Although the Court builds upon its 
previous jurisprudence concerning WKHQDWLRQDODXWKRULWLHV¶SRVLWLYHREOLJDWLRQV
to maintain and apply an adequate legal framework affording protection against 
acts of violence by private individuals and to take preventive operational 
measures,28 the use of PIL marks a shift. The Court introduced de novo detailed 
positive obligations under the scope of Article 2. This is illustrated if one 
compares Opuz to the Bevacqua and S. v. Bulgaria  case that was rendered only 
a year earlier.29 ,QWKLV LQVWDQFHWKH&RXUWGLVPLVVHGWKHDSSOLFDQWV¶FODLPWKDW
their right to be protected against domestic violence could be adequately 
protected only by means of criminal law sanctions. In light of WKH 6WDWHV¶
margin of appreciation, the choice of means to secure compliance with the 
rights under the ECHR was categorically left to them.30 With Opuz the choice 
of means is no longer left to the States. In contrast to Bevacqua, the Court 
accepts that the ECHR requires, in all cases of domestic violence, that the 
prosecution is initiated by national authorities even if the victim withdraws her 
complaint. Interestingly, the Court in the Bevacqua case took cognisance of the 
same PIL norms as in Opuz. In Bevacqua the Court devotes five paragraphs to 
                                                             
27
 Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, its Causes and 
Consequences (20 January 2006), UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/61, [29]. 
28
 Osman v United Kingdom, 28 October 1998, (Grand Chamber). 
29
 Bevacqua and S. v. Bulgaria, 12 June 2008. 
30
 Ibid, [82]. 
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the relevant PIL (one to two pages of its judgment) and the emphasis is on the 
Recommendation by the Committee of Ministers on the protection of women 
against violence, whereas the rest of PIL norms are mentioned in passing 
FODVVLILHGDVµRWKHUPDWHULDO¶31 in Opuz the Court devotes fourteen paragraphs 
(five pages in its judgment) to discussing the relevant PIL norms. Besides the 
TXDQWLWDWLYH FKDQJH WKH 3,/ QRUPV DUH VXEGLYLGHG LQWR SHUWLQHQW µUHJLPHV¶ ± 
µWKH8QLWHG 1DWLRQVSRVLWLRQ¶µWKH&RXQFLORI(XURSH¶DQGµWKH,QWHU-American 
V\VWHP¶ DQG WKH &RXUW GLVFXVVHV WKHP LQ JUHDWHU GHWDLO32 The interpretative 
impact that the Court drew from these norms on the construction of the ECHR 
in Bevacqua is limited to informing WKH&RXUW¶VSHUFHSWLRQRIWKHYXOQHUDELOLW\
of the victims of domestic violence.33 Opuz, on the other hand, signifies a 
FKDQJH LQ WKH &RXUW¶V OHJDO UHDVRQLQJ DQG WKH SURWHFWLYH VFRSH RI $UWLFOH 
ECHR. The duty to due diligence, as articulated in the PIL norms, is 
LQFRUSRUDWHG LQ WKH &RXUW¶V DQDO\VLV 1DWLRQDO DXWKRULWLHV¶ DFWV DQG RPLVVLRQV
are scrutinised against this yardstick and the link is explicit in many instances 
in the judgment.34  
This brings the question of the content of the due diligence standard 
into the fore.  Linguistically speaking due diligence can be found in Osman and 
the subsequent case law concerning the preventive operational measures that 
States ought to take under Article 2. Osman, however, applied this standard 
narrowly and set a strict condition, namely that it must be established that 
national authorities knew or ought to have known that there was a real and 
                                                             
31
 Ibid, [49]-[53]. 
32
 Opuz, [72]->@7KHµFRPSDUDWLYHPDWHULDO¶VXUYH\RIPHPEHU6WDWHV¶SUDFWLFHLVGLVFXVVHG
under a separate heading: [87]-[90].  
33
 Bevacqua, [65]. 
34
 Opuz, [131], [137], [147], [149].   
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immediate risk to the life of a said individual from the criminal acts of a third 
party.35 Is this part of the due diligence standard as applied in the context of 
domestic violence in Opuz? It seems that this is not the case. This strict 
condition (real and immediate risk) under Article 2 ECHR is not mentioned in 
any of the relevant PIL norms and practice. This is arguably the reason that the 
Osman FDVHDQGWKHVXEVHTXHQWFDVHODZZHUHTXDOLILHGDVµa variant of the due 
GLOLJHQFH VWDQGDUG¶36 Consequently, there are two different standards of due 
diligence and Opuz is not merely a follow up to Osman.37  
All the more, the Court in its process of integrating extraneous PIL 
standards into a common denominator and incorporating in turn this 
denominator under Article 2 ECHR loses certain fundamental contextual 
nuances. Although this standard was treated by the Court and partly by the 
literature as a well-established duty, this is not a valid assertion.38 Even the UN 
Special Rapporteur, who asserted that the due diligence standard has acquired 
the status of a a rule of customary international law,39 acknowledged the lack 
of clarity of its content and the existence of certain caveats in articulating this 
integration project. The CEDAW Committee in A.T. v. Hungary did not 
                                                             
35
 C. Ovey, R. White (eds.), Jacobs and White, The European Convention of Human Rights 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010) 153; A.R. Mowbray, Cases, Material and 
Commentary on the European Convention on Human Rights (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
3rd ed., 2012) 122. 
36
 2006 UN Report on Violence Against Women, [22] (emphases added). 
37
 Contra Ovey, White, (note 35); Mowbray, (note 35). Subsequent case law is not clear. The 
Court, on one hand, affirms, in principle, the strict Osman test but, on the other hand, it adds 
WKDW µRZLQJ WR WKH SDUWLFXODU YXOQHUDELOLW\ RI YLFWLPV RI GRPHVWLF YLROHQFH >«@ WKH GRPHVWLF
DXWKRULWLHV VKRXOG KDYH H[HUFLVHG DQ HYHQ JUHDWHU GHJUHH RI YLJLODQFH¶ ZKLFK VHHPV WR
introduce a lower threshold for State responsibility; for example, Hajduová v Slovakia, 30 
November 2010, [50].   
38
 J. Bourke-0DUWLJQRQL µ7KH +LVWRU\ DQG 'HYHORSPHQW RI WKH 'XH 'LOLJHQFH 6WDQGDUG LQ
International Law and Its Role in the Protection of Women against VioleQFH¶LQ&%HQQLQJHU-
Budel (ed.), Due Diligence and Its Application to Protect Women from Violence (Martinus 
1LMKRII3XEOLVKHUV/HLGHQ0+DNLPLµ6WDWH%\VWDQGHU5HVSRQVLELOLW\¶
EJIL 341, 380.  
39
 Contra B. Meyersfeld, Domestic Violence and International Law (Hart, Oxford, 2012) 107. 
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explicitly mention an absence of due diligence by Hungary; it is rather assumed 
that the standard clearly informed the way in which the Committee determined 
that the State failed to fulfil its obligations.40 Insofar as the practice of the 
IACmHR is concerned, the due diligence, as articulated in the Maria Da Penha 
v. Brazil case, forms an integral part of the general jurisprudential practice of 
the IACtHR to refer extensively to due diligence issues under the general 
provisions of Article 1 IACHR. It should not be ignored either that the 
IACmHR employed the due diligence standard in that case when it was 
exercising jurisdiction over, and declared a violation of, the specialised and 
regional Belem Convention.41 Hence, it appears that different variants of the 
due diligence standard exist depending on the treaty context from which it is 
being drawn ± the Inter-American context, the UN context and the ECHR 
context. The Court detached the different variants of the standard from their 
treaty context. The process of reading many PIL norms together and construing 
a common denominator may be considered as an intrinsic feature of developing 
PIL, as it was also highlighted in Demir and Baykara case.42 Although such a 
process it to be, in principle, welcomed, one should not lose sight of the 
important contextual differences;43 otherwise such an integration enterprise 
finds its place in the threshold of interpretation and judicial law-making.  
8.4 Criminalisation and effective prosecution of non-consensual sexual acts 
under Articles 3 and 8 ECHR 
 In M.C. v. Bulgaria the applicant ± a rape victim ± argued for a breach 
of Articles 3 and 8 due to the ineffectiveness of domestic law and practice to 
                                                             
40
 2006 UN Report on Violence Against Women, [23]. 
41
 Maria Da Penha v. Brazil, [60]; Meyersfeld, (note 39), 81. 
42
 Infra 7.4. 
43
 For example, infra 4.2 (Zolotukhin), 7.2 (Scoppola). 
238 
 
secure her right to legal protection against rape and sexual abuse.44 The core 
issue was that the Bulgarian criminal legislation required proof of physical 
resistance by the victim in order for a forcible sexual act to qualify as rape. In 
support of her arguments she referred to developments in international and 
comparative law on the definition of rape.45 Interights was permitted to 
intervene in the written proceedings. They submitted that the criminal offence 
of rape had evolved by providing an extensive survey of national legislations 
and developments in international criminal law.46 The shared concern of the 
relevant legislative reforms was that a rape victim did not have to prove 
physical resistance in order to substantiate the lack of consent.  
The Court, while acknowledging the margin of appreciation that States 
enjoy insofar as the means to ensure effective protection against rape are 
concerned, opined that it should be limited in light of guaranteeing the 
effective protection of the individual and giving effect to changing conditions 
within member States.47 In unanimity, it went on to proclaim that States have 
the duty to enact criminal legislation and to effectively investigate and 
prosecute rape, including non-consensual sexual acts even where the element 
of the physical resistance by the victim is absent. Bulgarian authorities were 
found to have afforded too much weight to the fact that the applicant had not 
actively resisted to her rape and too little consideration of her young age and 
the special psychological conditions of her case. This led to a failure to 
LQYHVWLJDWH VXIILFLHQWO\ WKH DSSOLFDQW¶V FLUFXPVWDQFHV XQGHU $UWLFOHV  DQG 
ECHR.  
                                                             
44
 M.C. v. Bulgaria, 4 December 2003. 
45
 Ibid, [112]. 
46
 Ibid, [128]-[147]. 
47
 Ibid, [154]-[155], [166]. 
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The legal reasoning for justifying the inclusion of the duty to 
criminalise and prosecute even in the absence of physical resistance under the 
(&+5ZDVEDVHGRQWKHH[LVWHQFHRID µFOHDUDQGVWHDG\WUHQG LQ(XURSHDQG
some other parts of the world towards abandoning formalistic definition and 
narrow interpretation of the laZ LQ WKLV DUHD¶48 The comparative survey 
attached to the judgment was very restricted in its scope (ten member States) 
and did not offer any definite conclusions on the issue of physical resistance by 
the victim as a sine qua non condition for rape.49 At beVW PHPEHU 6WDWHV¶
practice was divided. The Court attempted to reinforce its conclusion by 
referring to Recommendation (2002) 5 on the protection of women against 
violence by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, which 
strongly encouraged SWDWHVWRµpenalise any sexual act committed against non-
FRQVHQWLQJSHUVRQVHYHQ LI WKH\GRQRWVKRZVLJQVRIUHVLVWDQFH¶50 Although 
this may provide some form of support, on the other hand, it confirms that no 
harmonised position existed among States.51 Therefore, the consensual basis as 
a legal justification for such an interpretation is rhetorical and it serves 
legitimising purposes. The Court once again invokes and uses a dubious trend 
in formation and an emerging consensus. The reference to the trend in other 
parts of the world was not explained convincingly either. Presumably, the 
Court drew upon the material submitted by Interights which concerned the 
practice of several States in the USA, Canada, Australia and South Africa.52  
                                                             
48
 Ibid, [156]. 
49
 Ibid, [88]-[100]. 
50
 30 April 2002, Appendix, [35]. M.C., [101]. 
51
 , 5DGDFLF µ5DSH &DVHV LQ WKH -XULVSUXGHQFH RI WKH (XURSHDQ &RXUW RI +XPDQ 5LJKWV
Defining Rape DQG'HWHUPLQLQJWKH6FRSHRIWKH6WDWH¶V2EOLJDWLRQV¶EHRLR 357, 371.  
52
 M.C., [143]-[147]. 
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The only well-argued part of the judgment, which seems to have 
LQIOXHQFHG WKH &RXUW¶V UHDVRQLQJ LV WKH UHOLDQFH XSRQ WKH GHYHORSPHQWV LQ
LQWHUQDWLRQDO FULPLQDO ODZ ,Q OLQH ZLWK WKH DSSOLFDQW¶V DQG ,QWHULJKWV
submissions, the Court underlined a series of judgments by the ICTY which 
categorically recognised that force is not an element per se of rape.53 Although 
LWZDVDFNQRZOHGJHG WKDW VXFKDGHILQLWLRQZDV IRUPXODWHG µin the particular 
context of rapes committed against the population in the conditions of an armed 
FRQIOLFW¶54 it was stressed that at the same time µLW DOVR UHIOHFWV a universal 
trend¶55 The ICTY Trial Chamber in )XUXQGåLMD had indeed followed a 
µSURFHVVRI LGHQWLILFDWLRQRI WKHFRPPRQGHQRPLQDWRUV LQ >WKH@ OHJDO V\VWHPV
VR DV WR SLQSRLQW WKH EDVLF QRWLRQV WKH\ VKDUH¶56 as to the definition of rape. 
Similarly to other cases discussed in Chapter 4 (Van der Mussele, Siliadin),57 
however, the Court pays attention not to apply a definition formulated for a 
criminal offence under a different legal context into the ECHR uncritically.58  
The M.C. case demonstrates the distinctive nature and function of the 
three major interpretative principles employed by the Court. In the absence of a 
FRPPRQ DSSURDFK RI WKH PHPEHU 6WDWHV¶ SUDFWLFH WKH FRPSDUDWLYH
interpretation leans in a different direction to the principle of interpreting the 
                                                             
53
 Ibid, [102]-[107]; 3URVHFXWRU Y )XUXQGåLMD (Trial Chamber), Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, 10 
December 1998, [78]; Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac and Zoran Vucovic 
(Trial Chamber), Case No IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, 22 February 2001, [436]-[460]; 
Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac and Zoran Vucovic, (Appeals Chamber), 
Case No IT-96-26 & IT-96-23/1-A, 12 June 2002, [128]-[129]. 
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 M.C., [163] (emphases added). 
55
 Ibid (emphases added). 
56
 )XUXQGåLMD, [78]. 
57
 Infra 4.4. 
58
 G. Cohen--RQDWKDQµ5DSSRUW,QWURGXFWLI*pQpUDO¶LQ*&RKHQ-Jonathan, J.-F. Flauss (dir.), 
'URLW ,QWHUQDWLRQDO'URLWVGH O¶+RPPHHW-XULGLFWLRQV,QWHUQDWLRQDOHV (Bruylant, Bruxelles, 
2004) 11, 25. 
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ECHR in light of PIL norms.59 This conclusion has already been established in 
Chapter 4 (Vo, Evans) and Chapter 7 (D.H., 2UãXã, Opuz).60 It is doubtful 
whether the Court would have reached this interpretation of Articles 3 and 8 
ECHR without the reliance on PIL norms. Hence, PIL norms not only strongly 
reinforce the trend (if any) found in State practice,61 but also serves a primary 
role in formulating and justifying the final outcome. The fact that the 
interpretation of the ECHR by taking congisance of PIL norms is the driving 
IRUFHEHKLQGWKH&RXUW¶VUHDsoning has been stressed in Chapter 4 (Zolotukhin), 
Chapter 7 (Scoppola, D.H., Opuz, Rantsev, Demir and Baykara); one should 
not forget the substantial restrictions that the Court read on the scope of the 
ECHR by taking other PIL norms into account, as seen in Chapters 5 and 6.    
 
8.5 Criminalisation of prohibited practices under Article 4 ECHR 
As previously discussed, the applicant in Siliadin alleged that French 
criminal law did not afford her adequate protection against the practices of 
slavery and servitude. Chapter 4 analysed how the Court used PIL norms to 
define the terms under Article 462 and Chapter 7 demonstrated that the 
FRQVWUXFWLRQRIWKHµUHOHYDQW3,/EDFNJURXQG¶WRWKHFDVHE\WKH&RXUWFDQEHD
selective process which nonetheless has significant consequences in terms of 
legal reasoning and the interpretation of the ECHR.63 The focus herein lies on 
WKHDSSOLFDQW¶VFODLPWKDWDSRVLWLYHREOLJDWLRQVKRXOGEHUHDGXQGHU$UWLFOH
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 Radacic, (note 51). 
60
 Infra 4.2 and 4.7, 7.3 and 7.6. 
61
 &3LWHDµ5DSHDVD+XPDQ5LJKWV9LRODWLRQDQGD&ULPLQDO2IIHQFH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Judgment in M.C. v. Bulgaria¶JIntlCrimJ 447. 
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 Infra 4.4 and 4.5. 
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 Infra 7.5. 
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to adopt deterring criminal law legislation and effective enforcement 
machinery.64  
7KH &RXUW FRQFXUUHG ZLWK WKH DSSOLFDQW¶V DUJXPHQWV DQG LQFOXGHG IRU
the first time in its case law positive obligations under Article 4, namely the 
PHPEHU6WDWHV¶GXW\WRHQDFWFULPLQDO ODZSURYLVLRQVpenalising the practices 
of slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour and to apply them 
effectively. The Court reasoned its approach on two grounds: the absence of 
positive obligations would, first, render Article 4 ineffective and, secondly, it 
would be inconsistent with the PIL norms specifically concerned with the 
issue.65  
Although the judgment was welcomed in academic literature,66 the 
Court reasoning lacks material basis and treats the relevant PIL in a rhetorical 
fashion. None of the instruments referred to by the Court imposes a duty on 
States to specifically criminalise the prohibited practices under Article 4 ECHR 
in their legislation. The Forced or Compulsory Labour Convention and the 
Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery provide that all 
contracting parties shall take all necessary legislative and other measures to 
supress and abolish of slavery or forced or compulsory labour practice 
respectively.67 The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) similarly asks 
member States to take appropriate legislative and administrative measures for 
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 2QH RI WKH DSSOLFDQW¶V UHSUHVHQWDWLYHV EHIRUH WKH &RXUW ZDV D ODZ\HU IRU WKH &RPPLWWHH
against Modern Slavery acting as an assistant.  
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 Siliadin, [89], [112].  
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 90DQWRXYDORX µ6HUYLWXGHDQG)RUFHG/DERXU LQ WKHst Century: The Human Rights of 
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  Ind.L.J. 395, 404- + &XOOHQ µ6LOLDGLQ Y )UDQFH
Positive Obligations under ArtiFOH  RI WKH (&+5¶ 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Decaux, Jurisprudence, (2006) 133 JDI 1138. 
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 Article 1 Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery; Articles 1 and 4 (1) Forced 
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protecting children.68 The only PIL norms directly addressing the issue of 
FULPLQDOL]DWLRQ DOWKRXJK FLWHG LQ WKH MXGJPHQW XQGHU WKH µ5HOHYDQW /DZ¶
heading, are not referred to or discussed or even cited in the main body of the 
judgment aQG LQ WKH &RXUW¶V UHDVRQLQJ 7KHVH ZHUH Recommendation 1523 
(2001) of the Parliamentary Assembly and recent Anti-Trafficking Convention 
(Articles 18 to 21). The Assembly admitted in its Resolution that none of the 
Council of Europe member States expressly made domestic slavery an offence 
in their criminal codes,69 demonstrating the absence of a common denominator 
in the national legislations of member States. Also, the Anti-Trafficking 
Convention not only was not in force at the time (signed by fifteen and ratified 
by none),70 but also the Court does not discuss it or links it to its reasoning. 
Subsequently, in the Rantsev case the Court affirmed the existence of 
the duty under Article 4 to criminalise human trafficking in a more consistent 
fashion. The duty to criminalise and ensure effective investigation and 
prosecution, as envisaged in the Palermo Protocol71 and the Anti-Trafficking 
Convention, was tightly linked to the positive obligations under Article 4 
ECHR. In fact, &\SUXV¶OHJLVODWLYHIUDPHZRUNZDVDVVessed against the detailed 
standards provided in Article 5 of the Palermo Protocol and Article 1 of the 
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DQG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Domestic Slavery, 26 June 2001, [9], [10]; Siliadin, [49]. 
70
 Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking (concluded on 16 May 2005; 
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Anti-Trafficking Convention.72 Since Cyprus had given effect into its national 
law to its international obligations, the Court found no violation. The direct 
link between the external detailed PIL norms and the construction of the ECHR 
is now evident and it is so strong that, if the reader of the Rantsev judgment 
were not aware that the European Court is under the obligation to interpret and 
apply only the ECHR, he would be under the impression that the Court applies 
the Palermo Protocol and the Anti-Trafficking Convention. Therefore, the 
interpretive impact derived from the PIL norms is in practice equated to 
indirectly applying these norms through the ECHR.73 In this way, member 
States that have chosen not to be bound by the said international treaties are 
now bound by the Article 4 positive obligations.74 
The Court in this instance not only transposes detailed PIL norms in the 
positive obligations under Article 4 ECHR, but also it appears that it indirectly 
supervises the implementation of these norms, which questions the limits of its 
jurisdiction.  
8.6 The obligations to ensure the right to access information, to participate 
in the decision-making process and to access justice under Articles 2 
and 8 ECHR in cases related to the protection of the environment  
The 7DúNLQ case75 was concerned with the legality of the operating 
permit issued for a gold mine and the decision-making process that had been 
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 Rantsev, [285], [290]. 
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 6 &KDXGDU\ µ7UDIILFNLQJ LQ(XURSH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 The Anti-Trafficking Convention is ratified by twenty seven States, chart of signatures and 
ratification of the Convention available at 
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0&CL=ENG>. 
75
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followed. The applicants claimed that the use of sodium cyanide in the mine 
was a threat to the environment and breached the rights to life and to the 
private life of the neighbouring population. Having established the 
applicability of Article 8 to severe environmental pollution cases, the Court 
SURFHHGHG WR DVVHVV 7XUNH\¶V FRPSOLDQFH ZLWK LWV SRVLWLYH REOLJDWLRQV
Although the text of Article 8 does not provide for explicit procedural 
UHTXLUHPHQWV LW KHOG WKDW WKH QDWLRQDO DXWKRULWLHV¶ GHFLVLRQ-making process 
should be subject to specific conditions. Three different procedural guarantees 
were outlined. According to the first, the decision-making process had to 
involve appropriate investigation and studies for the competent authorities to 
evaluate and balance the possible risks to the environment or to human health 
accordingly. Secondly, interested individual should be granted access to the 
conclusions of such studies and to relevant information, thereby giving them 
the opportunity to evaluate, in advance, the risks to which they may be 
exposed. Thirdly, the individuals concerned should be able to appeal to 
national courts against any administrative act or omission.76 In the specific 
instance the Turkish Council of Ministers extended the operation of the gold 
mine by a decision which was not made public. Moreover, the Turkish 
administration did not comply with subsequent decisions of national courts. 
Hence, the Court, in a unanimous judgment, found a breach of Article 8 
ECHR.  
$OWKRXJKWKHVHJXDUDQWHHVDSSHDUHGWRVWHPIURPWKH&RXUW¶VSUHYLRXV
case law, the judgment - XQGHUWKHµ)DFWV¶VHFWLRQ77 - contained references to a 
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77
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series of PIL norms. It cited Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development78 (Rio Declaration) which reads that  
each individual shall have appropriate access to information 
concerning the environment that is held by public authorities, 
including information on hazardous materials and activities in their 
communities, and the opportunity to participate in decision-making 
processes >«@ Effective access to judicial and administrative 
proceedings, including redress and remedy, shall be provided. 
(Emphases added) 
Also, the detailed legal framework on access to environmental information 
contained in the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in 
Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters79 (Aarhus 
Convention) was outlined: (Article 4), public participation in decision of 
specific activities (Articles 6-8) and access to justice (Article 9). Mention was 
made to a Resolution by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 
which underlines the imperative of treating public access to information as a 
human right.80 The Court did not link these PIL norms to Article 8 procedural 
guarantees in the main body of the judgment.81 Yet it is hard to miss the 
QRWDEOHVLPLODULW\RIWKHZRUGLQJEHWZHHQWKH6WDWHV¶SRVLWLYH obligations and 
WKH5LR'HFODUDWLRQ¶VJXLGHOLQHVDQGWKH$DUKXV&RQYHQWLRQ¶VVWDQGDUGV82 In 
fact, in Demir and Baykara, a unanimous Grand Chamber came to admit 
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 (1992) 31ILM 874. 
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 2161 UNTS 447. 
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 Resolution 1087 (1996) of the Parliamentary Assembly on the Consequences of the 
Chernobyl Disaster, 26 April 1996, [4]. 
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retrospectively that the 7DúNÕQ judgment builds largely upon the standards 
envisaged in the Aarhus Convention.83 
Similarly, in the Öneryildiz FDVHWKHSXEOLF¶VULJKWWRLQIRUPDWLRQZDV
one of the factors assessed by the Grand Chamber in the context of the 
preventive measures that Turkey should have taken for effectively 
safeguarding the right to life. The interpretation of Article 2 ECHR as 
LQFOXGLQJ WKH SXEOLF¶V ULJKW WR LQIRUPDWLRQ ZDV SUHVHQWHG DV D IROORZ-up of 
previous case law (Guerra case84 DQG EHFDXVH VXFK D FRQVWUXFWLRQ µLs 
VXSSRUWHG E\ FXUUHQW GHYHORSPHQWV LQ (XURSHDQ VWDQGDUGV¶85 The only 
UHIHUHQFH WR D (XURSHDQ VWDQGDUG ZDV WKH  3DUOLDPHQWDU\ $VVHPEO\¶V
Resolution mentioned in 7DúNLQ. Despite the invocation of developments in 
European standards, its substantiation is poor and, again, the link between the 
ECHR interpretation and PIL norms is weak.  
7KH &RXUW¶V OHJDO UHDVRQLQJ EHFDPH PRUH WUDQVSDUHQW LQ WKH 7ăWDU
case.86 It is indicative that nine pages in the judgment are devoted to analysing 
the pertinent PIL. The case concerned an accident which took place in a gold 
mine extraction site causing a serious water pollution problem due to the use of 
cyanide in the site. The applicants ± father and son ± who lived nearby the site 
argued that the effects of this accident were a danger for their right to life and 
FRQWULEXWHG VXEVWDQWLDOO\ WR WKH DJJUDYDWLRQ RI WKH VHFRQG DSSOLFDQW¶V DVWKPD
condition. The Court examined their complaints under the angle of Article 8 
and their right to private life and to a home. Romania, for its part, denied the 
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 Demir and Baykara (GC), [83]. 
84
 Guerra and others v Italy, 19 February 1998, (Grand Chamber). 
85
 Öneryildiz (GC), [90]. 
86
 7ăWDU Y 5RPDQLD, 27 January 2009. The judgment is available only in French. This is 
unfortunate given the importance of the judgment in matters of environmental protection and 
with respect to WKH&RXUW¶Vinterpretative practice of taking PIL norms into account.  
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DOOHJDWLRQVDQGVWUHVVHGWKHODFNRIDFDXVDO OLQNEHWZHHQWKHDSSOLFDQWV¶ULJKW
to private life and the circumstances of the case. 
The three procedural guarantees outlined in 7DúNLQ were highlighted as 
essential corpus of the protective scope of the right to private life.87 In contrast 
to 7DúNLQ, the link between the Aarhus Convention (ratified by Romania) and 
the said guarantees was expressly made in the main body of the judgment.88 
(PSKDVLV ZDV SXWRQ WKH VSHFLILF DVSHFWRI 6WDWHV¶ REOLJDWLRQ WR GLVVHPLQDWH
information to the public in order to enable them to prevent or mitigate harm 
arising from another future accident.89 This positive obligation originates from 
Article 5 of the Aarhus Convention which envisages that  
in the event of any imminent threat to human health or the 
environment [...] which could enable the public to take measures to 
prevent or mitigate harm arising from the threat and is held by a 
public authority is disseminated immediately and without delay to 
members of the public who may be affected.    
The Parliamentary Assembly Resolution on Industrial Hazards, which was also 
FLWHGXUJHVPHPEHU6WDWHVµWRLPSURYHWKHGLVVHPLQDWLRQRILQIRUPDWLRQDERXW
good practices concerning the prevention and limitation of major accidents 
DOUHDG\SXUVXHGE\FHUWDLQPHPEHUVWDWHV¶90 Again, the similarity between the 
ZRUGLQJ RI WKHVH 3,/ QRUPV DQG WKH &RXUW¶V GHWDLOHG VWDQGDUGV RI UHYLHZ LV
remarkable.91 
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 P. Birnie, A. Boyle, C. Redgwell, International Law and the Environment (Oxford 
University Press, New York, 2009) 288, 295.  
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 7ăWDU, [118]. 
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 Ibid, [88], [101].  
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 Parliamentary Assembly Resolution 1430 (2005) on Industrial Hazards, 18 March 2005, [8] 
(iv). 
91
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The 7DúNLQ and 7ăWDU MXGJPHQWV PDUN D GLVFHUQLEOH VKLIW LQ WKH &RXUW¶V
interpretation of the ECHR with respect to the use of PIL norms relevant to 
environmental protection. In previous cases the applicants attempted to raise 
arguments for establishing a link between the protective scope of the ECHR 
and the protection of the environment and, hence, extend the protective scope 
of the ECHR. The Court, however, was unwilling to entertain such claims. 
Strong Joint Dissenting Opinions were raised before the Grand Chamber in the 
Balmer-Schafroth and Hatton cases where it was argued that PIL developments 
should have been taken into account for construing the ECHR.92 Many authors 
also refer to the long awaited integration of environmental concerns or 
considerations or objectives into the human rights discourse.93 In 7DúNLQ and 
7ăWDU WKH &RXUW¶V interpretation of the ECHR, by taking cognisance of 
environment-UHODWHG 3,/ QRUPV UHVXOWHG LQ WKH LQWHJUDWLRQ LQWR WKH (&+5¶V
scope not only of environmental concerns, but also of specific standards. 
Detailed obligations under the Aarhus Convention concerning access to 
information, public participation in decision-making and access to justice were 
fully incorporated into the positive obligations of Article 8 ECHR. In effect the 
Court provided for indirect procedural environmental rights,94 ZKLFKLVWKHµWKH
QDUURZHVWEXWVWURQJHVWDUJXPHQWIRUDKXPDQULJKWWRWKHHQYLURQPHQW¶95 Such 
a position taken by the Court must have been facilitated by the fact that the 
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 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Pettiti joined by Judges Gölcüklü, Walsh, Russo, Valticos, 
Lopes Rocha and Jambrek in Balmer-Schafroth and others v. Switzerland, 26 August 1997 
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Aarhus Convention is the first internationally binding instrument in the field of 
WKH HQYLURQPHQW ZKLFK DGRSWV D µKXPDQ ULJKWV DSSURDFK¶ DFNQRZOHGJLQJ WKH
close relationship between human rights and environmental protection.96 The 
Court once more, as in the Rantsev case transposes detailed PIL norms in the 
positive obligations under Article 4 ECHR.  
 
8.7 The obligations to put in place the appropriate legislative and 
administrative framework, to take preventive measures and to 
diligently investigate human trafficking under Articles 2 and 4 ECHR  
As it was previously discussed, Rantsev established the duty to penalise 
and prosecute trafficking in human beings as a positive obligation under 
Article 4 ECHR.97 The Court asserted, however, that this duty is only one 
DVSHFW RI PHPEHU 6WDWHV¶ REligations and that a comprehensive approach to 
human trafficking should be adopted by considering the broader PIL context.98 
Such approach involved the introduction under Articles 2 and 4 ECHR of three 
separate sets of positive obligations: to put in place an appropriate legislative 
and administrative framework, to take preventive measures and to investigate 
(potential) trafficking. These positive obligations reflect the letter of the 
provisions of the Palermo Protocol and the Anti-Trafficking Convention. In 
fact, the Court scrutinised the acts and omissions of the two respondent States 
(Cyprus and Russia) against the standards of these two international treaties.  
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 Lucca Declaration, Addendum to the Report of the First Meeting of the Parties to the Aarhus 
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)LUVWWKH&RXUWH[DPLQHG&\SUXV¶ OHJLVODWLYHIUDPHZRUN(YHQWKRXJK
the relevant legislation generally reflected the Palermo Protocol, the regulatory 
policy, and in particular the immigration policy, was considered unsatisfactory. 
7KH µDUWLVWH YLVD¶ V\VWHP JDYH LQGLFDWLRQV RI HQFRXUDJHPHQW RU WROHUDQFH RQ
behalf of public authorities, to individuals suspected of trafficking and did not 
provide practical and effective protection to (potential) victims.99 It is telling 
WKDW WKH &RXUW DVVHVVHG YHU\ VWULFWO\ &\SUXV¶ LPPLJUDWLRQ SROLF\ ZKHUH
member States traditionally enjoy a great margin of appreciation, by using PIL 
norms.100  
Secondly, with regard to the protective operational measures the Court 
found that State authorities were aware, or ought to have been aware, of 
circumstances giving rise to a credible suspicion that Ms. Rantseva was at real 
and immediate risk of being trafficked or exploited.101 A series of omissions by 
police officers to identify her as a trafficking victim and investigate her case 
YLRODWHG&\SUXV¶SRVLWLYHREOLJDWLRQV7KHVHREOLJDWLRQVZHUHGLUHFWO\OLQNHGWR
detailed standards of the Palermo Protocol and the Anti-Trafficking 
Convention concerning the provision of adequate training for competent 
authorities.102  
/DVWO\WKH&RXUWDGGUHVVHG&\SUXV¶SURFHGXUDOREOLJDWLRQWRDGHTXDWHO\
investigate the death of Ms. Rantseva and whether or not a link existed 
between the allegations of trafficking and the circumstances of her death under 
the ambit of Article 2 ECHR. The duty of States to cooperate effectively in 
cross-border trafficking cases under the Anti-Trafficking Convention was 
                                                             
99
 Ibid, [280], [290]-[293]. 
100
 Chaudary, (note 73), 93. 
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 Rantsev, [286], [296]. 
102
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underlined.103 A series of pertinent factors were examined, such as whether all 
the necessary steps had taken for securing evidence and examining witnesses. 
In this context the Court noted that both respondent States were parties to the 
European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters104 and had 
concluded a bilateral Treaty on Legal Assistance in Civil, Family and Criminal 
Law matters.105 The Court criticised Cyprus for not asking assistance from 
Russia in order to secure evidence although these instruments set out a clear 
procedure.106 This omission was one of the reasons that Cyprus breached its 
procedural obligation to effectively investigate under Article 2 ECHR. 
Criticising the respondent State for its (potential) failure to apply another 
international treaty clearly does not fall within the competence of the Court. 
This is all the more the case if such an alleged failure is one of the reasons for 
breaching the ECHR.107   
2YHUDOO WKH &RXUW¶V UHFHSWLYHQHVV WR D JUHDW YDULHW\ RI 3,/ QRUPV
relevant to human trafficking involves the acceptance of different paradigms 
for responding to the phenomenon of trafficking. In this sense, the Court read 
the positive obligation to criminalise and prosecute trafficking which is the 
Palermo Protocol-µFULPLQDO ODZ SDUDGLJP¶ Dnd also the obligations to put in 
place an appropriate legislative and administrative framework, to take 
preventive measures and to investigate (potential) trafficking which qualify as 
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 Rantsev, [289]. 
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 European Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters (concluded on 20 
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 Treaty between USSR and the Republic of Cyprus on Legal Assistance in Civil, Family and 
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 Rantsev, [241]. 
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the Anti-Trafficking Convention- µKXPDQ ULJKWVUHJXODWRU\ SDUDGLJP¶108 It is 
also characteristic that the AIRE Centre and Interights, in their third-party 
LQWHUYHQWLRQVEHIRUHWKH&RXUWVWUHVVHGWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIGLIIHUHQWµSDUDGLJPV¶
± ,QWHULJKWVIRFXVHGRQWKHµFULPLQDOODZSDUDGLJP¶XQGHUWKH3DOHUPR3URWRFRO
whereas the A,5( &HQWUH XQGHUOLQHG WKH µKXPDQ ULJKWV DSSURDFK¶ DQG WKH
necessity of protecting the victims under the Anti-Trafficking Convention.109 
7KH&RXUW¶VMXVWLILFDWLRQIRU reading such detailed obligations under Articles 4 
and 2 ECHR in light of PIL was that  
µ>L@t is clear from the provisions of these two instruments that the 
Contracting States, including almost all of the member States of 
the Council of Europe, have formed the view that only a 
combination of measures addressing all three aspects can be 
effective LQWKHILJKWDJDLQVWWUDIILFNLQJ¶110  
As the discussion in Demir and Baykara case showed, the Court is inclined to 
invoke a (alleged) consensual basis for legitimising its reliance upon PIL 
norms. Nonetheless, at the relevant time, although the overwhelming majority 
of member States had ratified the Palermo Protocol,111 only twenty six (out of 
forty seven) of the member States were formally bound by the Anti-Trafficking 
Convention.112 Even so, the incorporation of very detailed external standards 
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under the scope of the ECHR ignores the limits of the interpretation process 
and results in indirectly applying other international treaties.     
 
8.8 The obligations under Article 8 ECHR concerning the expeditious 
return of a removed child in international abduction cases 
The Court has also developed an extensive practice of taking into 
consideration the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of the International 
Child Abduction when interpreting Article 8 ECHR.113 In these cases, the 
common scenario before the Court is that the applicant is the left-behind parent 
who complaints of a violation of Article 8. The Grand Chamber in Neulinger 
and Shuruk case114 restated its position that the ECHR cannot be interpreted in 
a vacuum but should be interpreted in harmony with the general principles of 
international law. As Article 31 (3)(c) VCLT indicates, it continued, 
consideration should be given to any relevant rules of international law and in 
particular the rules concerning the international protection of human rights.115 
In this context, the obligations under Article 8 ECHR must be interpreted by 
taking the Hague Convention into account.116  
This came as a confirmation of the previous rich case law of the Court 
concerning the Hague Convention. The Court has incorporated the detailed 
provisions of the Hague Convention under the positive obligations of Article 8 
(&+5 DQG XVHV WKHP DV D VWDQGDUG RI UHYLHZ RI PHPEHU 6WDWHV¶ DFWV DQG
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omissions.117 $UWLFOHRI WKH +DJXH &RQYHQWLRQ VWLSXODWHV WKDW µWKH MXGLFLDO
and administrative authorities of Contracting States shall act expeditiously in 
SURFHHGLQJV IRU WKH UHWXUQ RI FKLOGUHQ¶ DQG SURYLGHV WKHP ZLWK VL[ ZHHNV WR
reach a decision. The Court has decided that national authorities have not 
shown the necessary diligence when inactivity and delay existed from six 
years118 or more than a year119 to two, three or four months.120 The direct link 
between Article 11 of the Hague Convention and the positive obligations is 
H[SOLFLWDQGVWULNLQJLQWKHMXGJPHQWVµWKH&RXUWQRWHVWKDWWKLVSHULRGRIWLPH
is not in acFRUGDQFH ZLWK $UWLFOH  RI WKH +DJXH &RQYHQWLRQ¶121 Not only 
does the Court find national authorities not to be in accordance with the Hague 
Convention but also that this breach automatically qualifies as a violation of 
Article 8 ECHR. 
Article 7 of the Hague Convention also sets out detailed standards 
regarding the enforcement of the decision to return the child. Similarly, the 
Court, by employing in its analysis the criteria outlined in Article 7 of the 
Hague Convention, examines whether or not the measures undertaken by the 
national authorities create the necessary conditions for enforcing the decision 
for the return of the abducted child.122 It found a violation of Article 8 when 
States could not justify periods of inactivity of the competent authorities at the 
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enforcement stage;123 when no coercive measures were taken against the parent 
that abducted its child so as to oblige KLPKHU WR UHVSHFW WKH QDWLRQDOFRXUW¶V
decisions;124 when those coercive measures were not effective or realistic;125 
when the authorities did not take any measures in order to prevent the parent 
from go into hiding with the abducted child.126 The same approach was 
followed in instances where no initiative was undertaken to ascertain the 
whereabouts of the child or the parent,127 or where the respective investigation 
had remained inactive for a long time.128 According to the jurisprudence, 
Article 8 ECHR includes the positive obligations to take preparatory measures 
in general129 or, in particular, measures regarding meetings of the social 
services with the left-behind parent and the child,130 and to take measures so as 
the parent can enjoy access while the court proceedings are pending.131 Again, 
the link between a violation of the Hague Convention and the breach of Article 
8 ECHR is made crystal clear: WKH GRPHVWLF FRXUWV¶ µLQWHUSUHWDWLRQ RI WKH
JXDUDQWHHVRIWKH+DJXH&RQYHQWLRQOHGWRDYLRODWLRQRI$UWLFOH>(&+5@¶132 
Although it is an established position that it is primarily for the national 
authorities, notably the courts, to interpret and apply domestic law,133 the Court 
does not hesitate to find that the interpretation followed by national courts 
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 Gudrún Hansen, [105]-[107]; .DUDGåLü, [61]; Bianchi, [98]; Lafargue v. Romania, 13 July 
2006, [103]; P.P., [92]. 
126
 H.N., [82].  
127
 Ignaccolo-Zenide, [105]-[109]; Sylvester, [71]; Gudrún Hansen, [105]; .DUDGåLü, [60]; cf. 
Article 7 (a) Hague Convention.  
128
 P.P., [91]. 
129
 Sylvester, [70]. 
130
 Ignaccolo-Zenide, [105], [112]; cf. Article 7 (d), (f), (g) Hague Convention.  
131
 Gudrún Hansen, [103]; cf. Article 7 (f) Hague Convention. 
132
 Monory v. Romania and Hungary, 5 April 2005, [81] and [79], [85].  
133
 Iglesias Gil and A.U.I. v. Spain, 29 April 2003, [61]. 
257 
 
contradicted the ordinary meaning of the Hague Convention;134 that the 
procedure followed by national courts was not consistent with the aim and 
object of the Hague Convention;135 or that the national Ministry deprived the 
Hague Convention of its very purpose.136 The Court also reviews the national 
FRXUWV¶ MXGJPHQWV E\ LQWHUSUHWLQJ WKH +DJXH &RQYHQWLRQ LQ DQ DXWKRULWDWLYH
way. It indicates the correct interpretation of the Hague Convention by way of 
correcting national courts137 and it ascertains the meaning of the text by 
considering its Explanatory Report,138 its purpose and aim, the interpretation 
followed by national courts of other members States,139 and by using Article 
31 of the VCLT.140 These instances have been depicted as signs of growing 
boldness.141  
 The transposition of external PIL standards under the scope of the 
positive obligations of Article 8 ECHR qualifies in effect as integration. The 
Court thinks that as insofar as Article 8 ECHR is examined in light of the 
Hague Convention, any weakening of the Hague Convention guarantees leads 
automatically to weakening the guarantees under Article 8 ECHR, and, hence, 
national authorities no longer enjoy exclusive competence to interpret and 
apply the Hague Convention.142 In this series of cases, the Court openly asserts 
a role that transforms its jurisdictional confines: it becomes a µ³SOD\HU´ ZKR
>«@SDUWLFLSDWH>V@LQWKHGHYHORSPHQWRIDQLQWHUQDWLRQDOMXULVSUXGHQFHUHlating 
                                                             
134
 Monory, [81]. 
135
 Bianchi, [92]. 
136Iosub Caras, [36]. 
137
 Bianchi, [83]. 
138
 Monory, [76], [81]; Iosub Caras, [36]; R.R. v. Romania (No 1), 10 November 2009, [118]-
[120]. 
139
 Monory, [76], [81]. 
140
 Bianchi, [83]. 
141
 Beaumont, (note 122), 51. 
142
 Monory, [81]. Also Bianchi, [92]; Carlson, [73]. 
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to cross-ERUGHU DEGXFWLRQV DQG WKH +DJXH &RQYHQWLRQ LQ SDUWLFXODU¶143 and 
ZKRVH SUDFWLFH ZLOO KDYH µD GUDPDWLF LPSDFW RQ WKH >+DJXH@ &RQYHQWLRQ¶144 
Similarly to the cases previously discussed (Rantsev, 7DúNLQ, 7ăWDU) PIL norms 
have such a dramatic effect on the interpretation of the ECHR that they have 
effectively been transposed under the ECHR and the Court supervises their 
LPSOHPHQWDWLRQ 6XFK D SUDFWLFH TXHVWLRQV WKH OLPLWV RI WKH (&W+5¶V
jurisdiction to interpret and apply the ECHR and sets aside the applicable law 
before the Court.  
 
8.9 Conclusions  
This Chapter has illustrated the influential impact of PIL norms when 
reading positive obligations under the ECHR. In line with other studies, a 
common justification for this increasing practice of the Court is the guarantee 
of practical and effective rights.145 Occasionally, the judgments contained a 
vague reference to the need to take changing conditions in member States into 
account without, however, invoking explicitly the dynamic interpretation of the 
ECHR. Nonetheless, the reliance upon PIL norms was the material factor for 
justifying and introducing positive obligations under the scope of the ECHR 
(Öneryildiz, Opuz, M.C., Siliadin, Rantsev and the international abduction 
FDVHV7KHSDUWLFLSDQWVLQWKH&RXUW¶VV\VWHPDUHZHOODZDUHRIWKLVIDFW,QWKH
great majority of the previously discussed cases both the applicants and the 
                                                             
143
 / 6LOEHUPDQ µ,QWHUSUHWLQJ WKH +DJXH $EGXFWLRQ &RQYHQWLRQ ,Q 6HDUFK RI D *OREDO
-XULVSUXGHQFH¶ ,QVWLWXWH RI ,QWHUnational Law and Justice (New York University, School of 
Law), Working Paper 2005/5, 32, available at <www.iilj.org>.  
144
 Ibid / :DONHU 3 %HDXPRQW µ6KLIWLQJ WKH %DODQFHG $FKLHYHG E\ WKH $EGXFWLRQ
Convention: The Contrasting Approaches of the European Court of Human Rights and the 
(XURSHDQ&RXUWRI-XVWLFH¶JPrivIntlL 231, 238. 
145
 Mowbray, (note 2), 221. 
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third-party interveners before the Court specifically advanced PIL related 
argumentation to support their claims. The Court in turn appears to warmly 
welcome this approach by openly endorsing their arguments and their 
supporting documentation. Special attention should be paid to the role of 
Interights in the Opuz, M.C. and Rantsev cases.  
Crucially, the interpretative impact derived from PIL norms was 
significant despite the fact that in the great majority of the cases there was 
clearly no general consensus among member States (Opuz, M.C., Siliadin 
cases). The Court also stepped into fields of law where States traditionally 
enjoyed a great margin of appreciation, such as in the area of ensuring the 
effective protection of the individual by having resort to criminal sanctions 
(Öneryildiz, Opuz, M.C., Siliadin, Rantsev cases),146 in the environment related 
cases (7DúNLQ, Öneryildiz, 7ăWDU cases), and in the immigration context 
(Rantsev case).   
The fact that the Court, in certain instances, construes a common 
denominator by certain PIL norms and subsequently reads and transposes this 
denominator in its analysis leads to indirectly applying, or even integrating 
detailed external standards into the ECHR (Opuz, 7DúNLQ, 7ăWDU, Rantsev).147 
This enterprise, however, poses certain difficulties. The first difficulty relates 
to the danger of disregarding fundamental contextual nuances in the process of 
forming a denominator out of a variety of PIL norms. It is submitted that when 
the Court develops the ECHR and PIL it should be very cautious of such 
concerns.  
                                                             
146
 Concurring Opinion of Judge Tulkens in M.C., [2]. 
147
 &/ 5R]DNLV µ7KH 3DUWLFXODU 5ROH RI WKH 6WUDVERXUJ Case-Law in the Development of 
+XPDQ5LJKWVLQ(XURSH¶Nomiko Vima 20, 26. 
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The second difficulty brings the role of the Court into play, since the 
methods used to interpret the ECHR reflect the role that the Court assumes.148 
Being incumbent with interpreting and applying the Convention, the imposition 
of such detailed external PIL norms on member States via the positive 
obligations under the ECHR VHULRXVO\ VWUHWFKHV WKH OLPLWV RI WKH &RXUW¶V
jurisdiction and questions the boundaries of the interpretation task. For 
example, finding in Rantsev a violation of Article 2 ECHR on the basis that 
Cyprus had failed (according to the Court) to apply the procedures envisaged 
under the bilateral Treaty on Legal Assistance in Civil, Family and Criminal 
/DZ PDWWHUV LV FOHDUO\ EH\RQG WKH &RXUW¶V MXULVGLFWLRQ $OO WKH PRUH LQ WKH
series of judgments concerning the international abduction of children the 
Court practically applies the Hague Convention and supervises the national 
DXWKRULWLHV¶ DFWLRQV DFFRUGLQJ WR WKH H[WHUQDO 3,/ QRUPV Conversely, 
integrating PIL norms also means asserting authority over them.149 On one 
KDQG WKH UHFHSWLYHQHVV RI WKH &RXUW¶V UHDVRQLQJ to PIL norms mitigates 
fragmentation through harmonisation of the ECHR to other relevant PIL 
norms. On the other hand, however, this practice also paves the way to more 
fragmentation of PIL, since the Court claims to authoritatively interpret other 
PIL noUPV E\ ZD\RIFRUUHFWLQJ WKHDOOHJHGVKRUWFRPLQJVRI QDWLRQDOFRXUWV¶
decisions, as was seen in the international abduction related cases. 
                                                             
148
 Ibid, 26-27. 
149
 7%URXGHµ)UDJPHQWDWLRQVRI,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ2Q1RUPDWLYH,QWHJUDWLRQDV$XWKRULW\
$OORFDWLRQ¶LQ7%URXGH<6KDQ\HGVThe Shifting Allocation of Authority in International 
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9. Using public international law norms as a material factor to assess the 
proportionality of a restriction to a right under the ECHR  
 
This Chapter investigates the practice of the Court to consider PIL 
norms when assessing whether or not a given restriction to a right under the 
ECHR is proportionate. It is typical in the jurisprudence that the Court 
acknowledges many factors when it applies the so-called proportionality 
principle, varying from the specific factual circumstances to legal 
considerations.1 The cases that will be examined reveal that in certain instances 
the reliance upon PIL norms may be one of the factors for finding a restriction 
disproportionate to the ECHR. Crucially PIL norms may, in fact, qualify as a 
GHWHUPLQDWLYH HOHPHQW LQ WKH &RXUW¶V UHDVRQLQJ 7KH &KDSWHU GLVFXVVHV WKUHH
judgments delivered by the Grand Chamber.          
The first case is the 7ăQDVH Y 0ROGRYD in which the applicant, an 
ethnically Romanian and Moldovan politician, claimed for a breach of his right 
to stand as candidate in elections and to take his seat in Parliament if elected 
due to his ethnicity.2 He complained that although he was elected as an MP in 
the national elections in Moldova, he had to renounce his second (Romanian) 
nationality for his mandate to be confirmed by the Constitutional Court and to 
be able to take up his public position. The application was heard by the 
                                                             
1
 Y. Arai-Takahashi, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine and the Principle of Proportionality 
in the Jurisprudence of the ECHR, (Intersentia, Oxford, 2002). 
2
 Article 3 of the First Additional Protocol to the ECHR provides WKDWµ7KH+LJK&RQWUDFWLQJ
Parties undertake to hold free elections at reasonable intervals by secret ballot, under 
conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of 
the OHJLVODWXUH¶ 
262 
 
Chamber; and subsequently by the Grand Chamber, upon a request for a 
referral by the Government.3 
 The Chamber held that, even though the restriction was prescribed by 
law and served a legitimate aim, it was not proportionate. When assessing the 
proportionality of the interference it was highlighted that there were alternative 
methods available to the State in order to ensure the loyalty of its MPs. The 
&RXUW DOVR WRRN FRJQLVDQFH RI WKH PHPEHU 6WDWHV¶ SUDFWLFH LQ WKLV DUHD
0ROGRYD¶VREOLJDWLRQVXQGHUWKH(Xropean Convention on Nationality (ECN)4 
and various Reports and Opinions published by international bodies regarding 
0ROGRYD¶V(OHFWRUDO&RGH 
 $UWLFOH  RI WKH (&1 SURYLGHV WKDW µQDWLRQDOV RI D 6WDWH3DUW\ LQ
possession of another nationality shall have, in the territory of that State Party 
in which they reside, the same rights and duties as other nationals of that State 
3DUW\¶7KH(XURSHDQ&RPPLVVLRQDJDLQVW5DFLVPDQG,QWROHUDQFH(&5,DQG
the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) 
KDGFULWLFDOO\UHYLHZHG0ROGRYD¶V(OHFWRUDO&RGHDVEHLQJDWYDULDQFHZLWKWKH
ECN and the ECHR and recommended its immediate revision.5 The Court also 
FLWHGWKHYLHZVRIWKH3DUOLDPHQWDU\$VVHPEO\¶V&RPPLWWHHRQWKH+RQRXULQJ
of Obligations and Commitments by Member States of the Council of Europe 
DQGRWKHULQWHUQDWLRQDOERGLHVZKLFKZHUHDODUPHGE\0ROGRYD¶VOHJLVODWLRQ6  
                                                             
3
 7ăQDVHDQG&KLUWRDFăY0ROGRYD, 18 November 2008; 7ăQDVHY0ROGRYD, 27 April 2010, 
(Grand Chamber). 
4
 European Convention on Nationality (concluded on 6 November 1997; entered into force on 
1 March 2000) ETS 166 (ECN). 
5
 ECRI, 3rd Report on Moldova (adopted on 14 December 2007; published on 29 April 2008) 
CRI (2008) 23, [16], [18], available at http://www.coe.int/ecri; Venice Commission, Joint 
Opinion on the Election Code of Moldova as of 10 April 2008, Opinion No 484/2008 (23 
October 2008), CDL-AD (2008)022, [30]-[32], available at http://www.venice.coe.int. 
6
 7ăQDVH, [36]-[39].  
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0ROGRYD VWURQJO\ FRQWHVWHG QRW RQO\ WKH &KDPEHU¶V ILQDO FRQFOXVLRQ
before the Grand Chamber, but also the methodology employed. It raised an 
objection ratione materiae concerning the use of PIL norms for interpreting the 
(&+5 0ROGRYD¶V FRQFHUQ ZDV WKDW WKH VLJQLILFDQW ZHLJKW DFFRUGHG WR LWV
obligations under the ECN had no place within the scope and the interpretation 
of the ECHR.7 It further stressed that the ECN was ratified when there were 
fewer dual nationals and, consequently, it was not deemed necessary to enter a 
reservation under Article 17 ECN regarding the rights and duties of dual 
nationals. In any event, it continued, it had the discretion to denounce and/or 
re-ratify the ECN by inserting a reservation to the said provision.8 Moldova 
DOVRFULWLFLVHGWKH&KDPEHU¶VDSSURDFKLQVRIDUDVLWV LQFOXVLRQRIWKHYLHZVRI
other international bodies in its reasoning.9  
On the other hand, the applicant argued that any emerging consensus 
among European States was a relevant factor for consideration by the Court 
and that the obligations assumed under the ECN, as well as the opinions of 
other international bodies, cannot be ignored when assessing the 
proportionality of the restriction to a right under the ECHR.10 The Romanian 
government, which was granted leave to intervene before the Grand Chamber, 
took the same position.11   
This is the second case in which a respondent State raises and strongly 
REMHFWV WR DVSHFWV RI WKH &RXUW¶V SUDFWLFH RI WDNLQJ UHOHYDQW 3,/ QRUPV LQWR
account when construing the ECHR before the Grand Chamber. The first 
                                                             
7
 7ăQDVH (GC), [124]. 
8
 Ibid, [135], [137]. 
9
 Ibid, [138]. 
10
 Ibid, [145]. 
11
 Ibid, [130], [152]. 
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instance was the Demir and Baykara case in 2008, in which Turkey objected to 
the inclusion of WKH (XURSHDQ 6RFLDO &KDUWHU LQ WKH &RXUW¶V UHDVRQLQJ12 The 
*UDQG&KDPEHUUHVSRQGHGWR0ROGRYD¶VFRQFHUQVLQWKHVDPHYHLQWKDWLWKDG
responded to Turkey in Demir and Baykara. It asserted that it has consistently 
held that it must take relevant PIL norms into account, in particular those 
stemming from the Council of Europe organs, in order to interpret the ECHR 
and to establish whether or not a common European standard exists. The Grand 
Chamber in Demir and Baykara KDG DOVR VWUHVVHG WKH VHDUFK IRU µFRPPRQ
gURXQG DPRQJ WKH QRUPV LQ LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ¶13 DQG IRU µWKH FRPPRQ
LQWHUQDWLRQDO RU GRPHVWLF ODZ VWDQGDUGV RI (XURSHDQ 6WDWHV¶14 The Court is 
particularly inclined towards conceptualising its reliance upon PIL norms by 
invoking consensus. Chapters 7 and 8 demonstrated, however, that the 
European consensus idea mainly serves as a rhetorical tool for legitimising the 
&RXUW¶V MXGJPHQWV Interestingly, the Court in 7ăQDVH took a step further and 
openly proclaimed that    
[i]t is for the Court to decide which international instruments and 
reports it considers relevant and how much weight to attribute to 
them.15 
It becomes clear that the Court is not willing to identify any concrete criteria or 
guidelines with respect to its methodology. Although it is indeed upon the 
Court to ascertain questions of relevance and weight afforded to external PIL 
                                                             
12
 Infra 7.4. 
13
 Demir and Baykara v. Turkey, 12 November 2008, (Grand Chamber), [78]. 
14
 Ibid, [76]. 
15
 7ăQDVH (GC), [176]. 
265 
 
norms, it is also obliged to give reasons for its judgments and guarantee a 
transparent and legitimate legal reasoning.16    
Turning to the proportionality of the restriction to WKHDSSOLFDQW¶VULJKW
the Court ascertained the existence of a consensus among member States which 
revealed that where multiple nationalities are permitted, the holding of more 
than one nationality should not be a ground for ineligibility to sit as a member 
of the Parliament.17 Yet, a different approach could be justified where special 
historical or political considerations exist.18 However, such a different 
approach would be subject to the passage of time (the said restriction had been 
introduced since 1991) and, most importantly, to the broader context of 
0ROGRYD¶V REOLJDWLRQV DQG WKH SUDFWLFH RI LQWHUQDWLRQDO ERGLHV19 The Grand 
&KDPEHUE\ZD\RIHQGRUVLQJWKH&KDPEHU¶VUHDVRQLQJVKDUHGWKHFRQFHUQV
of the international bodies on the discriminatory impacW RI WKH 0ROGRYD¶V
Election Code and the adverse effect on effective participation of various 
SROLWLFDO IRUFHV LQ WKH GHPRFUDWLF SURFHVV ,W DOVR XQGHUOLQHG 0ROGRYD¶V
obligation pursuant to Article 17 of the ECN to provide the same rights to dual 
nationals20 and, finally, found a violation of Article 3 AP 1.  
The 6HMGLüDQG)LQFLY%RVQLDDQG+HU]HJRYLQD case21 is a similar case 
to 7ăQDVH. The applicants complained of their ineligibility to stand for election 
to the House of Peoples and the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina on their 
ground of their Roma and Jewish origin. According to the Constitution of 
                                                             
16
 According to ArtiFOH(&+5µUHDVRQVVKDOOEHJLYHQIRUWKHMXGJHPHQWRIWKH&RXUW¶ 
17
 7ăQDVH (GC), [171]-[172]. 
18
 Ibid, [119]-[135], [123]-[128], [172]. 
19
 Ibid, [176]. 
20
 Ibid, [177]. 
21
 6HMGLüDQG)LQFLY%RVQLDDQG+HU]HJRYLQD, 22 December 2009, (Grand Chamber). 
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Bosnia and Herzegovina, only individuals declaring affiliation to one of 
µFRQVWLWXHQWSHRSOHV¶FRXOGUXQLQHOHFWLRQV 
The Grand Chamber followed the same legal reasoning. It accepted that 
the pertinent provisions of the State Constitution (which were provisions of the 
Dayton Peace Agreement) could provide for a legitimate restriction to the 
DSSOLFDQWV¶ULJKWXQGHU$UWLFOH$3VHUYLQJWKHLQWHUHVWRIWhe restoration of 
peace.22 In assessing the proportionality and the necessity of the restriction, 
however, the Court took a number of factors into account. The first was the 
passage of time; many positive developments have occurred in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina since the Dayton Agreement.23 Secondly, the Court admitted that 
DQ DXWRPDWLF DQG WRWDO SURKLELWLRQ RI WKH DSSOLFDQWV¶ LQHOLJLELOLW\ WR VWDQG IRU
elections is, in principle, problematic.24 Thirdly, and importantly for the present 
purposes, the proportionality of the restriction was assessed against various 
international obligations that Bosnia and Herzegovina had voluntary 
undertaken. The ratification of a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with 
the European Union stipulated its obligation to amend the electoral legislation 
ensuring full compliance with the ECHR. The same obligation had been 
assumed by virtue of becoming a member State of the Council of Europe. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina had specifically agreed upon reviewing its legislation 
with the assistance of the Venice Commission. The Court also noted that the 
Parliamentary Assembly had repeatedly reminded the respondent State of its 
post-accession obligation and that the Venice Commission had issued a series 
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 Also infra 6.3. 
23
 6HMGLüDQG)LQFL (GC), [47]. 
24
 Ibid, [48]. 
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of detailed relevant Opinions.25 It was concluded that and the impugned 
measure was disproportionate and thus Article 3 AP 1 had been breached. In 
both 6HMGLüand 7ăQDVH cases the consideration of PIL norms in assessing the 
proportionate of the restriction to the rights under the ECHR was material.  
The last judgment that will be examined in this Chapter forms part of 
the series of cases related to the Hague convention on international 
abduction.26 Chapter 8 discussed how the Grand Chamber in Neulinger and 
Shuruk UHDIILUPHGWKH&RXUW¶VSUDFWLFHRIUHDGLQJ$UWLFOH(&+5LQ OLJKWRI
the Hague Convention.27 It was demonstrated that the Court has incorporated 
the detailed provisions of the Hague Convention concerning the return of the 
abducted child into the positive obligations of Article 8 ECHR. This involves, 
for example, standards on the diligent and expeditious return of the child 
within a short period of time, and the enforcement of the decision to return it. 
In these cases, the common scenario before the Court is that the applicant is 
the left-behind parent. There are, however, instances where the applicant is the 
parent who abducted his/her child and who claims that returning it would be in 
violation of Article 8 ECHR. This was the case in Neulinger and Shuruk. The 
applicants ± a mother who had abducted her son and her son - alleged that by 
RUGHULQJ WKH FKLOG¶V UHWXUQ WR ,VUDHO WKH )HGHUDO &RXUW RI 6ZLW]Hrland had 
breached their right to respect for their family life under Article 8 ECHR. Their 
main argument was that their circumstances fell within the ambit of Article 13 
(b) of the Hague Convention, which provides for an exception to the return. It 
reads that  
                                                             
25
 Ibid, [21]-[25], [49]. 
26
 Convention on the Civil Aspects of the International Child Abduction (concluded on 25 
October 1980; entered into force on 1 December 1983) 1343 UNTS 89 (Hague Convention). 
27
 Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland, 6 July 2010, (Grand Chamber), [131]-[132]; infra 8.8. 
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>«@WKHUHTXHVWHG6WDWHLVQRWERXQGWRRUGHUWKHUHWXUQRIWKHFKLOG
if the person, institution or other body which opposes its return 
establishes that - 
>«@ 
(b) there is a grave risk that his or her return would expose the child 
to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an 
intolerable situation.    
They further argued that returning the child to Israel would be in breach of its 
best interests and that Article 8 ECHR should be also construed in light of the 
best interests of the child - a primary consideration according to Article 3 (1) 
Convention on the Rights of the Child.28  
In previous similar cases the Court had accepted that returning the child 
FRXOG EH D UHVWULFWLRQ WR WKH SDUHQW¶V DQG FKLOG¶V ULJKW WR IDPLO\ OLIH EXW it 
always found this restriction to be proportionate and necessary. Although the 
Court applied a strict and rigorous standard of review when national authorities 
were applying the Hague Convention to the return of the child, it merely 
subjected the exceptions to its return ± like Article 13(b) - WR WKH µDUELWUDU\
GHFLVLRQ¶VWDQGDUG,WUHIXVHGWRVXEVWLWXWHWKHQDWLRQDODXWKRULWLHV¶DVVHVVPHQW
of facts and it did not engage with reviewing the interpretation and application 
of Article 13 of the Hague Convention, unless there was an arbitrary 
decision.29 In Maumousseau and Washington, for example, the Court only 
asserted in abstracto that the interpretation of Article 13 (b) of the Hague 
&RQYHQWLRQ ZDV FRPSDWLEOH ZLWK WKH FKLOG¶V EHVW LQWHUHVWV ZLWKRXW KRZHYHU, 
                                                             
28
 Convention on the Rights of the Child (adopted by UNGA Res. 44/25 (20 November 1989) 
UN Doc A/RES/44/25; entered into force on 2 September 1990) 1577 UNTS 3 (CRC). 
29
 Eskinazi and Chelouche v. Turkey (Admissibility Decision), 6 December 2005, 21-22; 
Susanne Paradis and others v. Germany (Admissibility Decision), 15 May 2003, 13.  
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examining the specific circumstances.30 This is in direct contrast to the cases 
which were examined in Chapter 8, where the Court was not at all hesitant to 
strictly review and even correct the construction of the Hague Convention as 
employed by national courts when it came to the return of the child. In terms of 
the ECHR this means that the Court did not subject the (non-) application of 
Article 13 (b) by national authorities to the guarantees of Article 8 ECHR. The 
importance of effectively preserving and applying the Hague Convention and 
LWV DLPV ZHUH DFFRUGHG VLJQLILFDQW ZHLJKW LQ WKH &RXUW¶V UHDVRQLQJ WKDW LW
perhaps, outweighed the guarantees under Article 8 ECHR.31  
 The Grand Chamber in Neulinger and Shuruk came to change this case 
law. It was made clear that the obligations under Article 8 ECHR should be 
interpreted by taking both the Hague Convention and the CRC into account. 
The Court also stressed that it must preserve the special character of the ECHR 
as an instrument of the European public order and, therefore, it should review 
whether or not the application of the Hague Convention by domestic courts 
was in compliance with Article 8 ECHR.32 It analysed the protection of the 
best interests of the child under Article 8 ECHR by relying on relevant PIL 
norms.33 $FFRUGLQJWRWKH&RXUWµDEURDGFRQVHQVXVLQFOXGLQJLQLQWHUQDWLRQDO
ODZ¶34 existed for considering this standard in every decision relating to 
children. It was highlighted that this standard was referred to in certain 
international instruments: Article 3 (1) CRC, the Declaration on the Rights of 
                                                             
30
 Maumousseau and Washington v. France, 6 December 2007, [71]; cf. Dissenting Opinion of 
Judge =XSDQþLþ MRLQHG E\ -XGJH *\XOXP\DQ -40. ( 6WKRHJHU µ,QWHUQDWLRQDO &KLOG
$EGXFWLRQDQG&KLOGUHQ¶V5LJKWV7ZR0HDQVWRWKH6DPH(QG¶Michigan JIL 511, 
521-522. 
31
 Maumousseau and Washington, [73]; cf. Dissenting Opinion of Judge Spielmann in 
Neulinger and Shuruk, 8 January 2009, 41. 
32
 Neulinger and Shuruk (GC), [132]-[133], [138], [141].  
33
 Ibid, [49]-[56], [135]-[136]. 
34
 Ibid, [135]. 
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the Child,35 Article 24 (2) of the EU Charter36 and Articles 5 (b) and 16 (d) of 
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women.37 Since none of these provisions further elaborate on the actual 
meaning of best interests the Court relied on a variety of PIL documents and 
academic authorities in order to identify tangible criteria. Among other 
material, mention was made to the Guidelines on Determining the Best 
Interests of the Child issued by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and 
General Comments 17 and 19 of the Human Rights Committee. The Court 
asserted that the child is an individual, having rights, feelings and opinions of 
WKHLU RZQ DQG WKDW WKH µEHVW LQWHUHVWV¶ UHIHUV WR WKH FKLOG¶V ZHOO-being as 
determined by its individual circumstances, such as age, level of maturity and 
experiences.38 7KH&RXUWGLGQRWQHJOHFWWRXQGHUOLQHWKDWWKHµEHVWLQWHUHVWV¶RI
the child is a concern inherent in the Hague Convention.  
Having discussed the scope of Article 8 ECHR in light of the best 
interests of the child in PIL, the Court made clear that it will scrutinise whether 
or not the conditions for the enforcement of the return of the child were in 
conformity with Article 8 ECHR and whether domestic courts examined and 
balanced the entire family situation.39 On the basis of the facts it found that the 
return of the child, either with or, all the more, without his mother, to Israel 
would expose him to a serious psychological harm (Article 13(b) Hague 
Convention). It was concluded by an overwhelming majority of sixteen to one 
                                                             
35
 Adopted by UN General Assembly Resolution 1386 (XIV), 10 December 1959. 
36
 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 7 December 2000, Official Journal of 
the European Communities, 2000/C 364/01, 18 December 2000.  
37
 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (concluded 
on 18 December 1979; entered into force on 3 September 1981) 1249 UNTS 13 (CEDAW). 
38
 Neulinger and Shuruk (GC), [49]-[56]. 
39
 Ibid, [139]-[140]. 
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that the return of the child would be a disproportionate restriction to both 
DSSOLFDQWV¶ULJKWWRIDPLO\OLIHDQGLQEUHDFKRIWKH(&+5 
Although Neulinger and Shuruk involved quite exceptional 
FLUFXPVWDQFHV WKH*UDQG&KDPEHUFKDQJHGWKH&RXUW¶VDSSURDFKDVDPDWWHU
RI SULQFLSOH VRPHWKLQJ WKDW RQO\ -XGJH =XSDQþLþ DGPLWWHG LQ KLV 'LVVHQWLQJ
2SLQLRQ,QWKH&RXUW¶VSUHYLRXVFDVHODZWKHDLPVSULRULWLHVDQGVWDQGDUGVRf 
WKH+DJXH&RQYHQWLRQVHUYHGDSULPDU\UROHLQWKH&RXUW¶VUHDVRQLQJDQGWKH
construction of Article 8 ECHR, radically upsetting the structure and priorities 
of the ECHR. The fact that Article 13 (b) of the Hague Convention is an 
H[FHSWLRQDOµHVFDSHFODXVH¶WRWKHUHWXUQRI WKHFKLOGZKLFKKDGWREHVWULFWO\
interpreted had led the Court to not review the compatibility of a decision to 
return the child against the standards of the right to a family life under Article 
8 ECHR. As the Grand Chamber stressed, the Hague Convention is, after all, 
an international instrument of a procedural nature and not a human rights treaty 
protecting individuals;40 it is rather a jurisdictional mechanism which serves 
the need to reinstate the status quo prior to the removal of the child.41 Hence, 
in Neulinger and Shuruk the Court properly applied the proportionality test 
from a human rights law perspective. Interestingly, this happened by 
interpreting Article 8 ECHR in light of other relevant PIL norms, those 
regarding the best interests of the child. As it has been already noted - 
especially in Rantsev42 - it becomes clear, once again, how the construction of 
a new relevant PIL background to the case and the inclusion of new pertinent 
PIL norms lead to different interpretative outcomes. Yet the review of the 
                                                             
40
 Ibid, [145]. 
41
 Sthoeger, (note 30), 513. 
42
 Infra 7.5. 
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application of the Hague Convention against the best interests of the child and 
Article 8 ECHR seems to be a source of unease for the Court. In many 
instances the Grand Chamber attempted to somehow affirm that its judgment 
in no way undermined the effective application of the Hague Convention.43 
This is also clear from the large number of Concurring and Separate Opinions 
attached to the judgment stressing the importance of applying the Hague 
Convention in the fight against child abduction.44 
Of interest is also that, in the particular circumstances, each set of 
relevant PIL norms (Hague convention and the PIL norms concerning the best 
interests of the child) leads to a different construction of the ECHR vis-à-vis 
PIL. More specifically, the consideration of the pertinent provisions of the 
Hague convention weakens the guarantees under Article 8 whereas the PIL 
QRUPV RQ WKH FKLOG¶V EHVW LQWHUHVWV UHLQIRUFH WKH HIIHFWLYHQHVV RI $UWLFOH 
ECHR. In this sense, the use by the Court of these two different sets of 
relevant PIL norms not only informs the construction of Article 8 ECHR but 
DOVR EDODQFHV WKH HTXLOLEULXP EHWZHHQ WKH (&+5¶V UHFHSWLYHQHVV WR 3,/ DQG
WKH(&+5¶VHIIHFWLYHQHVV 
The cases discussed in this Chapter demonstrate that the &RXUW¶V
interpretative practice of  construing the ECHR in light of PIL norms infiltrates 
every step of its legal reasoning, including the assessment of the 
proportionality of an interference to a right protected under the ECHR. The 
scrutiny of the impugned measure takes place against a series of relevant 
factors, but the reliance on PIL norms, for ascertaining whether or not the 
                                                             
43
 Neulinger and Shuruk (GC), [134], [137], [145]. 
44
 Concurring Opinion of Judge Lorenzen joined by Judge Kalaydjieva, 54; Concurring 
Opinion of Judge Cabral Barreto, 56; Concurring Opinion of Judge Malinverni, 57; Joint 
6HSDUDWH2SLQLRQRI-XGJHV-RþLHQơ6DMyDQG7VRWVRULD-62 (point 4). 
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restrictions to Article 3 AP 1 were disproportionate, serves a significant role in 
WKH&RXUW¶VUHDVRQLQJ 
The 7ăQDVHcase is the second time that the respondent State challenged 
the use of PIL before the Grand Chamber. This indicates that member States 
KDYHVWDUWHGWRGLUHFWO\TXHVWLRQWKH&RXUW¶VSUDFWLFHLQVRIDUWKHFRQGLWLRQVWKDW
have to be met for considering PIL norms when interpreting the ECHR. Yet 
7ăQDVH is in the same spirit, and follows the same methodological outline, as 
Demir and Baykara. The Court did not add much but suggests that it is not 
willing to adopt very transparent methodology.    
 The Grand Chamber in Neulinger and Shuruk paves the way to a more 
balanced approach toward the interpretative impact of the Hague Convention 
on the construction of the ECHR. The Court, for the first time, rigorously 
reviewed the proportionality of the application of the Hague Convention 
against the guarantees of the right to a family life under the ECHR by 
employing a second set of relevant PIL norms concerning the best intersts of 
the child.  
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Final Conclusions 
7KLV WKHVLV VKRZHG WKDW WKH &RXUW¶V SUDFWLFH RI LQWHUSUeting and 
applying the ECHR by taking cognisance of PIL norms penetrates every step 
of its legal reasoning. It was demonstrated that the Court employs PIL norms 
to define certain terms embodied in the text of the ECHR (Chapter 4) and to 
define certain concepts necessary for applying the Convention, for example, 
the concept of jurisdiction (Chapter 3). Chapter 7 discussed how PIL norms are 
used to enlarge the applicability of rights and freedoms under the ECHR, 
&KDSWHU  DQDO\VHG WKH (&+5¶V H[SDQVLRQ ratione materiae by reading 
detailed positive obligations into its scope and Chapter 9 examined certain 
cases in which the consideration of PIL norms qualifies as an important factor 
when assessing the proportionality of a restriction to the ECHR. Moreover, the 
Court has a considerable practice of restricting the scope of the ECHR by 
finding recourse to and taking PIL norms into account. This aspect of the 
&RXUW¶V MXULVSUXGHQFH LV QHJOHFWHG LQ WKH H[LVWLQJ OLWHUDWXUH JLYLQJ WKH
impression that PIL norms are almost always concerned with the expansion of 
the ECHR. In this regard, Chapter 5 discussed the well-known cases related to 
the rule of State immunity and Chapter 6 presented many other instances 
where the Court restricts ratione materiae the scope of the rights under the 
ECHR by relying on PIL norms.  
Therefore, this study concludes that taking PIL norms into account 
when construing the ECHR is a widely mainstreamed interpretative principle 
LQWKH&RXUW¶VUHDVRQLQJLegal reasoning, besides being a matter of technique, 
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also reflects the way in which the Court frames the relevant questions.1 This 
PHDQVWKDWWKH&RXUW¶VVW\OHRIUHDVRQLQJUHIOHFWVDQGHQKDQFHVWKHKDUPRQLRXV
placement of the ECHR within PIL. As it was argued in Chapters 1 and 2, if an 
internationaOFRXUW¶VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRILWVFRQVWLWXWLYHLQVWUXPHQWLVLQFOXVLYHRI
and receptive to the consideration of other relevant PIL norms, it alleviates 
(many of) the difficulties which arise in the context of fragmentation of PIL. 
This is evidence that, in principle, the ECtHR does not endanger the unity of 
PIL.2 Notably, the parties before the Court also frame their claims and 
arguments by using PIL norms, including the applicants (Siliadin, D.H., M.C., 
Rantsev), the NGOs which were granted leave to intervene as third parties (Al-
Skeini, Vo, D.H., Rantsev, Opuz, M.C.) or other third-party interveners such as 
the Venice Commission in the Bijelic case.   
 
1. 7KH&RXUW¶VLQWHUSUHWDWLYHSUDFWLFHWRWDNHcognisance of other PIL 
norms is an autonomous interpretative principle in its 
jurisprudence 
The main conclusion of the present thesis is that the ECtHR has 
developed an autonomous interpretative principle of taking PIL norms into 
account when interpreting the ECHR. Contrary to the views supported in 
literature, it has been demonstrated that the Court employs this interpretative 
principle in a distinct fashion to other seminal interpretative principles, namely 
the comparative interpretation, the dynamic interpretation and the principle of 
effectiveness.   
                                                             
1
 J.G. Merrills, The Development of International Law by the European Court of Human Rights 
(Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1993) 29. 
2
 Infra 1.4, 2.1. 
276 
 
7KH &RXUW¶V Sractice of invoking this principle in a regular fashion 
witnesses that interpreting the ECHR by taking cognisance of PIL is one of the 
&RXUW¶V SULRULWLHV3 Also, the fact that the principle has acquired certain 
autonomy to other principles of interpretation evidences that the Court has 
enriched and sophisticated its legal reasoning to accommodate PIL norms.  
  
a) The synergetic relation of the interpretative principles 
In many instances the Court invokes and applies all four interpretative 
principles together. The synergetic application of these principles leads to an 
expansion of the applicability and the scope ratione materiae of the rights and 
freedoms under the ECHR. This was shown in Chapters 4 (Zolotukhin) and 9 
(7ăQDVH) and in a series of cases in Chapter 7 (Opuz, Scoppola, Demir and 
Baykara, D.H., 2UãXV5DQWVHY). Chapter 8 extensively discussed many cases in 
which the Court read detailed positive obligations into the scope of the ECHR 
by invoking the need for practical and effective rights, (occasionally) the 
dynamic interpretation and the principle of taking cognisance of PIL norms 
(Öneryildiz, Opuz, M.C., Siliadin, Rantsev; Neulinger and the case-law 
concerning the Hague Abduction Convention). Therefore, the specificities of 
the ECHR ± the need for effective and practical guarantees and dynamic 
interpretation ± harmoniously coexist with and are best served by reading the 
ECHR in light of other PIL norms.     
Nonetheless, even when these four interpretative principles are applied 
as a matter of synergy, the distinctive nature and function of the interpretative 
                                                             
3
 Contra M. Forowicz, The Reception of International Law in the European Court of Human 
Rights (Oxford University Press, New York, 2010) 383. 
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principle of taking other PIL norms into account becomes clear. Firstly, the 
synergetic relationship between the interpretative principles and the weight 
accorded to each of them may evolve. This was analysed in Chapter 7 when the 
Demir and Baykara case was compared to the previous pertinent case-law.4 In 
the Demir and Baykara (judgment by the Chamber) and Wilson, National 
Union of Journalists and others cases, the Court took PIL norms into account 
in order to reinforce and confirm an interpretation of the ECHR in light of the 
specific circumstances of the applications. In contrast, the Grand Chamber, in 
the Demir and Baykara case, took the same PIL norms into account and 
expanded the scope of Article 11 ECHR as a matter of law. In all three cases, 
the Court cumulatively invoked the principle of effectiveness, the dynamic 
interpretation and the interpretation by taking PIL norms into account. Yet, in 
the Demir and Baykara case a greater weight was accoUGHG WR WKH &RXUW¶V
reliance upon PIL. 
Secondly, and most importantly, it has been shown, in many instances, 
that the Court cumulatively invokes these principles, the driving force behind 
its reasoning is, in fact, the construction of the ECHR by taking cognisance of 
PIL norms. The instrumental impact of PIL in the interpretation process and in 
the final outcome of the case resulted in the Court overruling its previous case-
law in the Zolotukhin, Opuz, Scoppola, Demir and Baykara, D.H., 2UãXV, 
Öneryildiz, M.C., Siliadin, Rantsev, Neulinger cases. 
 
 
                                                             
4
 Infra 7.4. 
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b) Distinguishing the interpretative principle of taking other PIL 
norms into account from the comparative (or consensual) 
interpretation 
One of the important findings of this study is that the interpretation of 
the ECHR by consideration of PIL norms is a separate interpretative principle 
to the comparative (or consensual interpretation). The idea of consensus, and 
LQ SDUWLFXODU WKH (XURSHDQ FRQVHQVXV LV VHPLQDO LQ WKH &RXUW¶V UHDVRQLQJ
insofar as the reliance upon PIL norms is concerned. The Grand Chamber in 
the Demir and Baykara and 7ăQDVH cases stated that the interpretation of the 
ECHR by taking PIL norms into account is based on the existence of a 
European consensus, namely common international and/or domestic law 
standards accepted by the vast majority of States. On certain occasions, this 
methodology involves the identification or the construction of an alleged 
consensus by FRQIODWLQJ PHPEHU 6WDWHV¶ SUDFWLFH DQG 3,/ QRUPV DQ HDUO\
pertinent example is the Marckx case. This is why legal scholars treat the 
&RXUW¶V SUDFWLFH RI WDNLQg PIL norms into account as an integral part of the 
comparative interpretation. Nonetheless, the interpretative principle of taking 
other PIL norms into account should not be included under the comparative 
principle, nor should it be treated as a type of European consensus.5 
The Court has moved away from defining commonly accepted 
standards as those found solely in the legislation and practice of member 
States. In Chapter 4 the analysis of the Vo and Evans cases demonstrated that 
                                                             
5
 Contra C. Ovey, R. White (eds.), Jacobs and White, The European Convention of Human 
Rights (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010) 168; .']HKWVLDURXµ'RHV&RQVHQVXV0DWWHU"
Legitimacy of European Consensus in the Case Law of the European Court of HumDQ5LJKWV¶
(2011) PL 534, 548; J. Christoffersen, Fair Balance: Proportionality, Subsidiarity and 
Primarity in the European Convention of Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden-
Boston, 2009) 59. 
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the Court separately examined the absence of a common denominator in 
national and in international standards. Hence, even in instances where 
national legislation and practice converge with PIL norms, domestic and PIL 
norms are different sources of law and enquires.6  Chapters 7 and 8 proved that 
WKHFRQVLGHUDWLRQRI3,/QRUPVVHUYHVDGHFLVLYHUROHLQWKH&RXUW¶VUHDVRQLQJ
in the absence of common legal standards in national practice (Opuz, Siliadin, 
M.C.);7 or, all the more, when member States have contrary national practice 
(M. C., Siliadin).8 Chapter 8 additionally illustrated that the Court, on the basis 
of PIL steps into fields of law where States traditionally enjoy a great margin 
of appreciation, as in the area of whether the effective protection of the 
individual can be ensured only by means of criminal sanctions (Öneryildiz, 
Opuz, M.C., Siliadin, Rantsev), in environment related cases (7DúNLQ, 
Öneryildiz, 7ăWDU) and in the immigration context (Rantsev). The Court has 
disassociated the consideration of PIL norms from national practice. It is not 
exceptional for the Court to rely on PIL norms in the absence of European 
consensus. PIL does not serve a role supplementary to the comparative 
interpretation, in establishing or strengthening or weakening the existence of 
State practice;9 rather its impact on the interpretation process is instrumental 
DQGDXWRQRPRXVWR6WDWHV¶SUDFWLFH 
0RUHRYHUWKH&RXUW¶VSUDFWLFHRI WDNLQJ3,/QRUPV LQWRFRQVLGHUDWLRQ
is distinguished from the comparative interpretation and its European 
                                                             
6
 Also, Marckx (Pl), [41]; V. v. United Kingdom, 16 December 1999 (Grand Chamber), [64], 
[73]-[77]; Mangouras v. Spain, 28 September 2010, (Grand Chamber), [59].  
7
 Also, Goodwin v United Kingdon, 11 July 2002 (Grand Chamber), [85]; Joint Dissenting 
Opinion of Judges Wildhaber, Sir Nicolas Bratza, Bonello, Louciades, Cabral Barreto, Tulkens 
and Pellonpää in Odièvre v. France, 13 February 2003 (Grand Chamber), [15]. 
8
 */HWVDV µ7KH(&+5DVD/LYLQJ ,QVWUXPHQW ,WV0HDQLQJDQG/HJLWLPDF\¶ 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2021836.  
9
 Contra F. Vanneste, General International Law before Human Rights Courts (Intersentia, 
Antwerp-Oxford-Portland, 2010) 276-277, 285 (footnote 1047).   
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consensus underpinnings, since the Court employs PIL norms which are not 
evidence of a European consensus. Chapters 4, 7 and 8 demonstrated that PIL 
QRUPV KDYH D GHWHUPLQDWLYH LPSDFW RQ WKH &RXUW¶V UHDVRQLQJ ZLWKRXW EHLQJ
European developments or confirming the existence of a common regional 
perspective.10 Rather they were related to the IACHR and the case-law of the 
IACtHR or specialised regional treaties (for example, Inter-American 
Convention concerning the violence against women) or specific international 
instruments, such as the ICC Statute (Vo, Zolotukhin, Scoppola, Opuz, D.H.). 
Since in these instances, the European nexus is weak, if existent at all,11 it is 
clear that the Court uses the European consensus as a rhetorical tool to 
legitimise the use of PIL in its judgments. The invoked consensus legitimises 
progress, giving the false and positivistic impression of the existence of 
common European standards which are to be found and not created by the 
Court.12  
 
c) Distinguishing the interpretative principle of taking other PIL 
norms into account from the principle of effectiveness 
7KH SULQFLSOH RI HIIHFWLYHQHVV DWWDLQV D FDUGLQDO SODFH LQ WKH &RXUW¶V
jurisprudence in according to the rights and freedoms under the ECHR their 
full weight and effect. Even though that principle converges with the principle 
of taking PIL norms into account in many instances, there is a considerable 
proportion of case-law in which they diverge.  
                                                             
10
 Contra /5+HOIHUµ&RQVHQVXV&RKHUHQFHDQGWKH(XURSHDQ&RQYHQWLRQRQ+XPDQ5LJKWV¶
(1993) 26 Cornell Intl LJ 133, 161. 
11
 G. Cohen-Jonathan, J.-) )ODXVV µ/D &RXU (XURSpHQQH GHV 'URLWV GH O¶ +RPPH HW 'URLW
,QWHUQDWLRQDO¶/9AFDI 765. 
12
 Christoffersen, (note 5), 62; * /HWVDV µ6WUDVERXUJ¶V ,QWHUSUHWLYH (WKLF /HVVRQV IRU DQ
,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ\HU¶EJIL 509, 529-530; Dzehtsiarou, (note 5). 
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In Chapters 5 and 6 it was shown that the Court marginalises the 
principle of effectiveness in its reasoning when the interpretation of the ECHR 
by taking PIL norms into account restricts the scope of the rights under the 
ECHR. In fact, the Court hides the tension and conflict between the principle 
of effectiveness and the principle of taking cognizance of PIL norms. The 
reference to the guarantee of practical and effective rights is made, at best, in 
passing; the Court stresses, instead, the necessity of not applying the ECHR in 
a vacuum. Conversely, in instances where the relevant PIL norms reinforce the 
effective protection of the rights and freedoms under the ECHR the Court fully 
elaborates on the necessity of applying the principle of effectiveness (for 
example, Demir and Baykara). Hence, treating the interpretative principle of 
relying on PIL norms as part and parcel of the principle of effectiveness falls 
short of explaining these cases.13 
It should be underlined that when the two principles diverge, the 
principle of effectiveness preserves the specificity of the ECHR and stresses its 
µVHOI-FRQWDLQHG¶ function, in order to ensure the most practical and effective 
rights possible. This is an isolationist approach insofar as the relationship of the 
ECHR vis-à-vis PIL is concerned. On the other hand, taking PIL norms into 
account may restrict the scope of rights and freedoms, but ensures that the 
ECHR is read consistently, to the extent possible, to other relevant PIL norms. 
This evidences that the ECtHR prioritises the need to read the ECHR by taking 
cognisance of PIL norms even if this would mean following an interpretation 
that will not accord the possible full effect to the rights under the ECHR. 
                                                             
13
 Contra Forowicz, (note 3), 12- ' 5LHWLNHU µ7KH 3ULQFLSOH RI ³(IIHFWLYHQHVV´ LQ WKH
Recent Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights: Its Different Dimensions and its 
Consistency with Public International Law ± No Need for the Concept of Sui Generis¶
79 Nordic JIL 245, 267 et seq.; Ovey, White (eds.), (note 5), 73 et seq.  
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 However, it cannot go unnoticed that in the Al-Adsani, Prince Hans-
Adams, and Bosphorus cases the Court inferred such a strong interpretative 
impact from the PIL norms on the construction of the ECHR that it effectively 
set aside the minimum, core guarantees of the ECHR. It is submitted that the 
Court should employ a more balanced application of the principle of 
effectiveness and the principle of taking PIL into account. This does not entail 
that PIL norms should not be taken into account when they restrict the scope of 
the ECHR.14 If it were to be accepted that PIL norms are pertinent only insofar 
as they expand the scope of the ECHR, fragmentation of PIL would be 
addressed and mitigated only on a selective basis. Yet, the Court itself 
proclaims that the ECHR should be read harmoniously to other PIL norms to 
the extent possible. The principle of effectiveness should serve as a limit to the 
impact inferred by PIL. In a similar way, Chapter 4 highlighted instances in 
which the Court subjected the interpretative aid of PIL norms to the specificity 
of the ECHR, as in the Siliadin and Van der Mussele cases.15 The present 
author noted in Chapter 5 that the Grand Chamber, in its recent jurisprudence 
(Cudak, Sabeh El Leil), appears to adopt a slightly different legal reasoning, 
attempting to better balance the simultaneous application of the principle of  
effectiveness and the principle of taking PIL norms into account.  
   
 
 
                                                             
14
 Contra Forowicz, (note 3), 385-387, 391. 
15
 Infra 4.4, 4.7. 
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d) Distinguishing the interpretative principle of taking other PIL 
norms into account from the dynamic interpretation 
Finally, the interpretative principle to interpret the ECHR by taking PIL 
norms into account is also distinct from the dynamic (or evolutive) 
interpretation.16 There is obviously a considerable overlap between these two 
principles and this is why many commentators subordinate the first to the 
second.17 Moreover, the dynamic interpretation, namely that the ECHR must 
be interpreted in light of the changing conditions in member States, is closely 
connected to reading the ECHR in-line with legal developments, including on 
the international level.      
The Court, in most of the cases discussed in Chapters 7 and 8, invokes 
these two principles in a synergetic fashion (cumulatively). Chapter 8, in 
particular, noted that the Court reads detailed positive obligations into the 
scope of the ECHR by invoking the need for practical and effective rights, the 
principle of taking cognisance of PIL norms and occasionally the dynamic 
interpretation. The fact that the Court does not find it necessary to refer 
explicitly to the dynamic interpretation may indicate that the principle of taking 
FRJQLVDQFH RI 3,/ QRUPV KDV DQ µRYHUZKHOPLQJ¶ HIIHFW RQ WKH G\QDPLF
interpreWDWLRQ DQG KHQFH LW LV GHHPHG VXIILFLHQW WR JURXQG WKH &RXUW¶V
reasoning.  
On the other hand, the application of the two principles can diverge. 
First, the evolutive interpretation makes reference to sources of law other than 
                                                             
16
 937]HYHOHNRVµ7KH8VHRI$UWLFOH&RIWKH9&/7LQWKH&DVH/DZRIWKH(&W+5
An Effective Anti-Fragmentation Tool or a Selective Loophole for the Reinforcement of 
+XPDQ5LJKWV7HOHRORJ\"¶010) Michigan JIL 621, 648, 659-660. 
17
 $ 0RZEUD\ µ$Q ([DPLQDWLRQ RI WKH (XURSHDQ &RXUW RI +XPDQ 5LJKWV¶ $SSURDFK WR
2YHUUXOLQJLWV3UHYLRXV&DVH/DZ¶HRLRev 179, 193-194, 197. 
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PIL, such as national law or non-legal developments. Second, the consideration 
of PIL norms may function as a limitation to the application of the dynamic 
interpretation.18 Chapters 4 and 7 discussed cases in which PIL norms were 
considered insufficient so as to pursue and ground a dynamic interpretation of 
the Convention (Vo, Evans, Champan).19 Third, the principle of taking PIL 
norms into account does not share a fundamental characteristic of the evolutive 
interpretation. It is generally accepted ± DQG WKHUH LV QRWKLQJ LQ WKH &RXUW¶V
jurisprudence to suggest otherwise ± that the changing conditions in the 
PHPEHU 6WDWHV¶ SUDFWLFH FRXOG QRW MXVWLI\ UHGXFLQJ WKH SURWHFWLYH VFRSH RI
rights under the ECHR.20 Consequently, the evolutive interpretation follows 
the higher standards, which expand the scope of the ECHR. In contrast, the 
interpretation by taking PIL norms into account may restrict the scope of rights 
(Chapters 5 and 6).21 Hence, the dynamic interpretation may lead to different 
interpretative results to the interpretation of the ECHR by taking cognisance of 
PIL norms.           
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
18
 $0RZEUD\µ7KH&UHDWLYLW\RIWKH(XURSHDQ&RXUWRI+XPDQ5LJKWV¶ (2005) 5 EHRLRev 
57, 68.  
19
 Also, Stummer v Austria, 7 July 2011, (Grand Chamber), [132].  
20
 &:DUEULFNµ³)HGHUDO´$VSHFWVRIWKH(XURSHDQ&RQYHQWLRQRQ+XPDQ5LJKWV¶
Michigan JIL 698, 716; Mowbray, (note 17); Rietiker, (note 13), 266-267; K. Dzehtsiarou, 
µ&RQVHQVXV IURP ZLWKLQ WKH 3DODFH :DOOV¶ 8&' :RUNLQJ 3DSHUV LQ /DZ &ULPLQRORJ\ DQG
Socio-Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 40/2010, 14, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1678424.  
21
 Also Mangouras (GC), [59]-[60]. 
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2. The PIL Norms that the Court uses  
An important question for this study is to ascertain what types of PIL 
norms the Court takes into account. Since this thesis did not exclude a priori 
from its scope and analysis any PIL norms, it can be assessed whether the 
Court is receptive only or mostly to a specific set of PIL norms or whether it 
places the ECHR within the totality of PIL.22 According to the distinction made 
in the Introduction, PIL norms may be part of general international law 
(customary international, general principles of law, widely ratified treaties 
which are open to all States), other treaties and non-binding material (soft-law).  
In the Fogarty, McElhinney, Al-Adsani and Cudak cases the Court took the 
customary international rule on State immunity into account. This is the only 
instance examined herein in which the Court considered and brought into play 
FXVWRPDU\LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ7KHDQDO\VLV LQ&KDSWHUXQGHUOLQHGWKH&RXUW¶V
hesitance, and certain misgivings regarding the scope of the rule on State 
immunity and its exceptions. 
In the Bosphorus case (Chapter 6) the Court took cognisance of general 
principles of international law. It is not uncommon for the Court to assert that 
general principles of international law are included in the PIL norms that ought 
to be taken into account when construing the Convention. In the Bosphorus 
case, however, no clarifications were provided regarding how the principle 
pacta sunt servanda informed the interpretation of the ECHR, besides 
KLJKOLJKWLQJ WKH LPSRUWDQFH RI ,UHODQG¶V (8 PHPEHUVKLS DQG WKH QHHG IRU
properly functioning of international organisations. The Bosphorus case has to 
be distinguished from other cases in Chapter 6 (Prince Hans-Adam, Slivenko, 
                                                             
22
 Cf. Forowicz, (note 3), v-vii; Vanneste, (note 9). 
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Waite and Kennedy, Beer and Reegan, Al-Jedda and Carson). It is submitted 
that in these cases, the Court afforded significant weight to certain PIL norms 
because they served an important function in PIL or when they reflected a 
well-established practice of States in PIL. The difference lies in the fact that in 
these instances the Court took specific PIL norms into account, whereas in 
Bosphorus the Court neither mentioned specific PIL norms nor substantiated its 
reference to general principles of international law. Equally vague is the 
&RXUW¶V UHIHUHQFH LQ WKH %DQNRYLü case to the concept of jurisdiction in PIL, 
RPLWWLQJWRUHIHUWRDVRXUFHRI3,/7KH&RXUW¶VOHJDOUHDVRQLQJZDVOLPLWHGWR
citing a series of academic authorities. Subsequently, in the Al-Skeini case, the 
Court did not identify how other international courts (including the 
International Court of Justice) had developed general international law in the 
field of extraterritorial jurisdiction. The Al-Jedda (Chapter 6) and Bijelic 
(Chapter 3) cases stand out, in that the ECtHR followed a sound and 
transparent legal reasoning when engaging with the interpretation of the UN 
Charter, UNSC Resolutions and State immunity issues respectively. On these 
occasions the Court took a position and developed PIL. Overall, the Court 
resorts to customary international law and general principles of law, when 
necessary, and determines to what extent it will inform the ECHR by way of 
interpretation. From the cases examined, it appears that in certain instances the 
Court does not feel at ease, when having to pronounce on complex or unsettled 
questions. under general international law. Although a cautious position is 
welcome, it is stressed that the ECtHR has the authority to pronounce on such 
questions and any hesitance or cautiousness should not prevent it from 
discussing the cases and analysing the underlying issues.     
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On the other hand, international treaties qualify as the most common 
source of reference in the case-law. This is in contrast to the conclusions drawn 
from the short survey of the practice of international courts and tribunals in 
Chapter 2. International courts and tribunals ± with the exception of the 
IACtHR ± do not have an extensive practice of engaging with international 
treaties other than those at issue in the cases before them. Many of the treaties 
that the Court used form part of general international law, being widely ratified 
by and open to all States. As it was emphasised throughout the thesis, the Court 
reads the external to the ECHR treaty provisions into their treaty context. In 
practice, this means that the Court takes cognisance of the interpretation of 
these treaties by (if existent) their supervisory bodies. The alignment of the 
&RXUW¶VMXULVSUXGHQFHZLWKWKHSUDFWLFHRIRWKHUVXSHUYLVRU\ERGLHVLVDIRUFHIXO
argument before the Court, but in the Al-Skeini case with respect to the issue of 
exercising jurisdiction.  
([DPSOHV IURP WKH &RXUW¶V FDVH ODZ RI VXFK WUHDWLHV LV WKH United 
Nations Charter23 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights,24 which was read in conjunction with the Human Rights Committee 
general comments25 or its views in individual communications.26 The Court 
also takes cognisance of UN treaties which have a specific subject matter, such 
as the Convention against Torture,27 the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child,28 the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination29 and the 
                                                             
23
 Infra 6.2.1, 6.5. 
24
 Infra 4.6, 5.2, 7.2. 
25
 Infra 3.3, Chapter 9. 
26
 Infra 7.3.1. 
27
 Infra 4.3, 5.2. 
28
 Infra 8.3, Chapter 9. 
29
 Infra 6.2.2. 
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Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women,30 which was 
UHDG LQ OLJKW RI WKH &RPPLWWHH¶V JHQHUDO UHFRPPHQGDWLRQV31 and its views in 
individual communications.32 Other examples of specialised treaties of a UN 
origin are the UN Palermo Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish 
Trafficking in Persons,33 the recent UN Convention on Jurisdictional 
Immunities of States34 and the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, 
Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in 
Environmental Matters.35  
From the cases examined, it can be concluded that the Court refers to 
many international treaties which form part of general international law and 
have a specific focus, but they stem from other international organisations. One 
H[DPSOHLVWKH,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DERXU2UJDQLVDWLRQDQGWKH&RXUW¶VUHIHUHQFHVWR 
a series of ILO Conventions.36 The Court placed these treaties against the 
background of the views of the ILO Committee of Experts,37 the 
recommendations of the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association38 and the 
ILO Committee on Freedom of Association.39 The Court has also an extensive 
case-law referring to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of 
International Child Abduction and its Explanatory Report.40  
The Court additionally uses international treaties that come from the 
Organisation of the American States. These are treaties of regional scope on 
                                                             
30
 Infra 7.3.1, 7.3.2., 8.3, Chapter 9. 
31
 Infra 7.3.1, 7.3.2., 8.3. 
32
 Infra 7.3.2, 8.3. 
33
 Infra 7.5, 8.7. 
34
 Infra 5.2. 
35
 Infra 8.6. 
36
 Infra 4.4, 4.5, 7.4. 
37
 Infra 4.4, 7.4. 
38
 Infra 7.4. 
39
 Infra 7.4. 
40
 Infra 8.8, Chapter 9. 
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the protection of human rights: the Inter-American Convention on Human 
Rights and the pertinent case-law of the IACtHR,41 the Inter-American 
Convention on the prevention, punishment and eradication of violence against 
women and the relevant practice of the IACmHR.42 
(XURSHDQ8QLRQ(8ODZLVDOVRHQFRXQWHUHGLVWKH&RXUW¶VMXGJPHQWV 
The Court had regard to primary EU law, namely the Schengen Agreement and 
the jurisprudence of the ECJ,43 the Stabilisation and Association agreement 
between Bosnia and Herzegovina and the EU44 and, in many instances, the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights45 and its interpretation and application by the 
ECJ.46 As far as secondary EU law is concerned, although it is binding on EU 
member States, it is not binding from a PIL perspective. The Court does not 
seem to draw a relevant distinction, since it has a widespread practice not 
distinguishing between sources of law in its case-law.47 However, it does 
acknowledge a differing impact on its construction of the ECHR on the basis of 
whether or not the States had discretion in assuming and implementing an EU 
obligation. The Court proclaims that when a State freely enters into an 
international agreement, it exercises its discretion and, therefore, it should be 
held responsible for a violation of the ECHR. On the contrary, in cases in 
which a State complies with secondary EU law (binding from the perspective 
of EU law), such as EU Regulations, it does not exercise discretion and, hence, 
the Court attempts to accommodate this to the extent possible into the 
                                                             
41
 Infra 4.2, 4.6, 7.3.1. 
42
 Infra 7.3.2, 8.3. 
43
 Infra 4.6. 
44
 Infra Chapter 9.  
45
 Infra 4.6, 7.2, 7.4, Chapter 9. 
46
 Infra 7.2. 
47
 Infra 7.3, 7.5, 8.2, 8.5. 
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construction of a right under the ECHR.48 This is an interesting finding since, 
in practice, EU secondary norms which are not binding from a PIL perspective 
(for example, Directives) seem to have a stronger impact on the interpretation 
of the ECHR to EU primary norms which are binding PIL rules (for example, 
the EU treaties).  
A variety of treaties concluded under the auspices of the CoE are 
HPSOR\HG LQ WKH &RXUW¶V OHJDO UHDVRQLQJ 7KH WKHVLV KDV H[DPLQHG FDVHV
involving the CoE Statute,49 the European Social Charter and the observations 
by the Committee of Independent Experts,50 the European Convention on 
Nationality,51 the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal 
Matters,52 the Convention on the Protection of the Environment through 
Criminal Law (Strasbourg Convention),53 the Council of Europe (CoE) 
Convention on Action against Trafficking,54 the Framework Convention on 
National Minorities and the opinions of the Advisory Committee,55 the 
European Convention on State Immunity,56 the Ovideo Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to 
the Application of Biology and Medicine and the two Additional protocol 
attached thereto and their Explanatory Reports.57 
There is a widely mainstreamed view that the CoE treaties and soft-law 
instruments, which will be discussed below, serve a prominent role in 
                                                             
48
 Infra 6.5. 
49
 Infra Chapter 9. 
50
 Infra 7.4. 
51
 Infra Chapter 9. 
52
 Infra 8.7. 
53
 Infra 8.2. 
54
 Infra 7.5, 8.5, 8.7. 
55
 Infra 7.3.1. 
56
 Infra 5.2. 
57
 Infra 4.2. 
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GHYHORSLQJWKH&RXUW¶VFDVH-law and interpreting the rights and freedoms under 
the ECHR. This view reflects the position that the Court pursues a regional 
understanding of the ECHR.58 The Court itself reasons its cases on the basis of 
a European consensus. The findings of this study, however, do not confirm this 
view. There is nothing to suggest that the references to norms stemming from 
the CoE are qualitatively or quantitatively different to other PIL norms in the 
jurisprudence. The Court places the ECHR against the background of many 
different PIL norms which originate from the UN, the ILO, the EU, the Hague 
&RQIHUHQFH RQ 3ULYDWH ,QWHUQDWLRQDO /DZ 7KH SUHVHQW DXWKRU¶V FRQFOXVLRQ
however, should be read together with two caveats. The first caveat is that the 
&RXUW¶VSUDFWLFHLVLQWHUSUHWLQJDJLYHQSURYLVLRQRIWKH(&+5LQOLJKWRIPDQ\
PIL norms without clarifying the weight accorded to every single PIL norm. 
This makes it very difficult, if not impossible, to discern whether the Court 
accords different value to PIL norms originating from the CoE. The second 
caveat is that if one were to read certain judgments in isolation, it is possible to 
say that the Court in its reasoning affords significant influence to the CoE 
treaties and soft-law. Nonetheless, many other cases may be easily found 
where other PIL norms had a significant impact on the construction of the 
ECHR.  
 The Court considers many other international treaties. From the 
international criminal law field, it has referred to the Statutes of the 
International Criminal Court59 and the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia (ICTY)60 as well as to judgments by the ICTY61 and the 
                                                             
58
 Vanneste, (note 9); Helfer, (note 10); Forowicz, (note 3), 372 et seq., 
59
 Infra 4.6, 7.2, 8.5. 
60
 Infra 7.2. 
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International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.62 Further, a series of bilateral63 
and plurilateral64 treaties were taken into account.  
 Lastly, on specific occasions, the Court included soft-law in its legal 
reasoning. Besides the EU soft-law discussed above, it gave account to the CoE 
Committee of Ministers recommendations65 and Parliamentary Assembly 
resolutions66 or recommendations.67 Also, references may be found in the UN 
Declaration on the protection against torture,68 the Universal Declaration on 
Human Rights,69 the Rio Declaration,70 the Declaration on the Rights of the 
Child,71 the ILC Draft Articles on Jurisdictional Immunities of States,72 
Reports by UN Special Rapporteurs73 or Guidelines by the UN High 
Commissioner on Refugees74 and views of expert bodies, such as the ECRI75 
and the Venice Commission.76 7KH &RXUW¶V SUDFWLFH LV LQ FRQWUDVW WR RWKHU
international courts (with the exception of the IACtHR) which do not include, 
in principle, non-binding norms in their consideration.   
                                                                                                                                                                 
61
 Infra 4.5, 5.2, 8.3, 8.4, 8.5. 
62
 Infra 5.2. 
63
 The bilateral Treaty on Legal Assistance in Civil, Family and Criminal Law matters between 
Russia and Cyprus (infra 8.7); the USA-UK Extradition Treaty (infra 6.2.1); the two bilateral 
treaties on the withdrawal of Russian troops from Latvia between Latvia and Russia (infra 6.3); 
the cooperation agreement on crime prevention between Italy and Tunisia (infra 6.3). 
64
 The Commonwealth of Independent States Convention on Legal Assistance and Legal 
Relations in Civil, Family and Criminal Matters (infra 6.3.1); the Settlement Convention on 
matters arising out of the war and the occupation, signed by the US, the UK, France and the 
Federal Republic of Germany (infra 6.3); the Dayton Peace agreement (infra 6.3, Chapter 9).  
65
 Infra 7.3.2, 8.3, 7.4, 8.4, 8.5, 8.7.  
66
 Infra 8.2, 8.6, Chapter 9. 
67
 Infra 7.5, 8.5, 8.7. 
68
 Infra 4.3. 
69
 Infra 5.2. 
70
 Infra 8.6. 
71
 Infra Chapter 9. 
72
 Infra 5.2. 
73
 Infra 8.3. 
74
 Infra Chapter 9.  
75
 Infra 7.3.1. 
76
 Infra 3.3, Chapter 9. 
293 
 
 Overall, the PIL norms that the Court takes into account come from 
different bodies of law, may be multilateral, regional, plurilateral or bilateral. 
On the basis of the analysis in Chapters 3 to 9 there is nothing to suggest that it 
can safely and a priori be determined whether a specific norm attains a greater 
ZHLJKWWKDQDQRWKHULQWKH(&W+5¶VUHDVRQLQJ$QDUJXPHQWWKDWLVRIten raised 
is that the Court favours the global multilateral treaties, or more generally 
instruments, concerning the protection of human rights, emphasising in this 
way the effectiveness of the ECHR.77 Again, many counter-examples highlight 
that the Court takes other PIL norms into account, which do not relate to 
human rights protection (including bilateral treaties); or substantially restrict 
the scope of the ECHR (Chapters 5 and 6); or that the Court attaches 
significant weight to specialised treaties concerning the protection of human 
rights, which nonetheless restrict the rights under the ECHR (Jersild case).       
        
3. The concept of relevant PIL norms 
In its jurisprudence the Court systematically refers to the relevant PIL 
norms which must be taken into consideration. Yet, it does not define or 
explain the concept of relevance. Neither the International Law Commission or 
legal commentators have addressed this issue when discussing the relevant 
rules that should be taken into account when applying Article 31 (3)(c) 
VCLT.78 Chapter 2 showed that other international courts and tribunals do not 
                                                             
77
 Helfer, (note 10), 161-162; Forowicz, (note 3), 373, 377-382, 385-387. 
78
 ,QWHUQDWLRQDO /DZ &RPPLVVLRQ µ5HSRUW RI WKH 6WXG\ *roup of the International Law 
&RPPLVVLRQ ILQDOLVHG E\ 0 .RVNHQQLHPL¶  0D\-9 June and 3 July-11 August 2006) UN 
Doc A/CN.4/L.682 (ILC Final Rep.), [410]-[480]; J. Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public 
International Law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008) 263-264. 
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elaborate on their criteria when selecting a given set of PIL norms as relevant 
for the interpretation task.  
$QLQWHUQDWLRQDOFRXUW¶VSHUFHSWLRQRIZKLFK3,/QRUPVare relevant is 
important as it indicates whether, and what extent, the court places its 
constitutive instrument against the background of PIL. Judge Higgins, in her 
Separate Opinion in the Oil Platforms case before the ICJ, suggested that, on 
the basis of Article 31 (3)(c) VCLT, any relevant PIL rules should be part of 
the context of the treaty and, hence, the type of the treaty indicates what PIL 
norms are relevant.79 This is a quite restricted perception of relevance, being 
very close to the notion of the same subject matter treaties (Article 30 VCLT), 
and therefore, leads to a smaller sphere of PIL norms which may be employed 
in the interpretation process. Interestingly, the notion of the specific context of 
a treaty appears to be crucial not only for justifying divergent interpretations of 
similar or identical rules of PIL by different international courts, as Chapter 1 
discussed in detail, but also as a concept which may delimit the degree to 
ZKLFKDQLQWHUQDWLRQDOFRXUW¶VUHDVRQLQJZLOOEHUHFHSWLYHWRother PIL norms.  
However, there is merit in the idea that the concept of relevance 
includes a greater spectrum of PIL norms, without being necessarily embedded 
within or directly related to the context of a treaty. Article 31 (3)(c) VCLT 
does not mention that relevant PIL rules should be part of the context of a 
WUHDW\ EXW WKDW WKH\ ZLOO EH WDNHQ LQWR DFFRXQW µtogether with WKH FRQWH[W¶80 
                                                             
79
 Separate Opinion of Judge Higgins in Case concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of 
Iran v. United States of America), Judgment, 6 November 2003, ICJ Rep. 2003, p. 161, [45]-
[46]. Infra 7.5. 
80
 -.ODEEHUVµ5HOXFWDQWGrundnormen: Articles 31(3)(c) and 42 of the Vienna Convention on 
WKH /DZ RI WUHDWLHV DQG WKH )UDJPHQWDWLRQ RI ,QWHUQDWLRQDO /DZ¶ LQ 0 &UDYHQ et al (eds.), 
Time, History and International Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden-Boston, 2007) 141, 
160 (footnote 102). 
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Moreover, the ICJ in the Questions of Mutual Assistance case did not rule out 
that one treaty may be relevant and have certain interpretative impact over 
another treaty, even if the two treaties not only have different subject matters, 
but also no substantial link connecting  them.81 Of course, the less relevant a 
treaty is the more limited its impact will be over the interpretation of another 
treaty. Consequently, the notion of relevance may not be static. This model is 
inclusive of norms with varying degrees of relevancy. The finding of the 
present thesis is that the ECtHR is inclined towards this model. 
The ECtHR adopts a very inclusive definition of the concept of 
relevance. It has regard to and uses in its reasoning a great variety of PIL 
norms which are not related or close to the context of the ECHR.82 Some 
examples are extradition treaties (Soering), bilateral or plurilateral treaties 
settling matters which arising of war or occupation (Prince Hans-Adam, 
Slivenko, Sisojeva cases), the European Convention on Nationality (7ăQDVH 
case) or the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters 
(Rantsev case). If a restricted view on relevance were to be adopted, it is 
doubtful that these PIL norms would qualify as relevant for the interpretation 
of the ECHR.  
Moreover, Chapters 4, 7 and 8 illustrated the difficulties arising from 
the contextual nuances between international treaties which appear to be of the 
VDPHFRQWH[W&KDSWHUGLVFXVVHGWKH&RXUW¶VFDXWLRXVQHVVZLWKUHVSHFWWRWKH
contextuality of definitions found in ILO Conventions. Chapter 7 stressed that 
                                                             
81
 Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Djibouti v France), Judgment, 
4 June 2008, ICJ Rep.  S  >@ % 6LPPD 7 .LOO µ+DUPRQLVLQJ ,QYHVWPHQW
3URWHFWLRQDQG,QWHUQDWLRQDO+XPDQ5LJKWV)LUVW6WHSVWRZDUGV$0HWKRGRORJ\¶, in C. Binder 
et al. (eds.), International Investment Law for the 21st Century (Oxford University Press, New 
York, 2009) 678, 696. 
82
 Contra Forowicz, (note 3), 372-373. 
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the right to strike attains different nuances and meanings when it stems from 
the ILO - DµODERXUODZ¶SDUDGLJP- WKH(6&ZKLFKUHDGVLQDPRUHµLQGXVWULDO
UHODWLRQV¶ FRQWH[W DQG WKH (&+5 ZKLFK LV ILUVW DQd foremost a civil and 
SROLWLFDO ULJKWV¶ WUHDW\&KDSWHUGLVFXVVHGZKHWKHU WKHSXUSRVLYHHOHPHQWRI
the definition of torture in CAT should be transposed in Article 3 ECHR, since 
CAT has a different structure and purpose to a treaty protecting human rights. 
The particularity of international criminal law and the definition of rape in the 
context of an armed conflict was a concern raised by the Court in the M.C. case 
&KDSWHU7KHµKXPDQULJKWV ODZ¶DQGµFULPLQDO ODZ¶SDUDGLJPVFRQFHUQLQJ
6WDWHV¶ UHVSRQses to human trafficking under the CoE Anti-Trafficking 
Convention and the UN Palermo Protocol were underlined in Chapter 8. These 
are some of the instances that reveal that the Court extensively engages with 
PIL norms, which are not directly related to thH(&+5¶VFRQWH[WDVDKXPDQ
rights treaty, protecting mostly rights and freedoms of a civil and political 
nature. The ECHR is interpreted by taking a great variety of relevant PIL 
norms into account, which, in principle, suggests that any danger of taking an 
isolationist or fragmented approach regarding its construction is avoided.  
Although placing the ECHR against the background of a variety of PIL 
norms alleviates the danger of fragmentation, new challenges arise. Having a 
multiplicity of PIL norms which may be qualified as relevant then raises the 
question of selectiveness;83 how will an international court choose which PIL 
norms are more relevant than others for interpreting a given treaty? Secondly, a 
model, which is inclusive of varying degrees of relevant norms, introduces 
legal uncertainty and the possibility of different treatment of similar cases. The 
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 Tzevelekos, (note 16), 676; Forowicz, (note 3), 383. 
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identification of different possible sets of relevant PIL norms may lead to 
different interpretations of the ECHR and, hence, advance a varying 
interpUHWDWLYH LPSDFW RQ WKH SURWHFWLYH VFRSH RI D SURYLVLRQ DQG 6WDWHV¶
obligations accordingly. Chapters 4 and 7 demonstrated that Article 4 ECHR, 
for example, is subject to different interpretations in light of different relevant 
PIL norms. Although Siliadin and Rantsev were both human trafficking related 
cases, the Court indicated different PIL norms as being relevant.84 In Siliadin 
the Court used the Forced or Compulsory Labour Convention and the Slavery 
and the practices similar to Slavery Convention in its interpretation. In contrast, 
the Court in Rantsev explicitly acknowledged the human trafficking aspect and 
took cognisance of PIL norms which were more recent and specific to the 
subject matter of human trafficking, like the Palermo Protocol and the Anti-
Trafficking Convention. The different relevant PIL norms not only had a 
different impact on the interpretation of Article 4 ECHR, but also resulted in 
imposing substantially different positive obligations incumbent on the 
respondent States.85 A second pertinent example of how the relevant PIL norms 
and their impact may transform the interpretation of the ECHR is the Neulinger 
case (Chapter 9). The Grand Chamber, by way of changing its previous case-
law, found that the Hague Convention on international child abduction was not 
the only one relevant for the interpretation of Article 8 ECHR. It added another 
set of relevant norms concerning the best interests of the child, hence 
transforming the interpretation of Article 8 ECHR.  
 
                                                             
84
 Cf. infra 4.5 and 7.5. 
85
 Cf. infra 8.4 and 8.8. 
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4. The concept of PIL norms applicable in the relations between the 
parties 
When the Court applies the principle of interpreting the ECHR by 
taking PIL rules into account it also refers to the condition that these rules must 
EH µDSSOLFDEOH LQ WKH UHODWLRQV EHWZHHQ WKH SDUWLHV¶ 7KLV LV UHTXLrement is 
envisaged in Article 31 (3)(c) VCLT as well. As it was analysed in Chapters 2 
DQGOHJDOVFKRODUVDQGLQWHUQDWLRQDOFRXUWVDUHGLYLGHGDVWRZKHWKHUµSDUWLHV¶
under Article 31 (3)(c) should involve only the parties to a given dispute or all 
contacting parties to the treaty under interpretation.86  
It is clear, however, that in its jurisprudence the Court adopts an 
altogether different position regarding the meaning of applicable rules. Its legal 
UHDVRQLQJUHIHUVWRWUHDWLHVµDSSOLFDEOHin the particular sphere¶87 RUµDSSOLFDEOH
in respect of the precise subject matter of the case concerned¶88 The term 
µDSSOLFDEOH¶ LV DWWDFKHG WR WKH VXEMHFW PDWWHU RI WKH FDVH UDWKHU WKDQ WR WKH
requirement that the rule has to be applicable in the relations between the 
SDUWLHV ,Q WKLV UHVSHFW WKH *UDQG &KDPEHU H[SOLFLWO\ GLVPLVVHG 7XUNH\¶V
preliminary objection in the Demir and Baykara case, that the relevant PIL 
norms should be applicable between the parties and, hence, binding on the 
respondent State. The Grand Chamber reinstated its position in the 7ăQDVH 
case. As a result, the Court does not hesitate to use treaties which are not 
binding on the respondent State either.89 This is, arguably, one the weakest 
SRLQWVRIWKH&RXUW¶VPHWKRGRORJ\VLQFHLWLQWURGXFHVOHgal uncertainty. 
 
                                                             
86
 Infra 2.3.1 and 7.4. 
87
 Demir and Baykara (GC), [69] (emphases added). 
88
 Ibid, [86] (emphases added). 
89
 Ibid, [74], [78]; Marckx (Pl), [41]; Öneryildiz (GC), [93]. 
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5. 7KHGLIIHUHQWXVHVRI3,/QRUPVLQWKH&RXUW¶VUHDVRQLQJ 
The interpretative principle of taking cognisance of other PIL norms 
KDVPDQLIROGIXQFWLRQVLQWKH&RXUW¶VMXULVSUXGHQFH,WKDVEHHQVKRZQWKDW3,/
norms are used in every step of WKH&RXUW¶VOHJDOUHDVRQLQJDQGKDYHDQXPEHU
of different functions.  
PIL norms may be employed in order to establish a contrario 
arguments. For example, the Court in its case-law previous to the Demir and 
Bayakara case used the ESC for arguing that, since the ESC was a treaty 
posterior to the ECHR and it did not include a given freedom, the ECHR could 
not be interpreted as including this freedom. Likewise, in the jurisprudence 
anterior to Scoppola, the Court concluded a contrario the non-applicability of 
the lex mitior principle to the ECHR, by comparing it to other treaties which 
explicitly prescribed it. Conversely, PIL norms may be used to draw analogies 
(Sergey Zolotukhin and Scoppola judgments).   
The Court employs PIL norms in order to ascertain the ordinary 
meaning of a term under the ECHR (Article 31 (1) VCLT). Chapter 4 
exemplified such instances, where the Court considered PIL norms, especially 
WUHDWLHVLQRUGHUWRGHILQHVSHFLILFFRQFHSWVLQWKH(&+5¶VWH[W,QOLQHZLWKWKH
discussion in Chapter 2, this forms part of an established practice of 
international courts and tribunals to identify the common use of a term by 
States in PIL.90 Such a practice establishes links and synergies between 
different treaties, enhances the adoption of consistent legal standards (as far as 
possible), and promotes coherent and harmonious international jurisprudence.  
                                                             
90
 Infra 2.3.1 and 4.7. 
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The Court finds recourse to PIL norms in order to define certain 
concepts which are necessary for applying the ECHR. The Court had recourse 
to the notion of jurisdiction under PIL for determining when a State exercises 
jurisdiction under Article 1 ECHR. Chapter 3 also discussed the question of 
how State succession impacts on the application of the ECHR and whether the 
general rule on the non-continuity of treaty obligations equally applies to 
human rights treaties.  
PIL norms provide for supportive aid in the interpretation, or reinforce 
an interpretation, of the ECHR, which was reached by other interpretative 
means or on the basis of the facts of the case (Bijelic, Wilson, National Union 
of Journalists and others, National Union of Belgian Police, the judgment in 
Demir and Baykara by the Chamber). Alternatively, they can qualify as 
weighty factors in the proportionality assessment of a restriction to a right 
under the ECHR (6HLMGLü, 7ăQDVH, Neulinger cases).  
An interesting use of PIL norms concerns the enlargement of the 
applicability of the ECHR. PIL norms establish the nexus between the rights 
and freedoms under the ECHR and other rights or interests. In these instances, 
the Court decides that the ECHR might come into play, addressing a legal or 
IDFWXDO VLWXDWLRQ RU LQWHUHVW ZKLFK GLG QRW TXDOLI\ DV D µKXPDQ ULJKWV¶ LVVXH
The relevant PIL norms that the Court uses usually stem from specialised 
treaties or bodies of law (gender-based violence, environment, human 
trafficking) and consolidate the link between the scope of the ECHR and 
another legitimate interest in PIL. This use of PIL norms is important because 
it opens the way for different bodies of law to communicate. Not only is the 
meaning and content of the rights and freedoms of the ECHR read in light of 
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developments in PIL, but also specialised treaties and bodies of law are 
connected through interpretation to the (more) general ECHR. This comes to 
confirm the view taken in Chapter 1, that the relationship of lex generalis and 
lex specialis is not static. Interestingly, in such instances, the ECHR is closer to 
being lex generalis.91 This relationship between the ECHR and other treaties or 
bodies of law is further elaborated and developed by the ECtHR and, in the 
long term, it may lead to developments in PIL. In this ways, the ECtHR 
contributes to the development and enrichment of PIL.        
An important conclusion of the present thesis is that, in the great 
majority of the cases discussed, the interpretative principle of taking 
cognisance RI 3,/ ZDV RI IXQGDPHQWDO LPSRUWDQFH LQ WKH &RXUW¶V UHDVRQLQJ
7KLVSULQFLSOHZDVWKHGULYLQJ IRUFHEHKLQGWKH&RXUW¶VUHDVRQLQJHYHQZKHQ
this principle was cumulatively invoked with other interpretative principles. 
The PIL norms were granted extraordinary weight to construing the ECHR and 
were dispositive of the cases before the Court.92 In fact, in many of the cases 
examined, the Grand Chamber departed from and overruled its previous case-
law by relying on PIL norms. The Sergey Zolotukhin, Opuz, Scoppola, Demir 
and Baykara, D.H., Neulinger cases are some examples. This finding lends 
support to the general trend in the practice of international courts and tribunals 
to duly appreciate the weight of other relevant PIL norms to their interpretation 
task (Chapter 2). Although other relevant PIL norms somehow always found 
their place in the reasoning and interpretation of international courts, it appears 
that there is a shift in this practice. International court and tribunals, and 
                                                             
91
 Infra 1.4 and Chapter 2; ILC Final Rep., [460]; $13URQWR µ³+XPDQ-5LJKWLVP´DQG WKH
'HYHORSPHQWRI*HQHUDO,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ¶LJIL 753. 
92
 Rietiker, (note 13), 271-275; Tzevelekos, (note 16); Contra Forowicz, (note 3), 385; Helfer, 
(note 10), 161.  
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especially the ECtHR, use PIL norms in order to establish the content of their 
constitutive instruments, not only to confirm it.93  
At this point, it should be admitted that, since the focus of the study is 
mostly the practice of the Grand Chamber, the possibility of encountering 
shifts in the case-law is augmented. After all, it is the Grand Chamber which, 
in principle, will decide on the route of the jurisprudence and on serious issues 
of the interpretation of the ECHR. Yet, this does not diminish the importance 
of, or alter the fact that, the role of the PIL norms was prominent in guiding 
and justifying such departures. Also, as it has been highlighted throughout the 
various Chapters, the new constructions of the ECHR and the line of reasoning 
DUH IXUWKHU PDLQVWUHDPHG LQ WKH &RXUW¶V FDVH-law. Therefore, the importance 
lies not only on the individual cases before the Grand Chamber, but also on the 
spill-RYHUHIIHFW LQ WKH&RXUW¶V MXULVSUXGHQFH7KHWhesis illustrated this point, 
to the extent possible, and within its confines, namely focusing primarily on the 
*UDQG &KDPEHU¶V SUDFWLFH ,W ZDV VWUHVVHG WKDW WKH PHWKRGRORJ\ RI WKH Al-
Adsani and Demir and Baykara cases has been widely mainstreamed in the 
case-law.94           
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
93
 Simma, Kill, (note 31), 689. 
94
 Infra 5.3 and 7.4. 
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6. The (absence of the) role of Article 31 (3)(c) VCLT in the 
jurisprudence of the Court  
$UWLFOHF9&/7LVDUDUHUHIHUHQFHLQWKH&RXUW¶VSUDFWLFH,QWKH
cases discussed, the provision has been referred to five times, in the Bankoviü, 
Al-Adsani,95 Bosphorus, Demir and Baykara and Neulinger96 cases. Despite the 
&RXUW¶VH[WHQVLYHSUDFWLFHRI WDNLQJ cognisance of PIL norms, it is clear that 
the Court does not share the enthusiasm of the ILC and international scholars 
on the use of Article 31 (3)(c) VCLT.  
Some support the view that the Court applies the provision in an 
implicit or indirect way in its case-law.97 The present author does not concur 
with this position for four reasons. First, such an assumption is a hypothetical 
exercise and, in any case, there is no reason that the Court would not explicitly 
invoke and apply the provision, if it was deemed necessary. Second, there is a 
current trend in literature to invoke Article 31 (3)(c) VCLT for every instance 
that a treaty is interpreted in light of other PIL norms, whereas there are also 
other interpretative rules envisaged in Article 31 VCLT and general 
interpretative principles to support and justify the resort to PIL.98 Third, the 
present author argued that, in most of the cases in which Article 31 (3)(c) 
VCLT was invoked, there are serious doubts as to whether it was properly 
                                                             
95
 The reference to the Al-Adsani case includes also the McElhinney and Fogarty cases, since 
WKH&RXUW¶VPHWKRGRORJ\ZDVLGHQWLFDO,WDOVRLQFOXGHVWKHCudak case insofar as the reasoning 
is the same (Chapter 5 analysed the differences).   
96
 Some of the cases concerning the Hague Convention on international child abduction refered 
WRLQ&KDSWHUVDQGLQYRNH$UWLFOHF9&/7EXWWKH*UDQG&KDPEHU¶VUHDVRQLQJLQ
Neulinger fairly represents them. 
97
 Tzevelekos, (note 16), 651; Forowicz, (note 3), 356.  
98
 I. van Damme, Treaty Interpretation by the WTO Appellate Body (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2009) 365, 375-376; R. Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2010) 265-266. 
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applied.99 Fourth, and most importantly, it has been demonstrated that the 
&RXUW¶VPHWKRGRORJ\ZKHQWDNLQJRWKHU3,/QRUPV LQWRDFFRXQWIDOOV VKRUWRI
the requirements of Article 31 (3)(c) VCLT. The Court has made it explicit that 
it is free to take cognisance of non-binding norms and that the relevant PIL 
norms do not have to be applicable in the relations between the parties. 
Additionally, the text of the Demir and Bayakara and Bosphorus judgments 
strongly indicates that Article 31 (3)(c) is an inspirational and rhetorical 
reference for the Court (the provision is placed in brackets and is mentioned 
with pertinent case-law). Even more, in light of the alternative methodological 
framework of the European consensus idea that the Court strongly proclaims, it 
is concluded that the Court does not apply Article 31 (3)(c).100 
The crucial question is whether the non-application of Article 31 (3)(c) 
qualifies as a shortcoming iQWKH&RXUW¶VLQWHUSUHWDWLYHSUDFWLFH,QYLHZRIWKH
present author, the answer is, in principle, that it does not. First, as far as 
customary international law and general principle of law is concerned, the non-
use of Article 31 (3)(c) VCLT does not seem to be material. Chapter 2 showed 
that in the practice of international courts and tribunals the duty to interpret a 
treaty by taking customary international law and general principle of law into 
DFFRXQW IRUPV SDUW RI WKH µFRPPRQ VHQVH¶ RI WKH LQWHUQDWLRQDl judge.101 
Second, Article 31 (3)(c) VCLT poses complicated problems regarding its 
interpretation.102 International courts and tribunals have different approaches 
ZLWKUHVSHFWWRWKHPHDQLQJRIµUHOHYDQW¶DQGUXOHVµDSSOLFDEOHLQWKHUHODWLRQV
                                                             
99
 Infra 6.5, 7.4. 
100
 Contra, among others, -$UDWRµ&RQVWLWXWLRQDO7UDQVIRUPDWLRQLQWKH(&W+56WUDVERXUJ¶V
([SDQVLYH 5HFRXUVH WR ([WHUQDO 5XOHV RI ,QWHUQDWLRQDO /DZ¶   Brook.J.Intl.L. 349, 
353, who thinks that the Court gives Article 31 (3)(c) an astonishingly broad construction. 
101
 ILC Final Rep., [468]. 
102
 Forowicz, (note 3), 356. 
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between the parWLHV¶ &KDSWHU  7KLV DGGV PHULW WR WKH YLHZ WKDW ZKHQ
international courts and tribunals apply the same interpretative principle, they 
do it in different ways, due to their own specificities and due to the flexibility 
of the VCLT principles themselves.103 Therefore, even if the ECtHR applied 
the provision, there would be leeway for its own interpretation of the provision. 
Third, since it has been established that the Court has a wide practice of taking 
PIL norms into account and has, in fact, qualified this practice as an 
autonomous interpretative principle in its case-law, the challenges of 
fragmentation of PIL are effectively confronted.  
Preferably, international courts and tribunals should apply the VCLT 
framework. This enhances the adoption of common (to the extent possible) 
LQWHUSUHWDWLYHSUDFWLFHVDQGDXQLILHGµYRFDEXODU\¶LQDGGUHVVLQJIUDJPHQWDWLRQ
Yet, other, similar interpretative approaches, which may not follow Articles 
31-33 VCLT strictly to the letter, cannot be a priori excluded. Besides, the 
VCLT, despite its flexibility, does not accommodate everything. By way of 
example, one of the points raised throughout this thesis was that the VCLT 
does not accommodate the development of treaties by way of interpretation by 
their supervisory bodies, which is, however, a significant challenge in the 
fragmentation of PIL context.104 The ECtHR is correct, however, in its 
approach in placing treaties within the context of their progressive 
development by their supervisory bodies. Even if such an approach may not be 
                                                             
103
 -.ODEEHUVµ9LUWXRXV,QWHUSUHWDWLRQ¶LQ0)LW]PDXULFHet al (eds.), Treaty Interpretation 
and the Vienna Convention: 30 Years On (Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden, 2010), 17, 33; D. McRae, 
µ$SSURDFKHV WR WKH ,QWHrpretation of Treaties: The European Court of Human Rights and the 
:72 $SSHOODWH %RG\¶ LQ 6 %UHLWHQPRVHU et al (eds.), Human Rights, Democracy and the 
Rule of Law (Verlag AG., Baden-Baden, 2007) 1407.  
104
 Infra 07.DPPLQJDµ)LQDO5HSRrt on the Impact of International Human 
5LJKWV/DZRQ*HQHUDO,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ¶LQ07.DPPLQJD06FKHLQLQHGVThe Impact 
of Human Rights on General International Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009) 1, 8. 
306 
 
grounded on Articles 31-33 VCLT,105 a different approach would fall short of 
grasping the fragmentation challenges, namely the evolving interpretation of 
PIL norms by different international bodies and the need to harmonise to the 
extent possible varying perceptions. 
 
7. The limits to the interpretative principle of taking cognisance of 
other relevant PIL norms  
The present study has identified areas where the interpretative principle 
to take cognisance of other relevant PIL norms finds its limits. These limits 
have been discussed throughout the thesis and some of them have already been 
mentioned in the present chapter, but they are worth a short, concise summary.  
The most obvious limit to the principle is the letter of the ECHR. The principle 
of interpreting the ECHR by taking PIL norms into account and the weight 
accorded to these norms cannot go beyond the clear textual limits of the 
Convention. The Zolotukhin and Scoppola cases (Chapters 4 and 7) are typical 
examples were the Court, by way of relying on PIL norms, employed an 
interpretation which distorted the clear language of the Convention. 
Avoiding a possible conflict between the ECHR and another PIL norm 
through interpretation is not always a feasible task. The aim of harmonising 
and reading the ECHR consistent with PIL should be pursued to the extent 
possible. This is, of course, a matter of interpretation in light of the facts of the 
individual case, but other PIL norms must not have the effect of diminishing 
the core guarantees under the ECHR, as it appears to have happened in the Al-
Adsani and Prince Hans-Adam cases (Chapter 5 and 6). Such a practice, 
                                                             
105
 But see infra 4.5 footnotes 64-66 and accompanying text. 
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besides being an inappropriate interpretation, it sets aside the applicable law 
before the Court and questions the limits of its jurisdiction.  
CoQYHUVHO\ WKH &RXUW¶V SUDFWLFH RI GUDZLQJ V\QHUJLHV DQG OLQNV
between the ECHR and PIL norms is subject to the pertinent contextual 
nuances. This is a point that has been made already from Chapter 1. Construing 
an allegedly common denominator of different PIL norms could be problematic 
QRWZLWKVWDQGLQJ WKH H[LVWHQFH RI GLIIHUHQW µSDUDGLJPV¶ IURP ZKLFK QRUPV
originate. Similar concerns were analysed with respect to the conflation of 
norms originating from the ILO and the ESC (Demir and Baykara) and the 
different variants of the concept of due diligence in the context of domestic 
violence (Opuz). It was noted that on certain of these occasions the Court 
develops PIL,106 but one should not lose sight of the importance of different 
contexts. In view of the present author, drawing the line is a matter of 
interpretation in the specific instances.   
Lastly, the interpretation of the ECHR by taking other PIL norms into 
account should not result in the incorporation of these norms under the ECHR. 
Especially in the Rantsev, and Neulinger cases (as well as the rich case-law on 
the international child abduction) the Court not only transposed very detailed 
standards in the scope of the Convention, but also, in practice, indirectly 
applied and supervising them. Such a practice also sets aside the applicable law 
before the Court and directly contravenes its jurisdiction which is limited to the 
interpretation and application of the ECHR.107    
                                                             
106
 Infra  8.3, 8.5-8.9. 
107
 Arato, (note  49), 353. 
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The aim of this thesis was to examine whether the ECtHR, as an 
example of an international court entrusted with limited ratione materiae 
jurisdiction, endangers the unity of PIL. From the cases examined, it may 
safely be said that, in principle, it does not. On the contrary the Court develops 
PIL on the whole. The fact that it has developed an autonomous interpretative 
principle in its jurisprudence evidences that mitigating the difficulties arising 
due to fragmentation of PIL, by taking cognisance of other PIL norms when 
interpreting the ECHR, is one of its priorities, even in instances in which other 
PIL norms restrict the scope of the rights of freedoms under the ECHR. The 
DQDO\VLV LOOXVWUDWHGWKDW WKHUHDUHRIFRXUVHFHUWDLQ PLVJLYLQJV LQ WKH&RXUW¶V
methodology and, on some occasions, its reasoning is not convincing or 
transparent. One should not lose sight, however, of the challenging task to 
alleviate fragmentation of PIL and that developing PIL sometimes entails a 
GHJUHH RI H[SHULPHQWDWLRQ 7KH SUHVHQW DXWKRU¶V YLHZ LV WKDW WKH &RXUW ZLOO
further improve and mainstream its interpretative practice in the future. The 
fact that, in the 2010 Interlaken Declaration by the High Level Conference on 
the Future of the European Court of Human Rights, member States explicitly 
underlined the importance of ensuring that the judges appointed to the Court 
have sufficient knowledge of PIL, will be proven crucial in this respect.108    
 
 
                                                             
108
 High Level Conference on the Future of the European Court of Human Rights, Interlaken 
Declaration, 19 February 2010, point 8 (a), available at  
http://www.eda.admin.ch/etc/medialib/downloads/edazen/topics/europa/euroc.Par.0133.File.tm
p/final_en.pdf; Guidelines of the Committee of Ministers on the Selection of Candidates for the 
Post of Judge at the European Court of Human Rights, CM (2012) 40 Addendum Final, 29 
March 2012, [27]-[28]. 
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